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In recent years there has been growing policy attention for illicit firearms markets 
in Europe. Yet, in-depth research into the scale of the problem as well as the specific 
characteristics and dynamics of these markets is lacking for most EU member 
states. This is part of larger problem where firearms and gun violence in the 
European context have traditionally received scant research attention. To illustrate 
this, in 2012 Greene and Marsh found that, between 1999 and 2009, 665 Web of 
Science articles had been written on firearms and violence. Two thirds of these arti-
cles, however, covered the situation in the United States (US), and were written pri-
marily by authors based in the US.1 In contrast, research on the situation in Europe 
continues to be rather sparse. One of the reasons for this difference is that levels of 
gun crime and gun deaths in Europe are relatively low. A recent study demonstrated 
that, in the EU, on an annual basis an average of 1,000 homicides are committed 
with a firearm.2 As such, firearms-related homicides in Europe are among the 
lowest in the world.3 In addition, large-scale illicit firearms trafficking is quite 
exceptional in the EU and the illicit firearms market is considered to be modest 
in size. 
Nevertheless, the lack of a sound understanding of illicit firearms markets in 
Europe is not only an epistemological problem. It has obvious and far-reaching 
policy implications. Specifically, it hampers attempts to develop and implement a 
comprehensive regulatory and operational approach to combat illicit firearms 
markets and terrorist access to these markets. The EU has repeatedly stated that 
building a better intelligence picture on this multifaceted security phenomenon is 
urgently needed. Recent terrorist attacks involving firearms in Europe significantly 
boosted the sense of urgency. Both at national and EU levels various legislative and 
policy initiatives have been undertaken to reinforce the fight against illicit firearms 
trafficking in general, and to prevent terrorist firearms acquisition in particular. 
Yet, due to the lack of sound research, these initiatives have often been based on a 
case-bound, partial or even completely lacking, meaningful intelligence pictures. 
A mature research community could contribute significantly to the intelligence 
picture of illicit firearms trafficking that is being developed by national law enforce-
ment agencies and Europol. Yet, a European research community focused on illicit 
firearms trafficking and gun violence in Europe is currently still germinal. In their 
extensive literature review Greene and Marsh identified two distinct research 
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communities working on firearms-related topics. These communities differ with 
regard to their research questions, methodology, means of publication and geogra-
phy. The first research community is mainly concerned with domestic gun control 
and the causality between firearms availability on the one hand and violent death 
rates and armed violence on the other hand. This community principally involves 
scholars based in the US, who publish their mainly quantitative studies in academic 
journals. The second research community covers a more diffuse range of topics, but 
mainly focuses on linkages between arms flows and armed violence. While the 
members of this second research community are frequently based in Europe, their 
research focus is traditionally not on European societies but instead on developing 
countries.4 Research on the nature of illicit firearms trafficking and gun violence in 
Europe or on the linkages between firearms availability, gun control initiatives and 
the dynamics of armed violence are generally limited. In some European countries, 
for example the United Kingdom5 (UK) or the Netherlands6, several in-depth studies 
have been undertaken since the early 2000s. But “the scanty research efforts made in 
this field by epidemiologists, criminologists and legal scholars remain fragmented, and 
suffer from the fact that there is no integrated scholarly community dealing with gun-
related issues. Language barriers, moreover, often prevent the wider dissemination of 
research results”.7 In addition to these national studies, often commissioned by 
national authorities, a number of EU-wide studies have been published in recent 
years.8 An important driver for these recent EU-wide studies has been the European 
Commission, which funded several large-scale projects studying different aspects 
of illicit firearms trafficking and gun violence. These studies, however did not focus 
on the firearms acquisition dynamics of terrorists in the EU. A recent EU study, for 
example, noted that “Little research has been conducted to determine how and why 
European terrorists access certain types of weapons”.9
Project SAFTE, an international research project funded by the European Com-
mission, has addressed this knowledge gap by improving the intelligence picture 
on illicit gun markets across the EU and throwing light on, in particular, on terrorist 
access to these markets. To map this phenomenon a group of experts on interna-
tional firearms trafficking have undertaken several in-depth studies on the charac-
teristics and dynamics of illicit firearms markets in different parts of Europe, the 
firearms acquisition patterns of different types of terrorists across the EU and the 
policy that has been developed to combat these security phenomena. In concreto, 
eight country study were conducted in Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, France, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Romania and the UK. For these country studies the different 
research teams, coordinated by the Flemish Peace Institute, used a variety of sources 
and research methodologies. Yet, given the lack of reliable and detailed official data 












mainly relied on in-depth interviews with key national actors involved in the 
combat against illicit firearms trafficking or terrorism. 
During the initial phase of the research, it became clear that the phenomena under 
consideration could not be adequately understood without a sounder understand-
ing of what happened in Europe’s wider neighbourhood. Therefore, in addition to 
the eight country studies, an assessment was made of the illicit possession and pro-
liferation of firearms in the wider EU neighbourhood in order to address the signifi-
cant nexus between the EU’s internal and external security dimensions in terms of 
illicit firearms trafficking.
Overview of the chapters
The research conducted within the framework of Project SAFTE resulted in two 
separate publications: a policy report and a comprehensive research volume. The 
policy report10 contains the systematic and comparative analysis of the main find-
ings of the different country and neighbourhood studies, whereas this research 
volume contains all eight in-depth country studies and two neighbourhood studies 
as separate chapters. This allows the reader to gain profounder and more detailed 
insight into the research findings of Project SAFTE. 
The first chapter of this book examines the illicit gun market in Belgium, a country 
often labelled as one of Europe’s hotspots for illicit firearms trade. In this chapter 
Nils Duquet and Kevin Goris argue that the illicit gun market in Belgium is largely 
driven by criminal demand, especially from drugs criminals, armed robbers and 
organized motorcycle gangs. In recent years an increase in converted blank firing 
weapons and reactivated firearms has been observed. The availability of these 
weapons eroded the traditional closed character of this market. This made it easier 
for both lower-ranking criminals and terrorists with criminal connections to 
acquire firearms. The authors warn that current heightened prioritisation of terror-
ism in Belgium has become a double-edged sword in the fight against illicit fire-
arms trafficking: while it has increased policy attention for this security phenome-
non, it has also brought about a (temporary) displacement of people and resources 
towards preventing and investigating terrorism. Duquet and Goris conclude that 
Belgian law enforcement services all too often treat terrorism and illicit firearms 
trafficking as two distinct problems. They strongly recommend better information 
sharing and the development of joint actions between and within the law enforce-
ment services that combat these interconnected security phenomena. 
In the second chapter Filip Dragović, Paul James, Krešimir Mamić and Robert Mikac 
analyse the illicit firearms market in Croatia. Despite large number of weapons 
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handed in during voluntary surrender programmes, the current illicit firearms 
market in Croatia is still largely based on the significant presence of weapons left 
over from the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, including large quantities of military-
grade firearms. A great number of these legacy weapons ended up in the hands of 
civilians. The authors note that alongside these legacy weapons, firearms have also 
entered the illicit market through illicit production and thefts. Small storage facili-
ties at police stations and lower-level military units in particular, remain prone to 
theft. Interestingly, the authors argue that, despite the widespread illegal firearms 
possession in the country, Croatia is not characterised by a very active illicit fire-
arms market because many of the illegal gun owners prefer to retain their firearms. 
They conclude that research on the Croatian illicit firearms market is still limited 
and stress the need for more cooperation between law enforcement agencies, judi-
cial bodies, the private sector and the research community to improve the current 
intelligence picture and enhance the combat against illicit firearms trafficking.
In the third chapter of this book Lina Grip demonstrates that the illicit gun market 
in Denmark is fragmented and supply-driven. Criminal gangs, both organised 
motorcycle gangs as well as less organised urban street gangs, are the main custom-
ers on the illicit firearms market in Denmark. Violent conflicts between such groups 
are responsible for most of the public shootings in the country. A majority of fire-
arms on this market are locally sourced, especially through thefts of old unregis-
tered firearms. Grip warns that shooting clubs are commonly being used by crimi-
nals to practice their shooting skills and as a target for thefts. She also stresses the 
role played by gun enthusiasts, without violent or criminal intentions, who act 
outside of the law and this way may feed the illicit market. Not surprisingly, the 
firearms used in recent terrorist attacks in Denmark were acquired through thefts. 
While Danish policy to combat illicit firearms possession has been primarily 
focused on deterring the use of firearms by criminal gangs, Grip concludes that 
more can be done to integrate firearms-specific initiatives into programmes to 
prevent violent extremism. 
In the fourth chapter Nicolas Florquin and André Desmarais present a detailed 
analysis of the characteristics of the illicit firearms market in France and the fire-
arms possessed and used by different terrorist groups in recent years. They argue 
that France has a sizeable and growing pool of illicit firearms as a result of a historic 
tolerance towards unregistered rifles and shotguns, and because of cross-border 
smuggling of firearms in recent decades. This chapter demonstrates that the fire-
arms on the French illicit market originate from a wide variety of sources and that 
terrorist groups have used a wide range of procurement methods to access firearms. 
Florquin and Desmarais demonstrate that different types of terrorist groups and 












terrorist networks have used their, mainly low-level, criminal connections to 
procure firearms, a terrorist group like ETA, for example, has instead relied heavily 
on targeted thefts. Tracing firearms often proves very difficult, but the authors 
stress the merits of doing so. The tracing of the reactivated rifles used in recent ter-
rorist attacks, for example, has been a crucial step in building momentum to politi-
cally address the problem of easy-to-reactivate weapons from Slovakia. 
The illicit firearms market in Italy and terrorist access to this market is the focus of 
the fifth chapter. Francesco Strazzari and Francesca Zampagni note that the Italian 
market has mainly been supplied with a wide variety of firearms from the Western 
Balkans since the 1990s, but that organised crime groups have also relied on fire-
arms thefts and the reactivation of firearms. The authors stress that terrorist access 
to this market is rather difficult because the supply channels are tightly controlled 
by Italian organised criminal groups, who believe that it is not in their best interest 
to sell firearms to terrorist networks. 
In the sixth chapter Monique Bruinsma and Toine Spapens provide an overview of 
the main features of the illicit firearms market in the Netherlands as well as an in-
depth analysis of terrorist access to this market and Dutch policies that have been 
developed to tackle this access. This chapter demonstrates the increased availabil-
ity and criminal use of military-grade assault rifles in the country in recent years. 
This has partly been a result of trafficking of easy-to-reactivate firearms from 
Slovakia. Not only criminals, but also terrorists have been able to access the illicit 
firearms market in the Netherlands. In recent years the Dutch police have arrested 
at least fifteen terror suspects for the illegal possession or (attempted) acquisition of 
firearms. An in-depth analysis indicates that a broad range of firearms have been 
seized in these cases and demonstrates a firearms acquisition pattern for terrorists 
in which (usually pre-existing) criminal connections are crucial. 
The seventh chapter contains the first ever in-depth study on the illicit firearms 
market in Romania. Roxana Albisteanu, Alexandru Dena and Matthew Lewis note 
that researching this topic in Romania is hindered by the lack of uniform data col-
lection and registration procedures on illicit firearms possession or use by the dif-
ferent law enforcement and other government agencies involved. Despite this 
caveat, the authors clearly demonstrate the detrimental effects of national legal 
loopholes on regional illicit firearms markets: the significant availability of easy-to-
convert blank firing firearms in Romania is directly connected to the situation in 
Bulgaria, where these weapons can be bought legally for low prices and where con-
trols can easily be bypassed. This has resulted in significant cross-border smug-
gling of these weapons into Romania where they are sold to Romanian criminals 
across the country and in various criminal contexts. While there are no known 
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recent cases of terrorist acquisition of firearms in the country, the authors warn that 
some of the firearms that are currently legally exported from Romania and EU 
member states to third countries might eventually end up on criminal markets in 
the EU, where they can be bought by local terrorists. 
In the eighth chapter Paul Holtom, Paul James and Connor Patmore analyse terror-
ist access to the illicit firearms market in the United Kingdom (UK). The authors 
demonstrate that the combination of a restrictive legislative framework for legal 
firearms possession, a proactive operational ‘investigate the gun’-approach to 
combat illicit possession and use of firearms, and the use of tough prison sentences 
as a deterrent, has had a positive influence on the illicit firearms markets in the UK. 
The firearms that circulate in the UK’s criminal underground are therefore very 
often converted blank firing weapons and antique handguns rather than more 
heavy duty variants seen elsewhere. The recent cases of terrorist possession of fire-
arms suggest that the access of jihadi and right-wing terrorists to the illicit firearms 
market is likewise quite restricted. These terrorists’ options are largely restricted to 
converted or antique firearms. They do not usually have access to the semi-auto-
matic or automatic firearms that have been used in terrorist attacks in other parts 
of the EU. The findings of this chapter, however, indicate that the situation in 
Northern Ireland differs significantly, with Republican splinter groups having 
retained a wide range of legacy weapons from the ‘Troubles’, including different 
types of military-grade firearms, and continuing to use them in politically moti-
vated attacks. 
The illicit proliferation of firearms in Northern Africa is the focus of the ninth 
chapter of this book. Francesco Strazzari and Francesca Zampagni argue that in 
recent years illicit firearms possession has increased significantly in several 
Northern African countries as a direct result of the volatile political and security 
situation in the region. In particular the fall of the Libyan dictator Qaddafi in 2011 
and the armed violence that has ravaged the country afterwards has significantly 
increased illicit arms trafficking. A vast regional black market in firearms has 
emerged which has reached various groups from the western Sahel to the Middle 
East. The authors conclude that while significant firearms trafficking from Northern 
Africa into the EU has not been detected so far, the absence of an effective and effi-
cient firearms and ammunition management system in Northern Africa increases 
the risk of firearms diversion. 
In the final chapter of this book Francesco Buscemi, Nils Duquet, Ekaterina Golovko 
and Eric Woods analyse the proliferation of firearms in conflict-affected Ukraine, 
where the number of illicitly-held firearms surpasses the number of legally held 












firearms possession, the authors demonstrate that criminal activities and the recent 
episodes of armed violence in the country have significantly exacerbated opportu-
nities for state stockpile captures and arms transfers to different non-state actors. 
While most of the firearms trafficking is currently contained within the state 
borders of Ukraine, the authors warn that there are signs that this will likely change 
when the armed conflict stabilizes and the internal demand for these weapons 
decreases.
Goals of this volume
With this edited volume we hope to achieve three main goals. The first goal is to 
generate sounder and more comprehensive empirical knowledge about illicit fire-
arms markets in Europe in general and terrorist access to these markets in particu-
lar. A good intelligence picture is crucial for the development of an effective and 
efficient policy and operational response to these security threats. Yet, such an in-
depth intelligence is picture is often lacking among national law enforcement 
agencies from many EU member states. All too often the intelligence picture these 
agencies have is case-bound, which hinders a profound understanding of the bigger 
picture and potential trends therein. 
A profound understanding of illicit firearms markets is, moreover, vital for the 
development of effective and efficient legislative and operational approaches to 
combat these markets in general, and terrorist access to these markets in particular. 
This is our second goal. In addition to an in-depth analysis of the illicit firearms 
market and terrorist access to these markets in EU member states, each book 
chapter therefore includes a detailed description of the national regulatory and 
operational framework to combat firearms trafficking and prevent firearms acqui-
sition by terrorists. This contributes to the identification of best practices with 
regard to policy and operational approaches. These country studies were in the first 
place undertaken with the deliberate aim of contributing to the policy debate and 
supporting the development of evidence-based policies to combat illicit firearms 
trafficking. 
The third goal of this volume is to contribute to the further development of a 
research community focusing on firearms-related topics in the European context. 
The Flemish Peace Institute, an independent research institute of the Flemish 
Parliament in Belgium, has been supporting this development for several years by 
undertaking and coordinating specific research projects, such as Project SAFTE, 
and organising conferences and specialised research meetings. Following its 
mission statement, the Institute wants to contribute to a more peaceful society by 
thoroughly examining and analysing topics related to the prevention of violence. 
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The country studies in this volume relied heavily on the insights of experts from 
national law enforcement agencies across the EU. In total more than one hundred 
key actors were interviewed during the research process of Project SAFTE. This 
volume demonstrates the added value of collaboration between law enforcement 
agencies and independent researchers in which the methodological skills of spe-
cialised scientific researchers can be combined with the operational information 
and expertise of law enforcement officials. We therefore advocate a more structural 
collaboration between policy-makers, law enforcement agencies and specialised 
research institutes in the area of illicit firearms trafficking and gun violence. 
With this book we hope to have provided further groundwork to reinforce the effort 
to combat illicit firearms markets in Europe and terrorist access to these markets, 
and have demonstrated the potential of using existing expertise and knowledge to 
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The illicit gun market in Belgium: 
A lethal cocktail of criminal supply 
and terrorist demand 
Nils Duquet and Kevin Goris
In recent years Belgium has often been labelled one of Europe’s hotspots for illicit 
firearms, including military-grade assault rifles. Among other things, this label is a 
result of the evidence indicating that the terrorist networks responsible for the 
Paris attacks in 2015 acquired some of their firearms in Belgium. Belgium also has 
a historical reputation as being a ’gun country’ due to, among other things, hun-
dreds of years of firearms production and related traditions, its lenient firearms leg-
islation until 2006, and numerous export and trafficking scandals involving fire-
arms. Yet, despite this reputation, very little academic or policy-oriented research 
has been undertaken on the size and dynamics of the illicit firearms market in 
Belgium in general and on terrorist access to this market in particular. 
In this chapter we will analyse the characteristics and dynamics of the illicit fire-
arms market in Belgium, with a special focus on terrorist access to this market and 
the Belgian policy that has been developed in recent years to combat this security 
phenomenon. For this analysis we used a combination of quantitative and qualita-
tive methods (see Box 1). 
This chapter on (terrorist access to) the illicit gun market in Belgium consists of 
three main sections and a conclusion. In the first section we examine Belgian 
national policy and legislation to combat the illicit firearms market in general and 
the functioning of and cooperation between the practitioners involved in this 
process in particular. In the next section we analyse the characteristics of the illicit 
firearms market in Belgium. In sub-sections we discuss the size of this market 
(section 2.1), the criminal demand for firearms in Belgium (section 2.2), the differ-
ent ways in which these firearms end up on the illicit market (section 2.3) and the 
nature of the transactions that take place on this market (section 2.4). In the third 
section we focus on terrorist access to the illicit firearms market in Belgium. We
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Box 1: Research design 
This study is based on different methods. Firstly, desk research was con-
ducted in which scientific literature, data from earlier studies, policy and leg-
islative documents, and open-source media reports were studied. Secondly, 
we collected and analysed quantitative data from several services (police 
statistics, the Belgian Central Weapons Register (CWR) and justice statistics). 
Thirdly, numerous in-depth interviews with key actors involved in combating 
(terrorist access to) the illicit firearms market were conducted (see below). 
On 18 occasions we spoke to 27 different people in total linked to various 
police services, judicial authorities, the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis 
(OCAD) and the Belgian Federal Department of Justice.
Date in 2017: Actor:
24/02 National Institute for Criminalistics and Criminology 
03/03 Public Prosecutor’s Office at the Court of Appeal, Ghent
15/03  Former head of the Weapons Division of the Federal 
 Department of Justice
22/03 DJSOC/Terro of the Federal Judiciary Police
24/03 Central Weapons Register (CWR)
28/03 Joint interview with representatives of various specialised 
 divisions of the Federal Police
05/04  DJSOC/Weapons of the Federal Judiciary Police
06/04  Weapons Division of the Federal Department of Justice
18/04  OCAD
19/04  Weapons Division of the Province of Antwerp
25/04  Joint interview with representatives of various specialised 
 divisions of the Federal Police
25/04  Federal Prosecutor’s Office
04/05  Proof House
08/05  Firearms division of a local police force
10/05  Firearms Division of the Brussels Federal Judiciary Police 
16/05  Federal Police Directorate of Police Information and ICT (DRI)
24/05  Terrorism Division of the Antwerp Federal Judiciary Police









start this section with an overview of terrorist activities and attacks in Belgium 
since the early 1980s and then move to a focus on Islamist terrorist networks 
(section 3.1), followed by an analysis of right-wing terrorist networks (section 3.2). A 
final section provides conclusions. 
1.  Belgian legislation and policies to combat  
the illicit firearms market 
The keystone of the legal framework concerning the possession, domestic trade 
and use of firearms in Belgium is the 8 June 2006 Federal Act of Regulating 
Economic and Individual Activities with Weapons (hereafter, the Weapons Act).1 
The stipulations in the Weapons Act are further shaped by various royal decrees 
and circulars. This regulatory framework is aimed at controlling the legal posses-
sion of weapons and the legal trade in weapons. The monitoring, performance and 
checking of this framework is carried out by a diverse group of government depart-
ments at various levels (federal, regional, community, provincial and local).2 
However, the regulatory framework is also an important aspect of the fight against 
the illicit firearms market. It draws a legal boundary between legal and illegal activ-
ities, thus allowing the prosecution of these illegal activities. The Federal 
Government determines the policy on illegal weapons, and police departments and 
the courts are responsible for investigations of illicit firearms possession and trade. 
In Belgium, the policy focus on firearms in general, and the illicit firearms market 
in particular, is cyclical. It is strongly driven by violent incidents that affect public 
opinion, which hinders attempts to structurally put pressure on the illicit firearms 
market. In this section of the report we will describe the most important features 
and evolutions of the federal policy for combating the illegal weapons market in 
Belgium since 2006. 
1.1  The Weapons Act of 2006 
In 2006 firearms legislation in Belgium was tightened in the aftermath of a fatal 
shooting in Antwerp in May that year. In this incident a young man fatally shot two 
women and a toddler with a shotgun that he had legally purchased earlier that day 
upon showing his identity card. This incident caused considerable uproar in 
Belgian politics. Although the process of replacing the previous Weapons Act of 
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1993 had already been started in 2001I and had been included in the federal coali-
tion agreement of 2003,3 the shooting incident accelerated the debate. As a result 
the blueprint of the new Weapons Act was rapidly approved by Parliament and 
implemented almost immediately. 
The Weapons Act of 2006 is considerably stricter than its predecessor. Firearms 
that previously had been freely obtainable, such as certain types of shotguns and 
sports weapons, became subject to licensing. The 2006 Act introduced three cate-
gories of firearms: (1) prohibited firearms (e.g. assault rifles); (2) firearms for which 
no licence was required (e.g. deactivated weapons and alarm pistols); and (3) fire-
arms for which licences were needed (all firearms not belonging to one of the other 
two categories).4 A prior licence is required for the acquisition and possession of all 
weapons in the third category.II To obtain a licence, the applicant must meet several 
criteria. These comprise having reached the age of 18 years, being declared medi-
cally fit to handle a weapon, and passing a theoretical and practical test. Also, the 
local police conduct a background check to exclude citizens with a criminal record 
that includes certain offences (e.g. infractions of the Weapons Act) or who suffer(ed) 
from a mental disorder. Together with this, the mandatory criterion of a ‘good 
cause’ was introduced.5 This refers to a list of six activities that are eligible for 
weapons possession: hunting and fauna-control activities; sports and recreational 
shooting; the performance of a high-risk profession; self-defence; collecting his-
torical weapons; and participating in historical, folklore, cultural or scientific activ-
ities.III It is important to point out is that the ‘good causes’ of self-defence and a high-
risk profession are interpreted very restrictively, which means that very few people 
in Belgium actually qualify for these good causes and are allowed to possess fire-
arms for these reasons.6 The Weapons Act also imposes several strict safe storage 
and transportation requirements.7 When a weapons possessor no longer meets the 
legal criteria, his/her licence can be suspended or withdrawn.8 
The tightening of the Weapons Act was in line with European Directive 91/477/EEC 
of the Council of the European Union (EU) of 18 June 1991 dealing with control of the 
acquisition and possession of weapons. Besides the harmonisation of the firearms 
legislation with international legislation, the objectives of the new Weapons Act 
I The cabinet had already approved a preliminary draft of the new Weapons Act in 2001. This pre-
liminary draft was submitted to Parliament in 2002. 
II The Weapons Act makes provision for a more lenient regime for certified hunters and sports 
shooters. In some instances they can acquire and own certain weapons without a prior licence 
for every individual firearm.
III There is also the possibility of so-called ‘passive weapons possession’ for three specific groups: 
heirs, hunters or sports shooters who cease their activities, and – until the end of October 2008 
– people who legally owned weapons prior to the new and stricter 2006 legislation. These groups 








were the safeguarding of society by improving the registration and traceability of 
firearms, the centralisation of powers in the person of the minister of justice, a 
guarantee of uniformity in the issuing of licences – by transferring this power from 
local police areas to provincial governments – and the improved monitoring of pro-
fessional firearms dealers. All weapons owners were obliged to comply with the 
new legislation and register their weapons. In addition, as a means of reducing the 
level of weapons ownership, an amnesty period (until October 2008) was organised 
during which more than 200,000 firearms were handed in.9 
1.2  Increased policy focus on the illicit firearms market 
since 2010
With the tightening of the Weapons Act in 2006, political focus on the firearms 
issue in Belgium in the period 2006-2010 related mainly to the control of the illegal 
possession of weapons. This is shown by the fact that illicit firearms trafficking was 
not considered to be a priority security issue in the National Security Plan 2008-
2011.10 At the beginning of 2010 the issue of illicit firearms trafficking became a hot 
topic on the political agenda. In the following years a strong increase in political 
attention to the illicit firearms market can be observed, often motivated by inci-
dents of gun violence.
In early 2010 the precarious security situation in Brussels, the presence of military-
grade assault rifles in the criminal sphere and the increasing use of these weapons 
raised concerns on several occasions. In January 2010 a policeman was seriously 
injured in the centre of Brussels in a shooting incident in which a Kalashnikov-type 
assault rifle was used after a failed robbery. In its aftermath, around seven hundred 
policemen took to the streets to protest, among other things, ‘the increasing number 
of cases of extreme violence used against police officers, with disproportionately 
violent means being employed, such as weapons of war of the Kalashnikov type’.11 
The initial policy response was mainly aimed at controlling the illicit firearms 
market in Brussels and improving European cooperation to deal with this phenom-
enon. The focus here was on the availability of military-grade assault rifles in the 
criminal sphere. The Federal Government responded by means of an eight-point 
programme to deal with security in Brussels. This plan contained a proposal to step 
up the fight against illicit weapons trafficking, including through improved tracing 
of seized firearms and better information exchange.12 Besides this, a weapons task 
force was set up within the police consisting of eight detectives from the federal and 
local Brussels police forces to focus on the fight against illicit firearms trafficking in 
the context of organised crime in the judicial district of Brussels. The Federal 
Government also made use of its presidency of the EU in the second half of 2010 to 
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raise the issue of the availability of military-grade assault rifles at the European 
level,13 and in December 2010 the EU announced its Action Plan to combat illegal 
trafficking in so-called ‘heavy’ firearms destined for the criminal market. 
Despite these steps, the combating of illicit firearms trafficking in Belgium did not 
become a real national policy priority until a deadly shooting took place at the 
Christmas market in Liège on 13 December 2011. The perpetrator of this shooting 
used an illegally obtained firearms to kill five people and injure 123 others.14 This 
incident caused a great deal of public concern about the availability of illegal fire-
arms in the country. In the months that followed various measures were announced 
aimed at better combating illicit firearms trafficking. In effect, the policy comprised 
three instruments: the Weapons Action Plan of 2012, the National Security Plan 
2012-2015 and circular COL 14/2012. Each of these documents concentrated on a 
different aspect of the fight against illicit firearms trafficking, comprising respec-
tively a legislative, operational and judicial approach. 
The Weapons Action Plan of March 2012 was clearly focused on the tightening of 
the legislative framework dealing with the illegal possession of weapons and the 
optimisation of relevant procedures. Announced measures included, among other 
things, the establishment of a new committee to coordinate the fight against fire-
arms trafficking and the abolition of the list of freely obtainable firearms.I15 More 
operational objectives were addressed in the National Security Plan 2012-2015. In 
this document firearms trafficking was labelled a priority criminal area of focus for 
the police. More specifically, ‘a priority approach of a judicial nature was intended, 
supported by a sound intelligence picture and described in a (future) directive from 
the judicial authorities, with a special focus on the proactive criminal investigation 
department’.16 The focus here was on the detection of illicitly held firearms, the 
seizing of as many illicitly held firearms as possible, and the improvement of the 
intelligence picture of the phenomena of illicit firearms trafficking and the use of 
‘heavy firearms’ for criminal activities.17 Confidential circular COL 14/2012, issued 
in October 2012 by the minister of justice and the Board of Public Prosecutors at the 
Courts of Appeal, formulated the judicial approach to illicit firearms trafficking.18 
I European Directive 91/477/EEC allows antique weapons to be exempt from licensing and regis-
tration requirements. In the royal decree of 20 September 1991 concerning firearms of historical, 
folklore or decorative value and deactivated weapons, a number of general criteria were establis-
hed (such as using black powder and the date of manufacture) that weapons had to meet in order 
to be freely obtainable in Belgium under these rules. In addition, a list was added to this decree 
as an appendix in which a series of models of firearms that were considered to be freely obtai-
nable were included. This list was extended in 1995 and 2007. This extended list had already been 
much criticised, on the one hand because its scope was too wide and it allowed private indivi-
duals to buy usable firearms without a lawful reason, and on the other because the Belgian list 
was much more extensive than those of neighbouring countries, which would encourage weapons 
tourism to the country (Duquet, N. & Van Alstein, M. (2011), Vuurwapens: handel, bezit en gebruik, 








This document sets out a number of priorities for this approach and also contains 
several measures aimed at improving the operational and tactical intelligence 
picture, improving information sharing between the various police forces and the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office, and a better division of roles and responsibilities in the 
fight against illicit firearms trafficking. 
1.3  New measures in the aftermath of terrorist incidents 
since 2015
Combating illicit firearms trafficking has once again featured prominently in the 
Belgian political debate since early 2015. The background to this was the terror 
attacks in Paris in January and November 2015 and the associated media reports 
stating that the perpetrators of these attacks had bought some of their weapons on 
the Belgian illicit weapons market, the lethal gunfight between members of the 
Belgian law enforcement services and terrorists in Verviers in January 2015, and the 
failed terror attack on the Thalys train between Brussels and Paris in August 2015 
(see below). In the aftermath of these events various measures were therefore 
announced and adopted within the wider context of combating terrorism. 
For example, in the context of supplementary measures to counter terrorism, the 
Federal Government submitted a bill to Parliament that enabled the use of tele-
phone tapping to detect infractions of the weapons regulations.I The Federal 
Parliament adopted this bill on 27 April 2016.19 Moreover, new initiatives were taken 
to improve information exchange and expertise among the various departments 
involved. In October 2015, for example, an inter-federal advisory committee on 
illicit firearms trafficking was set up.20 Almost simultaneously a working group of 
police weapons experts was set up consisting of representatives of the federal and 
local police. Furthermore, the fight against illicit weapons trading is addressed 
prominently as one of the priorities in the most recent security policy plans, with 
improving the intelligence picture of the illicit weapons trade as an important focal 
point.21 Also in the federal action plan against radicalism, violent extremism and 
terrorism in the Brussels canal area (the so-called ‘Kanaalplan’), launched by the 
minister of the interior after the November 2015 Paris attacks, explicit attention was 
given to a more vigorous approach to illicit firearms trafficking. Together with 
other illegal economic activities, such as drug trafficking and the forging of identity 
documents, this is considered to be a phenomenon that supports terrorist activi-
ties.22 This plan has resulted in the allocation of additional detectives to the 
I Violations of the Weapons Act of 2006, the federal law of 1991, and the regional decrees of 2012 
and 2013 concerning foreign arms dealing.
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firearms trafficking division of the Brussels Federal Police. Also, several projects 
have been set up to enhance the intelligence picture of this market in the Brussels 
canal area. One of these projects involves sensitising local police forces to focus 
greater attention on the source of illicit firearms. To this end, an interrogation tem-
plate has been developed with a series of specific questions dealing with how a 
suspect acquired his/her weapon. Furthermore, all seized firearms and ammuni-
tion in the area will in principle be subjected to analysis by a ballistics expert.23
1.4  Combating (terrorist access to) the illicit firearms 
market in Belgium 
The discussion above makes clear that the policy focus on tackling illicit firearms 
market in Belgium is increasing, even though it is largely driven by events. Recently, 
preventing terrorists from gaining access to this market has also become a specific 
policy priority. In this section we give a brief overview of the main actors charged 
with these responsibilities, as well as the challenges they face on the ground.
Although customs servicesI also play a role, the police are the key player in detect-
ing firearms infractions. Belgium has one integrated police service, structured at 
two levels: the local and the federal. Local police forces are responsible for basic 
police tasks within the borders of one or more municipalities.24 Among others, 
these tasks comprise traffic control, emergency interventions, keeping track of rad-
icalising or radicalised inhabitants, and investigating local crimes. In many cases 
local police officers are the first to record a firearms infraction. In such cases, they 
seize the illicitly held, used or trafficked firearms and ammunition, after which 
these firearms become pieces of evidence that are deposited at the clerk’s office. 
During the investigations firearms and ammunition can be subjected to a ballistics 
analysis by the National Institute for Criminalistics and Criminology or a private 
expert. In principle, seized firearms should be destroyed by the national Proof 
House in Liège. In every link of this chain, data on seized firearms’ characteristics 
and status need to be registered in the CWR and other official databases. 
The Federal Police deal with nationwide specialised and supra-local investigations 
and support.25 With regard to its judicial tasks, the force comprises both central and 
I Customs services also deal with illicit firearms. This can occur both during controls of the coun-
try’s external (European) borders and during domestic fiscal controls. The vast majority of arms 
seized by customs are prohibited weapons other than firearms (e.g. flick knives, pepper spray, 
etc.). When weapons-related violations are detected, they are referred to the Public Prosecutor’s 
office (Sarrazyn, J. (2017), ‘De rol van de douane bij de controle van de in- en uitvoer van wapens, 
met bijzondere aandacht voor de strijd tegen illegale wapens’, presentatie op de studiedag ‘Ille-








decentralised services. Fourteen decentralised judicial police forces conduct spe-
cialised criminal investigations into complex phenomena like illicit firearms traf-
ficking and terrorism.I However, many of these judicial police forces have no spe-
cialised illicit firearms trafficking division. Mostly, this is dealt with by more generic 
divisions combating all kinds of violent or goods-related crimes.26 The Brussels 
Judicial Federal Police are an important exception. This police force contains a 
gradually expanding investigative division dedicated specifically to combating 
illicit firearms trafficking since the eight-point programme launched after the 2010 
shooting incidents in Brussels.27 In principle, detectives from this division should 
be informed of all illegal firearms seizures by local Brussels police forces and their 
federal colleagues working on other phenomena.28 At the central level, the Federal 
Police have a specific national department that specialises in illicit firearms and 
their trafficking known as DJSOC/Weapons. Its function is to provide support, 
coordination, and expertise to both local police and decentralised federal police 
forces (e.g. during a weapons-related house search or seizure).29 
The Public Prosecutor’s Office takes the lead in and is responsible for criminal 
investigations conducted by the police.II It assigns police officers and judicial 
experts (e.g. ballistics specialists) to carry out investigations. The 14 local public 
prosecutors are responsible for the criminal and prosecution policy in their judicial 
districts. The illicit firearms trade has not been given top priority for a considerable 
time, but circular COL 14/2012 was aimed at changing this situation. Since then, 
every local public prosecutor’s office is required to appoint a specific magistrate 
functioning as a point of reference for weapons-related infractions.30 One of the 
main reasons behind this was to encourage and better streamline inquiries into the 
illicit firearms problem.31 Apart from this, Belgium also has a Federal Public 
Prosecutor’s Office, which has nationwide responsibilities for dealing with geo-
graphically spread and complex phenomena. Among other crimes, this office takes 
a leading role in terrorism investigations. Also with regard to illicit firearms traf-
ficking, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office was assigned a key role in the 2012 circular. 
It not only directs the most complex and serious investigations, but also has an 
important coordinating and sensitising function. To this end it developed an action 
plan on illicit firearms that has prompted some noteworthy positive initiatives. For 
example, the federal public prosecutor organises regular joint meetings with the 
police and local weapons reference magistrates to determine priorities, foster infor-
mation sharing, detect and resolve bottlenecks, and promote (cooperation in) inves-
tigative work.32
I For terrorism investigations, five of the 14 decentralised federal police forces serve as reference 
units (Antwerp, Brussels, Charleroi, East Flanders and Liège).
II Or, when the most far-reaching intrusions in the suspects’ private lives are in order (e.g. tempo-
rary custody), under the supervision of an investigative judge.
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In spite of such positive developments and the increased policy attention paid to 
upgrading the fight against illicit firearms trafficking in the last decade, many of 
the interviews held for this research reveal that this issue’s high priority status is 
often not accompanied by concrete actions and progress on the ground. The main 
reasons for this are limited resources, a lack of coordination with and action at the 
operational level to achieve the planned objectives, and the presence of an extended 
series of other (competing) prioritised phenomena.33 
More concretely, one of the most important challenges remains the prioritising of 
and investment in illicit firearms investigations. This starts at the local level, where 
often rather limited attention is given to detecting the networks behind seized illicit 
firearms.34 When police are interrogating a suspect about a crime committed with 
an illicitly held firearm, little attention is often paid to where, how and from whom 
this firearm was acquired. Assigning the case to a more specialised (federal) police 
service could be a solution to this problem. However, in practice this does not occur 
systematically. Many police forces and public prosecutors seem to focus on solving 
major crimes (e.g. murders or robberies committed with firearms). Uncovering the 
routes and networks behind the acquisition of the weapons that were used in such 
crimes is often treated as a secondary task. Since resources and personnel are 
scarce, this is explained by the complexity and lengthy duration of such additional 
investigations, which require vast investments of time and resources with often-
uncertain outcomes.35 
Such problems are not confined to the local level. The fact that most decentralised 
Federal Police entities do not have a specific investigative division dedicated to 
illicit firearms trafficking also tends to reduce the investment in this highly complex 
and concealed phenomenon.36 Furthermore, the number of firearms experts and 
analysts working in DJSOC/Weapons has been diminishing in the last few of years. 
As a consequence, a great deal of knowledge and experience have also disappeared. 
At the expense of more strategic analyses and intelligence exercises, DJSOC/
Weapons’ main focus today is on providing technical support on the ground.37 The 
current heightened attention to terrorism furthers these regrettable developments 
within both local and federal police forces. There seems to be a displacement of 
resources and personnel to the surveillance, detection and investigation of terrorist 
threats at the expense of other non-terrorist infractions like drug trafficking, 
human trafficking, cybercrime and illicit firearms trafficking. Open sources indi-
cate that many Belgian security services have been increasingly struggling with 
this problem since the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks.38
Another important challenge in Belgium remains information gathering and sharing. 








overview of illicit firearms trafficking, in practice not much progress can be noted 
in this regard. As the discussion of the official figures in the next section will make 
clear, firearms-related registrations are characterised by several reliability and 
validity issues, rendering the official data that are available of only limited value for 
developing a reliable image of the illicit firearms market, the milieus and actors 
involved, and the crimes committed with firearms. Secondly, cooperation and 
information sharing among the national services involved – both bottom-up (e.g. 
from local police officers recording a firearms-related infraction to the specialised 
federal detectives investigating illicit firearms trafficking) and horizontally (e.g. 
from specialised drug investigators to firearms investigators) – are still insuffi-
ciently systematic.39 Specifically, cooperation and information sharing between ser-
vices working on terrorism and those involved in investigating firearms trafficking 
also remain limited. Although the illicit firearms crime-terror nexus has been 
observed in several recent terrorist incidents in and around Belgium, it seems that 
there is still little cooperation between police investigators and analysts working on 
these phenomena on the ground. In other words, terrorism and the illicit firearms 
market are chiefly treated as two distinct problems by separate police divisions with 
only a few linkages between them. Also, within other crucial actors invested in the 
fight against terrorism – like the national OCAD or the civil and military intelli-
gence services – there is still room for improvement in terms of the level of atten-
tion focused on the link between terrorism and illicit firearms markets.40
Internationally, cooperation mainly occurs on the operational level.41 Information 
is shared in specific cases42 and through Europol’s focal point.43 Also, joint investiga-
tions are set up with foreign law enforcement agencies (e.g. from the Netherlands), 
while the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office has established multiple special coop-
eration agreements with several other nations (e.g. Albania, Serbia and Romania).44 
Yet strategic forms of cooperation and information sharing that would allow more 
proactive intelligence gathering and actions still remain rather limited.45 
2.  Characteristics of the illicit firearms market  
in Belgium
The previous section showed that combating the illicit firearms market is defined as 
a priority in recent security policy plans in Belgium, with, among other things, 
improving the intelligence picture of this market as a specific area of focus for law 
enforcement agencies. Nonetheless, due to several problems with the reliability and 
validity of the available data, the official statistics these agencies collect are currently 
still of little value in attempts to gain in-depth insight into the characteristics and 
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dynamics of the Belgian illicit firearms market. In this section we first briefly illus-
trate the weaknesses of official quantitative data by attempting to estimate the size 
of the illicit firearms market. In the following sections we discuss the findings of 
our qualitative research with regard to the criminal demand, sources and dynamics 
of this market.
2.1 Size of the illicit firearms market 
In the last few years the international press has repeatedly pointed to Belgium as 
one of the most important European hubs for illegal firearms.46 The immediate 
cause of this phenomenon was the evidence that the perpetrators of the Paris ter-
rorist attacks of January and November 2015 acquired at least some of their weapons 
in Belgium. Therefore, the first important matter to address is the estimated size of 
the illicit firearms market in Belgium. According to frequently cited numbers in the 
national media, between 1.5 and 2 million firearms are in circulation – both legally 
and illegally – in the country. These figures were also used in the Belgian govern-
ment’s communication on the occasion of the adoption of the new federal Weapons 
Act in 2006.47 Since at that time about 870,000 legal firearms were recorded in the 
CWR – the national database for monitoring licit firearms possession – this implies 
an estimate of around 630,000 to 1.1 million illegal firearms in 2006.48 To date, 
however, it remains unclear on which sources this figure of 1.5-2 million was based. 
In reality, the size of the illicit firearms market is not known in Belgium. Estimating 
the size of this market is highly problematic. The official numbers are, of course, 
marked by well-known limitations characteristic of all official crime statistics. Due 
to the clandestine nature of the problem, there will always be a significant ‘dark 
number’ of illicitly-held firearms. Furthermore, official figures reflect the actions 
and priorities of law enforcement agencies rather than the actual extent of the phe-
nomenon.49 Also, earlier research has unveiled many additional and specific short-
comings of official data on the illicit firearms market. In summary, due to the poor 
registration of seized firearms, extrapolations based on the official statistics of law 
enforcement agencies are currently not possible in Belgium. For many years the 
development of a better intelligence picture of the illicit firearms market was not 
considered a national priority. In addition, in many police investigations that 
involve firearms – for example, murder, drug-related or armed robbery investiga-
tions – little attention is given to how the perpetrators acquired the firearm(s) that 
they used. Furthermore, many problems were highlighted regarding the complete-
ness and quality of the recording of firearms on the ground, which were often the 
result of the lack of firearms expertise of the police officers involved. In addition, 








generally not designed to be used for analytical purposes.50 The lack of reliable 
quantitative data thus renders it impossible to credibly and more accurately esti-
mate the number of illicitly held firearms in Belgium. In addition, this situation 
does not allow the country to comply with international reporting expectations 
such as UN Sustainable Development Goal 16.4.I 
Figure 1: Comparison of selected official data on illicit firearms, 2011-2015 
To illustrate the problematic nature of the official statistics on the illicit firearms 
market in Belgium, we can compare some of the data registered by several actors in 
the judicial chain (see Figure 1). In this figure, the dark blue bars on the left repre-
sent the annual number of police recordings of illicit firearms possession. Belgian 
police services recorded almost 27,500 cases of illicit firearms possession between 
2011 and 2015. Given that each recorded case refers to at least one illicitly held 
firearm, this implies that the police deal with at least about 5,500 illicitly held fire-
arms per year. This number is clearly an underestimation, while research shows 
that not all firearms infractions are registered as such by the police. This is 
I Which is designed to ‘by 2030 significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows, strengthen 
recovery and return of stolen assets, and combat all forms of organized crime’ (UN General 
Assembly Resolution 70/1 of 25 September 2015, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for 
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especially the case when they are detected in relation to another – deemed principal 
– crime (e.g. a drug deal).51 
In theory, the police have seized every recorded illicitly held firearm. Police officers 
are then obliged to register all these seizures in the CWR. The annual number of 
registered seized firearms in this database is represented by the lighter blue bars in 
the middle of the three-bar groupings in Figure 1. In comparison to the average 
minimum of 5,500 seized guns per year, which would be expected on the basis of 
police recordings of illicit firearms possession, on average fewer than 1,780 seizures 
were registered in the CWR between 2011 and 2015. This implies that, notwithstand-
ing the obligation of police officers to do so, not all seized firearms are actually being 
recorded in the CWR. This observation is further supported by the light purple bars 
on the right of the three-bar groupings in Figure 1, which reflect the number of fire-
arms deposited at clerk’s offices after seizure so they can serve as evidence in crimi-
nal courts. Again, major discrepancies can be observed in comparison to the other 
available data. According to these numbers, annually an average of 10,876 seized 
firearms were deposited at the various clerk’s offices between 2011 and 2015, which 
is more than six times higher than the seized firearms registered in the CWR. 
In conclusion, although the numbers in Figure 1 do not refer to the same entities, 
their cursory comparison illustrates the flaws in official statistics on the illicit fire-
arms market in Belgium. They are therefore of little value to any attempts to gain 
insight into this market’s size and characteristics. 
2.2 Criminal demand for firearms 
Criminals are generally considered the most important drivers of European illicit 
firearms markets. In Belgium too the demand for illegal firearms is strongly linked 
to various kinds of criminal activities. The underlying motives for criminals’ desire 
to obtain weapons are generally instrumental and defensive by nature.52 Besides 
this, the status that accords with the possession of guns also plays a role in the 
minds of some criminals. Owning a gun is a status symbol in the criminal world. 
The possession of top-brand firearms or weapons of war in particular elevates 
status, because it implies that the owner is engaged in serious criminal activities 
and, furthermore, has connections with an extensive network that is able to supply 
such weapons. 
The demand for firearms in Belgium comes from various spheres of the criminal 
underworld, such as armed robbers, drug traffickers and drug dealers, thieves, 








the world of outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMGs). Yet the demand from these diverse 
criminal environments is not identical: different types of criminals are character-
ised by different patterns of weapons possession and acquisition in Belgium. In the 
following sections we will go deeper into the possession and use of firearms in the 
three most important gun-related criminal environments in Belgium: the drug 
milieu (section 2.2.1), the environment of armed robbers and street gangs (section 
2.2.2) and the world of OMGs (section 2.2.3). 
2.2.1 Illicit firearms possession and use in the drug milieu 
Belgium is generally considered to be one of the most important manufacturing 
countries of cannabis, amphetamine and ecstasy in Europe. Relatively large 
numbers of people in Belgium are involved in cannabis cultivation. A significant 
part of this cannabis production takes place in the criminal milieu and is destined 
for Dutch coffee shops.53 Also with regard to the production of synthetic drugs such 
as amphetamines and ecstasy, intensive cross-border connections exist between 
the Belgian and Dutch criminal drug environments.54 In addition, due to its central 
location and the presence of a major seaport in Antwerp, Belgium is also one of the 
most important European entry points for the trafficking of hard drugs such as 
cocaine,55 but cannabis is also smuggled into the country on a large scale.56 Besides 
the wholesale trade in drugs, there is also an illicit retail drugs market in Belgium.57
In the criminal drug world the issuing of threats and the use of violence are com-
monplace. The people involved are very often armed, and shootings occur regular-
ly.58 According to the police, drug criminals are very often armed with firearms. 
They mainly possess handguns, which are easy to conceal.59 Although we need to 
interpret police statistics with the necessary caution, they seem to confirm this con-
tention: in the drug milieu mainly handguns and alarm weapons are found. Long 
weapons such as rifles and carbines are found less often (see Table 1). Yet it is impor-
tant to emphasise that not all drug criminals acquire and possess the same firearms 
in Belgium: firearms possession is especially widespread among those involved in 
the production of and wholesale trade in drugs.60 
The significant possession and use of illicitly held firearms by drug criminals can be 
illustrated by the results of recent police operations. For example, during Operation 
Trefpunt in April 2016 a large-scale network was rounded up that was producing 
synthetic drugs. In total, over a hundred house searches took place and six large 
drugs laboratories were dismantled. The epicentre of the action was the Dutch town 
of Best, close to the Belgian border. But house searches were also carried out in 
Belgium, in the surroundings of Turnhout and in the cities of Lommel and Leuven. 
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During the operation the police found handguns, an Uzi and a Kalashnikov, among 
other items.61 This example shows that some criminals involved in the drug trade 
have acquired heavy firearms.
Table 1: Number of firearms registered in a selection of drug-related police 
records according to type, irrespective of their involvement,  
2009-2015I
Possession of drugs 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Handguns 3 4 1 5 3 3 4
Rifles/carbines/machine guns 1 0 3 1 3 0 3
Alarm weapons 5 4 4 5 7 1 5
Cartridges/ammunition 12 6 6 11 14 5 7
Components and accessories 4 0 1 5 2 3 1
Manufacture of drugs 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Handguns 0 2 2 3 3 4 1
Rifles/carbines/machine guns 2 0 3 0 1 2 0
Alarm weapons 0 1 2 3 1 2 0
Cartridges/ammunition 3 3 5 0 5 4 2
Components and accessories 0 0 0 0 3 0 3
Drug trade 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Handguns 5 7 7 8 9 7 5
Rifles/carbines/machine guns 1 3 3 4 3 3 4
Alarm weapons 4 4 6 10 10 3 7
Cartridges/ammunition 11 17 11 8 16 12 8
Components and accessories 2 4 3 3 8 3 6
Import and export of drugs 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Handguns 2 4 0 0 1 3 1
Rifles/carbines/machine guns 0 0 0 1 1 3 0
Alarm weapons 1 0 5 1 4 1 0
Cartridges/ammunition 1 2 1 3 2 5 2
Components and accessories 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
Source: Belgian Federal Police
I For the composition of these categories, see Duquet, N. & Goris, K. (2017), De Belgische illegale 








2.2.2 Illicit firearms possession and use by armed robbers and 
street gangs 
Official crime statistics indicate that the Belgian police report about 4,000-5,000 
armed robberies annually.62 For this study we requested more detailed data on the 
firearms used in armed robberies (see Table 2). These data show that between 2009 
and 2015, 11,262 firearms were connected to recordings of armed robberies in the 
police database, mainly robberies with handguns (robberies in which long firearms 
and alarm weapons were used occur far less frequently in the statistics). Interviews 
for this study, however, suggest that in Belgium, armed robbers often do not possess 
or use lethal-purpose firearms. Compared with, for example, drug traffickers, this 
specific group of criminals often tend to use alarm pistols and fake guns. This is 
because most armed robbers do not intend to actually use a firearm and therefore 
do not need a lethal-purpose firearm. Instead, most of them use their weapons 
purely as a scare tactic.63 As with drug criminals, armed robbers prefer to use hand-
guns, because they can be more easily concealed. Some armed robbers also use 
military-grade assault rifles, especially in bank robberies and attacks on other 
heavily secured targets. For example, assault rifles were used in a spectacular 
diamond heist at Brussels Airport in 2013.64 However, in recent years men equipped 
with military-grade assault rifles have robbed some less heavily secured targets 
(e.g. a supermarket, a smaller shop, a post office and a discotheque).65 
Table 2:  Number of police records of armed theft according to type of  
firearm, 2009-201566
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Handguns 1,807 1,597 1,550 1,395 1,121 1,103 1,127
Rifles/carbines/machine guns 263 170 134 110 120 150 107
Alarm weapons 88 70 62 60 52 35 27
Total number of armed thefts 
with a firearm
2,055 1,763 1,764 1,531 1,254 1,236 1,233
Total number of armed thefts 5,862 5,377 5,548 4,971 4,413 4,054 4,047
Source: Belgian Federal Police
The numbers in Table 2 further seem to suggest a strong decrease in the use of fire-
arms in armed robberies since 2009. Moreover, this decrease appears to be stronger 
than the decrease in recordings of armed robberies in the same period. It is impor-
tant to stress, however, that these data need to be interpreted with caution. Whether 
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or not a firearm is linked to the armed robbery in the police database depends on 
the recording practices of police officers, which can differ considerably.67
Not surprisingly, many armed robberies are committed by young, inexperienced 
criminals who often lack the necessary criminal connections to obtain lethal- 
purpose firearms. In 2016, for example, 31% of armed robbery suspects were 
minors.68 It is much easier for these younger armed robbers to obtain a fake gun or a 
legal (homologated) alarm pistol than a lethal-purpose firearm, because adults can 
buy these types of weapons legall y in Belgium, without a licence. We see a similar 
picture of weapons possession by street gangs. These gangs generally consist of 
youths, and their criminal activities mainly involve small-scale drug dealing, theft, 
smaller robberies and extortion. Although there have been some cases of street gangs 
possessing firearms,69 it is fairly unusual for them to do so in Belgium. Members of 
street gangs usually use blank-firing weapons during their criminal activities.70 
2.2.3 Illicit firearms possession and use among outlaw 
motorcycle gangs
Europol estimates that the number of OMGs in Europe has doubled since 2005.71 
Such gangs are also active in Belgium, with about forty local ‘chapters’ of major 
international OMGs being present (like Hells Angels, Outlaws, Satudarah and No 
Surrender). In recent years there has seen a notable increase in the number of such 
gangs in the country. The border area with the Netherlands is a particularly popular 
site for new chapters of OMGs.72 
The criminal activities of these biker gangs mainly involve the production of and 
trade in drugs. In the course of judicial investigations in recent years, the Belgian 
police have found large quantities of drugs among members of various biker clubs 
and/or their support clubs. This involved, for example, both the discovery of can-
nabis farms73 and the busting of a cocaine-trafficking operation from Latin 
America.74 Besides the wholesale trade in drugs, some OMGs are also involved in 
drug dealing on a smaller scale.75 OMGs also engage in other criminal activities, 
such as prostitution, extortion and the fencing of stolen motorbikes.76 
In view of their criminal activities, it is not surprising that firearms are often found 
during house searches in police investigations of the Belgian chapters of OMGs.77 
These are not limited to handguns, but also include hunting rifles with sawn-off 
barrels and hand grenades. In 2015 even rocket launchers were discovered.78 In 
March 2017, in the context of a coordinated police operation against the OMG No 








and 34 individuals were arrested. In total, the police found 35 firearms of diverse 
types, including four pistols with silencers, a P38 pistol, various hunting weapons, 
a rifle with a sawn-off barrel, a Skorpion sub-machine gun and several assault rifles. 
Other items that were found included ammunition of diverse calibres, a hand 
grenade and a bulletproof vest.79 This example illustrates the wide variety of fire-
arms and related ammunition biker gangs have access to. 
International OMGs are known for their use of extreme violence, which is often 
combined with the possession of firearms, including assault rifles and hand gre-
nades. This extreme use of violence is primarily directed at rival gangs.80 A gang 
war has been raging in the Netherlands for some years. Because of the increase in 
activities of OMGs in Belgium, the police also expect an increase in violence, since 
the criminal cake has to be divided among more and more players and the Belgian 
gangs are under pressure – from the Netherlands and Germany – to demarcate their 
territory even further. Moreover, accounts still have to be settled as a result of previ-
ous violent incidents.81 This rivalry is often expressed in minor skirmishes and even 
shootings. For example, in 2010 in Aalbeke (West Flanders) three people were 
injured when members of Hells Angels and their support club, the Red Devils, fired 
multiple shots from a car at a clubhouse of the local chapter of the Outlaws.82 Since 
then, this rivalry has also resulted in fatalities. In 2011 three members of the Outlaws 
were shot dead by a group of Hells Angels during the opening of a new tyre centre 
in Maasmechelen (Limburg).83 Their extreme violence is not only directed at rivals. 
Motorcycle gangs also use their violent reputation to boost their general status in 
the criminal world.84
OMGs use firearms not only for instrumental reasons, but also as merchandise. 
European OMGs are sometimes also involved in the smuggling of firearms and 
often choose the sites of new chapters with an eye to existing routes for smuggling 
firearms, drugs and people.85 It is therefore no surprise that the police sometimes 
arrest individuals from Belgian-Dutch OMGs on suspicion of firearms smuggling. 
For example, at the beginning of 2015 the Croatian police arrested a man from the 
Belgian town of Poppel (Antwerp). He was carrying a small arsenal of weapons in 
his van, including numerous handguns, some Kalashnikov-type assault rifles, 
ammunition, hand grenades and six rocket launchers. The man was suspected of 
smuggling these weapons on behalf of No Surrender.86
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2.3 Sources of the illicit firearms market
In Belgium firearms enter the illicit firearms market in various ways (see Figure 2). 
Each of these ways is characterised by its own dynamics and specific policy and law 
enforcement challenges. Despite a lack of reliable and detailed quantitative data, 
our expert interviews suggest that the most important ways in which firearms end 
up on the illicit gun market in Belgium are through organised smuggling, the con-
version of non-lethal-purpose weapons into firearms and the reactivation of deacti-
vated firearms.87 
2.3.1 Cross-border smuggling
The cross-border smuggling of firearms is often considered the most important 
source of supplies for European illicit firearms markets; this is also the case in 
Belgium. According to the Belgian police services, the organised smuggling of fire-
arms is primarily intended for the criminal market and is usually undertaken to 
fulfil a specific order and in quite small quantities.88 
The firearms that are currently being smuggled into Belgium come primarily from 
the Balkans.89 These weapons generally have a long history behind them. They were 
often surplus weapons, firearms originating from plundered weapons storage facil-
ities, or weapons that in one way or another ended up in the hands of a wide range 
of non-state players during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.90 It is 
unclear at what specific time the smuggled guns that are now available on the 
Belgian black market first entered the EU. Although the Balkans area is currently 
considered as the prime source for firearms smuggled into Belgium, firearms are 
also being smuggled from neighbouring countries and other EU member states. 
Often these are weapons that – whether or not via intermediaries – have been circu-
lating in the criminal world for some time.91
Firearms are mainly smuggled by road in various types of vehicles (such as cars, 
passenger buses or vans used by courier companies).92 The weapons are hidden in 
the trunk, behind a false wall, or even in the tyres or petrol tank of these vehicles.93 
Since the smuggling of firearms is often secondary to, for example, drug smuggling, 
it is not surprising that these weapons are smuggled via the routes that are used for 
smuggling drugs.94 Two main routes are used for smuggling firearms from the 
Balkans to Western Europe: the southern route via Italy or Austria and the northern 
route via Hungary. Smuggling gangs currently seem to prefer the latter route.95 
With the abolition of the EU’s internal borders and the frequently ineffective control 








Belgium. According to the police, it is very difficult to effectively monitor this.96 The 
police are convinced that, in addition to smuggling by road, weapons are also smug-
gled via ships that dock in the port of Antwerp. They point out that this route is also 
extremely difficult to monitor. These weapons are, however, generally not intended 
for the Belgian illicit market: Belgium is considered more as a transit country for 
organised smuggling via maritime traffic.97 
According to Europol, the violent conflicts on the periphery of Europe will lead to 
an increase in the availability of firearms on the illicit market in Europe.98 A similar 
view was expressed several times in our interviews, with the emphasis often being 
laid on the imminent nature of this threat. Various Belgian police agencies point 
out that smuggling weapons from Ukraine will likely become a major problem in 
the near future.99 The police expect that this country will become even more impor-
tant as a source of especially Kalashnikov-type assault rifles and possibly also other 
types of military-grade equipment.100 Some interviewees also pointed to the danger 
of future firearms smuggling from North Africa and Syria. Reference was also made 
to Turkey as a possible transit country, considering its size, its porous borders, the 
fragile situation in some of its neighbours and the observation that the country is a 
hotspot for various types of smuggled goods.101 
It is difficult for the police to sketch a specific profile of the criminal associations 
that smuggle firearms. This is partly due to a lack of reliable and detailed data and 
because of the finding that firearms smuggling is seldom the main activity of a 
gang of smugglers. In the vast majority of cases a small number of firearms are 
smuggled to fulfil a specific order, together with much more lucrative products 
such as drugs or trafficked people.102 Earlier research has indicated that groups that 
smuggle firearms are often small, have a loose structure and only work together for 
a short time.103 In general, firearms smugglers are not part of large-scale and struc-
tured criminal organisations, but are mainly people who are in contact with others 
who have some kind of links to firearms and take advantage of the opportunities 
that arise. The police also point out that a link often exists between these groups 
and the source country of the smuggled firearms.104
Not all the smuggling of firearms to Belgium results from orders from criminal 
groups and is well organised. People interested in firearms have taken advantage of 
the differences in national firearms legislation across the EU by ordering firearms, 
components or ammunition in countries with more liberal legislation. Such people 
acquire these products by ordering them online and having them shipped by post 
or by travelling to these countries themselves to legally buy one or more firearms 
there and illegally bring them back to Belgium. According to the Belgian police, 
these so-called ‘self-shoppers’ generally do not buy lethal-purpose firearms, because 
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this requires having the right (criminal) connections in the source country; instead, 
they are more concerned with the smuggling of alarm pistols or deactivated 
weapons that are sold legally in the source country.105
2.3.2 Illicit firearms production 
The illicit production of firearms is not an important source of weapons for the 
European illicit firearms markets. The vast majority of firearms that circulate were 
initially produced and stocked legally, but at some stage leaked into the illicit 
market.106 There are a number of exceptions, though, such as homemade firearms 
that were produced in Croatian firearms workshops and have also been found across 
Europe, such as machine pistols of the R9 Arms, Agram 2000 and Šokac types.107  
In the period 2009-2015 the Belgian police recorded 79 cases of the illicit produc-
tion or repair of firearms. Most of these cases involved firearms of the types that 
need to be licenced (47 cases), but also involved prohibited firearms (23 cases). 
Furthermore, the police recorded nine cases of the illicit production or repair of 
ammunition and ten cases of the illicit production of firearms components or 
accessories.108 
Europol warns that technological progress will make 3D printing widely available 
in the future, and this will also offer opportunities for the illicit production of and 
trade in firearms. It is, however, highly unlikely that 3D printing of firearms will 
grow into an important source of weapons because of the technical complexity 
involved in this type of printing and the availability of relatively cheap firearms on 
the illicit firearms markets in Europe.109 According to the Federal Police, to date no 
3D-printed firearms have been encountered in Belgium.110
The illicit craft production of firearms is rather exceptional in Belgium, however.111 
Yet currently a considerable number of firearms are available on the Belgian illicit 
firearms market that, with the use of the right tools, were converted into lethal-
purpose firearms from either deactivated firearms or alarm or gas pistols.112 This 
type of conversion is considered a very important source of weapons on the illicit 
firearms market in Belgium (see below), and the phenomenon has also been noted 
in several other European countries. Europol has pointed out that illicit firearms 
dealers have taken advantage of differences between the various national legisla-
tive frameworks in Europe to legally acquire deactivated firearms or blank-firing 
weapons and then illegally convert them into lethal-purpose firearms.113 In the fol-








2.3.3 Illicit conversion of alarm and gas weapons
The number of converted alarm and gas pistols has shown a sharp increase on the 
illicit firearms markets in various European countries since the early 2000s. Such 
converted firearms are also found in Belgium. Yet seizures rarely involve converted 
alarm pistols that have been approved by the Proof House in Liège.114 
In the past the converted alarm pistols encountered in Belgium were often made in 
Italy. Especially alarm pistols of the Tanfoglio brand were converted (in particular 
the GT28 modelI) and used in certain branches of the criminal world.115 However, 
Tanfoglio stopped the production of the GT28 several years ago, precisely because 
of the persistent conversion of these alarm weapons in several European countries. 
The converted alarm and gas pistols currently encountered on the Belgian illicit 
firearms market are primarily manufactured in Turkey, such as the Ekol (Voltran), 
Zoraki (models 914, 918 and 925) and EKOL ASI.116 These weapons are offered for 
sale on the internet, and are very cheap, easy to convert and of higher quality than 
the Tanfoglio GT28.117 
Converted alarm pistols are mainly encountered among drug-related criminals and 
petty offenders. In some cases the owners have themselves converted these alarm 
pistols after purchasing the weapons abroad or on the internet. The weapons are 
converted in Belgium, and training videos are available on the internet showing 
how to do it. In other cases the alarm pistols are smuggled – to a large extent from 
Turkey – into Belgium and converted before they are sold on the Belgian illicit fire-
arms market.118 
2.3.4 Illicit reactivation and assembly of firearms
Since 2014 Europol has observed a significant increase in the supply of poorly deac-
tivated and reactivated firearms to criminals in Europe.119 Reactivated and self-
assembled firearms constitute a significant share of the firearms available on the 
illicit market in Belgium.120 A number of examples illustrate this. In 2011 various 
reactivated firearms were found in a large firearms trade network in Brussels, 
including an Uzi machine pistol that had once belonged to the former Gendarmerie, 
but, after the police reform, had been deactivated and sold to a firearms collector.121 
I This is a non-lethal-purpose version of the semi-automatic Tanfoglio GT27 pistol. In appearance, 
the two models are barely distinguishable from each other and the GT28 can very easily be con-
verted into a lethal-purpose weapon. For more information, see De Vries, M.S. (2008), De handel 
in omgebouwde gas- en alarmwapens: Vanuit een criminaliteitskundig perspectief, Apeldoorn: 
Politieacademie, pp. 23-24.
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Also in recent years, several people have been apprehended on suspicion of assem-
bling firearms or reactivating deactivated firearms. In 2015, for example, the police 
seized more than 250 firearms, accessories and rounds of ammunition in Lennik 
(Flemish Brabant) for which the owner did not have a licence. The weapons included 
handguns, semi-automatic rifles and assault rifles.122 On several previous occasions 
large stocks of unlicensed firearms had been discovered at his home. The police had 
suspected the man for years of reactivating deactivated firearms.123 
The ‘handymen’ who assemble or reactivate these firearms to a large degree depend 
on the legal firearms market for buying the necessary firearms parts and deacti-
vated firearms (both domestically and abroad).124 Most reactivated firearms that are 
available on the illicit firearms market were poorly deactivated in other countries. 
A large proportion of the reactivated firearms that are found in Belgium originate 
from Slovakia. These are often surplus weapons of East European armed forces that 
were deactivated in recent years and converted into acoustic weapons. In recent 
years Slovakian shops have legally sold these deactivated firearms to adults on the 
presentation of an identity card. It was, however, fairly easy to reactivate many of 
these firearms, which was common knowledge in the criminal world and among 
people interested in firearms. As a result firearms deactivated in Slovakia cropped 
up on the illicit circuit throughout Europe. According to the German Federal 
Criminal Police, Slovakian gun shops sold large quantities of deactivated firearms 
to foreign customers in recent years.125 Some of these firearms were reactivated and 
ended up in the hands of criminals and terrorists (see section 2.2.2). 
A number of people in Belgium who possess enough expertise and skills to reacti-
vate weapons have connections to the criminal world. The reactivation process is 
not undertaken by large-scale criminal organisations, but rather by a limited 
number of ‘handymen’ who have the necessary expertise, skills and tools.126 A noto-
rious example of such a handyman was Nordine Amrani, the perpetrator of the fatal 
shootings at the Liège Christmas fair in December 2011. During a search of his 
premises in October 2007 the police had discovered, in addition to a professional 
cannabis plantation, a dozen firearms and around 9,500 firearms parts in a shed. As 
well as handguns, the firearms included an AK-47 assault rifle, an FN FAL assault 
rifle, an MP40 machine pistol and a pump-action shotgun. A rocket launcher, 
silencers and hundreds of rounds of ammunition were also found.127 However, 
Amrani was not an isolated case. 
In Belgium, two types of handymen can be identified as being involved in reactivat-
ing and self-assembling weapons, with each type seeming to supply their own 
market segment. On the one hand, in some cases they are people who reactivate 








terrorist intentions, but only want to collect weapons. On the other hand, a limited 
number of handymen in Belgium mainly assemble or reactivate firearms for the 
criminal world.128 It should be mentioned that the same people often crop up in 
criminal cases and have a strong link with certain criminal milieus like OMGs.129 
Having a handyman or not in their network can have important consequences for 
certain criminal milieus in terms of obtaining weapons.130 
Reactivating firearms is sometimes thought of as a Belgian speciality.131 In Belgium, 
there is considerable knowledge about firearms, partly due to its history as a fire-
arms-producing country. Unsurprisingly, some handymen work or have worked in 
the legal firearms industry or are still connected to it in some way.132 According to 
the Federal Police, assembling and reactivating firearms for the illicit market is not 
a typically Belgian phenomenon, but a practice that has been identified throughout 
Europe, especially in the regions that manufacture firearms.133 Earlier research has 
shown the important role of the firearms producer FN Herstal in the large number 
of Belgians who have the technical expertise to assemble or reactivate firearms.134 In 
2015, for example, four former FN Herstal employees were arrested after the police 
had discovered about 50 firearms and a number of hand grenades behind false ceil-
ings and skirting boards at their home. According to the police, these men used 
their professional know-how to reactivate legally purchased deactivated firearms in 
order to sell them on to the criminal world.135 Belgian police crime figures also show 
that the illicit production of firearms is particularly prevalent in the province of 
Liège, where FN Herstal is located.136
2.3.5 Blackening
The ‘blackening’ of firearms is a type of embezzlement that is the mirror image of 
money laundering: when a weapon is blackened a paper reality is created to allow 
firearms that are legally available to disappear into illegality. This can take place in 
various ways, such as organising fake exports or reporting a firearm to the police as 
‘stolen’ or ‘lost’, even though the firearm in question is still in the person’s posses-
sion. Private individuals in Belgium frequently used this last form of blackening in 
the period after the tightening of the 2006 Weapons Act (see section 1.1). 
Blackening is not restricted to private individuals who want to make small numbers 
of firearms disappear in order to be able to retain them. In Belgium, there are exam-
ples of blackening of large quantities of firearms with the intention of selling them 
on the illicit firearms market. The Federal Police have pointed out the practice 
where people used forged import licences to purchase firearms on the legal fire-
arms market abroad.137 In this way, hundreds of firearms of various types have 
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ended up on the Belgian illicit firearms market in the last few years. The Belgian 
police, for example, rounded up a number of men in 2015 who pretended to be certi-
fied firearms dealers and ordered firearms directly from a German firearms manu-
facturer using forged import documents from the Walloon Region. The men are 
said to have imported around 200-250 firearms in this way and sold them on the 
illicit firearms market.138 
Legal firearms dealers can also play a role in blackening activities, often precisely 
because of their firearms expertise and their knowledge of legislation and proce-
dures.139 In recent years a limited number of authorized firearms dealers have been 
arrested and convicted for trading in illicit firearms. A licensed firearms dealer 
from Beveren (Antwerp), for example, was convicted in 2008 of the illicit sale of 773 
firearms and around 3,000 rounds of ammunition between January 2004 and 
March 2006. He sold these items primarily to a Belgian and a Dutchman, after 
which some of these firearms ended up in the Dutch criminal world.140 More 
recently, a recognised firearms trader from the Mons region, who was also the chair 
of a shooting club, was apprehended on suspicion of illicit firearms trading. A total 
of 367 firearms of various types, including military-grade assault rifles,I and a large 
amount of ammunition were found at the man’s premises. It was not immediately 
clear which weapons the man held legally, but the police suspect him of supplying 
firearms to organised crime networks.141 Despite these examples, the Belgian police 
state that the overwhelming majority of legitimate arms dealers are not involved in 
blackening activities because they do not wish to jeopardise their authorisation as 
arms dealer or risk their legally acquired stock of weapons.142 
Not only private individuals and arms dealers can embezzle firearms in Belgium. In 
October 2016 the director of the Proof House was arrested on suspicion of firearms 
trafficking. He is believed to have misused the lack of a reliable inventory at the 
Proof House to embezzle 260 firearms that were supposed to be destroyed, but he 
denies these charges, stating that these weapons were not destroyed because of 
their historical value and were supposed to be transferred to museums.143
I The police found a loaded Glock 17 pistol, an FN GP 9 mm pistol, a Browning 7.65 mm pistol, a 
Skorpion vz.61 machine pistol, two Mini Ruger-14 carbines with silencers, an AKSU assault rifle 
with a silencer and a Colt AR-15 rifle. At the shooting range the police found 125 pistols, 59 revol-
vers, 63 carbines, 68 rifles, 14 assault rifles, several machine guns, 28 machine pistols and hund-








On average the Belgian police record around 850 thefts of firearms, firearms com-
ponents and/or ammunition each year (see Table 3). This means that at least 850 
firearms per year are stolen in Belgium, since a police record can refer to one firearm 
or more. Based on police data and media reports144 we can conclude that a wide 
range of types of firearms are being stolen in the country. 
Table 3:  Number of police records of thefts of firearms and explosives  
according to type of firearm, 2009-2015145
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Handguns 246 240 257 289 302 274 265
Rifles/carbines/machine guns 272 252 262 288 266 293 274
Alarm weapons 140 140 165 174 189 176 161
Collectable/antique firearms 
(before 1886)
5 8 10 7 10 7 2
Total number of recorded thefts of 
firearms
779 861 882 940 924 852 827
Cartridges/ammunition 169 134 153 175 155 136 136
Components and accessories 118 249 224 244 228 170 213
Total number of recorded thefts of 
firearms and explosives
1,728 1,839 1,893 2,011 1,863 1,790 1,637
Source: Belgian Federal Police
Most firearms thefts occur in private homes.146 This is partly the consequence of the 
relatively high level of legal firearms ownership in Belgium. This largely includes 
relatively small quantities of weapons that are stolen at the same time. Thieves who 
come across guns during a burglary generally take the firearms with them along 
with other valuable items in order to sell them later. These gangs do not generally 
sell the stolen firearms directly to other criminals, but to fences who are known to 
buy and sell arms on the criminal circuit.147 
Besides private homes, firearms have in recent years been stolen from a variety of 
other locations. In the legal firearms sector, for example, burglaries occasionally 
take place during which dozens of firearms are stolen at once. Several cases are 
known of firearms thefts from shooting ranges or firearms shops. In 2013, for 
example, 47 firearms were stolen from a shop (where there was also a shooting 
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range) in Knokke (West Flanders) and some of these weapons were later found in the 
Dutch criminal circuit, including with an OMG.148 Belgian firearms manufacturers 
have also been victims of major arms theft. In 2007 the Hasselt criminal court con-
victed eight men and one woman for their involvement in arms theft and the illicit 
arms trade. These men included an arms maker from FN Herstal, who stole rejected 
spare parts of firearms from the factory floor and assembled them at home into lethal-
purpose weapons. Two security guards at the ammunition storage depot in Zutendaal 
(Limburg) also stole cartridges and magazines. The key figure in this gang of thieves 
was employed as a porter and was responsible for selling the arms. The gang stole at 
least three P90 rifles, 15 Five seveN pistols and 20,600 cartridges.149 The number of 
robberies of firearms dealers, shooting ranges and arms manufacturers is believed to 
have declined sharply in recent years as a result of the strict storage requirements 
prescribed by the Weapons Act and the associated security measures.150 
Other locations where firearms theft takes place in Belgium are from stockpiles of 
the Belgian armed forces or the police, but this happens rarely. In burglaries of 
police stations the perpetrators mainly steal handguns, while mostly assault rifles 
and ammunition are stolen from army barracks.151 In 2013 a major theft of firearms 
was discovered from the main police station in the Antwerp MINOS police zone 
(which includes Mortsel, Wijnegem, Wommelgem, Boechout and Borsbeek). The 
police picked up the trail after a firearm wrapped in a plastic bag was found in the 
cistern of a toilet in a criminal haunt in Ghent. A check revealed that this weapon 
was registered as a service weapon, and the police then discovered that 67 weapons 
had disappeared from the MINOS police zone. These were old police service 
weapons (Browning GP35 pistols and Smith & Wesson revolvers). Instead of their 
being destroyed by the Proof House, they were kept under lock and key at the police 
station. The weapons had probably been stolen over a fairly long period of time by 
one of the police officers. The police suspect that all 67 firearms have ended up in 
criminal circles.152 In the past, thefts have also been discovered from army barracks. 
This sometimes includes the theft of assault rifles and grenade launchers. The army 
suspects that these thefts often take place with the knowledge and consent of mili-
tary personnel.153  
Our interviews indicate that the modi operandi of these thefts differ considerably 
according to the type of location where the theft occurs. The theft of firearms from 
private homes frequently takes place by chance, for example during a run-of-the-
mill burglary, while the thefts of firearms from arms dealers or shooting ranges are 
generally deliberate actions that occur in a more organised way.154 In addition, it is 
known that many registered thefts at private homes are in fact attempts to embez-
zle these weapons (see section 1.3.3). The more organised thefts from, for example, 








Three Dutchmen drove to Knokke (West Flanders) on three consecutive nights to 
burgle a firearms trade business. Each night, two of the men went round to the back 
of the premises, where they spent hours hitting the wall with a sledgehammer, 
while the third kept watch in the car. The arms trader discovered what was happen-
ing and notified the police, who were able to apprehend the men.155
2.3.7 Non-regularised firearms
There is consensus among the judicial and police services involved that the largest 
group of illegal firearms owners in Belgium are people without any connections to 
criminal or terrorist networks. These are people who, at some time or another, pur-
chased their firearms legally, but have not regularised them after the changes to the 
law in 2006 (the implementation of the Weapons Act) and 2012 (the abolition of 
freely available antique firearms on the HFD listI) or no longer meet the conditions 
for the legal possession of their firearms. 
Especially the severe tightening of the Weapons Act in 2006 has had an important 
impact on illicit firearms possession in the country, because many hunting and 
shooting weapons previously freely purchasable on the mere presentation of a valid 
identity card became subject to licensing requirements. A large number of previ-
ously legal firearms owners failed to comply with the new rules and continued to 
illegally own their firearms. According to the police, these owners of illegal weapons 
generally do not seem to have criminal intentions, but simply do not wish to go 
through the licensing procedure.156 However, a number of people have illicitly sold 
on their weapons. In this way, an unknown number of firearms have found their 
way onto the illicit firearms market and thus have possibly ended up in the hands of 
criminals. 
After the abolition of the HFD list (the list of antique firearms for which no licence 
was required) in 2013 a similar dynamic can be observed. The owners of weapons 
previously on the list were given until the end of May 2014 to register them. 
Although tens of thousands of such weapons were sold in Belgium between 2007 
and 2013, only 6,000 HFD weapons were registered after the abolition of the HFD 
list.157 An unknown number of HFD weapons have found their way onto the illicit 
firearms market. In 2011 the Brussels Federal Judiciary Police dismantled a large 
arms trafficking network in which HFD weapons were traded. According to the 
police, Nagant revolvers in particular were valued in criminal circles because large 
supplies of ammunition were available and because it is the only HFD revolver that 
I Firearms with historical, folklore or decorative value. 
50
can be efficiently fitted with a silencer.158 In recent years, however, not many HFD 
weapons have been encountered in criminal circles in Belgium.159 This is probably 
because large numbers of these HFD weapons have left the country. Because a 
number of HFD weapons required a licence in other European countries and they 
were freely available in Belgium, many foreigners came to Belgium to buy their 
weapons legally, for example at arms fairs, and then (often illicitly) took them back 
to their own countries.160 In this way Belgium was a source country for illicit fire-
arms possession in other European countries. In the period 2010-2012 many Nagant 
revolvers that had been on the Belgian HFD list and could be freely purchased for 
around €170 were encountered in Dutch criminal circles. In 2012 someone was shot 
dead in the Netherlands with such a revolver.161
Figure 2: Sources of the illicit firearms market in Belgium
2.4 Transactions on the illicit firearms market 
Our expert interviews strongly indicate that the illicit firearms market in Belgium 
is a closed entity that can only be accessed by those with the right (criminal) con-
nections. Moreover, trust plays an important role in the firearms market: buyer and 
seller must trust each other. As a result, not every person and not even every crimi-
nal finds it easy to acquire a firearm. Given the importance of (criminal) connec-
tions and trust between buyer and seller, it is not surprising that most firearms 
Belgium Other countries
Non-regularized firearms
Illegal         Conversion/
























transactions happen face to face. The actual transfer of firearms can take place in a 
wide variety of settings, while there is also no specific profile for illegal arms dealers 
in Belgium. In general, a distinction can be drawn between people for whom selling 
a firearm or a small amount of firearms on the illicit market is a one-time activity, 
and those who are more actively involved in firearms trafficking – specifically, those 
who sell firearms to the criminal world.162
Earlier Dutch research has shown that the illegal owners of lethal-purpose firearms 
are mainly criminals who ‘have outgrown the level of petty criminal’.163 Such crimi-
nals have a wide-ranging network of contacts and have often made a name for 
themselves in the criminal world. It is generally quite easy for them to obtain good 
firearms. Lower-ranking, often-younger criminals do not have the same connec-
tions and tend not to have easy access to genuine firearms, and so often resort to 
fake guns and gas or alarm guns.164 This observation is confirmed by the Belgian 
Federal Police: young and lower-ranking criminals in Belgium generally possess 
and use converted alarm pistols, antique firearms or even fake guns, while the more 
experienced, more organised and higher-ranking criminals are generally not satis-
fied with such weapons (for practical and status reasons) and prefer to obtain real 
firearms via their networks. Certain groups consciously opt for weapons with a 
‘good’ reputation and higher status in the criminal world, such as Glock pistols, and 
are prepared to pay more for them.165 
Military-grade assault rifles are also present on the illicit gun market in Belgium. 
Although reliable statistics are lacking, the Belgian police stress that these weapons 
constitute a very small minority of the firearms on the market and that their avail-
ability is generally limited to ‘heavy’ criminals who commit serious crimes.166 Most 
of the military-grade assault rifles on the illicit firearms market have been smug-
gled from the Balkans, while other types of firearms originate from a geographi-
cally much wider area.167 In 2010 some police representatives stated that a new 
group of young criminals had appeared on the Brussels crime sceneI who seem to 
have had easy access to assault rifles.168 However, according to the Federal Judiciary 
Police, the significant presence of reactivated firearms and converted alarm 
weapons in the criminal milieu demonstrates that the availability on the Belgian 
I This new group differed markedly from the older generations of criminals. They were generally 
not really organised and worked together in a loosely connected way. They operated in small 
groups of at most three and with a continuously changing composition. Most came from a num-
ber of districts in Brussels. They were often minors and did not appear to have a real strategy. 
Their choice of targets and modus operandi were often characterised by a high degree of impul-
siveness. This was expressed in extremely violent behaviour and the casual discharge of their 
weapons. This development was often attributed to a sudden large increase in the availability of 
heavier weapons, e.g. assault rifles.
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criminal market of military-grade firearms smuggled from the Balkans and other 
(post-)conflict areas should not be overestimated.169 
The differences in availability are also reflected in the prices for these weapons on 
the black market. In general, converted alarm weapons are the cheapest (maximum 
€400). Most real handguns are sold for €500-1,000. Glock pistols, which have a 
very good reputation and high status in the criminal world, generally cost €1,000-
2,000. Kalashnikov-type assault rifles are more expensive and cost around €2,000- 
2,500.170 We have to interpret these prices very carefully, given that these estimates 
are based on a small number of cases. In addition, the prices of firearms on the illicit 
firearms market are strongly dependent on typical market conditions such as 
supply and demand. Other factors influencing prices are, among others, the type of 
firearm, its quality and origin.171
Interestingly, the Brussels Federal Judiciary Police have observed a decrease in fire-
arms trafficking cases in Brussels since the terrorist attacks in Paris and Belgium in 
2015-2016. They believe this is related to the increased focus of law enforcement 
agencies on terrorism and terrorist-related activities such as firearms trafficking. It 
seems like firearms traffickers have become aware of the perceived increased risk of 
getting caught and the heavier penalties if there is a link with terrorist networks. 
This seems to have resulted in some of them displacing their trafficking activities to 
other Belgian cities, especially since selling firearms on the criminal market is not 
a very lucrative business in Belgium. This evolution is believed to have also impacted 
both the availability of assault rifles in Brussels and current prices. Kalashnikov-
type assault rifles are now for sale for €2,000-3,000 (instead of approximately 
€1,200 it was previously sold for in Brussels), while Glock handguns are for sale for 
approximately €3,000 (the price was approximately €1,000 a few years ago).172
Although most transactions happen face to face, both criminal networks and ordi-
nary citizens are also known to buy firearms online. The growing online buying of 
firearms has led to an increased use of the postal services to transfer firearms within 
Europe. Europol expects that the online illegal trade in firearms will expand further 
in the future.173 The Federal Prosecutor’s Office states that a significant number of 
firearms are illegally shipped through the post.174 According to the Belgian police, it 
is very difficult to effectively monitor the internet.175 The police are particularly 
worried that it will become easier for those without criminal connections to ille-
gally acquire firearms and that these people will no longer have to move around 
physically to acquire these products, which hinders the effective detection of this 
type of trafficking.176 Data specifically requested for this study show that between 
2009 and 2015 the Belgian police recorded 85 cases of the illegal sale of firearms for 








role can be illustrated by a recent court case: in 2016 a Belgian IT professional was 
convicted of using the dark web to order a Kalashnikov assault rifle with 8,000 
bullets, a Glock pistol with 2,000 bullets and a silencer from a seller in the United 
States. The man explained that he wanted to buy these weapons to protect his family 
against the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).177 Unfortunately, the 
limited information currently available on illegal internet sales of firearms makes it 
impossible to determine trends and evolutions of this phenomenon in Belgium. 
3.  Terrorist access to the illicit firearms market 
in Belgium 
Like several other EU member states, Belgium has witnessed a number of Islamist 
terrorist attacks and threats inspired or ordered by ISIS in recent years. In some 
instances terrorists answered ISIS’s call to make use of easy-to-obtain weapons at 
hand, like the stabbings of soldiers in the streets of Brussels in August 2017, and of 
policemen in Charleroi in August 2016 and Schaarbeek in October 2016. In other 
cases Islamist terrorists in Belgium have relied on more sophisticated weapons. In 
the double attack on Brussels Airport and the city’s metro on 22 March 2016 and the 
failed bomb attack in the Brussels central train station in June 2017 they used 
explosives. Firearms have also been used in some of the recent terrorist incidents 
in Belgium. 
Belgium’s confrontation with terrorism is not new, nor does it exclusively involve 
Islamists. During the last 30 years the country has experienced threats and violence 
from both Islamist and other forms of terrorism. Noteworthy examples of Islamist 
terrorism are the Zaoui network (a propaganda and fund-raising cell of the Algerian 
Groupe Islamiste Armée), which was neutralised in 1995,178 and the activities of 
Nizar Trabelsi, who was arrested just prior to carrying out a planned suicide attack 
on a US military base in Kleine-Brogel a few days after the 11 September 2001 attacks 
in the United States.179 Especially in the early 1980sI, significant left- and right-wing 
terrorist violence has also been apparent, 180 These kinds of networks with the 
potential for violent actions are still currently active in Belgium.
I Nationalist Palestinian terrorist incidents also occurred in this period. At the beginning of the 
1980s two lethal terrorist incidents took place in Antwerp. Both were linked to the tensions in the 
Middle East, in particular between Israel and Palestine, and were prompted by nationalist Pales-
tinian and anti-Jewish/anti-Israeli motives (VRT NWS, ‘Terreur in België, een overzicht’, 22 March 
2016, http://deredactie.be/cm/vrtnieuws/binnenland/1.2609157).
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Importantly, throughout the last three decades Belgium has not only been the site 
of terrorist attacks: it has also functioned as an important logistics base for terrorist 
cells involved in organising attacks and providing, among other things, propa-
ganda, recruitment, training, housing and weapons.181 This observation is still rele-
vant today. An important example is the high number of terrorist fighters leaving 
Belgium to join ISIS: since the start of the Syrian civil war 380-481 people have left 
Belgium to fight for ISIS in Syria or Iraq, making it the European country with the 
highest number of such migratory fighters per capita.182 
In this section we specifically address terrorist access to the illicit firearms market 
in recent years. There are clear distinctions in the possession and use of firearms 
among different types of terrorist networks in Belgium. Although in the past fire-
arms have been found in the possession of left-wing terrorist groups,183 such groups 
generally no longer use or even possess them, given that their current modus oper-
andi mainly involves arson, letter bombs, sabotage and intimidation. According to 
the police, some members of these groups could have access to firearms through 
contacts with serious criminals, but they apparently deliberately choose not to use 
firearms in their activities.184 Firearms possession and use among contemporary 
terrorist groups in Belgium are therefore limited to Islamist and right-wing terror-
ist networks. 
3.1 Firearms among Islamist terrorist networks
3.1.1  Possession and use of firearm
Islamist networks in Belgium have carried out various terrorist attacks in recent 
years. Firearms have been used in a number of these attacks; for example, the 
shooting in the Jewish Museum in Brussels in May 2014, and the gunfights between 
terrorists and the police in Verviers in January 2015 and the Brussels commune of 
Vorst in March 2016. In addition, a terrorist attack with firearms was foiled on the 
Thalys train between Brussels and Paris in August 2015. Previous analyses of the 
firearms used in terrorist activities in Europe clearly indicate a preference for auto-
matic assault rifles, such as Kalashnikov-type rifles.185 This pattern can also be 
observed in Belgium, because such weapons were used in the three shootings 
referred to above and in the foiled attack on the Thalys train. The availability of 
military-grade firearms to Islamist terrorist networks in Belgium is not a new phe-
nomenon. In 2003 Nizar Trabelsi, a Tunisian national who lived in Belgium and was 
connected to al-Qaeda, was convicted of plotting a terrorist attack against the US 
military base in Kleine-Brogel. During a house search following his arrest in 2001 








The most lethal terrorist attack in Belgian history occurred on 22 March 2016, when 
32 people were killed during suicide attacks using explosives at Brussels Airport 
and in the Brussels metro. Although no firearms were used in these attacks, the 
perpetrators did have firearms at their disposal. On pictures taken by the perpetra-
tors in their safe house shortly before the attacks three Vz.58 automatic assault 
rifles, a Kalashnikov, two pistols and a pump-action shotgun can be identified.187 In 
an audio message dating from the day before the Brussels attacks that was later 
found on a computer dumped near one of the safe houses, one of the perpetrators 
stated that they had decided not to use their firearms because they felt they were 
not equipped with sufficient magazines. They also feared that many people would 
be able to escape the attacks if firearms were used and they were deterred by the 
soldiers patrolling the streets. Instead of using their firearms, they chose only to use 
explosives, to increase the number of fatalities.188 It is believed that the firearms in 
their possession in their safe house were transferred to a box garage a couple of 
days before the attacks. OCAD confirms that considerable resources were used to 
search for these weapons. After the attacks the Belgian police searched over two 
hundred box garages in Brussels, but without success.189 The Federal Prosecutor’s 
Office suspects that the perpetrators of the attacks left behind an arsenal of fire-
arms for the next wave of terrorists.190 
In the second half of 2017 there were three developments in this case. Firstly, in 
early July there appeared to be a breakthrough in the investigation after the finding 
of several Kalashnikovs, ammunition, detonators and police uniforms in a box 
garage in Anderlecht. According to the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office, however, 
this find was not connected to the investigations of the Brussels attacks. Indications 
pointed towards radicalised members of the Kamikaze Riders,I a motorcycle gang 
that had been suspected of plotting a terrorist attack during the Brussels fireworks 
display on New Year’s Eve in 2015.191 Secondly, later in July 2017 the media reported 
a school in the province of Limburg to be a potential hiding place for the Brussels 
terrorists’ hidden firearms arsenal. On two separate occasions security services 
searched the school’s premises, but with no result. Given the traces of a break-in 
they found and the fact that the school janitor was related to one of the perpetrators 
of the Brussels attacks and died fighting for ISIS, they are confident that the weapons 
had been hidden in the school for some time but were moved before the attacks of 
22 March 2016.192 Thirdly, in September 2017 a Brussels local police officer was 
arrested on suspicion of leaking sensitive police information to terrorism suspects. 
According to some police officers, this may help to explain why the weapons arsenal 
I In 2016 two members of the Kamikaze Riders, Saïd Saouti and Mohamed Kerai, were convicted of 
belonging to a terrorist group and recruiting youngsters for jihad.
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has not yet been found, in spite of numerous searches that were often based on con-
crete clues.193 
Since the attacks of 22 March 2016 numerous house searches and arrests have been 
carried out in Belgium as part of separate terrorist investigations. However, fire-
arms were almost never found in these searches.194 This could indicate that Belgian 
terrorist networks’ level of firearms possession is lower than it is perceived to be. On 
the other hand, it is also possible that law enforcement agencies have not yet dis-
covered the hiding place of these weapons, because they do not have an exhaustive 
overview of the safe houses and storage facilities used by terrorist networks.195 Also, 
these networks tend not to store their firearms in their immediate environment, 
but to keep them hidden until the moment of (once-only) use.196
Apart from the attacks with firearms and explosives, there is also concern in Belgium 
about what the Federal Prosecutor’s Office calls the ‘proletarianisation of terrorism’. 
This refers to an evolution towards terrorists’ use of a wide range of ‘weapons’, 
including ordinary consumer goods and vehicles.197 Islamist terrorists appear to use 
two types of weapons. They often possess and use firearms when ISIS is the driving 
force, because as a result they generally have more access to and expertise in the use 
of firearms and explosives. Lone wolves and younger, less experienced perpetrators, 
on the other hand, tend to have less access to assault rifles and are more inclined to 
opt for more everyday weapons.198 For example, in August 2016 two police officers 
were attacked with a machete at police headquarters in Charleroi. The perpetrator, 
who was of Algerian origin and residing illegally in Belgium, was immediately shot, 
and later died in hospital.199 With regard to this type of attack, the Federal Police and 
OCAD refer to the importance of ISIS online publications such as Dabiq and Rumiyah, 
which call for terrorist acts to be committed with whatever means are available.200 
3.1.2  Obtaining fully automatic assault rifles via the criminal 
milieu
The link with the criminal milieu is of crucial importance for terrorist networks’ 
acquisition of firearms, especially when there is a preference for automatic assault 
rifles, (for which the possibilities for legal possession are exceptional in Belgium).201 
This can also be noted when we analyse the way in which the weapons used by ter-
rorists in Belgium were acquired: the firearms found in Verviers and Vorst and 
those used at the Jewish Museum originated from the criminal illicit firearms 
market.202 A similar picture emerges from an analysis of the attacks of 22 March 
2016 in Brussels and 13 November 2015 in Paris. It was no coincidence that almost 








were no longer petty criminals and a number had connections in the criminal 
milieu that allowed them to obtain automatic assault rifles.203 An April 2017 seizure 
of cannabis and two handguns from former friends of Abdelhamid Abaaoud and 
Salah Abdeslam confirmed the availability of firearms in their network.204 
Assault rifles were also used in the gunfight in Verviers. After the gunfight the 
police found seven firearms, ammunition and the products needed to produce 
TATP explosives in the safe house used by the terrorist group. Among the firearms 
were three Kalashnikov-type assault rifles (Zastava M70 AB2, FEG S90 and a 
WIESA brand assault rifle), three pistols (BUL M-5, CZ M88A and a Tanfoglio 9 mm 
Parabellum) and one revolver (Hammerless Velo-Dog).205 Marouan El Bali, the only 
surviving terrorist participant in the Verviers gunfight, was sentenced to 12 years in 
prison for his role in the terrorist network. The court found evidence that El Bali 
owned some of the discovered firearms and transported them to the safe house in 
Verviers, but could not identify which firearms exactly.206 During the police investi-
gation the defendants gave contradictory versions of how the firearms were 
acquired,207 but given the prohibited nature of some of them, these weapons were 
almost certainly acquired on the illicit gun market, probably in the Brussels area. 
This crime-terror nexus in Belgium,208 particularly in terms of firearms acquisition, 
is most visible in the case of the El Bakraoui brothers – two of the perpetrators of the 
Brussels attacks of 22 March 2016 – whom the Belgian Prosecutor’s Office strongly 
suspect of having provided (some of) the weapons used in the Paris attacks of 13 
November 2015.209 This was also stated in an article published in Dabiq, an official 
ISIS English-language online propaganda magazine, which pointed to the brothers 
as the ones responsible for the acquisition of the firearms and explosives used in 
this attack.210 During the attack the perpetrators, who operated in three teams, used 
at least six firearms. All of these guns were Kalashnikov-type assault rifles (Zastava 
M70 AB2, AKS47 and Norinco 56-1).211 The El Bakraoui brothers were able to turn to 
their previous criminal networks to obtain these firearms.212 Both brothers had a 
history of criminal activities involving Kalashnikov-type assault rifles, and were 
part of a network of violent criminals that used firearms to carry out armed robber-
ies and carjackings. While the members of this network initially used pistols in 
their operations, they later started to use Kalashnikov-type rifles.213 In 2010 Ibrahim 
El Bakraoui opened fire on police officers with a Kalashnikov-type assault rifle 
while being pursued by police after a failed robbery at a foreign-exchange office in 
Brussels. He wounded a police officer and was sentenced to ten years in prison. 
Khalid El Bakraoui was sentenced to five years in prison in 2011 for his involvement 
in numerous armed carjackings in Brussels.214 Both brothers are believed to have 
been radicalised in prison.215
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Given their antecedents and that one of them rented the safe house (under a false 
name), it is very likely that the El Bakroui brothers also acquired the assault rifles 
used in the gunfight with the police when they were living at the safe house in 
Vorst. In November 2016 two people who belonged to the El Bakraoui brothers’ 
criminal network – Mohammed B. and Aboubaker O. – were sentenced to prison for 
delivering Kalashnikov magazines to the brothers, but the judge acquitted them of 
participating in terrorist activities since it could not be proved that they were aware 
of the bothers’ terrorist intentions. Two other members of this criminal network 
(Yassine L. and Zoher E.H.) were sentenced for acting as intermediaries in these 
deliveries.216 
The assault rifle Mehdi Nemmouche used in his attack on the Jewish Museum is 
also believed to have been acquired on the criminal market. Nemmouche is a French 
national who was sentenced for violent theft and robbery multiple times and spent 
five years in prison between 2007 and 2012. There he was radicalised, and immedi-
ately after his release in January 2013 he left for Syria, returning to Europe in March 
2014.217 In the afternoon of 24 May 2014 Nemmouche walked to the Jewish Museum 
in the centre of Brussels and used a handgun to kill two Israeli visitors who were 
standing at the museum entrance. He then walked into the museum, took out a 
Kalashnikov-type assault rifle from his sports bag and fired at two museum employ-
ees. He then knelt down, put his guns back in his bag and calmly walked out of the 
museum.218 Six days after the attack Nemmouche was arrested during a random 
drugs search at the international Marseille Saint Charles bus station in France while 
travelling on a Eurolines passenger bus from Amsterdam via Brussels to Marseille. 
In his jacket customs officers found a .38 revolver, while a Kalashnikov-type assault 
rifle, 57 rounds of ammunition for the revolver, more than 270 cartridges for the 
Kalashnikov, gun parts and a portable Gopro camera wrapped up in an ISIS flag 
were found in his luggage.219 In July 2014 Nemmouche was extradited to Belgium. 
During his interrogation he told the police he had stolen his firearms in Belgium 
from a car through an open window and that he was travelling to Marseille to sell 
them there.220 According to the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, however, Nemmouche 
acquired the guns he used in the attack in the Marseilles criminal milieu.221 In 
December 2014 the French police arrested a criminal with whom Nemmouche 
spent several years in prison, on suspicion of selling him the firearms he used in the 
attack on the Jewish Museum.222 In January 2017 Spanish police, in collaboration 
with Europol, dismantled a network that sold deactivated firearms (which did not 
comply with the existing deactivation standards) and lethal-purpose firearms in 
several European countries, including Spain, France and Belgium. These weapons 
were bought through legally established channels and later reactivated.223 According 
to Spanish media reports, the investigation into this Spanish network originated in 








Museum,224 but it still remains unclear if the guns Nemmouche used were reacti-
vated firearms and if this Spanish network was somehow involved.
According to the Federal Police, there is often no evidence of a specific and explicit 
division of logistical roles within terrorist networks. It is not generally the intention 
to deliberately include a firearms supplier when forming (the logistical wing of) 
such a network. Individuals who obtain firearms for a terrorist network are often 
already part of it and are then asked to do so because of their expertise and contacts, 
which make it easier for them to acquire firearms. A terrorist network also some-
times calls on ‘externals’ to support its terrorist activities. In other words, there is 
some sort of outsourcing when the network itself does not possess the knowledge 
or skills that it needs, for example to produce forged identity documents.225 
Although the firearms used in recent terror attacks were obtained on the criminal 
market, this does not automatically imply that the seller(s) of these weapons had 
prior knowledge of the buyers’ intentions and were therefore deliberately support-
ing terrorist activities.226 For most criminals, a terrorist attack that involves many 
random victims is often a bridge too far.227 The criminal underworld also prefers to 
operate in the shadows, while a terrorist attack attracts massive attention from law 
enforcement services.228 Equally, the penalty for the illegal sale of firearms is 
increased if it takes place in a terrorist context. The police indicate that, despite 
these concerns, not many questions are generally asked when a weapon is sold in 
the criminal milieu. They add that it is also not always easy to refuse certain busi-
ness deals, since all kinds of pressure can be brought to bear to force the sale of the 
weapon. Furthermore, they state that the boundaries between terrorist and crimi-
nal networks seem to be becoming blurred because of terrorists’ criminal anteced-
ents, for example hold-ups and firearms possession and use.229
The use of the internet to illegally obtain firearms, especially the dark web, is 
another possibility. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office sees this to be the modus oper-
andi of lone actors in particular.230 They are less likely to have criminal antecedents, 
so their access to the illicit firearms market is significantly limited. The Federal 
Police state further that lone wolves are less likely to use a firearm, partly because, 
contrary to, for example, Syrian returnees, they have had no experience on the bat-
tlefield.231 Returnees, on the other hand, do have such experience.232 The Federal 
Police are concerned that returnees can use their contacts in Syria or Iraq to import 
weapons in order to use them in attacks, sell them on the European illicit firearms 
market, or build up a weapons arsenal themselves in order to supply radical 
networks.233 
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3.1.3  Terrorists’ exploitation of the opportunities provided by the 
legal market 
Besides the traditional selling of lethal-purpose firearms on the criminal black 
market, terrorist networks have also been able to obtain their firearms in different 
ways, for example by acquiring reactivated firearms that were previously sold as 
deactivated firearms on the legal European firearms market. 
A well-known example of this are the firearms Amédy Coulibaly used during his 
attack on the Hypercacher supermarket in Paris on 7 January 2015 (see also the 
chapter on France). On that day, just a couple of hours after the Kouachi brothers’ 
attack on the Charlie Hebdo office, Coulibaly entered a Jewish Hypercacher super-
market in the east of Paris armed with two Vz.58 assault rifles and two Tokarev TT33 
pistols. He used his guns to shoot four people dead and held more than 20 super-
market customers and employees hostage for several hours before French security 
forces killed him. Following this incident, four additional Tokarev TT33 pistols and 
a Nagant M1895 dating from 1932 were found in his apartment. With the exception 
the Nagant revolver, all of these firearms were (poorly) deactivated in Slovakia and 
were legally sold by the same Slovakian store (AFG Security).234 In the immediate 
aftermath of these attacks in Paris it was repeatedly reported in the international 
media that Coulibaly had bought several of the firearms used by the Kouachi broth-
ers in Belgium. Soon afterwards, Metin K., a man from Charleroi, Belgium, reported 
to the police that he had been in contact with Coulibaly in the previous months and 
had intended to defraud him in the sale of a car. During a house search the police 
found documents that also indicated a possible sale of firearms and ammunition to 
Coulibaly. Metin K. denied selling firearms to Coulibaly and was released in March 
2015.235 Police investigations into the origin of these weapons quickly pointed to a 
number of other Belgian connections. One of AFG Security’s customers was Patrick 
H., a Belgian living in Marcinelle, Belgium. This man legally bought around 170 
deactivated firearms from the Slovakian store, including at least one of the Vz.58 
assault rifles that ended up reactivated in Coulibaly’s hands. Patrick H. admitted 
that he sold this firearm on an online auction site, but claimed it was sold to a 
Northern European man and denied reactivating the gun. Interestingly, Belgian 
police had found materials that could be used to reactivate firearms in Patrick H.’s 
house during an earlier search in May 2014. 
Another AFG Security customer was Claude Hermant, a Frenchman living in 
Comines, Belgium, who is known to be a militant right-wing extremist. The investi-
gation revealed that from his survival shop near Lille, France, Hermant ordered 
dozens of deactivated firearms from AFG Security, the other Vz.58 assault rifle and 








admitted selling a total of 40 to 50 deactivated firearms, but denied selling them to 
Coulibaly. The person suspected of having supplied firearms to Coulibaly is Antoine 
D., a Frenchman from Pas de Calais in northern France who is known in right-wing 
extremist circles and who had worked in Hermant’s chip shop. In April 2016 Spanish 
police arrested Antoine D. during a joint Spanish-French police operation in the 
vicinity of Malaga, Spain.236 In April 2017, during a coordinated operation, French 
and Belgian police arrested several people on suspicion of having provided logisti-
cal support to the Paris attackers in January 2015. In Belgium, at the request of a 
French prosecutor, two people (including Metin K.) were arrested in Charleroi on 
suspicion of delivering firearms to Coulibaly.237
Terrorist networks have also been able to take advantage of other opportunities 
offered by the legal firearms market. In recent years terrorists succeeded in legally 
acquiring components for their firearms. It was ascertained that Khalid El Bakraoui 
had legally bought magazines for assault rifles at various times in the summer of 
2015 from a firearms retailer in Walloon-Brabant, Belgium;238 this retailer alerted 
the law enforcement services. The Federal Prosecutor’s Office suspects that these 
magazines were used in the attacks on 13 November 2015 in Paris, and possibly also 
in the failed attack on the Thalys train between Brussels and Paris in August 2015.239 
As a direct result of the El Bakraoui brothers’ legal purchase of magazines, the 
Belgian Federal Government is currently preparing an amendment to the Weapons 
Act in terms of which a licence will be required to buy magazines. 
3.2 Firearms among right-wing terrorist networks 
Although Belgium has not been the scene of a right-wing terror attack for a very 
long time, firearms have been found in the possession of extremist groups, some of 
whom were planning an actual terrorist attacks. At the moment the activities of 
right-wing extremist groups in Belgium are not believed to be focused on carrying 
out attacks. According to OCAD, right-wing extremist groups with potentially 
violent motives are generally limited in size and often disappear very quickly. 
However, a number of key individuals in the Belgian right-wing extremist milieu 
keep turning up in potentially violent groups and some of them are known for 
being gun enthusiasts.240 Besides this, a number of right-wing extremist groups in 
Belgium are particularly active online.241 
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The best-known recent example of a right-wing extremist group that possessed 
firearms is Bloed, Bodem, Eer en Trouw (Blood, Soil, Honour and Loyalty, or BBET).I 
In 2006 a number of members of this group were arrested, and sentenced in 2014 
for being members of a terrorist organisation and for illegal possession of weapons. 
BBET was a Belgian splinter group of Blood & Honour, the international right-wing 
extremist group, and consisted of a hard core of around twenty people, surrounded 
by a larger group of youngish people who attended BBET activities and visited its 
website. The leader of BBET was Tomas Boutens, a professional soldier who was 
stationed in the army barracks at Leopoldsburg. He was said to have had plans to 
carry out attacks to disrupt Belgian infrastructure. The investigation carried out by 
the Federal Prosecutor’s Office showed that, since 2004, Boutens had been recruit-
ing people with right-wing extremist ideas, often in the army barracks or units 
where he worked. He also organised paramilitary exercises, survival weekends and 
firearms training, some of which took place on army property without the know-
ledge of his superiors. In the context of this investigation, on 7 September 2006 the 
police carried out searches of several army barracks and private addresses. They 
seized various firearms, a large quantity of ammunition, detonators for landmines, 
explosives and a homemade bomb. In addition, a template for a letter claiming 
credit for attacks and incriminating documents (such as a self-written manual on 
how to carry out attacks) were also discovered. In total, 17 people, including ten sol-
diers, were arrested. House searches were again carried out on the following day. 
More than one hundred weapons were seized, including assault rifles, riot guns and 
pistols. In addition, weapons parts, ammunition, binoculars and silencers were 
found. In total the police found around four hundred weapons during the searches, 
most of which came from Eastern Europe. It is not clear how the BBET members and 
their network had acquired their arsenal of weapons. 
International connections often exist among the various European right-wing 
extremist groups. These connections occasionally result in specific (Belgian) key 
individuals supplying weapons to other non-Belgian groups. For example, at the 
end of 2011 the Dutch police arrested various members of the Dutch right-wing 
extremist group Ulfhednar, a breakaway group from Blood & Honour. Various fire-
arms were found (including a ‘vuurbuks’ – a type of rifle – and a hunting rifle with a 
sawn-off barrel), as well as ammunition. One of the individuals arrested at the time 
was Tomas Boutens, the key figure in BBET. According to the Public Prosecutor, it 
was Boutens who had brought firearms from Belgium to the Netherlands. For that, 
I There was a shooting in May 2006 in the centre of Antwerp, when Hans van Themsche killed a 
toddler and her Malinese nanny and injured a woman of Turkish origin. Van Themsche was acting 
from racist motives. It later transpired that he had been visiting the BBET website, among others 










he was sentenced to ten months in prison, six of which were suspended.242 The 
investigation into BBET showed that Boutens and one of his associates were dealing 
in illegal weapons in order to fund their activities.243 
What stands out in the membership list of Belgian right-wing extremist groups is 
that it often includes people who are, or were, members of the Belgian armed forces. 
They therefore know how to use and maintain firearms.244 The military intelligence 
service is monitoring around fifty Belgian soldiers with extremist sympathies, 
including at least four members of the Soldaten van Odin (Soldiers of Odin).I The 
military intelligence service not only monitors people with extreme right-wing 
views, but also, for example, those with Islamist views. These soldiers are closely 
watched because they receive military training and have access to weapons through 
their professional activities. As long as they do not commit criminal offences they 
are allowed to remain in the armed forces.245
4.  Conclusions
Despite a more comprehensive approach in the policy aimed at combating the 
illicit firearms market, with a tightening of the legislative framework and the fight 
against firearms trafficking becoming a priority for both police and the judicial 
authorities in 2012, in recent years Belgium has often been labelled one of Europe’s 
hotspots for illicit firearms, and the place to go for terrorists looking for guns. At 
the moment it is impossible to estimate the size of the illicit firearms market due 
to a lack comprehensive, reliable and detailed quantitative data on seized firearms. 
In order to analyse the nature and dynamics of the Belgian illicit firearms market, 
we are therefore dependent on interviews with key actors in the fight against this 
market. 
This study has demonstrated that firearms end up on the illicit market in Belgium 
in various ways. Each of these sources is characterised by specific dynamics and has 
a different impact on the illicit market. The most important sources in Belgium are 
cross-border smuggling, the conversion of blank-firing guns and the reactivation of 
deactivated firearms. Firearms are generally smuggled by road and in small quanti-
ties by opportunistic individuals who are not part of large-scale criminal organisa-
tions. Most smuggling currently involves firearms from the Balkans, but Belgian 
I The objective of this right-wing group is to ‘protect Western values’ and ‘to safeguard the coun-
try’ against refugees and migrants. Soldiers of Odin originated in Scandinavia and operates there 
as a kind of civil guard. A branch of this group has been active in Belgium since 2016, mainly 
online.
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police fear that in the future other countries in the European periphery, notably 
Ukraine, will also become important sources of smuggled firearms. In recent years 
Belgian police forces have observed a significant increase in the numbers of con-
verted alarm weapons and reactivated firearms on the illicit gun market. Converted 
alarm pistols, which are usually made in Turkey, are rather cheap and can be con-
verted very easily. The reactivated firearms that have been encountered by Belgian 
police are generally not deactivated in Belgium, but were poorly deactivated abroad 
and smuggled into the country. A number of handymen in Belgium have the neces-
sary expertise, skills, and tools to reactivate these firearms, as well as the criminal 
connections to sell them on to the criminal world. Other significant ways in which 
firearms can leak into the illicit firearms market are theft (mainly from private 
homes) and the ‘blackening’ of firearms. 
The Belgian illicit firearms market is largely driven by criminal demand for fire-
arms. Not only international drug traffickers who often require firearms operate in 
Belgium, but armed robbers and criminal motorcycle gangs also create demand for 
firearms on the illicit market. Interestingly, different patterns in the acquisition, 
possession, and use of firearms can be observed between and within criminal envi-
ronments. Despite a lack of good data on seized firearms, it is clear that mainly 
handguns and (converted) blank-firing weapons are available on the criminal 
market for firearms in Belgium. Only specific categories of criminals – such as 
major drug traffickers, robbers targeting heavily secured targets and OMGs – have 
access to assault rifles. This difference in access is strongly linked to the fact that 
the Belgian illicit gun market is traditionally a closed one in which criminal con-
nections and trust between buyer and seller are key factors. 
Terrorist networks have also been able to acquire firearms on the Belgian illicit gun 
market. Various types of terrorist networks have been active in Belgium since the 
1980s. The country has not only been the target of several terrorist attacks, but has 
also served as an important logistics source for terrorist activities in other coun-
tries, including the acquisition of firearms. Currently the acquisition, possession, 
and use of firearms in terrorist networks are mainly limited to Islamist and right-
wing terrorist networks. Members of these networks have mostly used their crimi-
nal connections to acquire firearms on the illicit firearms market. In addition, ter-
rorists have not only used their past criminal connections to acquire weapons, but 
their prior criminal activities have trained them in the use of firearms. Not surpris-
ingly, the types of firearms used by terrorist networks are largely a reflection of the 
types of guns that are available on the criminal illicit gun market and the opportu-
nities offered by the legal firearms market (especially in terms of gun components 
and deactivated firearms). There is, however, a significant over-representation of 








While this type of firearm is not that easily accessible on the illicit market in 
Belgium, Islamist terrorist networks in particular have been able to acquire them. 
The crime-terror nexus and specifically terrorists’ use of criminal connections to 
acquire weapons are very visible in Belgium, especially in Islamist terrorist net-
works. On the other hand, several members of right-wing terrorist groups have 
been part of the armed forces. It could be argued that this has given them easy 
access to firearms and training in their use in combat situations. Criminals and 
members of terrorist networks from Belgium have also provided firearms to 
members of foreign terrorist networks, but the opposite is also the case: the fire-
arms used in the attack on the Jewish Museum in Brussels probably came from the 
Marseille underworld. This clearly illustrates the transnational nature of the threat 
posed by terrorists’ access to illicit gun markets in Europe: terrorists not only arm 
themselves on the local illicit firearms market, but also use the criminal firearms 
markets in other countries to acquire their weapons.
The recent terrorist attacks have further boosted the policy focus in Belgium on the 
illicit gun market in general and have led to the adoption of important measures. 
These include the use of telephone taps for gun-related crimes, and increased focus 
on an improved (national and international) system of information exchange, 
strengthened police investigations, a stricter prosecution policy, the development 
of a better intelligence picture of the illicit gun market and improved expertise 
among key actors. 
We can conclude that the current heightened prioritisation of terrorism in Belgium 
has become a double-edged sword in terms of combating the illicit firearms market. 
On the one hand – given recent terrorist incidents’ links with the Belgian illicit gun 
market – it has led to additional focus on illicit firearms trafficking and the deploy-
ment of greater skills and more personnel to fight the problem. This has mainly 
benefited specialised police services in the Brussels region. By contrast, at the 
central level of the Federal Police and in police entities in many other areas the ter-
rorist threat has brought about a displacement of people and resources to the areas 
of preventing, investigating and analysing the terrorist threat. Moreover, despite 
the specific terrorist access to the illicit firearms market, Belgian law enforcement 
and security services still generally treat terrorism and illicit firearms trafficking as 
two distinct problems. Our research has shown that there is still much room for 
improving information sharing and developing joint actions between and within 
the services that combat both of these closely interconnected phenomena.
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The territory of the Republic of Croatia has been a corridor for the transportation of 
people, goods and ideas from its early history to the present day. The modern secu-
rity environment and the risks facing Croatia are partly the legacy of its recent 
history, its geostrategic and geopolitical position, and its role as a transit country on 
the so-called Balkan routeI for the smuggling of people, drugs, contraband and fire-
arms from Asia, Africa and South Eastern Europe to Western Europe, as well as the 
smuggling of various goods such as stolen vehicles and synthetic drugs in the oppo-
site direction. As a result Croatia is often referred to in the context of organised 
crime. In professional security related circles it is usually linked to the smuggling of 
heroin from Afghanistan – the world’s largest producer – to Western Europe, where 
there are developed markets and high demand for heroin. In recent years the Balkan 
route has also been important for the movement of migrants.1 This route has at 
least three main branches: the Bulgarian branch, the east Balkan route and the 
Adriatic route.2
Not surprisingly, the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s strongly impacted the security situ-
ation in Croatia and trafficking along the Balkan route. On 25 June 1991 the Republic 
of Croatia declared its independence and broke its ties with Yugoslavia. The regime 
in Belgrade refused to accept this and attempted to undermine Croatian independ-
ence by encouraging rebellion among the local Serb population and sending the 
I The assumption is that the original route ran through Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Macedonia, 
Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia to Austria, Italy, and other Western Euro-
pean countries.
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Yugoslav People’s Army to attack Croatia. The violence soon escalated and signifi-
cant parts of the country became a battlefield for the next few years. This caused the 
relocation of the original Balkan route away from Croatian territory. The fighting 
ended in a Croatian victory in 1995 and the country was able to reclaim all of its occu-
pied territory and take control of its current borders. During what is known in Croatia 
as the Homeland War, an international arms embargo was imposed on the country, 
which armed itself by confiscating weapons from the Yugoslav People’s Army, obtain-
ing supplies on the black market and increasing domestic production. 
The Yugoslav wars also influenced the dynamics of the Balkan route after the wars 
and, among other things, boosted firearms trafficking from South Eastern Europe 
to Western Europe. During the wars in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, par-
ticularly in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, significant quantities of small 
arms, ammunition and explosives remained in the illegal possession of ordinary 
citizens. Simultaneously, the continuing demand from organised crime groups 
(OCGs) for arms in both Western and Eastern Europe motivated such groups to reac-
tivate the Balkan route and take up arms smuggling. 
Box 1: Research design
This study used a research methodology that includes an analysis of various 
sets of materials. Firstly, an extensive literature review and comprehensive 
document analysis were carried out. This consisted of analysing existing 
research on the availability of illegal firearms in Croatia prepared by the 
South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearing House for the Control of Small 
Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), complemented by analysis of Croatia’s 
current legislative and strategic framework for firearms control. In addition, 
quantitative data from the Ministry of the Interior was obtained and publicly 
available statistical data were collected and analysed. Obtaining these data 
was time-consuming and their analysis was hindered by the challenge of 
comparing and verifying disparate datasets.
Given the lack of significant and reliable open-source data, the research 
team introduced two additional research methods to address the questions 
posed for this research project. Firstly, interviews were held with key actors, 
including high-level government officials responsible for firearms-related 
issues from the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Foreign and European 
Affairs, and Security and Intelligence Agency; firearms business practitioners 
(manufacturers of and traders in firearms); relevant scientists; and experts 








personnel) who deal with this area. During this phase of the research formal 
interviews were conducted with 11 high-level government officials and six 
practitioners, scientists and experts. This part of the research process also 
included a visit to the largest Croatian manufacturer of small arms and light 
weapons (HS Produkt Ltd).
Finally, the research team also collected and analysed data gathered via 
questionnaires distributed to experts. For the purposes of the research, two 
questionnaires were developed, the first covering specific points that 
required fuller responses and the second statistical in nature. Both ques-
tionnaires covered three thematic areas: 
1. the characteristics of the illegal weapons market in Croatia;
2. the availability of weapons to terrorists on this market; and
3. Croatian policies to deal with (terrorist access to) the illegal weapons market. 
The first questionnaire containing 20 questions was distributed to the experts 
referred to above (11 high-level government officials and six practitioners, sci-
entists and experts). After it had been completed we held a meeting with the 
experts so that we could go through their answers and analyse them together. 
This meeting and the interviews were held in Zagreb from March to October 
2017. Between 1 March 2017 and 21 April 2017 a total of 102 statistical question-
naires were collected from experts in all parts of Croatia, which were pro-
cessed using IBM SPSS software. This questionnaire contained 22 questions 
requiring answers reflecting participants’ perceptions of the matters raised.I 
 
This chapter presents the results of an investigation into the size and dynamics of 
the illegal firearms market in Croatia, as well as this market’s potential availability 
to terrorist organisations and/or individuals with terrorist intentions. Despite the 
country’s reputation as a source and transit country for illegal firearms trafficking, 
in-depth research on the illicit firearms market and illicit firearms trafficking in 
Croatia is currently lacking. This is partly due to the lack of national databases that 
contain relevant data for such research. In addition, publicly available data are 
often fragmented. A key contribution to this research project is constituted by the 
results of interviews with and surveys of experts and analysts who deal with or have 
dealt directly or indirectly with the subject area during their professional careers 
(see Box 1). Indeed, this is the first research project designed to comprehensively 
I In a very small number of cases some participants did not answer or answered with multiple answers. 
In such situations these answers or sections without answers were excluded from the data analysis.
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and systematically examine the illegal firearms market in Croatia that includes the 
opinions of key experts and stakeholders in the field. Institutions that deal with 
these issues were also actively involved in the research, with some providing access 
to their databases. 
This chapter consists of three sections and a conclusion. In the first section we give 
an overview of Croatian national policy to fight the illicit firearms market (and ter-
rorist access to this market) and the modus operandi and models of cooperation of 
official institutions working in this area. In the second section we analyse the size 
and characteristics of the country’s illicit firearms market, and in the third section 
we discuss the potential for terrorists to procure firearms from this market. 
1. Croatian national policy to fight the illicit 
firearms market and terrorist access to it
1.1 Main elements of Croatia’s security policy
The Republic of Croatia is located in the Central European, Danube, Adriatic and 
Mediterranean regions. The country designs its strategies and policies to protect its 
national interests, citizens’ security, national identity and the fundamental values 
defined by its Constitution, and to achieve its national goals and its economic, polit-
ical and social development. Through its own actions, combined with numerous 
international processes, a high level of security has been achieved that enables 
Croatia to achieve balanced development. However, external and internal threats, 
risks, and challenges that change continuously and rapidly are highly complex, 
inter-linked, and often unpredictable create the need for the constant development 
of national security policy and responsiveness to changes. The need to ensure such 
a framework was the driving force behind the new National Security Strategy of the 
Republic of Croatia adopted on 8 June 2017.3
This strategy clearly highlights the security threats, risks and challenges facing 
Croatia at the global level, and the levels of Europe and the European neighbour-
hood (primarily South Eastern Europe), as well as ways of protecting the country’s 
national interests and achieving national security.
The country’s south-eastern neighbouring surroundings are a source of potential 
challenges in its attempts to protect its national interests. Political instability; insuf-








social, ethnic and inter-nationality tensions make the region’s security situation 
very fragile, which strongly affects Croatian interests. Croatia’s south east neigh-
bourhood shows trends of increasing intolerance, radicalism and extremism, espe-
cially Islamist radicalism. The National Security Strategy states that in some coun-
tries, for years, there has been a visible defamatory campaign directed against the 
Republic of Croatia with all the features of hybrid and special action, i.e. planned, 
permanent and systematic activities supported by state bodies. The security threats 
facing the country include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
dual-use equipment and technologies, in particular through the use of Croatian ter-
ritory to transport them to other countries.4 The unstable security situation in the 
Middle East, North Africa and Ukraine increases demand for weapons and military 
equipment obtained through illegal channels, and members of the criminal under-
world see fulfilling this demand as a profitable activity.5
Unresolved issues of border delimitation with some neighbouring countries could 
have a negative impact on the effective control of state borders and surveillance of 
the state territory of Croatia. The probability of terrorist attacks in the country is 
low, but the potential consequences were such attacks to occur are high, especially 
in the context of the tourist and transport sectors. One of the security threats facing 
Croatia is the transit of members of terrorist organisations across the country’s ter-
ritory via illegal migration routes. Like in every country, corruption is also in Croatia 
a challenge that affects the functioning of the free market, economic growth, and 
the independence and efficiency of public and state activities, and results in a loss 
of trust in public institutions. Organised crime is a threat to national security 
because it jeopardises the country’s institutional system, economic and financial 
stability, and public security. Croatia’s economic and geographical positions are 
among the reasons for the threats it faces from transnational organised crime. 
Landmines and unexploded ordnance left over from the Homeland War also remain 
a security problem for the country.6
Croatia attempts to ensure its national security by coordinated action in all areas of 
its development, not only security instruments and related activities. The main ele-
ments of the country’s security policy involve the development of a national secu-
rity policy, structure and capabilities that will ensure effective action not only 
within the national territory, but also beyond it, both independently and through 
joint international efforts to achieve peace, resolve conflicts and build trust. Croatia 
recognises that in the modern world the internal (national) and external (interna-
tional) aspects of security are strongly linked, requiring a commitment to a compre-
hensive approach to achieving security-related goals. These goals are pursued 
through a security paradigm based on a human security model designed to ensure 
the security of every Croatian citizen. The country will use all available resources 
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for the achievement and protection of national interests and the implementation of 
strategic goals, in proportion to the threats and risks to which it is exposed.7
Specifically – and relevant to the present research – the smuggling and (illegal) dis-
tribution of weapons is recognised as a challenge. This distribution process was 
largely uncontrolled during the Homeland War period (1991-1995), and conse-
quently opened up the potential for an illegal trade in small arms and light weapons, 
because a lot of weapons have stayed out of state control. That is why numerous 
efforts were and continue to be made to control small arms and light weapons as 
much as possible. This research project aims to develop an understanding of the 
phenomenon and to provide recommendations for future approaches to it. 
According to the Croatian Security and Intelligence Agency, arms smuggling from 
South Eastern Europe to European Union (EU) countries mainly involves the 
weapons remaining in circulation from the 1990s wars, as well those leaking from 
inadequately secured arms depots in some countries.8 The latest Security and 
Intelligence Agency public report for 2017 goes even further in its assessment, 
stating that: “Due to a number of crisis areas in the Middle East and Africa, demand for 
weapons and military equipment through illegal channels has increased. Given the high 
profitability of the arms trade, members of the criminal milieu from the Republic of 
Croatia and surrounding states are trying to position themselves as intermediaries in that 
trade. Such weapons, using false export documentation, end up in areas under an inter-
national embargo.” 9 
While interesting from a security point of view and for the present research, this 
statement is problematic because it does not specify to which areas under an inter-
national embargo it refers, while it is important to note that the present researchers 
were unable to uncover any facts that confirm such a claim.
Within the structure of the national security system, the authority to prevent and 
suppress the illegal arms trade, prevent illegal weapons production, and control 
exports and imports of military equipment and dual-use products is invested in the 
following bodies: the Ministry of the Interior and police; the Ministry of Finance; 
the Ministry of the Economy, Entrepreneurship and Crafts; the Ministry of Foreign 
and European Affairs; and the entire intelligence system (primarily the Security 
and Intelligence Agency and the Military Security and Intelligence Agency). Certain 








1.2 The most important elements of the Weapons Act 
and Criminal Code
The normative framework that regulates firearms-related issues in the Republic of 
Croatia – including both legal and illegal weapons – is primarily determined by the 
Weapons Act, while the criminal law dealing with illegal weapons and the illegal 
possession of weapons is regulated by the Criminal Code. This normative frame-
work is fully harmonised with the relevant EU legislation. The suppression of the 
illegal weapons market in Croatia falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the 
Interior. The General Police Directorate – as the key operational component of the 
Interior Ministry – carries out measures within its competence aimed at, among 
other things, the prevention and suppression of criminality. Criminality related to 
the illegal weapons market is dealt with by the Police Directorate’s working unit 
responsible for the suppression of organised criminality. The normative penal 
framework is contained in the Criminal Code, which in Article 331 lays down the 
criminal offence pertaining to the ‘unauthorised ownership, manufacturing and 
procurement of weapons and explosive substances’.
The Weapons Act was adopted in 2007 and has been amended three times.10 The 
first amendment involved minor tweaks. The second amendment in 2012 was 
designed to fully harmonise the Act with the relevant EU legislation, within the 
framework of the free movement of persons and goods within the EU. In particular 
this amendment harmonised the Weapons Act with Directive 2008/51/EC of the 
European Parliament and Council of 21 May 2008 amending Council Directive 
91/477/EEC on the control of the acquisition and possession of weapons.11 The third 
amendment to the Weapons Act was in 2017 to ensure compliance with Croatia’s 
Act on Explosive Substances and the Production and Transportation of Weapons.12
The Weapons Act classifies weapons into four categories: the possession, handling 
and trafficking of weapons in Category A (such as automatic weapons, military-
grade weapons, explosive weapons, weapons hidden in other items, etc.) are pro-
hibited to the public; weapons in Category B are those firearms for which citizens 
must have previously obtained a possession and carrying permit from the compe-
tent authority, such as semi-automatic weapons, semi-automatic long weapons 
with a magazine containing up to three rounds, antique weapons, etc.; weapons in 
Category C are permitted weapons for which no permit is required, but which need 
to be registered with the competent authority, such as an air weapon of energy force 
greater than 10.5 J and a calibre greater than 4.5 mm, a gas weapon, and a longbow 
or crossbow with a force greater than 450 N; and weapons in Category D are permit-
ted weapons that do not require a permit or registration.13
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The Weapons Act primarily regulates the legal possession of weapons and is very strict 
in terms of the conditions under which citizens can legally possess weapons and the 
deadline for the issuance of permits. According to the Act, Croatian citizens may be 
issued with a permit to own or own and carry weapons if they have a good reason for 
procuring such weapons, have reached the age of 21, have not been convicted of vio-
lence-related criminal offences or misdemeanours, there are no other circumstances 
indicating that the weapons could be misused, are equipped to safeguard the weapons, 
and have the necessary mental and physical capabilities and technical knowledge to 
handle the weapons. Citizens can procure weapons if their lives are in danger and if 
they engage in sports shooting or hunting; for the latter reason they must prove their 
membership of a hunting society or sports shooting club.14
Article 97 of the Weapons Act prescribes that citizens who illegally possess weapons 
in categories A, B and C are obliged to report this to the police. The police will take 
over the weapons and ammunition at the place where they are located and the 
owner will be issued a receipt. If a citizen wishes to disable a weapon that has been 
surrendered, he/she has to apply for a weapon deactivation permit within eight 
days of the date of the handover of the weapon. The costs of disabling the weapon 
are borne by the applicant. According to the Misdemeanour Act, Criminal Code and 
Police Act, if a citizen surrenders illegally owned weapons to the police prior to the 
police taking action to recover them, no criminal proceedings will be instituted 
against him/her.15
According to the 2002 National Programme for Increasing General Security by the 
Voluntary Surrender of Weapons, Ammunition and Explosive Devices (hereafter the 
National Programme), 394,419 firearms were registered in the possession of 236,918 
people. Thus, one in every 19 citizens of the Republic of Croatia possesses at least one 
registered firearm. Of that number, a large proportion of weapons are registered for 
possession (mostly hunting weapons), another part for possession and carrying, and 
a smaller part as a token. The larger number of registered weapons for possession 
and carrying arises from the fact that included in this number are weapons for 
hunting and sports shooting, and weapons privately owned by police officers, prison 
officers and members of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia who are author-
ised to own and carry weapons in accordance with the Weapons Act.16
The current Criminal Code was adopted in October 2011 and entered into force on 1 
January 2013.17 The general criminal framework for the punishment of illegal 
firearm offences is contained in the previously mentioned Article 331. Punishment 
by imprisonment for up to five years can be imposed for various types of firearms-
related criminal offences. Besides Article 331, the use of weapons of some kind con-








regard to terrorism: it is considered a criminal offense if someone who manufac-
tures, possesses, supplies, transports or uses firearms, explosives, or nuclear, bio-
logical or chemical weapons with the purpose to cause major fear among the popu-
lation, to force a state or an international organization to do or not to do something, 
or to seriously jeopardize or destroy fundamental constitutional, political, eco-
nomic or social structures of a state or an international organization18 
The second questionnaire (see Box 1) attempted to ascertain the surveyed experts’ 
perceptions of the adequacy of the normative framework of the Republic of Croatia 
in terms of issues relevant to this research. It is interesting to look at the answers to 
the following two questions: 
1. What are your views on the existing system of regulation relating to the 
illegal possession, use and trafficking of weapons? 
2. Is there a need to increase the control of legal and illegal weapons by stricter 
laws? 
Of 102 surveyed experts, the distribution of the answers to the first question is as 
follows: 7% of them answered ‘regulation is inappropriate’; 37% answered ‘needs to 
be upgraded’; 36% answered that ‘regulation is satisfactory, but that the problem is 
its application’; while 20% answered ‘regulation is appropriate’. Answers to the 
second question are: 41% answered ‘the problem is not in the laws, but in their 
implementation’, 40% answered ‘yes’, and 19% answered ‘no, the laws are satisfac-
tory’. In this regard it should be noted that most of the respondents were police 
officers who wanted a stricter legal framework and stronger sanctions in the area 
being researched.
In light of these responses and the totality of the other responses, it should be borne 
in mind that while this research was under way in 2017, the Weapons Act, the 
Criminal Code, and the Act on Explosive Substances and the Production and 
Transportation of Weapons were amended to achieve greater standards of control 
and regulation of the subject area. Analysis of the dynamics of changes in other 
normative, system-related and operational procedures caused us to conclude that 
the Republic of Croatia currently has satisfactory existing regulations dealing with 
the illegal possession, use and trafficking of weapons, and that the problem is pri-
marily that of their implementation. Although a high percentage of participants 
advocated stricter regulation, we consider that this is not necessary, but that more 
attention needs to be devoted to the implementation of existing legislation: laws 
can be written with lofty ideals, but if they are not implemented properly, the whole 
framework remains incomplete. We therefore wish to emphasise the importance of 
the effective implementation of weapons-related laws and regulations.
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1.3 National policy dealing with illegal firearms 
possession and the illegal firearms market
The Republic of Croatia’s policies for the control of illegal weapons and their avail-
ability to terrorists have been established in strategic and operational documents 
for the prevention and suppression of terrorism, as well as normative frameworks 
that provide for the criminalising of illicit weapons and national programmes for 
the surrender of illegally owned weapons. These constituent parts form the basis of 
national policies for the control of illegal weapons, which are implemented by the 
relevant bodies.
National policies to minimise the possibility of terrorists obtaining weapons on the 
illegal weapons market are very strict and are structured to prevent such activities 
as far as is humanly possible. Croatia complies strictly with national and EU regula-
tions regarding donations and sales of weapons to other countries. However, 
Croatia cannot prevent individuals or terrorist groups operating outside the country 
from accessing weapons from Croatia or obtaining weapons produced in Croatia 
and transferring, donating or selling them to third countries. All the interviewed 
actors stressed this.
1.3.1 Voluntary surrender programmes
With the aim of reducing the number of illegal weapons in the possession of its citi-
zens, Croatia has taken significant preventive actions that have resulted in the 
large-scale voluntary surrender of illegal firearms left over from the Homeland War 
(including ammunition and explosives). This has reduced the possibility of such 
firearms ending up on the illegal firearms market.
Three programmes should be highlighted, each of which consisted of various pro-
cesses and phases:
• The initial phase of programme development and implementation 
(1993-2002); 
• Awareness-raising campaigns (1 September 2007-31 December 2014); and
• Weapons collection programme (1 September 2007-continuing).
During these three programmes a large number of weapons were voluntary surren-
dered: 54,818 firearms, 13,719,940 rounds of ammunition, 2,068,892 explosive 
devices, and 3,352,948.79 kg of military and commercial explosives. In the follow-








Initial phase of programme development and implementation 
(1993-2002)
From 1993 to 2002 six campaignsI were conducted to encourage citizens to volun-
tarily surrender illegal weapons. From 31 May 2001 to 31 December 2002 the 
National Programme was implemented as the concluding phase of the preceding 
efforts to communicate to citizens the need to surrender illegal weapons. The 
purpose was to consolidate relevant indicators and data from previous activities, as 
well as to carry out additional activities in this phase. The Ministry of the Interior 
oversaw these activities. At the conclusion of the National Programme Croatia’s 
citizens had been given six opportunities to surrender or legalise unrecorded fire-
arms without sanction. Between January 1996 and January 1997 people were paid to 
surrender illegal weapons, and during this period the largest number of weapons 
were surrendered to police supervision. In total, 30,542,894 kunas (approximately 
€4 million today) were paid out. 
During these campaigns citizens surrendered 33,598 firearms (including automatic 
rifles, sub-machine guns and similar weapons); 1,670,355 explosive devices (bombs, 
landmines, various kinds of portable unguided anti-tank weapons and similar 
weapons); 5,080,693 rounds of ammunition; and 7,597 kg of military and commer-
cial explosives.
Awareness-raising campaigns (1 September 2007-31 December 2014)
As a continuation of the previous programme, the Ministry of the Interior and the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) launched a joint action entitled 
‘Less Weapons, Less Tragedy’. The aim was to sensitise the public to the issue of 
illicit firearms and encourage the voluntary surrender of weapons, as well as to 
raise public awareness of the dangers of improper handling of weapons and explo-
sive devices. The campaign lasted from October 2007 to March 2008, starting at the 
same time as the introduction of the new Weapons Act, which had a new provision 
to provide the time-unlimited voluntary surrender of prohibited and permitted 
weapons. In other words, weapons could always be surrendered and no misde-
meanour or criminal procedure was initiated against the person who did so. In this 
eight-month period, citizens surrendered 697 automatic firearms and 14,741 explo-
sive devices categorised as prohibited weapons, and 1,001 items categorised as 
permitted weapons. A total of 644,442 rounds of ammunition and 720.62 kg of 
various explosives were collected. UNDP considered this initiative to be particu-
I These campaigns covered the following periods: 30 October 1992-30 April 1993; 10 April 1993-10 
April 1994; 5 January 1996-5 January 1997; 19 February 1997-19 August 1997; 1 January 1999-2 
August 1999; 22 February 2001-22 February 2002.
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larly successful and stressed that this was ‘the most effective campaign to collect 
weapons in the history of the UN’.19
At the end of 2008 the Ministry of the Interior and UNDP published the document 
‘Destroying Weapons for Community Development’, which, along with other activ-
ities, allowed for the continuation of the ‘Less Weapons, Less Tragedies’ campaign 
in the period 2009-2011. During 2010 and 2011 the slogan was changed to ‘Get Rid 
of Weapons without Sanctions and Make Your Life Safer’. From 2010 the EU funded 
the campaign through a regional project called SEESAC Assistance to Arms Control 
Activities in South East Europe.20 
In total, during the various promotional campaigns running from 1 September 
2007 to 31 December 2014 citizens voluntarily surrendered 9,484 firearms, 
3,340,835 kg of explosives, 87,691 explosive devices and 3,988,457 rounds of ammu-
nition of various calibres.21
Collection programme (1 September 2007-continuing)
The next major weapons collection programme carried out by the Ministry of the 
Interior began on 1 September 2007 and is still under way. Up to 28 February 2017 a 
total of 4,330 Category A automatic weapons and 310,846 explosive devices were col-
lected. A total of 7,406 Category B firearms were collected, while 4,650,790 rounds of 
various types of ammunition and 4,516.79 kg of explosives were handed in.22
1.3.2 National Strategy and Action Plan for the Control  
of Small Arms and Light Weapons
The Croatian government has adopted several strategies and action plans dealing 
with weapons – primarily illegal weapons and ammunition – to strengthen inter-
departmental action and set policy guidelines. In light of the fact that the issue of 
illegal weapons at the operational level in the Police Directorate of the Ministry of 
the Interior is dealt with in terms of the framework to deal with organised crime, 
it should be noted that Croatia annually prepares an Organised Crime Threat 
Assessment modelled on the Europol Serious and Organised Crime Threat 
Assessment; this document deals with all types of organised crime in Croatia. 
Because it is classified, it was not available for this research.
During the accession negotiations for Croatia’s EU membership, it was agreed in 
Negotiating Chapter 31 (‘Foreign, Security and Defence Policy’) that: “Croatia needs 
to continue to strengthen its implementation and enforcement capabilities as well as the 
transparency of weapons information and ensure that the National Strategy and the 








harmonised with the EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW 
[small arms and light weapons] and their ammunition”.23 
In order to fulfil this criterion, but also to adopt a strategic and implementation 
document to regulate small arms and light weapons control, the Croatian govern-
ment adopted the National Strategy and Action Plan for the Control of SALW 
(National SALW Strategy) on 10 September 2009.24
The overall objective of the National SALW Strategy was to build an effective system 
for controlling small arms and light weapons in all relevant areas. To operationalise 
this strategy 15 functional areas were established containing prescribed activities 
and deadlines for their implementation in order to enable the effective monitoring 
of the implementation of the planned measures. These areas include the establish-
ment of a National SALW Committee, border control measures, criminal investiga-
tions, awareness campaigns, and the collection and destruction of collected and 
seized firearms.I 
On 5 May 2015, after the completion of all the measures of the National SALW 
Strategy, the government adopted the ‘Decision on the Termination of the Work of 
the National Committee’ after concluding that all the requirements of the strategy’s 
Action Plan had been fulfilled. However, in our view this decision has undermined 
Croatia’s ability to combat the illegal firearms market (see section 1.5, below).25 
I The following 15 functional areas were identified:
• FP 1 – Establishing the National SALW Committee
• FP 2 – Coordination of activities
• FP 3 – Suppression of the illegal firearms market
• FP 4 – Control of procurement, handling, trade and production of firearms
• FP 5 – Border control measures
• FP 6 – Legal framework
• FP 7 – Criminal investigation 
• FP 8 – Implementation of Information system for firearms licensing
• FP 9 – Research and assessment of the illegal possession of firearms
• FP 10 – Awareness-raising campaigns
• FP 11 – Collection and destruction of collected and seized firearms
• FP 12 – Managing of supplies
• FP 13 – Reporting on applied measures 
• FP 14 – Export and import of firearms and ammunition
• FP 15 – Regional and international cooperation
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1.3.3 National Strategy for the Prevention and Suppression of 
Terrorism 
On 8 June 2017 the Croatian government adopted a new National Strategy for the 
Security of the Republic of Croatia (National Security Strategy), which recognises 
that the country is situated on one of the routes that OCGs use to smuggle weapons, 
people, drugs and other illegal assets. It is necessary to repeatedly underline how 
the estimates show that the probability of terrorist attack in Croatia is low, but the 
potential consequences of such an attack would be high. Countering terrorism will 
be implemented through an integrated approach and inter-agency co-operation, 
and strengthened international cooperation.26 
The National Security Strategy is the basic strategic document dealing with secu-
rity, and forms the basis for all other strategies and laws dealing with this issue, 
and also for the National Strategy for the Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism. 
This strategy was adopted by the Croatian government on 27 November 2008 and 
revised on 7 October 2015.27 It has five key pillars and determines the general frame-
work of Croatia’s efforts to fight terrorism. The five pillars are: the prevention of 
terrorism, the suppression of terrorism, protection from terrorism, the repair of 
damage after and recovery from a terrorist attack, and the criminal justice response 
to terrorism.
In order to operationalise and implement measures and harmonise the organisa-
tional framework for the prevention and suppression of terrorism, the Action Plan 
for the Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism was adopted on 28 April 2011.28 
The aim of this plan is to operationalise and create an effective operational system 
for the prevention and suppression of terrorism. In the section on measures to 
control and thwart the transport and supply of weapons, explosives and other 
devices intended for potential terrorist activities, the Action Plan lays down the fol-
lowing measures: 
• the surveillance of the production of, trade in and export of explosive devices 
and weapons; 
• supervision by national commissions that issue export licences for military 
and dual-purpose goods and other commissions tasked with monitoring 
related problem areas; 
• the gathering of data on businesses producing customised military prod-
ucts; the trade in weapons, explosives and other devices; and mediating 








• the investigation of theft from or forced entry into civil and military facilities 
for the production, processing, packaging or storage, transport, and (il)legal 
trade in weapons and military equipment; 
• the introduction and use of up-to-date technical equipment for the detection 
of explosives; radioactive substances; chemical, biological and other agents; 
and equipment for their production at all border crossing points and har-
bours, along with increased surveillance; 
• the provision of security and intelligence support for measures to protect 
military storage facilities and other storage facilities for ammunition and 
military equipment; 
• the control and management of stockpiles of weapons, explosives and other 
substances; and
• the suppression of the illegal possession of weapons.
In addition, the section on measures for the control of arms, explosives and other 
devices that could be used in terrorist attacks, the Action Plan prescribes: 
• the timely reporting to relevant institutions of cases where irregularities 
have been identified, particularly regarding the identification of possible 
thefts or other kind of misuse; 
• the planning, implementation, and supervision of technical and physical 
measures for the security of facilities and premises in which the mentioned 
items are kept; 
• the proper storage, safeguarding, handling, transportation, supply, mainte-
nance and surveillance of the items stored; 
• the central logging of infantry weapons and arms that are being withdrawn 
from use, sold or donated (exported), or destroyed for the purposes of recy-
cling and reuse; 
• the supervision of the activities of national commissions responsible for 
monitoring these matters; and 
• the improvement of technical solutions to protect buildings that might 
become potential targets for terrorist attacks and activities in compliance 
with security assessments of such buildings.
The research questionnaire explored Croatian experts’ perceptions of the national 
policy to deal with the illegal weapons market and possibility of terrorists obtaining 
weapons on this market. It is interesting to examine the answers to the following 
two questions: 
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1) How do you assess national policy regarding the illegal weapons market in 
general and specifically in terms of the possibilities of terrorists entering this 
market? 
2) What is your level of confidence in the institutions that implement national 
policy to combat the illegal weapons market? 
The interviewed experts answered the first question as follows: 38% considered 
that national policy needs to be upgraded; 29% considered that policy is satisfac-
tory, but the problem is its application; 24% considered policy to be appropriate; 
and 9% considered policy to be inappropriate. Responses to the second question 
were as follows: 57% believed that the institutions were doing a good job; while 
39% expressed limited confidence in them and 4% had no confidence.
From these responses and in light of our analysis of other factors affecting Croatia’s 
attempts to deal with the illicit firearms market and terrorist access to that market, 
we concluded that the country has a normative framework that is in line with EU 
legislation, but which clearly has space for improvement, and that Croatia should 
do more in terms of its practical implementation. It is worth noting that most 
respondents had confidence in the state institutions dealing with these issues, 
although a significant percentage had limited trust in these institutions (39%) and 
a small percentage (4%) had no confidence in them.
Besides the statistical questionnaires, a very significant indicator and source of 
information were interviews with 11 high-level government officials and six practi-
tioners, relevant scientists and experts. The high-level government officials were 
the most consistent in their responses, and these responses were much closer to 
each other than the answers given by practitioners, relevant scientists and experts. 
There was a significant level of consensus that rigorous laws will not reduce the 
number of illegal weapons in circulation, and that targeted preventive programmes 
are needed. These programmes should focus on individual groups within society 
and their specific needs, such as various war veteran associations in different parts 
of the country where their needs differ from those in other areas. Likewise, special 
attention needs to be given to minors growing up in the virtual world where the 
boundaries between reality and the imaginary world are blurred, and to hunters 
and their organisations – a category that has about 60,000 members in Croatia. 
Additionally, the need for a clear strategic and operative approach to this problem 
and the strengthening of the international exchange of information were high-
lighted, both of which are included in the new National Security Strategy.I 
I Two researchers who worked on the present report participated as members of the National 








Occasionally the interviewed military and security analysts had very different 
views. This is especially visible in their perceptions of the main features of regula-
tions governing the illegal possession, use and trafficking of weapons. Some 
stressed that strict regulation is a good choice in light of the context of present-day 
Croatia. They stated that there is no need to change the legal system of regulation, 
but practical work needs to be done to reduce the transit of weapons through 
Croatia. Others argued that the existing system of regulation is too rigid in its 
approach to, for example, legal weapons collectors. Also, in recent years domestic 
regulations governing legal possession have frequently been tightened – very 
often in response to wrongdoing or risks arising from illegal weapons. This has 
mainly restricted the possession of legal weapons and resulted in the accumula-
tion of costs, constraints and obligations imposed on people willing to comply 
with the law. 
Arms business practitioners also emphasised the ‘rigidity’ of Croatian regulations 
and procedures. In terms of arms exports, the interviewed actors highlighted the 
strict laws and procedures that apply in Croatia compared to those in other EU 
member states. They noted problems that resulted from much stricter and unneces-
sarily complicated regulations compared to those in other countries, such as the 
requirement to obtain an export licence for weapons-related tools of the kind that 
can be freely bought in retail shops (e.g. hammers, pliers, rasps, etc.), while, for 
example, in Germany, Italy or France the things that need to be licensed are pistols 
or weapons, as well as essential weapons parts (grips, covers, barrels, etc.). There is 
obviously room for work on harmonising Croatia’s standards with those of other EU 
member states. Interviewees also noticed items in a list of military goods in Croatia 
that are outdated and should be changed/removed.
1.4 The various actors and their specific roles
Cooperation in the fight against the illegal weapons market involves the inter-
agency cooperation of all national bodies involved in the prevention of terrorism 
and the suppression of illegal weapons, and wider cooperation with relevant EU 
and international agencies. This cooperation is defined by the 2015 Act on the 
Organisation and Scope of Ministries and Other Central State Administrative 
Bodies,29 which defines the various ministries’ and agencies’ modes of cooperation, 
and in some cases is governed by cooperation protocols.
The main national government agencies involved in the prevention and suppres-
sion of terrorism and the illicit firearms market are the: 
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• National Security Council; 
• Office of the National Security Council;
• Ministry of the Interior; 
• Security and Intelligence Agency; 
• Military Security and Intelligence Agency; 
• Public Prosecutor’s Office; 
• Ministry of Justice; 
• Ministry of Finance;
• Ministry of the Economy, Entrepreneurship and Crafts;
• Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs; and 
• Ministry of Defence. 
These bodies are responsible for the implementation of measures to suppress the 
illegal weapons market and control the availability of weapons to terrorists. As the 
body that discusses security issues at the highest strategic level, the National 
Security Council participates in the creation of all key national policies. The Office 
of the National Security Council monitors and coordinates the activities of the 
country’s security system in cooperation with the other ministries and agencies 
listed above.
The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the suppression of the illegal weapons 
market in Croatia. The Police Directorate – as the ministry’s key operational arm – is 
tasked with preventing and suppressing criminality. The Police Directorate’s organ-
isational working unit responsible for the suppression of organised crime deals 
with illegal-weapons-related issues.
The most important operational cooperation in the fight against the illegal weapons 
market is between the police and security intelligence agencies (the Security and 
Intelligence Agency and the Military Security and Intelligence Agency) and the 
State Attorney’s Office, and between the police and the Customs Administration. 
These bodies collect, process, analyse, store, and evaluate all security phenomena 
that point to the existence and activities of the illegal weapons market. The Ministry 
of the Interior also cooperates with the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of 
Foreign and European Affairs, which deal with the issue of illegal weapons at the 
political level.
European and international cooperation in the fight against illegal weapons is pri-
marily determined by Croatia’s membership of international organisations such as 
the UN, EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). However, special 
emphasis should be put on cooperation with Europol, Interpol and the UN in which 
Croatian representatives actively participate and exchange information. In this 








Transnational Organised Crime, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, and iARMS (the 
Interpol Illicit Arms Records and Tracing Management System) should be empha-
sised. The Ministry of the Interior is, for example, expected to join iARMS in the 
first half of 2018, and is currently preparing the national database for this purpose. 
However, despite Croatia’s position as a transit country for illegal weapons, a 
number of joint international operational activities aimed at suppressing the illegal 
weapons market have not occurred in Croatia, but in the countries to where illegal 
weapons were being sent, so statistics on the nature and extent of the illegal arms 
trade are only available in these countries.
1.5 Main challenges 
The main challenge confronting Croatian national policy to address the illicit fire-
arms market and terrorist access to it is the lack of a strategic document such as the 
National SALW Strategy and Action Plan that would regulate and integrate the 
activities of all the institutions involved in the illegal weapons issue and monitor 
the results of their activities. The National SALW Strategy ceased to apply in 2015 
(see section 1.3.2, above), although key activities of the competent authorities and 
their mutual cooperation in the field of illegal weapons continued. However, the 
lack of a clear framework for role definition and cooperation, which had been pro-
vided by the National SALW Strategy, and the resulting lack of focus of the compe-
tent bodies lead to the inadequate routing of available capacities to deal with the 
illegal weapons market.
Because the issue of illegal weapons continues to be present, both in Croatia and 
elsewhere, stronger action at the international level may be a more effective way of 
dealing with it. Therefore, the administrative capacities of all competent bodies 
need to be continually strengthened and their activities should be made perma-
nent. Stronger international police cooperation and the high-quality exchange of 
information on seizures of illegal weapons and ammunition and the smuggling of 
weapons, ammunition and explosives among all EU member states and states bor-
dering on the EU are preconditions for reducing the availability of weapons in the 
illegal market.
In this regard, it is important to point out the lack of comparable databases both 
nationally and internationally, because it is impossible to investigate and draw rel-
evant conclusions without high-quality input data and comparable statistics that 
indicate trends. Much more attention should therefore be devoted to the synchro-
nisation, organisation, and management of relevant firearms-related databases, 
both nationally and internationally.
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2. Characteristics of Croatia’s illicit firearms 
market
Croatia’s legal weapons market is regulated by the provisions of the Weapons Act 
and the Ordinance on Special Conditions for the Production, Accommodation and 
Sale of Weapons and Ammunition, the Repair of Weapons and the Guidance of 
Civilian Shooting.30 Key factors of the legal weapons market are the licensed arms 
manufacturers (which must obtain Interior Ministry approval to produce weapons) 
and arms dealers (who need Interior Ministry approval to sell weapons and ammu-
nition to license holders). Croatia’s internal legal weapons market is influenced by 
the tradition of hunting and the development of hunting tourism and sports shoot-
ing. On 1 January 2017 a total of 266,479 firearmsI were registered in Croatia, com-
prising 259,129 weapons in the possession of natural persons and 7,368 in the pos-
session of legal persons. There were 106,616 firearms owners, including both 
natural and legal persons.31 
The Croatian defence industry played a crucial role during the Homeland War. 
Today it represents an important component of the defence and security segment 
and is also an important part of Croatia’s economic and export activity. Various 
types of Croatian military equipment are exported worldwide. In recent years arms 
exports strongly increased and currently exceed several billion Croatian kunas in 
value.32 There is a limited number of firearms manufacturers in the country, the 
most important of which is HS Produkt Ltd. This company was established during 
the Homeland War and today has its factory in the city of Karlovac. HS Produkt 
manufactures four semi-automatic handgun lines, the VHS-2 assault rifle (which 
uses 5.56 x 45 mm calibre ammunition) and the VHS-BG grenade launcher (40 x 46 
mm calibre). Approximately 95% of its products are exported to the US market.33 
There has been no known disappearance or theft of a weapon from the company in 
the last 17 years. In addition, the company does not have any information that its 
weapons have been used in illegal activities. The research team found that HS 
Produkt operates according to the highest world standards and conforms with 
domestic and EU legislation. The company is careful to protect its quality level and 
contracts, and attempts to ensure that no incident occurs that would threaten its 
existing brands and jobs. 
After the end of the Homeland War and during the subsequent restructuring and 
modernisation of the country’s armed forces, Croatia experienced problems with a 
surplus of weapons that were no longer needed in such large quantities. Some analy-
I According to the Weapons Act, firearms are all devices that fire bullets, pellets, shots, arrows or 








ses indicate that by the end of 2012 Croatia had exported weapons and ammunition 
worth €126 million to Saudi Arabia and €44 million to Jordan.34 In 2013 the New York 
Times reported that many planeloads of weapons had left Croatia since December 
2012, and not much later Croatian weapons began appearing in YouTube videos 
posted by rebels fighting in the Syrian civil war. Quoting undisclosed officials who 
were familiar with these transfers, the New York Times stated that the shipments 
included ‘thousands of rifles and hundreds of machine guns’ and an unknown 
quantity of ammunition that were part of an undeclared surplus remaining from 
the 1990s Balkan wars. However, Croatia’s Foreign Ministry and arms export agency 
strongly denied that such shipments had occurred.35 In 2017 an investigative news 
report by Balkan Insight stated that in the first nine months of 2016 weapons and 
ammunition worth €83 million were exported to Saudi Arabia despite warnings 
that some of these deliveries ran the risk of being illegally diverted to war zones.36 
The Croatian authorities have repeatedly stated that they did not arm Syrian rebel 
groups. It should be noted that when a country legally sells weapons to another 
country that is not under embargo, the seller cannot realistically control the further 
sale or transfer of the purchased weapons and that abuse is beyond the control of 
the seller and is the responsibility of the buyer. This is not only Croatia’s approach 
to the sale of surplus weapons to crisis areas, but is also that of many other coun-
tries. These weapons can very easily come into the possession of combatants from 
either side of a conflict and then end up on the illegal market. They could even be 
smuggled back into Europe. 
It is clear that the widespread possession of illegal firearms presents a considerable 
problem in Croatia. The widespread availability of such firearms is due to a number 
of historical and (geo)political factors such as the legacy of the Homeland War, the 
geographical location of the country on the Balkan route, corruption, and organ-
ised crime. However, the Croatian illegal weapons market is small and not very 
active. This apparent paradox is explained by the fact that Croatians mainly 
acquired illegal firearms for their individual needs and have limited interest in 
trading them. The demand for illegal firearms in Croatia has been largely met by 
weapons left over from the Homeland War. In the following sections we will discuss 
the characteristics and dynamics of the illicit firearms market in Croatia. We will 
start by exploring the difficulties of estimating the size of this market. 
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2.1 Estimating the size of Croatia’s illicit firearms market
Research on estimates of the number of small arms and light weapons on the illegal 
market in Croatia is very limited, which is a little surprising in light of the apparent 
problem of the large numbers of weapons in civilian hands. The lack of previous 
credible research and reliable and detailed national databases means that it is dif-
ficult to compare data and to look at differences in these data over time. 
A number of older estimates do exist, but have been criticised by government offi-
cials. Between January and June 2006 SEESAC conducted research into the posses-
sion of small arms and light weapons in Croatia by interviewing 30 people from 
state agencies dealing with small arms and light weapons and conducting a house-
hold survey across the country among a representative sample of a thousand 
people.I Based on this survey, SEESAC estimated that there were 371,000 legal and 
597,000 illegal weapons in Croatia at the time of the survey.37 These estimates have 
been the subject of dispute between experts in Croatia and the region during scien-
tific conferences and official meetings, and in internal Interior Ministry and 
Security and Intelligence Agency reports. It should be noted that the SEESAC 
research project was not focused solely on the number of illegally owned weapons, 
but was directed at the general phenomenon of small arms and light weapons in 
Croatia. It is possible to assume that because of this not enough attention was paid 
to the development of the part of the research methodology that examined the 
number of illicit small arms and light weapons in citizens’ possession, which is why 
the number of illegal weapons present in the country is disputed.
The 2009 National Strategy and Action Plan for the Control of Small Arms and 
Light Weapons38 expressed the need to conduct research into illegally owned fire-
arms in Croatia. Despite this, no such research has been carried out. 
During 2014 the Small Arms Survey conducted research on firearms possession and 
armed violence in the western Balkans, referring to the 2006 SEESAC research, as 
well as the Gallup Balkan Monitor research of 2012.II This research estimated that 
Croatian citizens illegally owned between 150,000 and 600,000 firearms.39 It 
should be noted that the research did not develop its own methodological frame-
work for estimating the quantity of weapons, but relied on evaluations of the results 
obtained in other research. It was estimated that the majority of the citizens who 
I The survey asked two questions:
1. Are there any weapons in your household and, if any, how many?
2. How many weapons on average do you think people have in their households?









possessed weapons lived in the areas affected by the most intense fighting in the 
Homeland War, but there was no further explanation and analysis.
In recent years no significant attempts have been made to investigate and establish 
realistic indicators of the number of small arms and light weapons illegally owned 
by Croatians. It is therefore currently impossible to reliably estimate the size of the 
Croatian illicit firearms market. The surveys undertaken for this study indicated 
that the interviewed government officials were aware of the existence of the 
problem of illegal weapons: 50% of them estimated the market as small, while the 
remaining 50% regarded it as medium in size, especially in areas where firearms of 
military origin are most often available. In addition, 60% of questionnaire survey 
respondents stated that there is a significant problem with the number of illegal 
weapons, as opposed to only 5% who considered that there is no problem with such 
weapons and 35% who considered this problem to be very small. In the following 
sections we will analyse the available data on seized and destroyed firearms.
2.1.1 Seized firearms 
Although there is currently no reliable estimate of the number of illegally owned 
firearms in Croatia, seizure data suggest that this number is significant. Every year 
a large number of firearms are seized as a result of police investigations, primarily 
in searches of crime-related premises. Internal Interior Ministry data obtained for 
this study indicate that in the period 2007-2016 a total of 63,913 firearmsI were 
seized by the police during criminal, misdemeanour or administrative procedures 
(see Table 1). These data show strong variations in the annual number of firearms 
seized in Croatia. They also indicate that after a peak in 2010, a consistent and sig-
nificant decrease in the number of seized firearms can be observed, especially with 
regard to firearms seizures connected to misdemeanours and administrative 
infringements.
In 2011-2016 the Croatian police recorded a total of 3,462 criminal offences involving 
firearms.40 These figures fluctuate strongly from year to year. Among others, the 
reasons for these annual fluctuations in criminal offences and seized firearms are 
believed to be the result of changes in the national legal framework, since the higher 
numbers of criminal offences and seized firearms were recorded during the period 
when the illegal possession of Category B firearms was considered to be a criminal 
offence. After amendments to the Criminal Code this became a misdemeanour, and 
as a result the numbers of criminal offences and seized firearms fell. There are also
I This information includes all types of firearms, but excludes ammunition and explosive devices.
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Table 1: Firearms seized, 2007-2016
Year Criminal Misdemeanour Administrative Total
2007 683 2,094 2,607 5,384
2008 644 2,127 3,067 5,838
2009 618 2,980 3,265 6,863
2010 1050 3,649 4,403 9,102
2011 808 2,956 4,115 7,879
2012 885 2,480 3,524 6,889
2013 995 1,769 3,215 5,979
2014 1,050 1,854 2,999 5,903
2015 1,034 1,502 3,522 6,058
2016 845 1,243 1,931 4,019
1 January 2007-31 December 2016 63,913
Source: Croatian Ministry of the Interior 
 
significant differences in the seizures related to the various procedures. It should be 
noted that these differences are the result of substantive changes in the legislation 
that regulates illegal-weapons-related offences. Thus, until the entry into force of the 
Criminal Code in the period to 1 January 2013, the unauthorised possession of 
weapons that did not fall into the category of prohibited firearms in terms of the 
Weapons Act was an offence punishable in accordance with the Act’s misdemeanour 
clauses. In the first period of the application of the Criminal Code from 2013 to 2015 
any unlawful possession of firearms, both prohibited and not prohibited, but for 
whose possession the approval of the competent authority is required, was a criminal 
offence. Amendments to the Criminal Code in 2015 have again introduced misde-
meanour punishment for the illegal possession of firearms that are not prohibited, 
but for whose possession the approval of the competent authority is required. These 
changes have directly affected the statistical indicators of the number of criminal 
offences. However, even with these changes, the constant presence of illegal firearms 
can be observed through the number of detected criminal offences.
In addition, the activities of the border police and their detection of smuggled 
weapons should be taken into account. Between 2010 and 2016 the Croatian border 
police seized 2,521 firearms and 56,787 rounds of ammunition (see Table 2). In 
recent years higher numbers of rifles, pistols, and gas and signal weapons were 








the number of seized firearms, an increase in the number of firearms seizures at the 
country’s borders can be observed. In addition, the data on seizures at state borders 
indicate that a significant number of replicas are also being seized. This suggests 
that these types of weapons are also available on the illicit firearms market in 
Croatia and are being smuggled into or out of the country. Reasons for a significant 
increase in the number of seized firearms during border controls should be sought, 
among others, in strengthened border police capacity since the start of the negotia-
tions on Croatia’s accession to full EU membership. After joining the EU, Croatia 
started preparations for Schengen accession, which is why it continued to 
strengthen its border controls by increasing the number of border police officers 
and the procurement of technical equipment for border control. This has resulted 
in greater rates of detection of cross-border smuggling and increased seizures of 
firearms and ammunition. Other types of weapons have also been seized. In 
November 2017, for example, the border police arrested a citizen of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina who attempted to smuggle 60 kg of military explosives from Bosnia to 
Croatia by boat across the Sava River.41
Table 2: The number of firearms and rounds of ammunition seized at state 
borders, 2010-2016
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total
Cold-steel 
weapons 
84 73 216 446 278 477 504 2,078
Pistols 11 10 42 22 15 27 25 152
Revolvers – 2 – – – 1 – 3
Rifles 14 14 13 9 5 13 24 92
Gas and signal 
weapons 
7 7 21 7 6 27 92 167
Air weapons 3 – 4 6 4 8 4 29
All firearms 119 106 296 490 308 553 649 2,521
Ammunition 
(rounds) 
2,011 27,877 3,904 9,101 9,047 2,160 2,687 56,787
Source: Croatian Ministry of the Interior Border Police
The details of a number of recent cases (see Box 2) highlight the wide variety of 
firearms, ammunition, related equipment (such as optical sights and silencers), and 
other types of weapons such as rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers, hand 
grenades and explosives seized in Croatia. In addition, these cases suggest that the 
illegal private ownership of weapons mainly involves rifles, automatic rifles, pistols, 
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automatic pistols and explosives of military origin. A more detailed analysis of the 
cases in which police reported the brand and models of found and seized firearms 
also suggests that the majority of illegally owned weapons are of military origin and 
were probably left over from the Homeland War. Unfortunately, more detailed 
information about police activities leading to the recovery of these firearms cannot 
be established because they are confidential.
It was impossible to analyse the potential sources of illegal weapons in Croatia 
based on these data. This would require a deeper analysis of whether the weapon 
was intended for the domestic illegal market or for transit through Croatia to third 
countries. At the moment we do not have sufficient information for such an analy-
sis, but the number of weapons seized at the country’s borders helps to build up a 
wider picture of the problem of illegal weapons in Croatia.
2.2.2 Destroyed firearms 
The Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defence and the Croatian Armed Forces 
are responsible for destroying weapons. Data on destroyed firearms are significant 
because they not only show the number of weapons that no longer appear on the 
illegal market, but also illustrate government efforts to destroy surplus weapons and 
prevent their re-use. In cooperation with domestic and international organisations, 
the responsible ministries destroy large numbers of small arms and light weapons. 
According to data for the period 1993-2012, in total more than 70,000 small arms and 
light weapons were destroyed in several large (sometimes parallel) cycles: 
• According to the National Programme, more than 15,000 long and short 
weapons (pistols, revolvers, rifles, machine guns and other) were officially 
destroyed at the Sisak Steel Factory between 1993 and 2001.42
• At the beginning of 2008 the Ministry of Defence and the Croatian Armed 
Forces organised the largest destruction to date of surplus military small 
arms and light weapons. Twenty-five thousand weapons of various kinds 
were destroyed as part of the UN Action Programme of Action to Prevent, 
Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in 
All Its Aspects and in line with Croatia’s obligations to the EU and the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The destruction was 
carried out by members of the Armed Forces at a repair facility in Zagreb and 
on a military firing range in the presence of representatives of international 
organisations and military envoys.43
• On 19 October 2012, during the 20th round of weapons destruction in the 








UNDP concluded the EU-funded regional small arms project to destroy 
30,000 small arms and light weapons.44
Box 2: Some recent illustrative firearm seizures 
In December 2014, during a house search, police found and seized six hand 
grenades, 6,055 rounds of various types of ammunition, one semi-automatic 
rifle, two automatic rifles, one hunting rifle, three hunting carbines, one 
mini-calibre rifle with an optical sight and silencer, 11 automatic rifle tanks, 
two pistols, four electric detonator capsules, two hand grenade fuses, 1.4 kg 
of military explosives, one hand grenade, one hand-made firelock, 263 car-
tridges, seven gun barrels of various calibres, and various other rifle parts.45
On 7 January 2015 the police concluded an investigation that ran for several 
months during which a truck with Dutch registration plates driven by a Dutch 
citizen was found to be carrying a rifle of unknown origin, 22 hand grenades, 
two RPG launchers, two CZ M88 pistols, one Beretta 9 mm pistol, two M70 B1 
automatic rifles, a CZ M70 automatic rifle with folding stock, a Kalashnikov 
rifle, an M53 machine gun, an M72 machine gun, four RBR 64 mm hand grenade 
launchers, firing pins for an M53 machine gun, five ammunition belts for a light 
machine gun, three M70 automatic rifle magazines, 250 rounds of 7.62 mm 
ammunition, 860 rounds of 7.9 mm ammunition, and five detonator caps. Nine 
people were arrested: eight Croatian citizens and one Dutch citizen.46
In January 2015, during the search of a house owned by a Croatian citizen, 
police found and seized 20 pistols, 16 automatic pistols, nine automatic 
rifles with associated magazines and ammunition, 2.8 kg of explosives, and 
30 hand grenades. A subsequent search revealed another gun and a home-
made rifle, as well as dozens of rounds of ammunition, dozens of silencers 
and 12 laser sights.47
In August 2016, during a house search, police found a total of 10,365 rounds 
of various types of ammunition, eight rifles (including one automatic rifle), 
four pistols, 13 complete silencers and several silencer parts, 12 different 
magazines, 11 detonators caps, 11 metres of detonating cord, four hand gre-
nades, one explosive bullet and various weapons parts. The investigation 
found that the suspect acquired the weapons, ammunition and explosive 
devices immediately after the Homeland War and then stored them illegally 
in his home.48
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During our research we found no information on recent weapons destruction activ-
ities. We also concluded that there is no unified system for the tracking and record-
ing of destroyed weapons in Croatia.
2.3 Main characteristics of the Croatian illicit  
firearms market
The main feature of the illicit weapons market in Croatia is that it involves only 
small transactions, despite the large amount of weapons in citizens’ illegal posses-
sion. The predominant theory is that individual citizens are usually the buyers and 
sellers of weapons, which supports the argument that the illegal market involves 
only small quantities of weapons. Supply mechanisms indicate that individuals sell 
weapons on the illegal market, although the possibility that OCGs are also involved 
cannot be excluded. To date, no major and significant cases have been officially 
reported that OCGs were significantly involved in these activities. In the following 
sections we will analyse the various supply mechanisms of the illicit firearms 
market in Croatia and the actors involved. Unfortunately, too little evidence is avail-
able for an in-depth analysis of the other characteristics of this market.
2.3.1 Supply mechanisms
In our survey, respondents were asked how they believed weapons ended up on the 
illegal market. The analysis of these responses reinforces the perception that most 
weapons on the illegal market originate from items illegally owned since the 
Homeland War. Smuggling from other countries, illicit production and theft were 
not considered to be important sources of supply.I 
Legacy from the Homeland War
The illegal market is largely supplied by weapons acquired to defend the country in 
the Homeland War. At that time a significant amount of weapons were imported 
both legally and illegally: during the war Croatia was under an international arms 
embargo and armed itself in various ways. Citizens who lived in war-affected areas 
armed themselves both for personal protection and to fight in the war. In addition, 
during the war large quantities of weapons of were captured from the former 
Yugoslav People’s Army. Since the primary focus was on the defence of the country, 
I 37% and 39%, respectively, of respondents stated that ‘very few’ and ‘few’ weapons end up on 
the market through smuggling. 21%, 53% and 27%, respectively, of respondents stated that ‘no’, 








it was difficult to establish any form of control, and the number and type of weapons 
in the country, particularly those owned by civilians, were not recorded. Interviewed 
military and security analysts stressed the importance of easy access to small arms 
of military origin used in the Homeland War or kept in the reserves of the former 
Yugoslav People’s Army and other former state bodies. 
Semi-automatic and automatic weapons such as pistols and various versions of the 
AK-47 assault rifle can be found on the illegal market. The average price ranges 
from €100 to €500 per weapon, depending on the type. Due to its reliability and 
longevity, the AK-47 has significant personal value for the people who own it, and 
its price on the illegal market does not reflect this personal value. Similarly, during 
the Homeland War many bought AK-47-type assault rifles on the illegal market for 
more than they are now worth, which is one of the reasons why they may not want 
to sell them for lower prices today. 
Cross-border smuggling
In various international media reports and some of the research undertaken for 
Project SAFTE, Croatia is mentioned as a source of illegal weapons used in criminal 
offences in other countries. These claims could not be substantiated during our 
research: we did not find any links in court judgments and police operations in 
Croatia that have a direct link with such claims. This indicates the need to continue 
detailed research on this topic, improve the exchange of information and confirm 
the authenticity of media claims. 
In this section it is worth pointing out two recorded cases of weapons smuggling 
across Croatia to Western Europe, the first from 2003, the second from 2010. In both 
cases, members of Croatian OCGs acquired weapons (dozens of pistols and several 
kilograms of detonators) on the illegal market in neighbouring countries and smug-
gled them to the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries. Interestingly, in their des-
tination countries these weapons were subsequently traded for large quantities of 
cocaine, ecstasy and amphetamines, which were then smuggled into Croatia and 
sold on the local market. In this way the smugglers realised high earnings compared 
to the potential earnings from the sale of the weapons in Croatia.49 No evidence was 
found that the weapons were either illegally or legally acquired in other countries 
and subsequently transferred to Croatia for illegal sale there. Yet this does not mean 
that there are no such cases. We consider that this is not a common practice since 
quite large supplies of (generally not too expensive) illegal weapons are available in 
Croatia itself and potential weapons smugglers may not consider it worth the risk to 
smuggle weapons into the country for such small returns.
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Illegal production
Some of the weapons that ended up on the illegal market were illegally produced. 
The best-known case is that of the Vugrek family, which for generations was legally 
involved in repairing and remodelling firearms. At the beginning of the Homeland 
War, when there was a shortage of firearms, a member of the Vugrek family designed 
and produced a sub-machine gun known as the Agram. Since the Croatian Army 
had decided to adopt the ERO sub-machine gun manufactured by HS Produkt, the 
Vugrek family did not obtain a licence to manufacture the Agram, even though the 
design of the subsequent Agram 2000 was improved. After several murders were 
committed using Agram sub-machine guns, the police investigated the Vugrek 
family (first in 2006 and then in 2013) and found an illegal gun factory in their 
home.50 The production equipment was seized in criminal proceedings and 
members of the family are currently in prison. There were also a few cases of small-
scale production during the Homeland War. All such factories were closed during 
war, but some weapons produced in them are still in existence. 
Theft 
The storage of firearms in Croatia is primarily under the jurisdiction of the police 
and the Armed Forces, because police and army personnel are the main users of 
firearms in their duties. Manufacturers and firearms dealers also store some 
weapons. All of these are a potential source of weapons for the illegal market.
The Croatian police, with EU financial support and in cooperation with UNDP, estab-
lished the MURAT central weapons and ammunition storage facility in the city of 
Jastrebarsko. The facility is equipped with modern security systems to control access 
and prevent unauthorised access. Thefts mainly occur from small police storage 
facilities where weapons seized in criminal and misdemeanour proceedings are kept 
until the end of these proceedings. Small military storage facilities are also targeted. 
It is not unusual for weapons to disappear from these two types of facilities. In 2003, 
for example, 231 HS95 pistols with related equipment were stolen from the Sveti Križ 
military storage facility in the Split area,51 while in 2010, 549 pistols (with an esti-
mated value of 30,000 kunas) were removed from the police storage facility in 
Sesvete.52 Some more recent examples illustrate the recurrent problem of stockpile 
theft. In 2015, for example, it was discovered that three police officers from the 
Dubrovnik-Neretva police department stole firearms that should have been 
destroyed, in 2016 an official police sub-machine gun was stolen from the police 
station in Ogulin,53 while in 2007 about 20 ERO sub-machine guns were removed 
from the police station in Zaprešić. The subsequent criminal investigation found 








It can be concluded that the central military and police storage facilities in Croatia 
are generally well equipped and protected and that weapons very rarely disappear 
from them. However, small storage facilities at police stations and lower-level mili-
tary units are not well protected and are therefore more prone to theft. Improving 
the security systems of smaller firearms stores through cooperation with key inter-
national partners and with EU financial assistance is therefore recommended.
2.3.2 Actors
The surveys undertaken for this study provide some insight into the actors involved 
in the illicit firearms market in Croatia. More than half of the experts (54%) who 
completed the statistical questionnaire, for example, believed that the illegal 
weapons market is mainly supplied by illegally owned weapons left over from the 
Homeland War. The assumption is that individuals tend to put small quantities of 
weapons into circulation on the illegal market, that this is not an organised activity, 
and that it is difficult to acquire larger quantities of weapons in this way. 
When asked about who sells illegal weapons in Croatia, the majority of respondents 
(61%) considered that they are sold by individuals, while 19% thought OCGs were 
the main sellers of weapons.I It is necessary to see this in the context of answers to 
questions on who purchases illegal weapons in Croatia and who smuggles illegal 
weapons through the country. Most participants answered that individuals from 
Croatia bought weapons (41%), while OCGs (20%) and citizens from other countries 
(13%) were named less often.II In terms of the second question (on smuggling), 41% 
of participants answered that OCGs were the main actors. Citizens from other coun-
tries (20%) and individuals from Croatia (18%) were named less often.III
An interesting aspect of these responses is the role of OCGs, with 19% of respond-
ents asserting that OCGs sell illegal firearms, 20% believing that OCGs buy illegal 
firearms and 41% thinking that OCGs smuggle illegal firearms through Croatia. 
This is in contrast to the available official data, which do not reflect interviewees’ 
perceptions. OCGs were also mentioned in some documents and media reports 
(that we have analysed earlier in the text) as actors in a chain involving the pur-
chase, transfer and sale of weapons on the illegal market. We did not encounter 
official indicators, statistics, court verdicts or police reports to confirm such a 
thesis, especially in terms of the trafficking of larger amounts of weapons. Clearly, 
I 18% declared that they did not know or had no information about this issue.
II 23% of respondents stated that they did not know, while two answers were invalid responses.
III 21% of respondents stated ‘I do not know/I have no information’. One answer was an invalid response.
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however, this does not mean that such activities do not occur. Ongoing investiga-
tions by their very nature cannot be described here. Further research on the role of 
OCGs would be beneficial.
2.4 Croatia as a transit country for illegal weapons
The analysis in this section is based on official documents, assessments by compe-
tent institutions and border police records reflecting the number of seized weapons. 
Unfortunately, operational indicators and data on significant cases of smuggling of 
larger quantities of weapons were not available during the study. Most importantly, 
because the correlation between a particular weapon and its end use cannot be 
ascertained with great certainty from the available data, we prefer not to speculate 
on such links.
As mentioned above and as stated by the Security and Intelligence Agency, arms 
smuggling from South Eastern Europe to EU member states mainly involves 
weapons still in circulation from the 1990s wars and thefts from poorly secured 
arms depots in some countries. From an analysis of what few relevant data are 
available and the perceptions of experts interviewed for this study and those who 
filled in the questionnaires,I we believe that Croatia may be a significant route for 
the transport of illegal weapons through its territory, although adequate concrete 
evidence of this was lacking. 
To sum up: it is difficult to determine the size of the illicit firearms market in 
Croatia, primarily because of the lack of available and reliable data. Furthermore, 
although many Croatians own a large number of illegal firearms, the active mar-
ketplace is comparatively small. Ultimately, the domestic illicit firearms market is 
not considered to be a significant problem and is probably small to medium in 
size. Croatia could be a transit country for smuggled firearms. However, the 
limited information currently available means that we are unable to be more spe-
cific about certain aspects of the illegal market. Further research needs to be done 
in this area. 
I More than half of the participants (58%) considered that Croatia is mostly a transit country for 
illegal firearms, while a further 24% agreed that it is a transit country, but that there is some 
element of supply on the illegal domestic marketplace. 14% answered ‘I do not know/I have no 
information’. This means that 82% of respondents believe that Croatia is a transit country for 
firearms, with only 3% dissenting from this view. Such a response should be seen in the context 








3. Terrorist access to Croatia’s illicit firearms 
market
The aim of this section is to understand the potential for terrorist activities to occur 
in Croatia involving terrorist access to illegal weapons, either independently or in 
cooperation with OCGs. It is also necessary to consider if firearms produced or pro-
cured in Croatia are being used for terrorist activities beyond its borders. 
The Croatian National Strategy for the Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism54 
defines ‘terrorism’ as the planned, systematic and purposeful use of violence or the 
threat of violence against people and/or material objects, as the means of provok-
ing and using fear among an ethnic or religious community, the public, the state or 
the entire international community to achieve political, religious, ideological or 
socially motivated ends.
Since the end of the Homeland War there has been minimal terrorist activity in 
Croatia. In recent decades only one terrorist attack has been carried out: on 20 
October 1995 a suicide bomber blew himself up in a car in front of the headquarters 
of the Primorje-Gorski Kotar County Police Department in Rijeka. This was also the 
first attack by radical Islamist terrorist organisations in Europe. During the attack, 
for which the Egyptian terrorist organisation Al Gamma’a Al-Islamiyya claimed 
responsibility a day later, 29 people were injured, while only the perpetrator was 
killed. The aim of the attack was to force Croatian authorities to release the spokes-
man of the organisation Tala’at Fuad Kassem, who had been in police detention in 
Zagreb since 12 September 1995.55 No firearms were used in the terrorist attack, 
while no small arms and/or light weapons were found that were intended for use in 
the attack. 
According to the Croatian authorities there are currently no terrorist groups or 
individuals in Croatia who are officially seen as perpetrators of terrorist acts, or 
people clearly involved in terrorist activity.I There are currently no identified direct 
threats from terrorism in the country and no information is available about the 
activities of individuals or groups associated with terrorist organisations. However, 
if we take into consideration Croatia’s geopolitical position, and in particular its full 
membership of the EU, NATO and other international organisations, associations 
and initiatives, a threat arises from the country’s membership of such organisa-
tions. It should also be noted that no activities of organisations, groups or individu-
als associated with terrorism in Croatia have been recorded.
I For more information, see the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Croatia, and Security 
and Intelligence Agency public reports.
114
For now, there is no official awareness within the entire Croatian security sector 
that terrorists are acquiring weapons on the illegal market in Croatia or that the 
illegal weapons from Croatia are being transferred outside the country to arm ter-
rorists. The respondents to our statistical questionnaire share this view: they are 
aware of the dangers of terrorism, but they consider it to be a small threat to Croatia.I 
They also expressed the belief that terrorists occasionally transit through Croatia.II 
Because the 1995 terrorist incident is unique, it is not possible to draw conclusions 
from it that are relevant to the research subject because the suicide bomber did not 
use firearms. Also, no relevant data have been found that could be analysed for the 
purpose of this research and there is no evidence of terrorist groups in Croatia 
acquiring firearms. In the following paragraphs we will therefore focus on the 
potential access of terrorists to the illicit firearms market.
Analysis of terrorist attacks carried out in Europe since January 2015 show that fire-
arms were used in some form in most of them, whether as the main means of exe-
cuting an attack (e.g. the attack on the Charlie Hebdo office in January 2015), as an 
auxiliary device, or in obtaining the main means of attack (e.g. the attack in Berlin 
in December 2016). Although the source of the firearms used in some terrorist 
attacks could not be clearly identified, the media have often identified the western 
Balkans as the source of the weapons, especially automatic weapons of military 
origin, while Slovakia has been reported as a source of modified weapons.56 Some 
media sources have reported the possible linkage of weapons from Croatia to the 
Irish Republican Army57 and accused leaders of the Serb Republic in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina of arming this group.58 It is significant that these media reports have 
never been officially researched and either confirmed or denied by national or 
international bodies. However, regardless of the actual sources of the firearms used 
by terrorists, the availability of firearms on the illicit market points to the fact that 
there is insufficient systematic control and suppression of the illegal weapons 
market at the EU level.
From interviews with government officials a common opinion emerged that although 
many Croatian citizens undoubtedly own large numbers of illegal weapons, the 
illegal market is small and weak (although the possibility of individual purchases 
cannot be excluded), and there is no evidence that such weapons are available to 
I When asked if terrorism is a real threat to Croatia, most participants (56%) considered that it 
poses little threat to the country and 10% even considered that it poses no threat, while only 31% 
of participants believed that terrorism represents a real threat to Croatia and 3% perceived it as 
a major threat. 
II When asked if Croatia is a transit country for terrorists, the majority answered positively: ‘perio-
dically’ (60%) and ‘yes’ (28%). The remaining 12% of respondents stated that they did not know or 








terrorists, a finding that is based on official statistical and operational indicators 
and findings. If the creation of terrorist networks in Croatia or the increased involve-
ment of OCGs in the country should occur, then there may be a danger that there 
will be an opening up of the market, with more weapons becoming available. 
Military and security analysts consider that in general insufficient material is avail-
able for deeper analysis of specific features of this potential phenomenon. When 
asked in the statistical questionnaire whether terrorists are using illegal weapons 
market in Croatia for their own supply, a large group of participants (42%) answered 
that they did not know or had no information on this subject, followed by ‘periodi-
cally’ (34%), ‘yes’ (13%) and ‘no’ (11%). These responses show a lack of information 
about this complex issue among core practitioners and stakeholders who are 
directly or indirectly involved in tackling serious crime and terrorism. This shows 
that the true situation is currently unexplored and that there is an urgent need for 
further research. 
In a follow-up question, respondents were asked whether terrorists obtain or have 
obtained weapons with the help of links with OCGs. Interestingly, the largest 
number of respondents (39%) considered that such links exist. However, these 
answers should be seen in light of the 37% who said that they did not know or have 
information on this subject. Clearly, there is not enough relevant information, 
knowledge and understanding in general about this issue, and responses are likely 
to be based on rough perceptions rather than real understanding or knowledge. 
In conclusion, the answers to this part of the questionnaire indicate that survey par-
ticipants considered Croatia not to be a potential terrorist target, but rather as a 
transit country for terrorists (and also a site for firearms acquisition). The most spe-
cific thoughts on this issue came from an Interior Ministry expert with considera-
ble experience of the issue of arms smuggling: “99% of weapons smuggled through 
Croatia to Western European countries come from South East Europe. From Asia and 
Africa almost no weapons pass through Croatia, since their main smuggling channels 
are through Italy and especially Spain. As for the so-called Balkan route, it exists as a 
smuggling channel because its main (central) part passes through the continental part 
of Croatia. There are also two auxiliary routes (north and south), and the southern route 
passes partly through the coastal part of Croatia.” 
He added that “based on long-term monitoring of weapons issue, I conclude that the 
illegal arms trade in Croatia and its near neighbourhood is not really a highly profitable 
business. For this reason it is not the main activity of criminal groups and such activities 
are mostly organised ad hoc. This paradoxically complicates the work of the police to 
detect organised groups of weapons smugglers. From my involvement in all the 
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important criminal investigations in the last ten years, I can conclude that smuggled 
weapons from Croatia are primarily targeted towards criminal groups, most notably in 
the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany and the United Kingdom, while the weapons used in 
terrorist attacks in Western Europe came from smuggling routes through Spain, although 
Serbian and Bosnia-Herzegovina origins cannot be excluded.”
4. Conclusions 
This research study examined three key issues: 
1. Croatian national policy to fight the illicit firearms market and terrorist access 
to this market; 
2. the size and characteristics of the illicit firearms market in Croatia; and
3. the potential for terrorists to procure firearms from the illegal weapons market 
in Croatia. 
The first key finding is that Croatian citizens own a large quantity of illegal firearms, 
primarily as a legacy of the Homeland War (1991-1995). However, it is extremely dif-
ficult to accurately gauge the number of illegal weapons in circulation. Past esti-
mates are questionable because of the method of collecting and processing data. 
During the Homeland War a significant number of weapons were imported both 
legally and illegally, which today can be traded on the illegal market. They are 
mostly semi-automatic and automatic weapons such as pistols and various versions 
of the AK-47 assault rifle. A small but significant number of firearms have also been 
stolen from police and military storage facilities and ended up in illegal hands. 
The second key finding is that, despite the fact that citizens own a large number of 
illegal firearms, the actual active illegal firearms market in the country is small and 
weak, and prices are relatively low, ranging on average from €100 to €500 per 
firearm, depending on the type of weapon. Firearms appear to be purchased indi-
vidually or in small quantities, with limited opportunities to purchase large quanti-
ties of weapons, while buyers and sellers are mostly individuals who are not 
involved in general weapons trading. Most weapons offered for sale are left over 
from the Homeland War. Although illegally possessed firearms can be found all 
over Croatia, their initial journey mainly began in areas where military operations 
occurred during the war. OCGs are occasionally involved in smuggling, but further 
research is needed into the transit of illegal weapons through the country. In light 
of the presence of the so-called Balkan route, it is realistic to assume that Croatia is 








The third key finding is that Croatia is not being used to any significant degree to 
supply illegal weapons to terrorists, although it is certainly a transit country for 
weapons smuggling in general, and some of these weapons could end up in terror-
ist hands. It should be noted that in the last 25 years there has been minimal terror-
ist activity in Croatia, while no terrorist groups or individuals have been identified 
recently in the country. While it is possible that potential terrorists could acquire 
firearms from OCGs, we found no concrete evidence of this.
In the past decades several policy instruments have been developed to combat the 
illicit possession of and trade in firearms in Croatia, including primarily the 
Weapons Act and Criminal Code with an additional strategic framework. These 
instruments are fully harmonised with EU legislation. Two important features are 
noteworthy in this regard: firstly, the legislation itself is not a problem, but its 
implementation is; and, secondly, some regulations are unrealistic and the restric-
tive policy governing the legal procurement of weapons in the country could 
encourage illegal ownership. Cooperation among the various state institutions 
responsible for dealing with the illegal firearms market is a keystone of state policy, 
as is cooperation with international bodies. Croatian citizens have surrendered 
large numbers of illegal weapons, and police have seized other illegal firearms in 
the country itself and at the borders with neighbouring states. The police and 
Armed Forces have destroyed large numbers of illegal or surplus small arms and 
light weapons.
National policies to prevent terrorists from entering the illegal weapons market are 
very strict and designed to minimise such activities. This is a key priority in Croatia. 
However, the country is unable to control the acquisition by terrorist groups of 
weapons legally produced in Croatia and legally sold or donated to other 
countries. 
During this study we have identified several challenges confronting attempts to 
combat the illicit possession of and trade in firearms. The Croatian government 
announced the completion of the implementation of the National SALW Strategy 
and its Action Plan in 2015. However, the problems and challenges identified in this 
research prompt the recommendation that a similar programme should be drawn 
up and implemented that will continuously regulate the activities of all the institu-
tions involved in the illegal weapons issue and monitor the results of their activi-
ties. Clear strategic and tactical action plans should be developed at the national 
level that would raise awareness about the dangers of illegal weapons, standardise 
security at all weapons storage facilities, and require key actors to cooperate more 
effectively in implementing the existing system of regulation.
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The aim of this research was to answer with as much precision as possible questions 
about the state of national policies to prevent the entry of terrorists into the illegal 
weapons market, the characteristics of this market and the possibility of terrorists 
acquiring weapons on it. Research of this kind has never been carried out in Croatia. 
Empirical security-related research is very rare in the country and therefore – and 
also due to the sensitivity of the subject – many participants in interviews and 
surveys were restrained in their responses. Full statistical indicators of material for 
the research were not available to the research team, but with the help of the 
Ministry of the Interior, which provided the available databases, an analysis was 
carried out. This analysis showed that it is not possible to accurately determine the 
number of illegal weapons in Croatia, the size of the illegal market and the possibil-
ity of terrorist access to that market. The majority of the conclusions of this research 
project are based on the perceptions of key stakeholders with very different profiles 
who were or still are actively involved in firearms and terrorism control and man-
agement. Using these perceptions and what materials are available, this study has 
identified trends that form a good basis for further research on these phenomena in 
both Croatia itself and in the wider region. 
The need for further research should be emphasised. South Eastern Europe and 
countries such as Ukraine that have either previously experienced or are experienc-
ing armed conflict on their territories are a rich source of weapons. It is necessary to 
extend the existing research in these areas to more accurately understand the 
extent of the problem, to identify the challenges and to make recommendations for 
further activities to tackle the issue of illegal firearms. Extremely limited research 
into this issue has been undertaken in Croatia, and based on the initial results of the 
present study, it is strongly recommended that further in-depth research be con-
ducted. The argument for doing so is reinforced by the widely diverse and incon-
sistent perceptions of the key informants who contributed to this study. Clearly, few 
facts are known and few data are available that would allow a better understanding 
of the problems confronting Croatia and the wider region. In light of the wide-
spread terrorist attacks in recent years across Europe, it is a matter of some urgency 
that our understanding of these problems should be based on much firmer factual 
information. This study suggests the need for higher level of cooperation between 
law enforcement agencies, judicial bodies, business entities, legislators and the sci-
entific community. All are called and have not only the need, but also the obligation 
to cooperate, exchange information and strengthen the capacity of the system as 
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Illegal weapons, gangs and violent
extremism in Denmark 
Lina Grip
Denmark is a relatively small country with an exceptionally high standard of living, 
although the trends in Denmark’s Human Development Index show that its national 
development has flattened out in the past decade.1 The Global Peace Index ranked 
Denmark the second most peaceful country in the world in 2016, ranking very low 
in, for example, violent crimes and access to weapons.2 Denmark has limited expe-
rience of terrorist attacks carried out with firearms, with only six incidents occur-
ring in the past 36 years. Yet on 14-15 February 2015 Copenhagen was the site of two 
terrorist attacks carried out with firearms. In two shootings in different locations 
an armed man killed and injured several people in the course of less than 12 hours. 
This study seeks to investigate the illegal gun market dynamics in Denmark and 
how terrorists could have access to that market. Previous studies on these issues in 
Denmark have been rather limited. The present study’s analysis is therefore mainly 
based on police data on seized firearms and a few expert interviews. Where rele-
vant, the analysis was enriched with complementary information from various 
sources (see Box 1). The first section lays out the key Danish actors in the fight 
against illicit firearms and national policies to deal with these firearms, including 
terrorists’ access to them. The following sections analyse the characteristics of the 
illicit firearms markets in Denmark and terrorists’ and violent extremists’ potential 
access to firearms on these markets. The last section provides conclusions.
1.  National actors and policies for fighting illicit 
firearms 
The Danish approach to controlling illegal firearms and preventing terrorist access 
to weapons has been targeted primarily at fighting criminal gangs and enforcing the 
country’s strict gun legislation among civilian, non-violent firearms owners and 
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traders. The aim has been to weaken criminal gangs, to deter criminals from using 
firearms in their activities, and to reduce the availability and use of illegal firearms.
1.1  Legal framework
The key legislative acts dealing with legal firearms possession, distribution and 
trade are:
• the Danish Weapons and Explosives Act (Act 1005 of 22 October 2012, with 
subsequent amendments);
• the Danish Weapons and Ammunition Order (Order 1248 of 30 October 2013, 
with subsequent amendments);
• the Danish Weapons and Ammunition Circular (Circular 9597 of 30 October 
2013); and 
• the Danish War Material Act (Act 1004 of 22 October 2012).3
Box 1: Research design
The study started with a literature review of the existing academic and policy 
literature on illegal firearms in Denmark. The existing literature was very 
limited in scope: not a single publication devoted exclusively to the topic 
was found during the study. Although the academic and policy literature on 
illegal weapons in Denmark is very limited, the Danish authorities regularly 
collect data on firearms, and seized firearms are typically sent to the 
Nationalt Kriminalteknisk Center (National Forensics Centre) for analysis. 
This means that the authorities have information on, for example, weapon 
types and the countries where illegal weapons that are seized by Danish 
authorities were produced. The National Police also keep records of whether 
firearms were seized in connection with criminal gangs, although establish-
ing this is not always straightforward. The centralisation of firearms statis-
tics in Denmark was of great assistance. This case study of illegal gun 
markets primarily used statistics collected by the Nationalt Kriminalteknisk 
Center and the Nationalt Efterforskningscenter (National Investigation 
Centre), both of which form part of the Danish National Police. 
Besides this quantitative data collection and analysis, two expert interviews 
were conducted. The first was with experts from the National Investigation 
Centre. The second interview was with a Danish academic who specialised 









enforcement agencies were absolutely crucial for the study. Unfortunately, a 
number of other stakeholders (including city authorities in Copenhagen and 
officials in the Ministry of Justice), three academics and other sections of 
the police declined to be interviewed on the subject. The response by these 
stakeholders was that they did not feel that they had sufficient insight into 
or expertise on the topic of terrorist access to illicit firearms in Denmark (or 
illicit firearms markets in Denmark more broadly). 
In addition, a number of other sources were used to provide complementary 
information that was relevant to this study. The section on gang violence and 
shootings, for example, relied heavily on the annual reports on gang violence 
in the period 2010-2016 produced by the police’s National Investigation 
Centre, as well as to a more limited extent on Danish criminal statistical 
reports and national reports to the United Nations Programme of Action to 
Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPOA). The author used the Global Terrorism 
Database to identify terrorist incidents in Denmark in the past 36 years. The 
section on violent extremism and the crossover between gang criminality 
and extremism relied primarily on academic publications, as well as on the 
above-mentioned expert interview. News media were also used to a limited 
extent primarily to collect additional information on specific events, includ-
ing smuggling and terrorism-related cases.
Denmark has one of the strictest – possibly the strictest – gun ownership laws in 
Europe. The only type of weapon that civilians may own without a licence are air 
rifles of a calibre of 4.5 mm or less. All other firearms, including gas pistols, alarm 
weapons and deactivated weapons, require a licence. In Denmark, self-defence is 
not a legitimate reason for acquiring a weapon, and civilians are never granted a 
firearm licence for self-defence reasons. The only two reasons for being granted a 
firearms licence are for sports shooting and hunting purposes. To gain an individ-
ual licence, sports shooters are required to have been active members of a sports 
shooting club for at least two years. Members without a firearms licence may prac-
tise their shooting at the firing range of the club to which they belong using the 
club’s own licensed weapons, but they may not take any of these weapons home. 
Sport shooting clubs in Denmark currently have approximately 75,000 members; 
of these, about 20,000 members hold firearms licences. Dynamic sports shooting 
with semiautomatic rifles, as defined by the International Practical Shooting 
Confederation, is not allowed in Denmark. To have the right to hold a licence for 
hunting, individuals must pass an advanced hunting exam, which includes skills 
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on how to handle weapons properly. Although Danish law accepts that hunters use 
semi-automatic rifles with a magazine capacity of more than two cartridges, 
hunters may never carry more than two cartridges in their semi-automatic rifles at 
one time. There are currently approximately 250,000 hunting licences in Denmark, 
of which about 170,000 are active (the rest are suspended due to unpaid licence 
fees). A background check is conducted for all firearms licences and all licences are 
issued for a specific period.
Acquiring antique firearms (those produced before 1890) also require registration 
with and notification to the authorities. Collectors of antique weapons may not 
keep ammunition for their old guns and pistols. Collectors of firearms must keep an 
updated list containing information about the weapons in the collection that must 
be renewed once a year, as well as a list of any changes to the weapons in the collec-
tion, which needs to be sent to the police’s administrative centre. The purpose of 
this is for the police to have an updated record of available weapons in order to 
avoid unregistered weapons disappearing in thefts or robberies, and thus possibly 
supplying the illicit firearms market.4
All firearms must be stored in an authorised weapons cabinet, which must be bolted 
to the floor or wall if it weighs less than 1,000 kg. Storage of up to 25 conventional 
weapons or ten particularly dangerous firearms should be in a security cabinet con-
forming to at least EN1143-1 grade 0 or a security level corresponding to this. A col-
lection of more than 25 regular weapons or ten particularly dangerous firearms 
(pistols, semi- and fully automatic weapons, smoothbore shotguns with a barrel 
length of less than 55 cm, and semi-automatic shotguns) should be stored in a room 
with a security level equivalent to at least EN1143-1 grade 1, or in a security cabinet 
conforming to at least EN1143-1 grade 1, or a security level corresponding to this. In 
addition, an automatic burglar alarm system linked to a control centre approved by 
the National Police must be installed.5 
The minister of justice or a person authorised by the minister has the right to carry 
out checks at any time and without a court order of the weapons collections of indi-
vidual collectors; the stockpile and weapons records of dealers; the records of those 
who transport weapons; and the ammunition storage facilities of persons and asso-
ciations, including those who are authorised to recharge ammunition.6 In one such 
check of 152 collectors in 2010, the East Jutland Police confiscated 250 antique 
weapons from 29 civilian collectors over the course of two days, due to their failure 
to report the new antique weapons that they had added to their collections. Another 










1.2  Legislative criminal gang packages 1, 2 and 3
As will be illustrated later in this study, much of the illicit possession and use of 
firearms in Denmark is mainly connected to the activities of criminal biker gangs 
and street gangs. In an effort to curb gang violence (which often involves firearms), 
law enforcement in Denmark has worked through so-called legal ‘gang packages’, 
with one legislative package launched in 2009 and a second in 2013. A third initia-
tive, ‘Gang Package 3’, is currently under way. 
The first legislative package aimed at addressing situations where several shoot-
ings, or similar serious violent incidents, had taken place and the individual acts of 
violence were assumed to be connected to a conflict between criminal groups (i.e. 
inter-gang violence). It introduced a provision for the imposition of up to double 
penalties for specific illegal actions carried out as part of inter-gang violence, as 
well as a minimum sentence of one year in prison for the illegal possession of fire-
arms (up from six months’ imprisonment prior to the reform). The legislative 
package also included the introduction of zone bans, under which the police may 
issue a ban on entering and residing in an area with a radius of 500 metres; any 
violation of a zone ban leads to a prison sentence.8
In the first quarter of 2013 Copenhagen witnessed some of the worst motorcycle 
club and gang violence for several years. The police recorded more shooting inci-
dents in the first quarter of 2013 than in the whole of 2012. Several of these inci-
dents occurred in densely populated areas and involved the use of, for example, 
machine guns, at times when many innocent people were in the area. A key compo-
nent of the 2013 package was to tighten the penalty for the illegal possession of fire-
arms in specific circumstances, that is, when the firearm is carried in a public space, 
with an additional sentence if ammunition for the firearm was simultaneously 
carried. The penalty was increased from one year in prison to one year and three 
months for the first offence in the case of illegal possession of firearms in public 
places without ammunition; and imprisonment for one year and six months for the 
first offence in the case of the illegal possession of firearms in public places with 
ammunition. For a second offence, Danish law has a ‘gang clause’, that is, a provi-
sion that allows the imposition of a double sentence for certain serious crimes.9
The Danish justice system imprisoned 302 gang members between 2012 and 2016. 
In June 2016 315 gang members were in Danish prisons.10 Entries in the criminal 
register for 2015 and 2016 show that motorcycle club and other gang members in 
particular had been charged with various public crimes involving weapons and 
drugs, including violations of the drug laws, theft, burglary and crimes against the 
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public authorities.11 In 2016 the upsurge in shootings in public places in Denmark 
again initiated a legal reform package to curb gang violence.
In continuation of Gang Package 2, Gang Package 3 is currently being processed and 
is expected to be adopted soon. The legislative package includes 28 provisions 
divided into three focus areas: (1) ensuring the safety and security of all Danish citi-
zens; (2) keeping gang criminality off the streets; and (3) applying legal pressure on 
criminal gangs. The initiatives include banning motorcycle club members from 
returning to the areas where they have committed crimes, special efforts against 
extortion in gang environments, easier steps to close motorcycle clubhouses, etc. 
Of particular interests to the weapons-related area are the following:
• The minimum penalty for the possession of firearms in public places will 
double, for example, from approximately one year in prison to approxi-
mately two years for the possession of firearms without ammunition.
• An additional penalty is introduced for all crimes where weapons have been 
used in public areas, in terms of which any penalty may be increased by ‘up 
to half’. For example, a crime that on its own results in a sentence of up to ten 
years (such as robbery) will increase to 15 years if a firearm was used in the 
execution of the crime. Previously, this only applied to inter-gang violence, 
but in Package 3 it always applies to other serious crimes.
• Due to intelligence data indicating that criminals are learning shooting and 
weapons-handling skills in shooting clubs, and that shooting clubs have 
accepted members with prior criminal and problematic mental health 
records, Gang Package 3 includes new provisions for increasing control of 
Danish shooting clubs. Approval of membership of shooting associations 
will be subject to approval by the police. All members who do not have their 
own firearms licences but use shooting club weapons will be checked (this 
includes some 50,000 people), as well as all new members.
• The police will have the right to make home visits to hunters and sports 
shooters who keep licensed firearms at home to check that these firearms 
are properly stored. Previously, this only applied to weapons collectors.
• Any violation of weapons legislation that has resulted in conditional or 
unconditional imprisonment must now be included in a person’s criminal 









1.3  Reducing illicit firearms possession and gun violence 
through weapons amnesties and temporary stop-and-
search zones 
1.3.1  Temporary weapons amnesties
Given the risk of the theft of unregistered weapons held by civilians in Denmark, 
temporary gun amnesties are considered good ways of reducing risks associated 
with such weapons. At regular intervals so-called gun amnesties are announced in 
terms of which illicit weapons can be handed over to the police without the person 
being charged with a violation of the Weapons and Explosives Act. 





















Sydøstjylland 397 720 446 54,287 122 78




Fyn 432 1,088 562 113,940 467 107
Sydsjælland & 
Lolland-Falster
474 924 354 ca. 50,000 65 120
Midt- & Vestsjælland 256 756 311 7,240 11 9




Københavns Vestegn 243 387 286 55,640 20 64
København 758 564 399 Large 
amount
37 7
Bornholm 85 216 84 ca. 3,500 70 3
Total 4,844 8,637 4,035 Large 
amount
1,335 575
Source: National Investigation Centre, Danish National Police
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The latest gun amnesty for the handing in of civilian-held illegal small arms and 
explosive was announced in 2013. The nationwide initiative was very successful 
and resulted in the handing in of close to 20,000 weapons and significant quanti-
ties of explosives, while a large amount of ammunition was also collected. 
Interestingly, the number of voluntarily handed in firearms is about the same as the 
combined number of airguns and blank-firing weapons (see Table 1).13 
The result was more than double that of the previous gun amnesty in Denmark in 
May-June 2009, when a total of 8,085 firearms were handed over to the police.14 It 
also surpassed that of the most recent gun amnesty in Sweden in 2013, when 15,000 
weapons were handed over in a country with twice the population of Denmark and 
considered to have a greater gun problem.15
1.3.2  Temporary stop-and-search zones 
In situations when the police assess that there is an increased risk of violent confron-
tations between criminal gangs, the police have the right to stop any person within a 
limited geographical area during a limited time period in order to search, for example, 
for illegal weapons. They may also search vehicles within the defined zone. 
The police established 19 such zones in 2016 and a total of 982 searches were made.16 
Many of the zones were located in the Copenhagen region, and were in part moti-
vated by attempted murders and death threats involving the Loyal to Familia and 
Black Jackets gangs, as well as illegal weapons seized in Kokkedal and Hillerød.17 In 
September 2016 the police declared a stop-and-search zone in Odense, in responses 
to the continuing conflict between the Hells Angels and Black Army, leading to at 
least 478 searches within the zone.18 
According to the police, stop-and-search zones and other targeted actions against 
inter-gang violence and illegal weapons have had a significant positive impact.19 In 
particular, temporary stop-and-search zones help to de-escalate an ongoing conflict 
between criminal groups, and have helped, for example, to calm down an area 
where shootings had occurred. This gives law enforcement and other actors the 
time to carry out their investigative and preventive activities. A temporary halt in 
shootings may disrupt what are known as ‘near-repeat’ shootings (see section 2.4, 









1.4  International cooperation with regard to illicit 
firearms trafficking
1.4.1  EU harmonisation and cooperation
Denmark has stricter firearms legislation compared to the European Union (EU) 
Common Framework and most other EU member states. One such area is deactiva-
tion, which in Denmark is carried out by cutting the whole firearm in two parts 
along the length of the weapon. The common EU technical minimum criteria intro-
duced for the proper deactivation of weapons were welcomed by the Danish author-
ities, but came too late. There is evidence that dealers are trying and sell off as many 
of their deactivated weapons as possible before the enforcement of the criteria 
becomes compulsory, according to Europol’s Operation Portu and one Danish police 
representant.20 Danish legislation is also stricter than most other EU member states 
in terms of convertible weapons: “The problem is that you cannot force people in the 
rest of European countries to stick to the rules actually, that’s the problem. Here [in 
Denmark] you’re not allowed to have gas alarm weapons, even though it’s only a gas 
alarm weapon. You can buy them in Germany but you can’t take them to Denmark.”21
Since the early 1990s Denmark has had a special opt-out clause exempting the 
country from all participation in justice and home affairs (JHA) issues that apply at 
the supranational EU level. This became a growing problem after the treaties of 
Amsterdam and Lisbon, when much of the cooperation on JHA issues was changed 
from a qualified majority voting policy to a supranational policy. In May 2017 
Europol became supranational as well, in large part due to the terrorist attacks in 
Brussels and Paris. Denmark is excluded from Europol unless the country agrees to 
withdraw its right to opt out.22 On 3 December 2015 Denmark decided in a referen-
dum to leave Europol. Just two days before the new Europol regulation entered into 
force on 1 May 2017, Europol and Denmark signed a cooperation agreement. This is 
a tailor-made agreement that seeks to minimise the negative impact of Denmark’s 
withdrawal from Europol by allowing for a sufficient level of cooperation, including 
the exchange of operational data and the deployment of liaison officers, without 
full membership.23 Denmark’s special status has been taken into account, given its 
membership of the EU and the Schengen Agreement, and it was requested that 
Denmark should contribute financially to Europol. In turn, Denmark will have a 
national focal point at Europol headquarters and be able to receive or retrieve data 
on a 24/7 basis, as well as take part in meetings of the heads of the Europol national 
units and the Europol Management Board.24 Denmark believes that making the 
fight against illicit firearms a key priority of the nine EMPACT priorities (i.e. 
Europol’s priority crime areas) under the 2013-2017 EU Policy Cycle has been very 
valuable and successful. Danish police welcome the continued focus on illicit 
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firearms in the next policy cycle, which is due to start in 2018. Danish police have 
participated in Europol Policy Cycle EMPACT activities and are ready to continue 
their engagement, including in EMPACT operations targeting illicit firearms traf-
ficking. The current policy cycle’s goal under the ‘illicit firearms trafficking’ policy 
is to reduce the risk firearms pose to citizens, including combating the illicit traf-
ficking in firearms.25
1.4.2  Nordic cooperation
The Nordic countries cooperate to fight illicit weapons in a number of ways. The 
Nordic Police and Customs Cooperation was established in 1984 to combat drug-
related crime. However, since 1996 this agreement has covered practically all types 
of crime. The Swedish ‘arms mission’ (vapenuppdraget) was communicated at an 
early stage to the Nordic Police and Customs Cooperation and its liaison officers 
around the world. The Swedish focus on firearms smuggling has been reflected in 
increased information about firearms in liaison officers’ reports, as well as a focus 
on the annual threat report of the Nordic Police and Customs Cooperation, in which 
firearms smuggling constituted an area of deepening concern in 2014. During the 
year discussions have been conducted among Danish, Finnish and Norwegian col-
leagues, and Nordic cooperation is working very well. Norway has also had a liaison 
officer at the customs office in Malmö since 2012, which further facilitates coopera-
tion in ongoing cases. Consequently, liaison officers are used continuously in cases 
involving illegal firearms.26 Cooperation among the Nordic countries regularly 
includes staff visits. An analyst from Swedish customs regularly works at the 
Danish police’s National Investigation Centre, for example.27
1.5  Prevention of radicalisation 
The Danish approach to preventing and countering violent extremism and radicali-
sation is based on systematised multi-agency collaboration among various social-
services providers, the educational system, the health-care system, the police, and 
the intelligence and security services that has evolved over a decade. The sharing of 
information necessary for such collaboration is regulated by the Danish 
Administration of Justice Act, which delineates the use of shared information. The 
Danish approach draws on decades of experience with similar collaboration from 
other areas and benefits from already existing structures and initiatives developed 
for other purposes than specifically preventing extremism and radicalisation, such 
as preventing criminality.28 The Danish approach rests on “the understanding of 









radicalization as risks especially to vulnerable young people, rather than as an existen-
tial threat to the state and the existing order or a political challenge.”29
In 1997 a new law allowed knowledge sharing in collaborations among schools, 
social services and police. This is primarily a form of collaboration between munici-
pal offices and the local police. The cooperation is anchored in so-called ‘info 
houses’ that store specialised knowledge of extremism and radicalisation, and 
which have been established in Denmark’s 12 police districts.30 Denmark also has a 
system of collaboration among psychiatrists, social authorities and police; and 
among the Correctional Service, social authorities and police (KSP).31 The KSP 
system was launched primarily to prevent individuals released from prison or other 
institutions from re-engaging in crime. The Copenhagen terrorist attacks indicated 
the importance of the KSP system.32 In recent years there has been a significant 
strengthening of the authorities’ efforts with the introduction of a series of anti-
terrorism packages, for example, a multi-year agreement between the police and 
prosecuting authority in the period 2016-2019.
1.5.1  Key actors
The terrorist threat from radicalised individuals and groups in Denmark is handled 
primarily by the Police Intelligence Service (PET), which, as Denmark’s national 
intelligence and security force, has the task of identifying, preventing, investigat-
ing and countering threats to freedom, democracy and security in the Danish com-
munity. PET has had a violent extremism prevention centre since 2007, which is 
responsible for launching and implementing initiatives and projects in cooperation 
with other relevant actors, with the aim of intervening as early as possible. The 
efforts are intelligence based and threat based, and involve the intelligence ser-
vices’ knowledge and experience of previous terrorist cases, investigations, etc. 
PET’s early prevention work has three main tracks: outreach to and dialogue with 
civil society, developing the capacity and knowledge of professional subject groups, 
and exit programmes targeted at people who are already part of an extremist envi-
ronment.33 However, the efforts also involve other authorities, including the 
Defence Intelligence Service, the police, prosecutors’ offices and the Correctional 
Service. Denmark has also developed a series of policies aimed at preventing violent 
extremism.34 The National Police Prevention Centre (NFC) establishes policy for, 
supports and coordinates the police’s crime prevention efforts, including inter-
agency collaboration. The centre’s tasks are to promote cooperation with external 
actors, and to develop new methods and approaches to police crime prevention 
work. The NFC collects research-based knowledge and best practice, and is also 
responsible for civilian police duties, including activities in particularly vulnerable 
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residential areas. The national EXIT programmes contact point is also based in the 
NFC.35
A large number of authorities are involved in efforts to prevent extremism and radi-
calisation in Denmark. The Board of International Recruitment and Integration, 
PET, the NFC, and the Board of Education and Quality support efforts in the coun-
try’s municipalities and police forces, as well as in day-care centres, elementary 
schools and the area of youth education. Much of the preventive work is aimed 
more generally at all crime prevention rather than violent extremism or illegal fire-
arms trafficking specifically.36
1.5.2  EXIT programmes
Although the bulk of the work is directed at preventive measures, Denmark has also 
introduced a series of direct intervention responses targeting already radicalised 
individuals. A national emergency response team has been established, for 
example, to respond at short notice if a municipality or police district requests 
counselling in relation to emergency situations, for example, if individuals are 
planning to travel to conflict zones, and in emergency situations following (terror-
ist) arrests, arson attacks, demonstrations, etc. The response team can launch tar-
geted emergency interventions in municipalities that experience acute challenges.37
Since 2011 the Danish government has implemented a national exit plan for gang 
members called ‘A Way Out’. The national EXIT programme targets individuals 
linked to motorcycle club or gang groupings who need help to start afresh. The pro-
gramme is available throughout Denmark at the municipal level and is rooted in 
local EXIT units consisting of coordinators from the municipality, the police and 
the Probation Service.38 A new proposal in Gang Package 3 is that individuals 
actively taking part in EXIT programmes may hand in their weapons to the police 
without criminal charges being laid against them.39 PET’s exit initiatives are tar-
geted at individuals who are radicalised and involved in violent militant Islamist 
groups and extremist political groups. National authorities provide counselling to 
local authorities on how to strengthen exit initiatives dealing with extremism, with 
a special focus on how to tackle young people’s recruitment for and participation in 
armed conflicts abroad.40 
Studies have shown significant differences between EXIT programmes offered by 
various Danish municipalities in different parts of the country. Some municipali-
ties have gradually established teams of experienced professionals who possess 









academic backgrounds. In other municipalities an exit candidate’s only option is to 
obtain an exit coordinator or a mentor who is a policeman. In one case the exit coor-
dinator was the same police officer who had been in charge of the investigation of 
the crime that the candidate had been accused of committing.41 
2.  Characteristics of the illicit firearms market  
in Denmark
The size of the illicit firearms market in Denmark is estimated to be rather modest, both 
in scale and organisation. There is no single illicit firearms market in Denmark that a 
range of stakeholders access; rather, there appears to be a web of interactions involving 
illegal weapons (see section 2.3, below). Yet, the PET Centre for Terror Analysis (CTA) 
considers firearms to be ‘readily available’ to extremists wanting to carry out an attack 
in Denmark and believes that ‘simple attacks’ could be carried out after little or no plan-
ning.42 An interviewee with the Danish police’s National Investigation Centre agrees 
that illegal weapons are available to those who wish to carry out such attacks, but 
accessing illegal weapons in Denmark involves high risks and is costly. The price for a 
used standard pistol starts at 15,000-20,000 Danish kroner (about €2,000-2,700), and 
increases if the buyer has specific requests or needs.43
The majority of illegal weapons are thought to be sourced through domestic theft 
inside Denmark, followed by criminal supplies of weapons mixed with other illegal 
goods, and imported weapons. No illicit manufacturing of firearms is reported in 
Denmark44 beyond small-scale craft conversion of items such as gas pistols and 
blank-firing weapons, which is known to take place in many European countries.45 
Yet there are ongoing investigations and prosecution of groups or individuals 
engaged in transferring small arms and light weapons illegally, as well as of indi-
viduals engaged in unlawful brokering activities.46 The following section lays out 
the main characteristics of the illegal firearms market in Denmark.
2.1  The size of the Danish illicit firearms market 
A reliable estimate of the size of the illicit gun market in Denmark is currently not 
available. Data on seized firearms and reported cases of violations of the Weapons 
Act, however, suggest that this market is rather limited and that the general avail-
ability of firearms is decreasing, but criminal gangs have nonetheless managed to 
access illegal firearms through illegal imports or illegal domestic gun markets. 
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2.1.1  Weapons seizures
One type of evidence of the scale and types of firearms found on illegal markets in 
Denmark is provided by weapons seized by the police. The Danish authorities are 
relatively successful in seizing weapons and have seized a total of 3,001 firearms in 
the past four years (2013-2016), with a relatively stable range from one year to 
another (see Table 2). Weapon seizures in this case, refers to guns submitted to the 
National Forensic Centre for analysis and include all firearms that are suspected to 
original from criminal environments (including criminal possession). Many of the 
seized weapons are thought to be connected to criminal gangs, but proving a con-
nection to criminal gangs is often very difficult. 
Table 2:  Number of firearms seized in Denmark, 2013-2016






Source: Danish National Police; Denmark’s national report to UNPOA 2014, p. 15
 
According to Project FIRE’s findings, Northern Europe is the macro-region with the 
third highest number of cases of firearms seizures (20.88% of cases and 11.15% of 
firearms of the EU total). Within Northern Europe, the highest number of cases 
occurred in Sweden (33.62% of cases; 20.79% of firearms). In terms of firearms 
seized, however, Denmark accounted for the highest number (11.12% of cases; 33% 
of firearms), followed by the UK and Sweden.47
Many of the firearms seized in Denmark could not be owned in the country even 
with a licence, which means that they must have been obtained illegally (including 
converted weapons and automatic weapons). Pistols are the most commonly seized 
type of weapon, and are also the weapon of choice for criminals in Denmark (see 
below). Given the prevalence of pistols in shootings in Denmark and the fact the 









surprising that pistols make up 43% of the seized weapons. Not surprisingly, mili-
tary-grade firearms make up only a small percentage of the firearms seized in 
Denmark, while machine pistols account for 5% of the firearms seized in 2016. It 
suggests that some seized weapons that were not recorded as being seized in a gang 
environment may nonetheless be linked to criminals. Furthermore, other weapons 
types may have different effects on safety and security in terms of, for example, crime 
or suicides.
Table 3:  Firearms seized in 2016 
Type of firearm Number of firearms





Sawn-off shotguns 58 8.3%
Machine pistols 33 4.7%
Saloon rifles 35 5.0%
Converted gas and alarm weapons 22 3.1%
Automatic weapons 13 1.9%
Machine guns 5 0.7%
Total 699 100%
Source: Database of the Danish National Forensics Centre
In 2014 less than one-fifth of the alarm and gas pistols that were seized in Denmark 
had been converted, but in the first months of 2017 more than one in three of them 
had been (see Table 4). In 2014 converted weapons were a relatively significant 
problem; however, in the past few years Denmark reported a decrease in converted 
alarm and gas pistols, and Danish authorities estimate that the problem is smaller 
in Denmark than in, for example, Sweden, and in some other EU countries, where 
converted weapons are a significant problem. The conversions that the Danish 
police come across are all simply done and did not require any special skills or 
equipment. The increase in converted gas weapons is thought to be motivated by 
the same reasons as in other EU countries: their availability, low price and relatively 
low risk of acquisition.48
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Table 4: Gas/alarm weapons seized in Denmark, 2014-2017
Year 2017 2016 2015 2014
Total 21 61 53 86
Converted 8 22 17 16
Source: National Investigation Centre, Danish National Police
The most common country of production of weapons seized in Denmark is Germany. 
Figure 1 shows the country of production of all the firearms seized in Denmark in the 
period 2013-2016. The statistics show very little variation from one year to another 
in the four years covered: Germany is, for example, always the most common country 
of production, while the United States is always the second most common, and 
Belgium, Italy and Spain alternate among third, fourth and fifth places.
Figure 1:  Countries where weapons seized by Danish authorities were  
produced, 2014-2016
Source: National Investigation Centre, Danish National Police
2.1.2  Violations of the Weapons Act
Firearms-related violations constitute about 10% of the annual reported violations 
of the Weapons Act. Like the number of seized firearms, the annual numbers of 



















































































drop was a significant decrease in the number of illegal firearms from 2009 to 2010, 
while the increase since has remained relatively stable. The drop from 2009 to 2010 
is considered to be a result of the successful implementation of a new criminal code 
making firearms crimes costlier (see above). Fluctuations in other years are typically 
caused by police districts’ special efforts in this area. Targeted operations carried out 
by, for example, the Jutland police and Fyn police, resulted in an increase in seizures 
because of, for instance, seizures resulting from the failure to renew firearms 
licences. A recent national victims survey did not indicate that there has been an 
increase in the use of knives and firearms associated with episodes of violence in 
recent years.49 The result may indicate a stable level of such violence, as well as being 
indicative of the relative isolation of gun and knife violence in criminal gang envi-
ronments that generally do not affect the average citizen.
Table 5:  Reported cases of Weapons Act violations, 2009-2015
Year











Source: Danish National Police, Strategic Analysis 2016, p. 25
While the number of firearms violations has remained quite stable, the total num ber 
of reported violations of the Weapons Act has increased by over 20% in the past 
decade (Table 5).
The number of offences perpetrated with unlawful knives increased by 11% between 
2009 and 2014, while the number of cases of illegal firearms in the same period fell 
by almost 39%. Hence, the number of firearms-related cases that the police have 
investigated has also been falling. In the period 2010-2014 this number more than 
halved from 1,371 to 619.50 A possible cause was the stricter legislation on the unlaw-
ful possession of firearms that entered into force in 2009, allegedly causing crimi-
nal gangs (including motorcycle club gangs) to partly shift from using firearms to 
using weapons such as knives.51 This would suggest that stricter gun legislation 
specifically targeting gangs may have a deterrent effect. Since 1 July 2014 the penalty 
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for the possession of firearms has been made more stringent and it has become 
easier to apply the so-called gang clause that can impose double sentences for 
serious biker- and gang-related crime. In addition, imprisoned members are 
excluded from parole when their group has engaged in a violent conflict with 
another group.52 However, the implementation of the ‘gang clause’ placed specific 
pressure on investigators to prove the individual perpetrator had a gang connec-
tion, which is very difficult in practice. If gang members involved in firearms 
offences and violence are not convicted under the gang clause, the deterrent effect 
of the stricter legislation is likely to be undermined, which may explain the return 
of gun violence a few years after the entry into force of the stricter legislation.
2.2  Sources of firearms on the illicit market
Firearms have mainly ended up on the illicit gun market because of domestic diver-
sion from legal gun owners and shooting clubs and illegal imports of firearms. In 
addition, some firearms also reach the illicit gun market through the illegal sale of 
unregistered firearms by individual gun enthusiasts without criminal intentions or 
through internet sales. 
2.2.1  Domestic diversion
The theft of firearms from private citizens often involves licensed firearms. These 
thefts are then reported to the police. Between 2012 and 2016 more than 1,000 fire-
arms were reported stolen from private homes in Denmark.53 On other occasions 
the weapons are old and not in use, and are stored somewhere on the property such 
as in the loft or attic (i.e. not in proper locked weapons-storage facilities). Thefts 
from such sources are often not reported to the police, but the police estimate that 
the number of unrecorded cases is large, and that these weapons constitute a con-
siderable pool of illegal weapons in Denmark. One indicator is that the unlicensed 
and unregistered weapons stored in people’s homes are often very old, typically 
from the Second World War or earlier. Unregistered old pistols of this type show up 
rather frequently in shooting incidents or in other criminal investigations, but 
without being previously reported to the police. 
One specific aspect of firearms acquisition through robbery and theft is theft from 
sports shooting clubs. Two-thirds of the current 75,000 members of Danish sports 
shooting clubs are not allowed to take firearms home. However, the ‘freedom of 
association’ in Danish law allows associations to include any member in their activ-









underage people can join sports shooting clubs in Denmark, where they learn, for 
example, weapons-handling and shooting skills, and gain information about the 
club’s security arrangements (e.g. the location of storage rooms and surveillance 
cameras) that could subsequently be used to steal the club’s weapons. Recently, a 
Danish police officer was shot and killed by a mentally disturbed attacker with a 
criminal record who used a weapon that he had stolen from the sports shooting 
club to which he belonged. The incident, along with other known criminal involve-
ment in some shooting clubs, has resulted in a change in legislation (see above).54
2.2.2  The illegal importation of firearms
Although the scale of weapons smuggling is difficult for authorities to estimate, fire-
arms trafficking into Denmark from other European countries is believed to be more 
limited compared to some other countries, such as neighbouring Sweden. The illegal 
imports are of two kinds: firstly, weapons are legally bought without a licence in 
another EU country and then brought illegally into Denmark. This is possible 
because many weapons that require a licence in Denmark can be bought licence-free 
in other EU countries, including, for example, alarm weapons, gas pistols and deac-
tivated weapons. Secondly, weapons are bought illegally and smuggled into Den-
mark, sometimes via a series of other European countries. A 2014 study found that 
the main method of trafficking illicit firearms into Denmark was in heavy goods 
vehicles originating primarily from the western Balkans.55 Some weapons smuggled 
into Denmark are destined for the Swedish criminal market (see below). 
Profit-motivated criminals who also engage in, for instance, the smuggling of ciga-
rettes, drugs or people are thought to be responsible for firearms smuggling. The police 
believe that criminals typically smuggle firearms to sell rather than for their own use. 
Contrary to the findings in the 2014 study, what the authorities can confirm is that 
weapons of a specific origin, such as those once produced in the western Balkans, are 
relatively seldom used in shootings or seized in investigations in Denmark compared to 
in some other EU countries. This is most notable in comparison to Sweden, where most 
weapons used in shootings in public spaces are from the western Balkans. One of the 
explanations may be the use in firearms acquisitions of closer personal connections in 
Sweden with the western Balkans, due to the much larger diaspora in Sweden com-
pared to Denmark.56 This does not mean that there are no cases in Denmark of firearms 
smuggling from the former Yugoslavia. In 2013, for example, a man was convicted of 
smuggling four AK-47s and two Zastava pistols into Denmark from Croatia.57 The 2015 
strategic analysis report of the Danish National Police stated that terrorist access to fire-
arms in Denmark may increase in the future through the smuggling of weapons and 
other military materiel from, for example, Russia.58
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2.2.3  Illegal internet sales
Danish and other national police forces actively monitor the internet in an attempt 
to follow developments and illegal trade deals. The Danish police’s investigations 
have shown that the trade in illegal firearms on the dark web is primarily conducted 
by gun enthusiasts who have no criminal intent. The assumption is that, although 
the prices of weapons on the dark web tend to be lower than on the street, criminals 
are risk averse and avoid using the dark web to access firearms.59 Less experienced 
criminals may be less risk averse and may use social media to access guns. In 2015 a 
report about Danish youth trading weapons on a Facebook group (one that had 
1,000 members) caused a stir, although it is difficult to assess whether any firearms 
were actually traded in this way.60
2.2.4  Illegal sales by gun enthusiasts
Individual gun enthusiasts, such as collectors, have been known to organise infor-
mal garage sales of unregistered weapons and to sell weapons to other weapon 
enthusiasts without criminal intent.61 In December 2012 Danish police confiscated 
a total of 158 illegal firearms, hand grenades, mortar shells and fuses, as well as 
large amounts of cartridges in several searches of homes, leading to the arrest of 
eight men aged between 19 and 71. In the first search the police found ten illegal 
firearms, including two machine guns and three pistols. The investigation found 
evidence that some weapons collectors held many unregistered and illegal weapons, 
and that these collectors to some extent traded illegal weapons among themselves 
and with other interested parties.62 Although the traders typically have no violent 
or criminal intention, it is a completely illegal arrangement that may also attract 
individuals who intend to use the unregistered weapons for criminal or even terror-
ist purposes.
2.3  Dynamics of the illicit gun market
2.3.1  Instrumental market with a wide variety of available 
firearms driven by criminal demand
The illegal gun market in Denmark is facilitated and largely driven by the demand 
of criminal gangs. Criminals in Denmark sell and resell firearms within and between 
gangs. The illegal gun market in criminal environments appears to be pragmatic 
rather than ideological. Individuals from an motorcycle club gang known to have 









an ethnic street gang.63 Thanks to police firearms forensics units, investigations 
have shown that the same weapons are used in multiple shootings and various 
crimes. On one occasion the same weapon was used in five different shootings. The 
police therefore infer that the size of the criminal gang market in firearms is limited 
in Denmark.64 This dynamic is different from the situation in Sweden, for example, 
where a weapon is rarely used in more than one shooting.65 Criminal gangs in 
Denmark are typically so-called ‘multi-criminals’ and do not specialise in firearms 
only. Most commonly, firearms are used as protection or for the control of, for 
example, drug markets. Theft, robbery and involvement in the illegal sales of gun 
enthusiasts are ways in which criminals gain access to firearms in Denmark, as well 
as through the conversion and importation of weapons.66 The police warn that the 
improved organisation and increased internationalisation of criminal groups may 
increase criminals’ and terrorists’ access to weapons in Denmark.67
Box 2: Weapons and accessories seized in January 2012
• German semi-automatic saloon rifle, .22 calibre, GSG 5
• US revolver, .44 Magnum calibre, Colt Anaconda
• Us revolver, .357 Magnum calibre, Smith & Wesson 28-2 Highway 
Patrolman
• Sharp-loaded US self-loading pistol, .45 ACP calibre, Colt MK IV 
Govern ment
• Turkish converted gas and signal pistol, 6.35 mm calibre
• Italian semi-automatic shotgun, 12/70 mm calibre, FABARM
• US ‘slide-action’ (pump-action) shotgun, 20/76 mm calibre, Mossberg 500C
• Sharp-loaded Turkish converted gas and signal pistol, 6.35 mm calibre
• Turkish converted gas and signal pistol, 6.35 mm calibre
• US ‘slide-action’ (pump-action) shotgun, 12/70 mm calibre, Winchester 1200
• US rifle, 30-30 calibre, Winchester 94 
• German/US semi-automatic saloon rifle, .22LR calibre, Colt M4 Carbine
• Sharp-loaded US revolver, .44 Magnum calibre, Smith & Wesson 25-5
• Sharp-loaded US revolver, .357 Magnum calibre, Smith & Wesson 627-5
• Sharp-loaded Brazilian even-let pistol, 9 Parabellum calibre, Taurus 
PT92AF
• Sharp-loaded German self-loading pistol, .22LR calibre, Walther P22, 
with attached silencer
• German self-loading pistol, 9 mm Parabellum calibre, Walther P99, 
number FAG5050 with associated magazine containing 15 cartridges
• German self-loading pistol, 9 mm Parabellum calibre, SIG Sauer P226 S
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• US self-loading pistol, .45 ACP calibre, Colt COMBAT Commander
• British sub-machine gun, 9 mm Parabellum calibre, Sten MK II
• US self-loading pistol, 9 mm Parabellum calibre, Springfield 1911A1
• German self-loading pistol, 7.65 calibre, Mauser HSC with magazine 
containing eight cartridges
• US revolver, .357 Magnum calibre, Smith & Wesson 19-3
• Israeli self-loading machine pistol, 9 mm Parabellum calibre, Uzi
• Italian percussion revolver, .44 calibre, NAVY 1851 
• Belgian self-loading pistol, 9 mm Parabellum, Browning 1935 Hi Power 
with magazine containing two cartridges
• US self-loading pistol, .22LR calibre, Ciener Platinum Cup
• While-charging pistol, .45 ACP calibre, unknown brand, model 1911A1
• US self-loading pistol, .45 ACP calibre, Enterprise Arms, with three mag-
azines each containing 11 cartridges
• Philippine self-loading gun, .45 ACP calibre, ARMSCOR
• Chinese self-loading gun .45 ACP calibre, Norinco 1911A1, with magazine 
containing one cartridge
• US bolt, barrel and magazine, .22LR calibre, Ciener 1911A1
• Philippine self-loading pistol, .40 calibre Smith & Wesson, with associ-
ated magazine containing two cartridges
• Gun, 7.65 mm calibre, unknown make and producer, with six cartridges
• US revolver, .22 calibre Hornet, Smith & Wesson 686-3 with 12 cartridges
• US revolver, .357 Magnum calibre, Ruger GP100 with six cartridges
• US self-loading pistol, .22LR calibre, Ruger MK II with magazine contain-
ing eight cartridges and attached silencer
• Danish military pistol, 9 mm Parabellum calibre, SIG, P-210 Neuhausen
• German converted gas and signal pistol, .22 Hornet calibre, Rohm Noris 
Twinny
• US self-loading pistol, .45 ACP calibre, Kimber Gold Match II
• .410 calibre gun, unknown tag and trademark
• German semi-automatic saloon rifle, .22LR calibre, GSG 5
• German self-loading pistol, 7.65 mm calibre, Walther PPK
• Electronic laser sight, Walther; one silencer; and a Hawke laser
Source: SKAT, High Court, Doc. No. SKM2013.667.ØLR, 24 January 2013
One court case from 2012 is an illustrative example of the dynamics of the illegal 
firearms market and the different types of firearms that are available on the illicit 
gun market in Denmark. In January 2012 two men were convicted of smuggling 









fraudulent information and tax fraud. According to PET, at least one of the men had 
close contacts with the biker community, including leading members of the G5 and 
G4 motorcycle club gangs. Large parts of the sentences that the smugglers receivedI 
were due to the possession of an illegal weapons cache consisting of a wide variety 
of 44 firearms (see Box 2) and large amounts of ammunition of various calibres. Five 
of the seized firearms were registered in the police firearms register as having been 
stolen in Denmark. The serial numbers had been removed on 14 of the other 
weapons. The remaining firearms were not registered in the firearms register and 
could not have been legally acquired, owned or transferred in Denmark.68 
2.3.2  Weapons transiting through Denmark
Malmö and the Öresund bridge (between Copenhagen and Malmö) are thought to 
be the most common route for illicit weapons that reach Sweden by land. The illegal 
import of firearms to Malmö is extensive. As one example, three-quarters of fire-
arms seized in Sweden in the first half of 2012 were seized at the Öresund bridge and 
the docks in Malmö.69 Because of Malmö’s location and local demand, the city is 
thought to be used as a depot for illegal firearms. Most of the illegal weapons circu-
lating in Malmö’s criminal environments were produced in the Czech Republic or 
the former Yugoslavia.70 The importance of Öresund bridge and Malmö for the 
illicit gun market in Sweden suggests that many of the guns trafficked to Sweden 
have transited through Denmark; these guns include military-grade assault rifles. 
In February 2017, for example, a man previously convicted of murder was stopped 
in his car at the Öresund bridge and found to be carrying two AK-47 assault rifles 
with him.71
The Öresund bridge is not only used for firearms trafficking to Sweden, but also for 
bringing firearms from Sweden to Denmark.72 In February 2017, for example, 
Swedish customs and police arrested a couple for importing and converting a large 
number of gas pistols that authorities think were then sold to criminals in Sweden 
and Denmark, one of which was used in a murder in Gothenburg, Sweden. The 
couple had received more than 90 gas weapons that the man had converted to fire 
live ammunition. The weapons had been imported by making use of the laxer gun 
I One of the men was sentenced to 12 years in prison and a fine of 1.195 million Danish kroner 
(approximately €160,000), and some of his belongings were confiscated. The other man was sen-
tenced to seven years in prison and was expelled from Denmark for life.
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laws in the countries from where they originated.I The authorities also found 
several thousands of cartridges of various calibres, silencers, magazines and several 
weapons barrels.73 74
2.4  Criminal gangs and firearms violence in Denmark
The Danish intelligence picture of gun violence is very closely linked to criminal 
gangs, although these vary in terms of their organisation. It is assumed that gun 
violence in public places that is not linked to criminal groups is a rare occurrence in 
Denmark. Historically, the criminal gang scene in Denmark was almost exclusively 
made up by two rival motorcycle club gangs, Hells Angels and Bandidos. The Hells 
Angels motorcycle club has seven divisions in Denmark, as well as a support group 
called AK81.II75 In the past decade Hells Angels have represented themselves as the 
protectors of Denmark against young men from ethnic minorities, and have 
engaged in a conscious process of demonising their rivals.76 About two-thirds of 
individuals affiliated with gangs in Denmark are linked to motorcycle club gangs, 
primarily Hells Angels and Bandidos. Only about 100 people are connected to other 
motorcycle club gangs.77
Contrary to the motorcycle club gangs, criminal gangs are smaller and more numer-
ous. In recent years the gang scene has diversified and become more complex, 
including by the establishment of international groups in Copenhagen from, for 
example, the Netherlands and Germany. The police have detected conflicts among 
the various gangs related to crime markets, territory, and personal conflicts and 
cases of revenge.78 The groups are very dynamic, with old ones disappearing and 
new ones forming. In 2016 the largest gangs were Loyal to Familia, Black Army, 
Brothas Souljaz, Black Cobra, UTF and Bloodz.79
In addition to the organised criminal groups, a number of street gangs have further 
diversified the gang environment in Denmark. In 1998, as a result of collaboration 
among police, schools and social services, 15 to 20 youth street gangs were identi-
fied in Copenhagen alone, each with five to 20 members between the ages of 15 and 
I In both Sweden and Denmark alarm weapons require a licence. While associations and clubs that 
are affiliated with the Swedish Sports Confederation or the Swedish Kennel Club do not need a 
licence for alarm weapons, a private individual requires a licence to own such a weapon, which 
is applied for under so-called odd purposes. The prerequisites for obtaining a licence for an alarm 
weapon is that you need the weapon for dog training, sports competitions, agriculture or to scare 
pests. Authorisation is very restrictive (Swedish police, Weapon Laws and Regulations, <https://
polisen.se/Lagar-och-regler/Vapen/Paintballskytte/>).
II The letters A and K stand for Altid Klar (Always Ready), and the numbers 8 and 1 refer to the let-









20.80 These youth gangs are geographically based (from areas such as Tingbjerg, 
Blågårds Plads, Kokkedal, Værebro, Mjølnerparken, etc.). Some of them have 
formed an official grouping and display their gang identity by wearing black 
hoodies marked with local geographical names.81
In 2016 approximately 1,400 people were affiliated to criminal or motorcycle club 
gangs in Denmark, which is the lowest figure recorded since 2010.82 A recent study 
showed that 3,332 individuals had been affiliated to gangs and motorcycle club 
clubs between 2009 and 2016, but only 324 individuals had been associated with 
the gang environment for the entire period. Hence, criminal and motorcycle club 
gang membership is very fluid in Denmark, and it is not uncommon that members 
leave or even shift from one gang affiliation to another. Interestingly, to some extent 
there has been some integration, or at least individual overlaps, since 2008 between 
street gangs and more organised criminal motorcycle club gangs. One example 
given in the literature was a drive-by shooting of a male member of a rival street 
gang, after which the young shooter was offered a position linked to Hells Angels: 
‘For HA, a prospect who had committed such as brutal drive by killing was attrac-
tive, because it symbolized power and [a] dangerous reputation in relation to other 
street communities.’83
According to official estimates, eight violent conflicts between gangs were ongoing 
in January 2017.84 Criminal gangs are responsible for the overwhelming majority of 
public shootings in Denmark. In 2016 all 54 recorded public shootings were con-
nected to biker and gang conflicts. Almost all shootings are carried out with pistols, 
which are more easily available, and are easy to carry and conceal.85 The trends in 
shootings in criminal environments in Denmark show clear evidence of so-called 
near-repeat shootings. This involves crimes that are clustered in space and time, 
with a crime event often shortly followed by another one nearby. Between mid-Sep-
tember and mid-October 2016 alone Denmark experienced 24 shootings, 20 of 
which took place in Copenhagen, Næstved and Odense. Many of the exceptionally 
numerous shootings during 2016 included young men who were believed to be 
linked to the motorcycle club gang community. However, because several of the 
shootings occurred in public spaces, there were also non-gang-related casualties 
(i.e. people who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time).86 
Although the number of shootings in public spaces fluctuates from year to year, a 
significant increase in the number of ‘successful’ shootings can be observed: while 
in 2011 someone was hit in only six of the 50 shootings (an 11.5% accuracy rate), the 
same number of shootings resulted in injuries in 29 shootings in 2016 (a 54% accu-
racy rate). Police intelligence has also noted an improvement in individual gang 
members’ handling of firearms and that gang members tend to assume a ‘correct’ 
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position before shooting. The police therefore conclude that criminals have become 
more skilful shooters in the past few years. The police have further concluded that 
some criminals, including members of motorcycle club gangs, have learnt how to 
shoot and handle firearms in Danish shooting clubs.87 
Figure 2:  Public shootings and number of injured or killed, 2011-2016
Source: National Investigation Centre, Danish National Police
Although almost all shootings can be linked to criminal groups and many firearms 
seizures are thought to be linked to gangs, only about 6% of the seized weapons can 
actually be definitely linked to gangs. In 2014, 584 firearms were submitted for 
investigation by the police, of which 33 weapons were confirmed to be linked to 
motorcycle club and gang environments (5.6%).88 In 2015, 691 guns were submitted 
for investigation by the police, 43 of which were confirmed to be linked to motorcy-
cle club and gang environments (6.2%).89 
However, the number of firearms seized in gang environments has not followed the 
same pattern in recent years. In 2016 police found 48 firearms that the National 
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number of shooting incidents with the number of weapons seized, police find sig-
nificantly fewer firearms per shooting incident than before. In 2016 police there fore 
identified 0.88 firearms per public shooting incident. In 2010, when Denmark 
experienced 40 shootings in public places and the police confiscated 224 firearms 
linked to the biker and gang environments, the ratio was 5.6 firearms per firearms 
shooting incident.90 While the decline in firearms after 2009 was thought to at least 
partly have been the result of a changing preference for knives, the police believe 
that the gangs have recently become more skilful in hiding their firearms: for 
example, the weapons are often not kept in private residences, but are stored in 
other locations and ‘pooled’ for use from there.91
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Source: Danish National Police, annual reports on gangs and motorcycle clubs, 2012-2015, <https://www.politi.dk/>
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3.  Terrorist access to firearms on the illicit 
market in Denmark
The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) lists 40 terrorist attacks in Denmark between 
1978 and 2015. Only a small number of these attacks resulted in injuries (13 attacks) 
or fatalities (four attacks). Firearms were rarely used in attacks in this period, and 
homemade explosive devices such as Molotov cocktails were used much more fre-
quently. Yet the six attacks in which firearms were used resulted in injury or death
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on four occasions, in total killing two people and injuring five others (see Table 6). 
This finding suggests that when firearms are used in acts of terrorism, these attacks 
have deadlier outcomes.
In the last decade four terrorist attacks in which firearms were used can be identi-
fied. On 3 April 1981 an Armenian gunman shot a Turkish Embassy labour attaché, 
Cavit Demir, in his apartment building in Copenhagen. Demir was seriously 
wounded, but survived after a series of operations. The Armenian Secret Army for 
the Liberation of Armenia and Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide 
claimed responsibility for the attack.95 On 11 May 1995 former staff member Henry 
Stærke Hansen hijacked the ferry that he was fired from a year previously. He used 
a Winchester rifle to take the captain hostage while demanding to have his case 
dealt with by the municipality, which he believed had treated him unfairly in con-
nection with the layoff. Stærke Hansen surrendered himself to the police and was 
later convicted under the Terrorist Act.96 On 31 December 2008 a perpetrator of 
Danish-Palestinian descent opened fire with a 9 mm pistol at three Israelis in a 
shopping mall in Odense and injured two of them. The perpetrator was convicted of 
attempted murder and sentenced to ten years in prison. No information is publicly 
available about how the shooter acquired his pistol.97
On 5 February 2013 an unknown gunman posing as a postman attempted to shoot 
Danish historian and journalist Lars Hedegaard in his home in Copenhagen. 
Hedegaard was the chairman of the Danish Free Press Society and the recipient of 
the 2012 ICLA Defender of Freedom Award. Hedegaard had been critical of Islam in 
the past, including by alleging that it limits free speech. The attack failed and the 
perpetrator was able to escape. No group claimed responsibility for the incident, 
but it was considered an act of terrorism.98 According to the US State Department, 
Basil Hassan was accused of the attempted murder of Hedegaard and arrested in 
Turkey in 2014, but released as part of an alleged exchange for 49 hostages held by 
the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).99 
The most deadly terror attack in recent history in Denmark took place in February 
2015 when a so-called ‘lone wolf’ killed two people and injured five others in a 
double attack on a cultural centre and a synagogue in Copenhagen. The paper will 
discuss the firearms the perpetrator used in this double attack in greater detail in 
the following section. 
Besides these (attempted) terror attacks, the Danish security forces have foiled a 
number of other terrorist plots, and firearms have been seized in house searches 
connected to some of these foiled plots. In 2010 security services in Denmark and 
Sweden uncovered a terrorist plot against the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, 
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which published the controversial cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in 2005. In 
several raids the police detained five men whom they described as militant 
Islamists. Automatic firearms, ammunition and silencers were seized.100 In April 
2016 the Danish police arrested four men in Copenhagen suspected of having joined 
ISIS with the intention of committing acts of terror. The police searched four prop-
erties, and at one address claimed they had found weapons and ammunition. The 
address had links to one of Copenhagen’s criminal gangs.101
According to data submitted to Eurojust, Denmark concluded court cases against 22 
individuals for terrorist offences in the period 2013-2015.102 In the past few years 
several Danes have been convicted of openly supporting ISIS, and of travelling to 
fight for the group in Iraq and Syria.103 The PET Centre for Terror Analysis (CTA) 
estimates that at least 135 people have left Denmark to go to Syria or Iraq since the 
summer of 2012. Barely a quarter are still in the conflict zone and a corresponding 
proportion have possibly been killed.104 The CTA estimated further that half of those 
who had left the country had been involved in crime before their departure.105 The 
number of Danish citizens travelling to join ISIS and the number of returnees has 
dropped in the past year. Despite the law banning travel for terrorist purposes and 
the strengthening of Criminal Code provisions restricting connections to enemy 
armed forces, it is likely that people will still travel abroad to and return home from 
conflict zones in the coming years.106 As of April 2016, approximately 62 such indi-
viduals had returned to Denmark.107 Although PET assesses that a small-scale ter-
rorist attack in Denmark is more likely to be carried out by someone other than 
returned foreign fighters, the latter are considered more likely to be involved in a 
planned attack. According to PET, members of this group therefore constitute the 
most dangerous terrorist threat to Denmark, while it acknowledges broad variation 
within the group. Risk assessments are carried out at the individual level to deter-
mine what kinds of responses are needed.108 
3.1  The terrorist attacks in Copenhagen  
on 14-15 February 2015 
On 14 February 2015 at about 3.30 p.m. a man opened fire on a cultural centre in 
central Copenhagen called the Krudttønden Café during a debate being held there 
on ‘Art, Blasphemy and Freedom of Expression’. The debate featured the contro-
versial Swedish artist and activist Lars Vilks, who had depicted the Prophet 
Muhammad as a dog in 2007, and who had been the target of death threats ever 
since. Finn Nørgaard, a film director attending the event, was shot dead at close 
range after going outside at the time the attacker struck. Three police officers were 









next morning, at about 1 a.m., shots were fired at the synagogue in Krystalgade in 
central Copenhagen during a bat mitzvah celebration, killing a security guard 
standing outside. Two police officers were also shot, but their injuries were not life 
threatening.110 A couple of hours later the police shot dead a suspect who had 
arrived at an address they had under surveillance. Officers said that the police 
challenged him near a railway station in the neighbourhood of Nørrebro, upon 
which he opened fire and was then shot.111 The dead suspect carried with him the 
same weapons that were used in the attacks. The attacker, later identified as Omar 
Abdel Hamid el-Hussein, was thought to have carried out both terrorist attacks in 
Copenhagen. The attacks are considered ‘lone wolf’ incidents and no group 
claimed responsibility for them.112 
The perpetrator of the double attack was a 22-year old Danish-born Palestinian with 
a criminal history who was well known to the Danish intelligence services. As a 
teenager, he became a member of the Brothas gang in Mjølnerparken and was sen-
tenced twice for violence, possession of an illegal weapon, and an indiscriminate 
knife attack on a man on a suburban train in Copenhagen. He was arrested in 
January 2014 and sentenced to two years in prison. El-Hussein was believed to have 
been radicalised in prison. The prison authorities reacted to changes in his behav-
iour and found that el-Hussein had expressed sympathy for ISIS, which had led 
prison staff to warn the Prisons and Probation Service and the latter to in turn warn 
the Danish Security and Intelligence Service.113 El-Hussein was released from prison 
on 30 January 2015, just two weeks before the attack.114
El-Hussein used a 5.56 mm M95 rifle in the attack on the Krudttønden Café. The 
M95 is a magazine-fed, air-cooled, automatic weapon that can fire 700-900 shoots 
per minute, and is primarily used at ranges of up to 500 metres. Importantly, the 
M95 is the Danish defence forces’ standard weapon.115 According to the Danish 
police, el-Hussein used the semi-automatic function of the weapon, which is easier 
to use and more precise. Despite the wide variety of firearms that can be acquired 
on the illegal gun market in Denmark, an M95 is rarely found there. The police 
investigation found that el-Hussein had stolen the weapon in an armed robbery of 
a house belonging to a member of the Danish Home Guard, a volunteer military 
organisation that supports the military and police. Its members take a series of 
obligatory courses, including target shooting and weapons training.116 In October 
2014 the Danish Home Guard had 46,651 members,117 4,328 of whom each had a 
weapon stored at home. The investigation found that the robbery had been planned 
and the house was targeted specifically to steal the weapon stored there.118 After the 
terrorist attack these Home Guard weapons were temporary recalled to a central 
storage facility. After a multi-million euro procurement, the Home Guard reintro-
duced the system of members’ taking their weapons home – with the significant 
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difference that each home-stored weapon now requires a chamber lock. The 
chamber can only be unlocked with a key or code, and attempts to remove the lock 
without the key will render the weapon inoperable. The chamber lock system is 
used by the Home Guard in both Norway and Sweden.119
At the Krystalgade Synagogue el-Hussein fired nine shots from two pistols. Both 
weapons were old, probably stolen, pistols. The pistols were found on el-Hussein 
when the police shot him. One was a Polish-made pistol produced sometime before 
the Second World War. The second was a German-made Walther 7.65 mm pistol 
that had also been produced in the first half of the 20th century. Given the dynam-
ics of the illegal gun market in Denmark, together with the confirmed theft of the 
M95, it is very likely that the two pistols were unregistered weapons that were 
stolen from a private home or storage system and were never reported as stolen to 
the police.120
3.2 Firearms possession in left-wing and right-wing 
extremist networks
Denmark has a history of violent left-wing extremism, but the movement has 
largely become non-violent. The extreme left enjoys a relatively large member-
ship, especially in Copenhagen. Left-wing squatters in Copenhagen engaged in 155 
acts of vandalism and sabotage between 1981 and 1994. These actions included the 
systematic demolition of branches of multinational companies and the offices of 
perceived imperialist regimes like the United States, Israel and apartheid South 
Africa, as well as a number of arson attacks and only occasionally the use of primi-
tive bombs and firearms. Left-wing terrorist attacks after 1994 have not been 
con fir med.121
Between 1990 and 2005 there were 19 confirmed cases of right-wing extremist vio-
lence against people in Denmark, injuring nine people and killing one person. The 
attacks were carried out by, for example, Frit Danmark (Free Denmark), Blood & 
Honour Denmark, White Pride and Dansk Front (Danish Front). The attackers used 
knives, beating/kicking, firebombs, letter bombs, Molotov cocktails, glass, axes, 
brass knuckle-dusters, other melee weapons, maglights, crowbars and tear gas. 
Only one attack involved a firearm – a saloon rifle. In this attack three members of 
Blood & Honour Denmark harassed, threatened and attacked three Bosnian refu-
gees in the town of Rudkøping, using one rifle and 13 knives.122 Another study 
showed that Danish radical right-wing groups engaged in 188 acts of violence 
between 1982 and 1999. Refugees and immigrants were the principal targets of the 









how many of the offences included firearms, but the study concluded that the use 
or involvement of firearms was limited.123 
Danish extreme right-wing organisations officially distance themselves from vio-
lence and other unlawful activities. Yet individuals with varying degrees of involve-
ment with these groups have been known to engage in criminal activities, includ-
ing the possession of illegal weapons.124 Individual members of the National Front 
of Denmark, for example, have been convicted of the illegal possession of weapons 
and/or violent assaults, including violent hate crimes.125 A public report states that 
some members of the National Front of Denmark have received weapons training 
in Russia.126 
In January 2014 Danish Defence League member Jimmie Hørskov Juhler, the treas-
urer and deputy chairman of the Danish Defence League Support Association, 
updated his profile picture on Facebook to one of the Norwegian terrorist and mass 
murderer Anders Behring Breivik. The image was the notorious self-portrait of the 
Norwegian terrorist in uniform posing with a gun, but Breivik’s face was replaced 
with that of Jimmie Hørskov Juhler.127 As of April 2017 the Danish Defence League’s 
Facebook page had obtained 12,000 likes.128 The profile picture is an anecdotal case of 
the potential symbolic value firearms hold in right-wing extremist environments. 
In December 2014 the Norwegian police seized automatic weapons and narcotics 
from members of the Norwegian Resistance Movement. The movement’s logo was 
found on some of the weapons. The Nordic Resistance Movement is the name of the 
umbrella organisation made up by the Swedish, Finish, Danish and Norwegian 
resistance movements. Several members of the Swedish chapter of the organisa-
tion have previously been convicted of illegal firearms possession.129 Like the Nordic 
Resistance Movement, the National Socialist Society of Denmark and the organisa-
tion Stop the Islamisation of Denmark have stated that they would use violence in 
self-defence.130 In June 2017 three members of the Swedish chapter of the Nordic 
Resistance Movement were charged with detonating two bombs and placing a third 
at a left-wing community centre and two refugee housing facilities in Gothenburg, 
Sweden, in January 2017, causing severe injuries to one victim.131
According to PET, some left-wing and right-wing extremist networks in Denmark 
are prepared to use violence to promote their agendas. Such violence can be directed 
against political opponents; minority groups, including refugees and migrants; and 
organisations and companies that are judged to have symbolic value. Yet the CTA 
believes that there is a limited terrorist threat from people or groups who move in 
or sympathise with these environments, but that increasing focus on refugees and 
migrants among people linked to these networks or with extremist sympathies may 
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increase the threat to asylum centres, refugees and migrants, and the responsible 
authorities. The CTA further assesses that threats can take the form of violence, 
arson or other attacks. Attacks and threats against refugees and migrants from 
right-wing extremists can in turn lead to counter-reactions from extreme Islamists 
or from members of left-wing extremist circles.132
3.3  Crossover between criminal and political violent 
networks
Several studies have shown crossovers between known terrorists behind recent 
attacks in Europe and criminal environments, largely by mapping the past crimi-
nal records of known terrorists. One recent Danish study, for example, showed that 
an increasing proportion of the perpetrators who are directly involved in terrorist 
attacks linked to jihadism in Europe have known criminal pasts. Between 2001 
and 2011 five of the 33 perpetrators of terrorist attacks had known criminal back-
grounds, while between 2012 and July 2016, 30 out of 51 had such backgrounds.133 
A study by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political 
Violence found that the crime-terrorism nexus did not mean the merging of crimi-
nals and terrorists as organisations, but of their social networks, environments or 
milieus. Criminal and terrorist groups, for example, often recruit from the same 
pool of people, creating (often unintended) synergies and overlaps that have con-
sequences for how individuals radicalise and operate.134
Already in 2014 the Danish government stated that a key concern for Danish 
authorities are criminals, including people associated with gangs, with close links 
to extremist circles.135 The crossover between criminal and politically motivated 
violence became much more apparent since the shootings in Copenhagen 2015, 
which, as we have seen, were carried out by a former local gang member who had 
recently been released from prison. The police’s evaluation report of the terrorist 
attacks in Copenhagen found the crossover between criminal and violent extrem-
ism in Denmark to be a growing concern: 
In the gangster environments, there are signs of radicalization and it can 
be noted that there are people who perceive themselves in both environ-
ments and who exploit their connections to the criminal environment to 
gain access to weapons, etc. These people, who are simultaneously affected 
by militant Islamic propaganda, and who move in environments with high 









A recent study of the crossover between crime and extremism in Denmark found 
that individuals do indeed move in and out of both environments, while there are 
also social and geographical crossovers. However, crossover can also contain group-
ings that operate in a greyer area in between or overlapping both ideologically 
motivated crimes and other crimes. Criminal and extremist groups may also com-
plement each other. Extremist groups may serve as alternatives to criminal groups, 
on the assumption that they offer other forms of community and morality than 
criminal networks.137 
Access to weapons and explosives is a condition for terrorist incidents and violent 
conflicts in other criminal environments.138 According to PET, contact with the 
criminal community can facilitate access to weapons and explosives for extremists 
intending to carry out an attack.139 Or, as in the case of el-Hussein, the terrorist had 
past experience of illegal gun acquisition techniques and could himself obtain a 
highly lethal firearm through a planned home robbery. PET further believes that 
there are people who have both the intention and capacity to commit terrorist 
attacks in Denmark, partly due to the availability of illegal firearms, and that rela-
tively simple attack by individuals or small groups continue to represent the most 
likely form of terrorist attacks in Denmark.140 
The CTA believes that violent extremist communities thrive in both criminal gang 
environments and prisons. The CTA further believes that stays in conflict zones 
and/or related prior involvement with the criminal community may be indicators 
of radicalised individuals’ capacity to commit violent acts.141 Criminal gang envi-
ronments are characterised by their members’ readiness to use violence. Thus, 
people without experience in conflict zones may have developed the capacity for 
violent crime in criminal environments.142 The attacks on the Krudttønden Café and 
the synagogue in Copenhagen on 14 and 15 February 2015 are examples of this type 
of attack. Despite the warnings of the potential capacity to carry out terrorist attacks 
in Denmark of the over one hundred Danes who have travelled to Syria and Iraq to 
fight for ISIS, el-Hussein was trained in criminal gangs in Copenhagen, not on the 
battlefields in Syria. 
Although most extremist organisations in Denmark are not associated with vio-
lence or unlawful activities, individuals and criminal groups use ideological ele-
ments of the extreme Islamist and right-wing political environments to legitimise 
violent and criminal acts.143 Individuals associated with extremist groups have been 
known to act on their own when engaging in violent and other illegal acts. This is 
most visible in terms of motorcycle club-related individuals engaging in right-wing 
extremism, but also occurs among individuals who misinterpret the mandate they 
are given by these groups.144 Some people with connection to the gang and 
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motorcycle club environments also find themselves ideologically linked to the 
radical right-wing environment. As part of this environment, the individuals 
attached to the motorcycle club environment often deem Islam to be a threat.145 A 
recent report by Danish welfare authorities further highlighted that certain gangs 
or criminal groups had increasingly begun to embrace Islamist views in their rheto-
ric, as well on the internet and in social media. One example is Loyal to Familia, 
which is particularly active in the Copenhagen area. The group increasingly claim 
that they have felt excluded by society because of racism and discrimination, not 
least from the police, which motivates their unlawful actions.146
Extreme Islamist environments may offer gang members an alternative commu-
nity and establish an apparently legitimate framework for the pursuit of crime and 
violence. Individuals in gang environments may, for example, start using militant 
Islamist symbols and rhetoric as an identity marker, or actual radicalisation may 
result, in which a subject uses the gang capacity for violence, including access to 
weapons, and applies it to a militant Islamist agenda.147
4. Conclusions
Denmark does not have a significant problem with organised domestic terrorism or 
violent extremism, and only a few cases have involved illegal firearms. The one 
recent terrorist attack – in Copenhagen on 14-15 February 2015 – was a so-called 
‘lone-wolf’ attack without any affiliation to a terrorist organisation. Historical ter-
rorist activities in Denmark, which were conducted primarily by left-wing extrem-
ists, but also occasionally by right-wing extremists, have rarely involved firearms. 
Left-wing extremist organisations have since largely become non-violent. 
According to the Danish police, the Security and Intelligence Service, and an aca-
demic expert on Danish extremism, Denmark does not have a major problem with 
violent extremism in terms of the traditional ideological spectrum. However, at the 
same time, the country has experienced several attempted and actual attacks in the 
past ten years and has a comparatively high number of citizens who have left to 
fight for ISIS (although this trend among foreign fighters is declining, like else-
where in Europe). Denmark also has a problem with gang violence and illegal 
weapons, and there is some crossover between the criminal and domestic extremist 
environment. Both the extremist and gang environments in Denmark have diversi-
fied in the past one-to-two decades.
The illegal firearms market in Denmark is fragmented and supply driven. Many of 









majority of the illegal firearms available in Denmark are believed to have been 
sourced domestically, through theft. Although the biggest concern are the black 
markets run by criminals, Danish authorities also face a problem with individuals 
and gun enthusiasts without violent or criminal intentions who act outside the law. 
One example is informal garage sales of firearms; another is that many citizens 
keep old firearms on their property without proper registration or licences. Another 
source of supply is illegal imports of deactivated firearms, gas weapons and lethal 
firearms. Some gas weapons are converted before being smuggled into Denmark, 
while others are converted after entry. Illegal imports of firearms are often organ-
ised by criminals who also smuggle goods or people. Denmark is also a transit 
country for firearms being trafficked into Sweden: the Öresund bridge between 
Copenhagen and Malmö is the most common entry point for illicit firearms being 
trafficked overland into that country. 
Some of the policy challenges Denmark faces are the difficulty of linking firearms 
crimes to gang environments, which would allow the use of the gang clause in the 
legislative framework, and the less restrictive legal frameworks on firearms in other 
EU and Schengen Area countries, which tend to undermine the strict Danish legal 
framework. A potential future policy challenge is Danish-Europol cooperation, 
given Denmark’s withdrawal from Europol in 2017.
The Danish approach to preventing illegal firearms possession and terrorist access 
to weapons has been targeted primarily at fighting criminal gangs and enforcing 
the country’s strict gun laws among civilian, non-violent firearms owners and 
traders. The aim has been to weaken criminal gangs, deter criminals from using 
firearms in their activities, and reduce the availability and use of illegal firearms. 
Although the police maintain that this approach has been highly successful, it only 
seems to keep violence levels down for a couple of years at a time.
The National Action Plan to prevent radicalisation and violent extremism contains 
numerous recommendations for action at different levels of society, including by 
both the social services and law enforcement agencies. The updated 2016 National 
Action Plan also states that there is a crossover between criminal gangs and violent 
extremism in terms of both operations and recruitment, and this requires more tar-
geted and consistent efforts against common crimes committed in radicalised envi-
ronments. Nonetheless, this strategic document does not include any reference to 
firearms or gun control efforts.
Although Denmark already has plans and policies to tackle illegal gun possession 
and limit criminal access to and use of firearms, more could be done to integrate 
firearm-specific initiatives in the established long-term programmes developed 
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through inter-agency collaboration to prevent violent extremism. This would 
include a specific focus on firearms- and gun-enabled crime in broader violence 
prevention measures, to shift the balance away from the predominantly repressive 
firearms measures under the so-called ‘gang packages’. More awareness could also 
be raised among legal gun holders to prevent the illegal circulation of weapons that 
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Illicit firearms and 
terrorism in France
Nicolas Florquin and André DesmaraisI
This chapter analyses the illicit firearms market in France, the ways in which terror-
ist networks have been able to access firearms, and the national policies that have 
been developed to combat (terrorist access to) the illicit gun market. Particularly 
since 2015, France has by far been the European country most affected by terrorist 
attacks involving the use of firearms. The use of fully automatic rifles in the January 
and November 2015 Paris attacks took an unprecedented human toll, with 147 
deaths in those events alone.1 In 2015 the French authorities made 424 terrorism-
related arrests, compared to 238 in 2014 and 225 in 2013.2
The recent attacks have created a push to reform the country’s intelligence and secu-
rity forces in order to adapt to, anticipate and better respond to these threats.3 The gov-
ernment has also identified a series of measures to tackle the issue of illicitly held fire-
arms: the Ministry of the Interior’s National Action Plan was launched on 13 November 
2015, just hours before the attack on the Bataclan theatre started.4 Yet these efforts can 
only rely on limited information on and analysis of the extent and nature of the illicit 
arms market in France, owing principally to the fact that levels of gun violence in 
France were previously moderate, if not low by international standards.
This study constitutes an unprecedented effort to present and analyse data and 
information on illicit firearms and their acquisition by terrorist actors in France. 
Indeed, the literature on the illicit firearms market in France is particularly scarce, 
with only a few notable exceptions. To overcome this lacuna, this study uses a com-
bination of quantitative and qualitative methods (see Box 1). 
I The authors would like to thank their colleagues at the Small Arms Survey for supporting this 
research, particularly Anna Alvazzi del Frate for her overall guidance, as well as Moshe Ben Hamo 
Yeger for his research assistance.
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Box 1: Research design
Several methods were used to analyse the illicit gun market in France, terror-
ist access to this market and the policy that has been developed to combat 
this security phenomenon. 
Firstly, desk research was conducted in which scientific literature, data from 
earlier studies, policy and legislative documents, and open-source media 
reports were studied. 
Secondly, the research team collected and analysed quantitative data from 
several state services, including statistics on legally registered firearms, 
weapons seizures, crime forensic and ballistics analyses, gun-related crime 
and morgue examinations. 
Lastly, more than 25 in-depth interviews with key actors involved in combating 
(terrorist access to) the illicit firearms market in France were conducted 
between March and May 2017. The research further drew from other research 
undertaken by the Small Arms Survey in France since late 2016 on the spe-
cific but related issue of illicitly converted firearms. Unless specified other-
wise, representatives from the institutions listed below were met in person, 
with interviews often followed by additional written communications and 
data sharing. The names and affiliations of several informants are kept anony-
mous in the text through the use of interview codes. This list does not 
include a number of informants and experts with specific knowledge who 
were interviewed in their personal capacities.
Central and regional state services 
• Direction Générale des Douanes et Droits Indirects (DGDDI), Bureau D3, 
Lutte contre la fraude, Montreuil
• Direction Nationale du Renseignement et des Enquêtes Douanières 
(DNRED), Ivry-sur-Seine
• Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris, by phone
• Section Centrale des Armes, Explosifs, et Matières Sensibles (SCAEMS), 
Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire (DCPJ), Nanterre 
• Service Central des Armes (SCA), Nanterre
• Sous-Direction Anti-Terroriste, DCPJ, by phone
• Pole Judiciaire de la Gendarmerie Nationale, Cergy Pontoise
• Institut de Recherche Criminelle de la Gendarmerie Nationale (IRCGN), 
Cergy Pontoise








• Institut National de la Police Scientifique (INPS), Ecully
• Direction Interrégionale de la Police Judiciaire, Marseille
• Centre de Déminage, Marseille
• Unité Médico-Légale, Marseille
Municipal-level security actors
• Communauté d’Agglomération Melun Val de Seine, Dammarie-lès-Lys
• Association Nationale des Cadres Territoriaux de la Sécurité, Saint Etienne
Research and training institutions
• Observatoire National de la Délinquance et des Réponses Pénales 
(ONDRP), Paris
• Ecole Nationale Supérieure de la Police, Saint-Cyr-Au-Mont-d’Or
Other actors 
• Banc National d’Epreuve, Saint Etienne
• Chambre Syndicale des Armuriers, by phone 
The report consists of three main sections and a conclusion. The first section exam-
ines French national policy established in the wake of the 2015 terrorist attacks to 
combat the illicit firearms market. In doing so, it identifies the main actors involved, 
the data management tools being developed, the state of international cooperation 
and remaining challenges identified by interviewed stakeholders. The second 
section analyses the characteristics of the illicit firearms market in France. It dis-
cusses the size of this market, the general typology of illicit firearms in France, 
black market prices, and the main sources of supply of and actors involved in the 
illicit firearms market. 
The third section focuses on terrorist actors’ access to the illicit firearms market in 
France. It starts with an overview of terrorist activities and attacks involving fire-
arms in France since the early 1990s. This is followed by an analysis of the typology 
and acquisition of firearms used by terrorist networks in France. Due to the secrecy 
surrounding ongoing terrorism-related investigations, official information was not 
available on the proximate sources of supply for firearms used in recent jihadist 
attacks. French services have nevertheless provided detailed unpublished data on 
the models of firearms and types of ammunition used in several incidents, as well 
as on the status of their tracing efforts. Combined with available open-source 
reporting, this information makes it possible to draw some important conclusions 
on the links between terrorist acquisition of firearms and organised crime.
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1. National policy to fight (terrorist access to) 
the illegal firearms market
The recent wave of terrorist attacks in France have created a push to accelerate 
reform of the country’s intelligence and security forces in order to adapt to, antici-
pate and better respond to these threats.5 France declared a state of emergency on 
the night of the November 2015 attacks in Paris, which was extended until new anti-
terror legislation entered into force on 1 November 2017.6 
In parallel, the government has also identified a series of measures to specifically 
tackle the issue of illicitly held firearms. The Ministry of the Interior’s National 
Action Plan on illegally held weapons was launched on 13 November 2015, only 
hours before the start of the November 2015 Paris attacks that killed 130 people.7 
The plan includes a set of 20 measures, grouped under five core pillars. The French 
customs service devised its own action plan containing 14 measures that focus on 
giving the institution the judiciary, operational and intelligence means to address 
the issue.8 Regular coordination meetings are organised to ensure the coherence 
and complementarity of the two plans.9
The following section reviews efforts to address each of the five pillars identified 
in the Interior Ministry’s action plan on firearms. In doing so, it identifies the 
main actors involved, the data management tools being developed, the state of 
international cooperation and remaining challenges identified by interviewed 
stakeholders.
1.1 Reinforcing knowledge on trafficking routes and 
actors
This set of measures includes improving the collection and analysis of intelligence, 
including the development of a database of seized, recovered and found firearms. It 
also envisions making the ballistics testing of firearms systematic in all judiciary 
investigations. The plan further notes the need to improve general knowledge of 
firearms and of the relevant legal regulations among police officers, gendarmes, 
and local state officials. 10
The following sections of this report will draw largely from law enforcement agen-
cies’ data management systems. The SCAEMS at the DCPJ in Nanterre centralises 
data on seized, recovered, found and lost weapons recorded by both the police and 
gendarmerie. Data for 2015 can be disaggregated by legal weapons category and 








these statistics to be broken down by type of crime or offence, or users to determine 
the proportion of seized weapons that are or were previously registered.11 Developing 
these capabilities would help to provide a more detailed understanding of the 
sources and uses of illicit weapons. It would also be in line with international com-
mitments to reduce illicit arms flows under Target 16.4I of the UN’s Sustainable 
Development Goals.12
The Fichier National d’Identification Balistique (FNIB, a ballistics database) is 
hosted by the INPS in Ecully and is based on the Evofinder system.13 Created in early 
2016, as of 31 December 2016 it included 16,576 ballistics entries from both the 
police and gendarmerie, including new cases entered since the inception of the 
system, as well some old cases that could be transferred from the previous CIBLE 
database. Open cases for which the crime weapon has not been retrieved are also 
being re-entered into the new system. The system remains in its infancy, however, 
with less than 50% of seized weapons currently being examined by the laborato-
ries. This proportion has been growing following internal guidelines requesting the 
security services to systematically submit recovered firearms to forensic analysis, 
as well as the establishment of ‘proximity ballistics’ (balistique de proximité) facili-
ties across France since 2010.14 
The FNIB database holds promise for improved ballistics analysis in France and for 
facilitating ballistics information exchanges with other European partners, espe-
cially if its coverage can expand to include all seized firearms. In 2016 alone the 
system identified 60 ballistic ‘hits’, establishing links between different criminal 
cases where the same weapon was used. Several of these hits had been missed by 
the previous CIBLE database.15 Given the FNIB database’s technical focus, its utility 
for generating analysis on the nature of arms trafficking could still be improved: 
while the system allows for disaggregating data by type of offence or crime, many 
offences are grouped under a catch-all category entitled ‘infraction à la legislation sur 
les armes’ (breaches of the firearms law), which would merit further disaggregation. 
Furthermore, determining whether examined weapons were previously registered 
in the Application de Gestion du Répertoire Informatisé des Propriétaires et 
Possesseurs d’Armes (AGRIPPA database) and future Système d’Information des 
Armes (SIA database) would help better ascertain the origins of the seized weapons.
Police and gendarmerie officials noted the need to train officers in the field to 
enhance their understanding of the significance of firearms in criminal investi-
gations and improve the quality of their recording of information on seized 
I As of May 2017 the proposed indicator for monitoring progress towards this target is the ‘Propor-
tion of seized, found or surrendered arms whose illicit origin or context has been traced or esta-
blished by a competent authority in line with international instruments’.
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weapons.16 They also highlighted the importance of encouraging and supporting 
officers to investigate firearms retrieved in the context of other crimes, such as drug 
trafficking. In such cases, investigators tend to prioritise the forensic investigation 
of the drugs over that of the firearms.17 Initiatives are under way in security agen-
cies to address these concerns. The gendarmerie, for instance, created the Plateau 
d’Investigation eXplosifs et Armes à Feu (PIXAF), a team of four gendarmes working 
closely with the IRCGN that, among other duties, assists and serves as a resource for 
field officers by facilitating forensic analysis of the firearms that are retrieved and 
by disseminating strategic guidance notes on emerging trafficking trends.18
1.2 Reinforcing targeted interventions to destabilise 
trafficking actors
The National Action Plan includes a number of measures related to combating 
internet trafficking; undertaking operations that target specific trafficking sources, 
actors and hotspots; coordinating controls at the country’s points of entry; and rein-
forcing controls over gun shops and arms fairs.19
Both the gendarmerie, through PIXAF, and customs, through the DNRED, monitor 
and investigate the online market in small arms, including the dark web, with par-
ticular focus on francophone sites. In 2016 alone PIXAF identified 160 illicit online 
firearms transactions.20 Since June 2016 these bodies have also been authorised to 
organise undercover purchase operations and use online avatars to investigate 
cases. The first such investigation was in progress at PIXAF in late March 2017.21 
Both institutions also monitor arms fairs, targeting suspicious attendees identified 
by undercover officers.22 The customs action plan also envisions the creation of 
teams using dogs trained to detect firearms that will support units that perform 
controls on roads, at railway stations, and in postal and courier centres.23
1.3 Modernising the regulatory regime on arms trafficking
The French government first adopted legislation classifying weapons into eight cat-
egories in 1939.24 Despite numerous amendments over the years,25 this classifica-
tion system formed the bedrock of the country’s firearm legislation until 2013, 
even though European Council Directive 91/477/EEC of 1991 called for greater har-








2013 a number of decrees were passed to reclassify specific weapons of concernI and 
to strengthen the background checks required for obtaining firearms subject to 
authorisation.II On 6 September 2013 France passed new arms control legislation27 
that effectively moved away from the 1939 eight-category system towards the EU 
classification system based on four categories of firearms (categories A, B, C and D).
The 2013 legislation has been further strengthened following the 2015 wave of 
terror attacks. This has included the adoption of decrees to reclassify certain types 
of replica and deactivated firearms:
• In 2016 blank-firing Zoraki R1 and Ekol Voltran Arda revolvers and other fire-
arms with similar characteristics were classified in Category B.28 In practice, 
individuals who owned these weapons before the decree was passed had to 
place them in the custody of a registered firearms retailer and had one year 
to obtain the required authorisation from the authorities.29 Alternatively, 
they could surrender them to the authorities for destruction or have them 
deactivated at the Banc d’Epreuve (proof house) in Saint Etienne.
• Since May 2017 firearms modified to fire blank ammunition in order to 
create a noise effect (‘armes de spectacle’, which include the ‘acoustic expan-
sion weapons’ discussed later in this chapter) are to be classified under their 
pre-modification legal category. In addition, all firearms – including alarm 
and signal weapons – that are produced and modified in or introduced or 
imported into France must be tested by the Banc d’Epreuve in Saint Etienne 
and must be officially classified by the Interior Ministry before being intro-
duced onto the French market.30
Moreover, as foreseen in the National Action Plan, in 2016 prison terms for illicitly 
acquiring, holding and selling Category A and B weapons were increased from 
three to five years, and to ten years when such offences were orchestrated by two or 
more individuals.31
I In 1997, for example, the non-lethal MR35 repeating pistol was classified in the former fourth 
category (now Category B) (Decree of 16 September 1997 on the classification of some specific 
firearms and ammunitions in the fourth category, Journal Officiel 224, p. 13985), while in 1998 
slide-action shotguns, and single-shot, rimfire handguns of an overall length greater than 28 cm 
became classified in the former fourth category (now Category B) (Decree 98-1148 of 16 Decem-
ber 1998, Journal Officiel of 17 December 1998, p. 19048).
II In 2003, for example, ‘any person applying for the issue or renewal of an authorisation for the 
acquisition or possession of weapons or ammunition of the 1st and 4th categories … must pre-
sent a medical certificate attesting that his or her physical and mental health is not incompatible 
with the possession of such devices’ (Law 2003-239 of 18 March 2003 on internal security, Jour-
nal Officiel 66 of 19 March 2003, pp. 4761ff).
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On 12 January 2017 the Minister of the Interior inaugurated the new SCA in Nanterre 
to coordinate the ministry’s policy on arms control.32 A key task for the new service 
– staffed with 41 employees as of March 2017 – involves transitioning from the 
AGRIPPA registry of legally held firearms to the new SIA database. The SIA will 
allow the tracing of every legally held firearm throughout its life cycle, based on its 
serial number. Exchanges of information will be possible with the relevant civilian 
actors, including firearms producers, importers, hunting and sports shooting asso-
ciations, and the Banc d’Epreuve, in order to keep track of all successive legal owners 
from a weapon’s manufacture or importation to its deactivation, destruction or 
export. The SIA will be rolled out according to the time lines set under the new EU 
firearms directive.33 The SCA acts as the coordinating body and as a resource for 
local state agencies when they implement the firearms legislation. The SCA is also 
responsible for establishing the technical norms for firearms deactivation and for 
certifying firearms as deactivated in France in accordance with EU Regulation 
2015/2403 of 15 December 2015. 34
1.4 Improving international cooperation
Following the 2015 attacks, and in accordance with the National Action Plan,35 
France applied strong pressure on its European partners to fast track the ongoing 
reform of the EU firearms directive and the development of the new EU regulation 
on firearms deactivation.36 Officials expressed frustration at the time required to 
adopt the new instruments; specifically, the reopening of technical negotiations on 
the new deactivation regulation has further delayed this measure. France appears 
to be one of only a few countries that have started to implement the deactivation 
regulation, despite its entry into force in April 2016.37
The key international partners being engaged by French agencies include Interpol, 
Europol (including EMPACTI firearms) and the European Firearms Experts group.38 
The French police meet their European counterparts physically every six months, but 
also communicate regularly with them more frequently to exchange information.39 
The SCA in particular takes part in ongoing meetings and working groups dealing 
with the exchange of information on denials of requests to authorise the ownership 
of Category A and B firearms, alarm and signal pistols, and deactivation.40 
Through the SCA, France is until October 2018 the current rotating chair of the 
Permanent International Commission for Firearms Testing (CIP), the body that pro-
vided technical guidance for the EU firearms deactivation regulation.41 At the request 








of the European Commission, the CIP has also established a working group to 
support work on a definition for alarm pistols.42
In addition to cooperating with neighbouring states, France has also established 
special cooperation programmes with states in the Balkans, notably in Bosnia and 
Serbia, to support governments in the region in tracking and stemming illicit fire-
arms proliferation. This has included, for instance, deploying attachés de sécurité 
intérieure (internal security attachés) to these countries and mobilising them to 
work on this issue.43 A cooperation programme with Serbia has led to monthly 
meetings between the two countries’ police, customs, justice, and administrative 
officials, as well as the creation of a permanent intelligence unit with Serbia and the 
carrying out of joint operational initiatives.44 The French police have also visited 
their counterparts in Slovakia to investigate the issue of easily retro-convertible 
deactivated firearms sold as blank-firing firearms (acoustic expansion weapons) 
and 6 mm Flobert by Slovakian companies.45
With regard to the United States, French police authorities are also in regular 
contact with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, and liaison officers, while the SCA maintains contacts with 
the Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers Institute. Through the EU, con-
tacts are being initiated with countries in the Middle East and North Africa. There 
are no contacts with Turkey, however.46
1.5 Developing interventions for French citizens
Based on the observation that burglaries represent the majority of cases of stolen fire-
arms, and drawing from pilot interventions carried out in French overseas territories, 
the National Action Plan envisions campaigns to encourage owners of firearms to 
surrender them voluntarily at police and gendarmerie stations.47 There was no pub-
licly available information or statistics about the implementation of such voluntary 
weapons surrender campaigns at the time of writing.
Several interviewed experts and officials noted the strength of the gun lobby in 
Europe (and on some specific issues in France), and the politicised nature of the 
civilian arms control debate, which according to them hindered the implementa-
tion of the needed pragmatic reforms.48 Some pointed to the recent appearance of 
groups advocating for looser restrictions on firearms, especially those dealing with 
the carrying of firearms by private citizens, on the basis that arming responsible 
citizens may help to deter or counter future terrorist attacks.49 In the tense security 
situation currently prevailing in France it appears that some individuals prefer to 
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keep weapons at home out of anxiety for the future, while others decide to acquire 
firearms illicitly for self-defence.50 These dynamics and perceptions need to be 
taken into consideration or they will hinder the success of any voluntary weapons 
collection campaign.
2. Characteristics of the illicit firearms market  
in France
2.1 Size of the illicit firearms market
Assessing the size of the illicit firearms market in any country is fraught with chal-
lenges. Generally speaking, weapons are considered illicit when they are produced, 
transferred, held, or used in violation of national or international law.51 Estimating 
their volume is therefore not a straightforward task and requires examining the 
various ways in which weapons become illicit throughout their life cycle. Officials 
interviewed for this study were reluctant to provide official estimates of the total 
number of illicit firearms circulating in France, citing methodological concerns.52 
Key informants state that illicit weapons in France include not just firearms smug-
gled into the country and used by criminal actors,53 but also firearms left behind 
after the Second World War, as well as hunting and other firearms that are inherited 
from generation to generation but never declared. In line with previous EU-focused 
studies,54 available indicators of the extent of the illicit firearms market in France 
reviewed in this report include estimates of legal and illicit holdings, information on 
weapons seized by the authorities, and data on the use of firearms in violent crime.
2.1.1 Estimates of legal and illegal firearms possession
Assessing illicit arms holdings in France requires an understanding of the linkages 
between legally and clandestinely held weapons. Indeed, analysts note that the 
majority of firearms held or sold illicitly in the country do not originate from foreign 
sources such as the Balkans or Eastern Europe, but are stolen from legal owners 
or have been held for generations in France without being declared to the authori-
ties.55 Indeed, thousands of firearms are reported stolen every year in France, 
including 10,572 in 2015 alone.56 
According to the SCA, as of 30 March 2017 a total of 4,501,235 firearms were regis-
tered in the AGRIPPA database. They include 1,221,667 firearms in Category B 








declaration) and 229,485 in Category D (this figure refers specifically to sub-cate-
gory D1a: shoulder-fired, single-shot, smoothbore firearms registered since 
December 2011).57 In addition, the SCA notes that an estimated 2-3 million firearms 
that belong to sub-category D1 (single-shot, smoothbore, shoulder-fired weapons 
and shotguns) are not subject to declaration, because they were held or acquired 
before the declaration requirement introduced in December 2011.58 The reliability 
of this estimate of legally held but unregistered firearms is difficult to assess.59 
Moreover, this situation hinders the tracing of such unregistered firearms if and 
when they are used for criminal purposes, and affects the reliability of statistics on 
both legal and illicit firearms in France.
The pools of illicit firearms are possibly significant, but difficult to estimate. For 
instance, according to the president of the Syndicat des Armuriers, based on the 
number of arms typically held by hunters, France’s 1-1.5 million holders of hunting 
permits can be estimated to own about 6 million hunting rifles and shotguns, both 
registered and unregistered.60 The AGRIPPA register currently does not make it 
possible to determine how many of the almost 3.3 million registered Category C and 
D shotguns and rifles are owned by hunters, however.61 As a result, estimating 
unregistered hunting firearms is currently difficult.
Some insights into overall gun ownership can be gained from representative house-
hold surveys and opinion polls that ask respondents if they or their household own 
a firearm. Generally, survey methodology is likely to result in the under-reporting 
of firearms ownership – especially illegally held weapons.62 Yet it provides impor-
tant comparative data to supplement existing official data and expert knowledge. 
According to the most recent survey carried out in the EU, France has the eighth-
highest rate of gun ownership in Europe, suggesting significant total holdings. In 
2013, 7% of respondents declared that they personally owned a firearm to the Flash 
Eurobarometer 383 survey.63 Extrapolating these results to France’s population of 
aged 15 or more of 52.7 million in 2015,64 this suggests that there are 3.7 million 
individual gun owners in France who each own one or several firearms. 
Expert estimates’ on the total number of firearms in France are rather scarce and 
tend to vary greatly. In 2017, for instance, the president of the Syndicat des Armuriers 
reiterated earlier assessments that the total of civilian-held firearms stands at about 
10 million, based on his above-mentioned calculation of the rifles and shotguns 
owned by hunters.65 Other experts have given numbers as high as 20 million in the 
past, but no details are available on the methodology used to arrive at this figure.66 
The wide range of estimates of total civilian firearm holdings in France highlights 
the current challenges in assessing gun ownership more generally in the country. 
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The ongoing reform of the national AGRIPPA register, additional polling, and 
research into gun ownership patterns among the principal categories of gun owners 
are needed to shed further light on both undeclared and illicit holdings in France. 
2.1.2 Seizures of firearms 
Data collated from official and media sources show that the police and gendarmerie 
regularly seize thousands of firearms every year (Table 1). The extent to which 
aggregated seizure data reflect the size of the illicit firearms market is subject to 
caveats, however. An increase in the number of weapons seized may instead be the 
result of the authorities’ dedicating more resources to seizing illicit weapons, or of 
changes in data-recording practices. The SCAEMS – which keeps track of firearms 
seized by the police and gendarmerie – notes that reforms implemented in 2002 
and 2006, followed by the adoption of new software in 2010, contribute to the vari-
ations in reported annual seizures. Moreover, the apparent surge in the number of 
weapons seized in 2016 is to be nuanced by the fact that at the time they were cited 
by the minister of the interior, the 2016 data had not been fully cleaned and verified 
by the SCAEMS and may include cases of double counting.67 
Table 1: Firearms seized by the police, gendarmerie and customs, 
available years





















Moreover, not all of the seized weapons were necessarily trafficked: they could also 
have been seized as a result of their links with other types of criminal offences, or 
because of administrative violations, such as the lack of a licence or the failure to 
register a weapon.70 While the SCAEMS reported that 1,300 firearms (about 20%) 
were seized in 2015 in the context of drug-related cases, 71 current software limita-
tions do not make it possible to further break down the number of seizures by the 
specific type of crime and offence.72 Moreover, current record-keeping by officers in 
the field does not allow the SCAEMS to determine the proportion of seized weapons 
that feature in the AGRIPPA database of registered firearms.73
In addition to the French police and gendarmerie, French customs officers annually 
seize several hundred firearms being imported, exported or transiting illicitly in the 
country (see Table 1). Customs officials seize these firearms not only at the country’s 
ports of entry, but in fact primarily in people’s homes or vehicles (during traffic 
control checks) and throughout the national territory.74 When seizures are linked to 
other offences, the majority of cases relate to drug-related charges, with a more 
marginal number of cases of counterfeiting and forgery. Weapons seized by customs 
are not systematically cross-checked with the AGRIPPA register of legally held fire-
arms; in cases where registered weapons were seized, they were usually held legally, 
but were confiscated together with illicit firearms.75
Officials explain that the peak in customs seizures observed in 2015, when almost 
1,200 firearms were seized, is primarily due to one exceptional incident.76 They con-
sider the overall number of arms seizures to have remained stable since 2014, noting 
even a decrease in the number of Category A firearms seized between 2015 and 
2016. In contrast, customs seizures of ammunition increased significantly from 
67,848 units in 2014, to 110,649 in 2015, to 412,624 in 2016.77 Much of this increase is 
attributable to a sharp rise in seizures of Category D ammunition, and in particular 
12-gauge shells. While 12 gauge is the most common firearms calibre in France, 
customs officials could not identify a specific reason for its increased prominence 
in ammunition seizures.78
It appears clear that many weapons are seized by the police and gendarmerie in the 
context of violations of the country’s firearms legislation. The IRCGN, which per-
forms forensic analyses for the gendarmerie, for instance, reports that 82% of the 
930 firearms79 it examined between November 2015 and October 2016 were linked 
to cases of violations of firearms legislation (coded as ‘ILA’). The remainder are dis-
tributed among attempted acts of violence, homicides and attempted homicides; 
participation in a criminal association; and armed robberies.80 Category ILA can 
include a variety of offences, ranging from the possession of an illicit weapon to the 
illicit carrying or use of an otherwise perfectly legal firearm. More detailed data 
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would be helpful for determining more precisely the circumstances of the seizures 
and for excluding cases of minor administrative violations that do not constitute 
trafficking (e.g. failure to register an inherited firearm).
Bearing these caveats in mind, the geographical distribution of police and gendar-
merie seizures in 2015 is presented in Map 1. Seizures appear to be concentrated in 
large population centres, including Paris and its surrounds, the north-eastern 
regions bordering Belgium and Germany, Lyon and its surrounds, and the 
Mediterranean coast. The picture is slightly different when taking into account pop-
ulation density: Corsica (46 firearms seized per 100,000 people) and the Pyrénées 
Orientales (39 per 100,000) stand out as the départements with the highest rates of 
seized firearms per 100,000 people (Map 2).81 In the case of Corsica, the high rates of 
seizures correspond to an average homicide rate of 6.45 per 100,000 people for the 
period 1996-2015, which far exceeds those seen in the large cities of Marseille (3.81) 
and Paris (2.77).82 The high seizure rate for the Pyrénées Orientales, located on the 
Spanish border, is more unusual, and appears to be the result of a single seizure 
involving dozens of firearms during 2015.83 Taking these observations into consid-
eration, it appears clear that firearms seizures are mostly concentrated in the north-
eastern border regions, Paris, Lyon, the Mediterranean coast and Corsica. 
Map 1: Number of firearms seized by police and gendarmerie in 2015,  
by départementI
Source: SCAEMS84








Map 2: Rate of firearms seized by police and gendarmerie  
per 100,000 people in 2015, by départementI
Sources: SCAEMS, INSEE85
2.1.3 Illicit use of firearms
The Ministry of the Interior publishes statistics on the number of offences related to 
‘carrying or holding prohibited weapons’. These are incidents recorded by police 
and gendarmerie units in each département and compiled in the so-called ‘Etat 
4001’ database. Not all these cases involve firearms, however: an undetermined 
proportion involve the illicit carrying of blunt weapons, teargas self-defence 
weapons and electric batons.86 Figure 1 shows a steady increase in these offences 
between 1996 and 2010, after which they stabilised until early 2017 above 2,500 
incidents per month. Disaggregating these available data by type of weapon would 
help shed further light on trends in prohibited firearms carrying or holding. 
I The zoomed in departements on the left-side of the map are those of the ‘Ile de France region’
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Figure 1: Monthly incidents of carrying or holding prohibited weapons,  
January 1996-March 2017
Source: Data.gouv.fr87
What is clearer is that, compared with other European states, the use of firearms in 
lethal violence in France is relatively moderate. Homicide rates in France have been 
decreasing in the last 20 years, from more than 1,500 in 1996 to less than 1,000 in 
2014.88 Significantly, the proportion of homicides in Paris that involved the use of a 
firearm decreased from 30% for the period 1994-2003 to 24% for 2004-2013.89 For 
the period 2010-2015, about 17% of intentional homicides in all of France involved 
the use of a firearm, slightly lower than the 21% Western European and 24% 
European average.90 France experienced an average of 138 firearm homicides per 
year for the period 2010-2015, or a rate of 0.2 per 100,000 people. This is roughly 
equal to the average in Western European states more generally and only about half 
the average rate for all European states.91 Data on the types of firearms used to per-
petrate homicides are not available nationally, however. Moreover, it is not cur-
rently possible to access statistics on the proportion of guns used in homicides that 





















































































































































































While nationwide statistics on the extent of the use of firearms in lethal violence 
are generally encouraging, the way these weapons are used can illustrate situations 
of extreme violence in specific regions. The Institut Médico-Légal in Marseille pro-
vided autopsy data on 105 cases of firearm homicides that occurred in the city and 
its surrounds in the period 2011-2017. This dataset reveals that in 15% of cases the 
injuries were caused by not one but two firearms (often a 9 x 19 mm firearm together 
with a shotgun or a 7.62 x 39 mm AK-pattern rifle). The data also make it possible to 
calculate the number of bullet paths per case, revealing how many shots hit each 
victim. As Table 2 illustrates, on average there were 10.5 bullet paths per body for 
each case involving 7.62 x 39 mm firearms, 7.1 for cases involving 9 x 19 mm guns, 
and 2.3 for cases involving shotguns. Moreover, it could be determined that in at 
least 19 of these 105 cases, one or more shots were fired from a distance of less than 
2 metres from the victim.92 
Table 2: Number of bullet paths on victims of firearm homicides examined 
at the Institut Médico-Légal in Marseille, by calibre, 2011-2017
Calibre Number of cases
Average number of  
bullet paths per body
7.62 x 39 mm 21 10.5
9 x 19 mm 18 7.1
Shotgun 14 2.3
Source: Institut Médico-Légal, Marseille93
Indicators for other types of violent crime involving the use of a firearm highlight 
inconsistent trends. One such indicator is the number of ‘règlements de compte’, or 
incidents of score settling between criminals, most of which involve the use of a 
firearm.94 As Figure 2 illustrates, while the monthly incidence of such score settling 
appears to have increased in late 2016-early 2017, current levels remain much lower 
than the previous peaks experienced in 2002 and 2008.
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Figure 2: Monthly incidents of score settling by criminals,  
January 1996-March 2017
Source: Data.gouv.fr95
On the other hand, monthly armed robbery statistics reveal a steady decline since 
1996 (Figure 3). According to the ONDRP, the reduction in robberies involving a 
firearm observed since 2013 can be seen across categories of victims. Yet it has bene-
fited businesses (especially jewellery shops, petrol stations and tobacco shops) more 
than private individuals, who represented 45% of armed robbery victims in 2015.96









































































































































































































































































































































































Overall, indicators point to relatively moderate levels of illicit firearms use in France, 
which appear relatively stable, or in several cases to be even decreasing. Similar to 
weapons seizures, however, rates of violence are unevenly distributed on the national 
territory, with the Corsica, Marseille and Paris areas emerging as ‘hotspots’ for fire-
arms crime.98 Furthermore, available data show that when firearms are used, they can 
involve significant violence and the firing of multiple shots at the victims.
2.2 Typology of available illicit firearms
Given the seemingly large pool of illicit firearms circulating in France (see above), it is 
crucial to examine the types most commonly encountered in the illicit sphere. What 
appears clear from the available firearm seizure data is that only a minority of illicitly 
held firearms can be considered ‘weapons of war’. The vast majority of illegal firearms 
in France belong to categories that are legally accessible to the general population, 
but are not adequately registered with, declared to, or authorised by the authorities. 
The following paragraphs will elaborate on this finding by presenting the available 
seizure data from customs, the police and the gendarmerie; forensic and ballistics 
data; and autopsy data. From the analysis of these different types of available datasets 
it can be concluded that the primary calibre for illicit firearms is 12 gauge (in use with 
shotguns), followed in varying order of importance, depending on the nature of the 
dataset, by 9 x 19 mm ammunition (typically in use with handguns and some sub-
machine guns), .22LR (a popular calibre for rifles in France), and 7.65 mm Browning (a 
popular pistol calibre). Converted replica firearms are of concern, and appear more 
prominently in the reviewed datasets than reactivated firearms, although the impor-
tance of the latter may be under-represented, given their resemblance to original fire-
arms. Also of note is the absence of 7.62 x 39 mm (that of standard AK-pattern assault 
rifles) in the top calibres of several datasets, although its use is more prominent in the 
context of the most serious crimes and offences.
2.2.1 Seizure data
According to customs officials, the most prominent illicit firearms are, by order of 
importance, single-shot hunting shotguns, semi-automatic hunting rifles, pistols 
and revolvers.99 In 2016, 38% of customs seizures involved Category B firearms (fire-
arms subject to authorisation, including semi-automatic handguns and semi-auto-
matic shoulder-fired weapons with a magazine capacity greater than three rounds), 
31% were in Category C (firearms subject to declaration, including semi-automatic 
firearms with a magazine capacity of less than three rounds), 22% were in Category D 
(other firearms, including single-shot, smoothbore, shoulder-fired weapons, antiques 
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and deactivated firearms). Only 9% of custom seizures of firearms involved Category 
A firearms (prohibited weapons, including automatic firearms).100 
A similar result can be observed when analysing the data provided by the SCAEMS. 
These data show that among the 6,145 firearms seized by the police and gendarme-
rie in 2015, only 5% belonged to Category A. In contrast, 34% belonged to Category B, 
31% to Category D, and 17% to Category C, with the remainder unspecified.101 
Categories D (55%) and C (26%) also dominate the statistics for firearms reported 
stolen, although these also include a significant number of Category B weapons 
(10%) (Figure 4). The fact that weapons stolen in 2015 outnumbered those that were 
seized by the authorities suggests that the pool of illicit arms is growing, even more 
so if one adds undetermined numbers of weapons entering the country illicitly. It is 
nevertheless more encouraging that seizures for the more restricted categories of 
firearms – A and B – vastly outnumber thefts by a ratio of two to one. 
Figure 4: Number of firearms seized by and reported stolen  
to the police and gendarmerie, 2015, by category
Source: SCAEMS102
2.2.2 Forensic and ballistics data 
The French forensic laboratories of the gendarmerie and police examine almost 
half of all weapons seized by these agencies. The information they collect is particu-
larly useful because firearms confiscated due to administrative violations are less 































actual ‘crime guns’ – although there are exceptions to this rule.103 The data – shown 
in tables 3 and 4 – illustrate the prominence of 12 gauge and .22LR among the 
observed firearms, which are common calibres for shotguns and sports-shooting 
rifles that can be legally held in France. It also reveals the presence of calibres in use 
with replica firearms (8 and 9 mm alarm) as well as makes of replica or trauma fire-
arms (Baïkal, Bruni, Reck, Umarex). The presence of replica firearms in forensic 
datasets suggests that they were either used in crime or illicitly converted to fire live 
ammunition. It is also interesting to note the presence of calibres such as 6 mm ‘à 
bille’ that are not considered firearms under French law, but whose presence in 
seizure data suggests they were used in criminal acts. 
Table 3: The 20 most common calibres among the firearms examined by 
police and gendarmerie forensic laboratories, 2014-2015
Calibre Number of firearms Percentage
12 gauge 2,352 15.2
.22LR 1,540 9.9
4.5 mm (métal) 811 5.2
9 mm alarm 643 4.2
9 x 19 mm 419 2.7
7.65 mm 362 2.3
16 gauge 317 2.1
Other 9 mm (e.g. Mauser, Winchester Magnum) 272 1.8
6 mm (‘à bille’ – airguns) 256 1.7
9 mm Annulaire Flobert 216 1.4
6.35 mm 184 1.2
7.65 mm Browning (.32 ACP) 180 1.2
.45 ACP 176 1.1
.357 Magnum 175 1.1
7.62 x 39 Kalashnikov (AK-47) 172 1.1
12/50 SAPL 165 1.1
8 mm Alarm 145 0.9
.38 Special 111 0.7
12 mm 99 0.6
14 mm 88 0.6
Source: SCAEMS104
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Table 4: The 20 most common makes among the firearms examined 
by police and gendarmerie forensic laboratories, 2014-2015






















Nationwide ballistics data provide further insights into the main calibres of firearms 
involved in or collected at the scenes of various crimes and offences.I The FNIB, 
created in early 2016, centralises ballistics information collected by the forensic lab-
oratories of the Gendarmerie Nationale, Police Nationale and Police Judiciaire. As of 
31 December 2016 the database included 16,576 ballistics entries106 associated with 
I This includes information on both:
• ‘retrieved firearms’, which are weapons that were found at crime scenes or during the subse-
quent investigations, and with which the laboratories perform ballistics testing; and
• ‘inferred firearms’, meaning weapons that were not recovered, but were nevertheless entered 
into a ballistics database on the basis of the unique marks they left on spent ammunition 








4,764 cases (‘saisines’). Among these, 4,870 ballistics entries are associated with 1,451 
cases that were opened in 2016. Sixty per cent of the 2016 cases relate to offences, 
84% of which are categorised as ‘ILA’ (violations of the firearms legislation). The 
remaining 40% were associated with crimes, mainly acts of violence committed 
with a firearm (30%), homicides (25%) and attempted homicide (25%).107 In 2016 the 
most commonly identified calibres in FNIB were 12 gauge, 9 x 19 mm, 7.65 Browning, 
.22LR, 7.62 x 39 mm, and .38 Special/.357 Magnum (Figure 5). 
Figure 5: The five calibres most commonly observed in the FNIB ballistics 
database in 2016 (%) 
Among both retrieved and inferred firearms I
Among retrieved firearms only II
Source: INPS108
I For this bar graph cases were taken from the FNIB database and correspond to a unique firearm 
that was either retrieved and examined by the laboratories or not retrieved but uniquely identi-
fied (or inferred) through traces left on spent ammunition found at the crime scene (written 
communication with the INPS, 29 May 2017). 
II For this bar graph entries were taken from the FNIB database and correspond to a unique firearm 
that was retrieved either at the crime scene or subsequently as part of the investigation.
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The Ministry of the Interior notes that while 12 gauge dominates the entire FNIB 
dataset, 9 x 19 mm is the most prominent calibre for cases of delinquency/criminality. 
Moreover, the proportion of FNIB cases involving 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition (for use 
with AK-pattern rifles) is increasing, and these entries relate primarily to cases of ILA 
(31%), homicides (19%) and terrorism (13%).109 Also of note is the presence of seven 
entries for 5.56 x 45 mm weapons in the 2016 dataset. This is the calibre for newer-
generation AK-74-pattern rifles, which were previously very rarely seen in France.110
2.2.3 Autopsy data
Autopsy data provided by the Institut Médico-Légal in Marseille concerning 105 
cases of firearm homicides that occurred between 2011 and 2017 make it possible to 
determine the calibre of the crime guns used in 89 of these cases. 7.62 x 39 mm 
calibre weapons were involved in 28% of the cases, 9 x 19 mm also in 28%, shotgun 
ammunition in 23% (12, 16 and 36 gauge, or 12 mm), and revolver ammunition in 
9%, with the remaining calibres comprising 7.62 x 25 mm, .32 ACP and .45 ACP.111 
Although these data are only representative of the Marseille region, they suggest 
that AK-pattern rifles, 9 mm handguns and shotguns are common firearm types 
used in homicides in this part of France.
2.3 Black market prices
Selected black market prices gleaned from media sources, key informant inter-
views and online trading platforms provide a sense of the prices of different types of 
weapons that can be accessed on illicit or informal markets (see Table 5). Overall, 
pricing data reveal lower prices for weapons belonging to categories that are legally 
accessible to the public, as well as converted, modified or reactivated firearms. 
12-gauge shotguns, which constitute the primary category of weapons seized in 
France, are generally available for €300-1,000, depending on the type and model. 
On the other hand, 9 x 19 mm handguns, also common in seizures, are more costly, 
with reported prices ranging between €1,000 and €3,000. Of note is that converted 
replica handguns sell for much lower prices than regular models, mostly in the 
€300-550 range, representing an affordable alternative to lethal-purpose pistols 
and revolvers. On the other end of the scale, prohibited Category A ‘weapons of war’ 
such as automatic rifles and rocket launchers top the price list. While prices for 
AK-pattern rifles in the last five years tend to oscillate between €1,000 and €2,500, 
some sources point to a great disparity of prices according to the location, with 








platforms. Sub-machine guns also tend to be priced between €1,000 and €3,000, 
with a reactivated model selling for under €1,000. Other weapons of war, such as 
rocket launchers, are priced at several thousands euros. 
















Arsenal SLR-106UR  
(5.56 x 45 mm)
2014 1,150 113
Unspecified AK-pattern 












AMD 65 (7.62 x 39 mm) 2014 500-1,100 122
M70 AB2  
(7.62 x 39 mm)
2017 2,000-2,500 123
vz.58 (reactivated,  
7.62 x 39 mm)
2014 600-800 124
2015 1,500 125 
Sub-machine guns
Sten MK II (9 x 19 mm) 2014-2017 1,000-1,500 126 









v z.26 (reactivated,  
9 x 19 mm)
2016 850 133 
Shotguns (12 gauge)














Sawn-off 2016 500 144
Handguns
Beretta (e.g. models 
92FS, PX4, 9 x 19 mm 
Parabellum)
2014-2016 1,000-2,000 145
CZ 75 (9 x 19 mm 
Parabellum)
1996 1,200-1,700 146
Glock (9 x 19 mm) 1996 1,850 147
2009 1,500 148
2014-2016 1,400-3,000 149 
2017 1,500 150
Intratec Tec 22 (.22LR) 2015 900 151
Rohm RG5S (converted 
from 8 mm blank to 6.35 
mm Browning)
2015 45 152
Bruni Gap and Mini-Gap 
(converted 9 mm PAK)
2015-2016 200-450 153




(converted from 8 mm 










Zoraki (models M906, 
M914, M925, converted 
from 9 mm PAK to fire 
modified, 6.35 mm or 
7.65 mm Browning 
rounds)
2016-2017 200-550 156 





M80 Zolja 64 mm 
anti-tank rocket launcher
2002 3,800 159
RPG-7 (with one rocket) 2009 4,500 160
Pen gun (converted, 
.22LR) 161
2015-2016 150-200 162 
Inserts to convert calibre 





It was only possible to gather limited time-series price data for this project gleaned 
from different sources. As a result, no solid conclusions can be drawn as to changes 
in the prices of specific weapons models over time. Additional research and the 
more systematic monitoring of the prices of both arms and ammunition have the 
potential to illuminate the relative accessibility of specific weapons over time and 
across regions, as has been done elsewhere.163
2.4 Sources of supply of and actors in the illicit gun market
The SCAEMS identifies three main categories of sources of illicit firearms in France: 
international trafficking from outside the EU, intra-European trafficking and 
domestic sourcing.164 The main sub-components of these trafficking streams are 
reviewed below, together with specific cases to illustrate the actors involved. 
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2.4.1 International trafficking from outside the EU
‘Ant trade’ from (post-)conflict areas
The trafficking of ‘weapons of war’ from neighbouring regions, including from for-
merly conflict-affected countries in the Balkans such as Albania, Bosnia, Croatia 
(before 2013) and Serbia, is a trafficking route commonly cited in media sources, in 
academic reports165 and by officials.166 Weapons manufactured in the former 
Yugoslavia, such as the M70AB2 AK-pattern rifle, often feature in organised crime- 
and terrorism-related seizures (see section 3 of this chapter). However, they are 
often models produced before the conflicts of the Balkans of the 1990s, and as a 
result it can be difficult to determine whether they were smuggled into France 
recently or ten or 20 years ago. Interestingly, associated 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition 
observed by the authorities tends to be equally old.167
Officials speak of current trafficking from the Balkans as an ‘ant trade’: small trans-
actions occurring ‘on demand’, often involving less than six firearms that are mainly 
transported by road (in private vehicles or on board buses) and that accumulate 
over time.168 In a recent case tried in Marseille in 2013 two French legionnaires from 
the Aubagne regiment and with personal connections in the Balkans were found 
guilty of smuggling 14 Skorpion vz.61 sub-machine guns, 24 magazines and ammu-
nition from Croatia. They transported the weapons by car and intended to sell them 
in France for €3,000 per unit.169 Beyond reports of such cases, it is difficult to assess 
the true extent and volume of trafficking from the Balkans.
Interestingly, officials also cited the risks posed by the ongoing conflicts in North 
Africa, the Sahel, the Middle East and Ukraine as potential sources of illicit firearms 
in the future, once these conflicts have abated and the weapons are no longer in 
demand.170
Convertible Turkish-origin replica firearms
Replica firearms (e.g. blank-firing, alarm and trauma guns) can be used in their 
original state to perpetrate certain crimes; some can also be easily converted to fire 
live ammunition.171 Turkish-origin replicas have been of particular concern in 
recent years. Out of the 72 seized blank-firing firearms examined by the gendarme-
rie’s IRCGN between November 2015 and October 2016, most were of Turkish origin 
(57%), and primarily of the Zoraki and Ekol makes. In addition to their cheaper 
market prices, the gendarmerie notes that Turkish handguns’ small size and weight, 









Some replica firearms are illicitly converted in France: an internal gendarmerie 
memo states that clandestine conversion workshops are regularly dismantled on 
the national territory.173 Others are converted abroad in workshops run by local 
organised crime groups, notably in Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia. Once smug-
gled into France, they tend to be seized in the context of road checkpoints, drug 
seizure operations or online sales.174
Replica firearms can usually be sold in France without restrictions – sellers only 
need to ask for an ID to ensure that buyers are aged 18 or more, but they are not 
required to keep records of each buyer’s identity.175 In response to the ease with 
which specific models could be converted, a 2016 decree classified Turkish-origin 
blank-firing Zoraki  R1 and Ekol Voltran Arda revolvers – as well as other models 
featuring similar characteristics – in Category B, making them subject to authorisa-
tion (see section 1.3). Other models of Turkish replicas, including fully automatic 
types, are not currently restricted, however. In addition, the Banc National d’Epreuve 
in Saint Etienne does not proof Turkish-origin blank-firing firearms, making their 
direct legal importation from Turkey to France difficult.176 These weapons may nev-
ertheless be imported by and proofed in other states with which France has proof-
ing reciprocity agreements,177 such as the Czech Republic,178 before being lawfully 
transferred to France. 
Trafficking in components from the United States
A third international source of illicit firearms is the trafficking in firearm compo-
nents from the United States. This includes trafficking in essential parts for the 
AR-15 rifle, such as upper and lower receivers.179 In a case tried in Boston in 2015, for 
instance, a US citizen was indicted for exporting firearms components to other 
countries without the required licence or written authorisation from the State 
Department. The items he exported or attempted to export to France in March 2012 
included four AR-15 lower receivers, four M16/AR-15 5.56 x 45 mm barrels and two 
M16/AR-15 flash suppressors. He organised the sales through Gunbroker.com, a 
popular auction website based in Atlanta that specialises in the sale of firearms, 
components and accessories.180 According to French customs officials, barrels for 




The intra-European trafficking of firearms is strongly connected to differences in 
legislation. Not surprisingly, intra-European sources of illicit firearms destined for 
France include neighbouring countries with looser firearms regulations,182 such as 
Belgium and Switzerland. One Swiss case referred to by the police in Marseille 
involved a French national who trafficked some 400 handguns from 2012 onwards, 
which he smuggled in small numbers by visiting his supplier near Geneva twice a 
month. He was arrested in 2016 on drug-dealing charges, which revealed his fire-
arms-smuggling operation.183 Trafficking from Belgium has received prominent 
attention in the context of the 2015 terror attacks in France (see section 3). 
Interlocutors met further stressed the smuggling of sports-shooting ammunition, 
given the fewer restrictions in Belgium placed on the quantities of ammunition an 
individual can legally buy (in France, this may not exceed 2,000 rounds per year for 
each Category B firearm held, for instance).184 A further source of illicit firearms is 
the trafficking in essential firearms components that are classified as restricted in 
France but easier to access in other European countries. Officials note, for instance, 
that it is possible to purchase the slide for a Glock pistol in Austria, its receiver in 
Luxembourg and the barrel in the United States. Firearms parts are typically 
shipped using regular mail and courier services, concealed in packages that contain 
old electronics material. Their lower weight makes them harder to detect.185
A key intra-European source of illicit firearms are weapons that were deactivated in 
other European countries and then reactivated illicitly before their transfer to or 
use in France. Reactivated weapons are of particular concern, because they include 
not only handguns, but also automatic rifles and sub-machine guns. Recent atten-
tion has focused on trafficking in so-called acoustic expansion weapons of Slovakian 
origin, and notably Arrow PS97 pistols, Vz.58 rifles and Vz.61 sub-machine guns. 
These firearms, many of which originated from surplus military stocks, were modi-
fied in Slovakia to function as blank-firing weapons and therefore sold without 
restrictions, including on Slovakian gun retailers’ websites. The ease with which 
they could be reconverted to fire live ammunition led to the trafficking of hundreds 
– and possibly thousands – of these weapons in Europe,186 as well their use in recent 
terrorism cases in France (see section 3). Intelligence sources state that AFG Security 
– one of the Slovakian companies that sold such firearms online – sent more than 
4,000 packages to 24 EU member states between January 2013 and November 2014, 
including more than 740 to France. These figures are difficult to interpret, however, 
because it is possible that some packages only contained accessories, while others 








In the last decade traffickers have exploited similar gaps in deactivation standards 
in several other European countries. From 2008, for instance, easily convertible 
Walther and Norinco pistols were being sourced in Austria at a gun shop.188 
According to police sources, the company bought as many as 2,900 firearms – pri-
marily from Czech surplus stocks – including some 300 automatic weapons. While 
the retailer sold these weapons as deactivated ones, in reality the deactivation 
measures were either insufficient or even non-existent.189 The first high-profile case 
involving such a weapon was the use of a reactivated Walther P22 pistol in the 
murder of a Swedish student outside Paris in April 2008.190
While the countries cited above have taken measures to address the issue, and in 
spite of the entry into force of a new EU regulation on deactivation, officials noted 
that reactivated acoustic expansion weapons of Slovakian origin were still entering 
French territory.191 The IRCGN and SCAEMS also expressed concern over the recent 
appearance of firearms that are modified to fire 6 mm Flobert ammunition – notably 
in Slovakia – and which may be easily reactivated.192 Converting weapons to this 
unregulated calibre means that they can be sold without restriction – a loophole 
that traffickers could potentially exploit. 
2.4.3 Domestic sources
While much attention is commonly paid to foreign sources of firearms, it is clear 
that a significant share of illicit arms in France are procured nationally. Prohibited 
Category A firearms, including AK-pattern rifles, that currently circulate in France 
were not all necessarily trafficked recently from abroad. Instead, in Marseille some 
have been held and used for years by various individuals linked to the same gang.193 
Analysts have noted an upsurge in the use and pooling of local firearms arsenals 
rather than a constant growth in their numbers.194 Ballistics data for 2016 tend to 
support this assessment: when a single firearm is found to be used in two separate 
criminal cases, the average distance between the crime scenes is only 7 km, and the 
average time that elapsed between the two cases is less than one year (274 days on 
average).195
The three main domestic sources for the firearms that ended up on the black market 




Gun theft from legal owners probably represents the most significant domestic 
source of illicit firearms in France, with 10,572 weapons reported stolen in 2015 
alone (Figure 4). Among them, almost three-quarters (7,800) were stolen from indi-
vidual gun owners and gun shops.196 Statistics show that the majority of stolen 
weapons belong to categories D and C, indicating a large proportion of thefts of 
hunting rifles and shotguns. Gun thefts are not limited to hunting weapons, 
however: more than 1,000 Category B weapons, which include semi-automatic 
handguns and higher capacity rifles, were reported stolen in 2015 (Figure 4). 
Gun-theft statistics need to be treated with caution, however. Indeed, officials note 
that there have been cases of ‘embezzlement’ whereby legitimate firearm owners 
decide to declare certain weapons as lost in order to keep them illicitly, especially 
following the adoption of new regulations aimed at reclassifying and ‘over-restrict-
ing’ certain models.197 Quantifying the extent of this practice is difficult, but it 
appears to also exist in other European countries such as Belgium (see section 2.3.5 
in the chapter on Belgium).
Reports of thefts from legal gun retailers are relatively frequent. In February 2017, 
for instance, a 15- and 17-year-old used a stolen pick-up vehicle to break into a gun 
shop in Arandon-Passins, a town in Isère, and stole more than forty hunting shot-
guns and rifles and ammunition.198 Officials further noted that thefts can occur at 
arms fairs.199 Associations of hunters, sports shooters, and First and Second World 
War memorial and municipal associations organise more than 300 arms fairs in 
France annually. According to the gendarmerie, there are frequent reports of local 
criminals stealing some of the firearms on display at such events, while some sellers 
have been caught displaying prohibited Category A firearms, including magazines 
and grenades.200 Recent cases have also highlighted cases of theft and the improper 
storage of firearms held by movie companies, which have included AK-74 rifles, 
PPSH41 sub-machine guns, Famas rifles and pistols.201 
Individual gun owners with sizeable collections represent another possible source 
of high-calibre firearms for criminal groups. In June 2011, for instance, near 
Toulouse, well-informed thieves stole two crates from a professional sports shooter, 
one containing more than 80 kg of firearms, the other filled with ammunition. 
Among the stolen goods was the Colt .45 pistol that Mohamed Merah used during 
the 2012 attacks in Toulouse and Montauban (see section 3).202 The sometimes 
excessive and illegal arsenals accumulated by so-called ‘compulsive collectors’ also 
represent valuable loot for gun thieves. Many official press releases and media 








prohibited items such as rocket launchers and mortars – stashed in the homes of 
individuals presenting themselves as avid collectors or sports shooters.203
Lastly, media reports show that criminals also target the security forces to steal 
their weapons. For instance, on 2 February 2017 two assault rifles and ammunition 
were stolen from an unmarked military vehicle in Isère. The small truck, part of a 
convoy of several military vehicles, was parked at a restaurant while the drivers 
were having lunch inside.204 In another case in Essonne a gendarme was found to 
loan service weapons to local armed robbers, replacing them in his unit’s armoury 
after use.205 In the absence of nationwide statistics, the scale of such diversion from 
the national stockpile is difficult to assess, however.
Conversion of replica and deactivated firearms
Sizeable reactivation workshops have been discovered on French territory. In June 
2007, for instance, such a workshop run by three men aged 20, 30 and 50 and that 
reactivated and sold 15-20 Eastern European weapons per week was dismantled in 
the Hauts-de-Seine.206 In October 2014 the 49-year-old owner of a firearms business 
was found guilty of reactivating firearms and selling them to individuals linked to 
Corsican organised crime, including AK-pattern rifles and a Skorpion sub-machine 
gun.207 In another case, a Marseille-based retiree was sentenced to four years in jail 
in 2014 for purchasing 132 deactivated handguns – including 75 Glock pistols – from 
a shop in Barcelona, Spain, over several years. He reactivated the guns at home by 
simply replacing the barrels with others purchased online from the United States 
and sold them to individuals linked to criminal circles. Several of these reactivated 
firearms were subsequently used in murder cases.208
The Banc National d’Epreuve in Saint Etienne is the only institution authorised to deac-
tivate firearms in France, and already implements the new European deactivation regu-
lation. While it deactivates thousands of firearms per year (including 3,046 in 2016), the 
authorities seize very few – in the range of 60-80 per year – in reactivated form.209 A 
recent case nevertheless illustrates how ingenious individuals can reactivate firearms 
at home – even weapons that were deactivated according to reputedly stringent stand-
ards. On 25 April 2013 a 19-year-old man shot three people dead in Istres using a 
Romanian AIM AK-pattern-rifle that had been deactivated in Germany – a country 
known for its high deactivation standards. The investigation revealed that the perpe-
trator had purchased the rifle for €267 through a German website in 2012,210 and that he 
reactivated the rifle himself using a hydraulic press and instructions he found on spe-
cialised online forums.211 He used ammunition he reloaded himself using old East 
German primered steel cases that he purchased from another German website. 
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Internet
Online sales of firearms are legal in France when the gun is an antique weapon 
(which can be traded without restriction) 212 or when the seller is a registered retail-
er.213 Online sales of Category B firearms between individuals are strictly prohibited, 
as such purchases must be made in the presence of a law enforcement official who 
must keep a record of the transaction and check that both buyer and seller have all 
the required documents.214 Individuals can sell Category C and D1 firearms online, 
however. In such cases they are themselves responsible for ensuring that they have 
the proper documentation and must subsequently inform the authorities of the 
transaction.215 
Several cases mentioned above have shed light on the use of the internet for selling 
and buying firearms, including restricted models and components. Research for 
this report has revealed the presence of numerous posts offering such firearms for 
sale – many without adequate reference to the relevant regulatory requirements – 
on several open trading platforms (see Table 5). A range of deactivated firearms 
(including Vz.58 rifles, CETME 7.62 x 51 mm rifles and Vz.61 sub-machine guns), 
replica firearms (some converted) and tools for modifying firearms are also found 
on display. For instance, one post dated July 2016 offered a reactivated blank-firing 
Sa. vz.26 sub-machine gun for €850.216
Customs and gendarmerie experts state that they closely monitor these platforms 
to identify suspicious individuals and build up files on the main protagonists. 
Generally speaking, the authorities claimed to be satisfied with the cooperation 
they received from the companies running these websites. Customs and the gen-
darmerie also monitor the dark web. While it is potentially an increasing source of 
illicit firearms, officials currently consider the dark web to be mainly a space where 
contacts for acquiring firearms can be found, and where technical knowledge and 
advice are shared, for instance for modifying or converting firearms.217 
2.4.4 France as a transit country for trafficking to other 
destinations
While France is mainly a destination country for trafficked weapons, some weapons 
and ammunition are also smuggled from or transit through the country to other 
destinations, mainly the United Kingdom (UK). This includes, for instance, the 
regular shipping or smuggling of small quantities (a few dozen at a time) of Category 









A prominent case of illicit firearms transiting through France is the August 2015 
seizure of 22 Czech-made vz.58 automatic rifles, nine vz.61 sub-machine guns, 58 
magazines, more than 1,000 rounds of ammunition, and two silencers near Kent in 
the UK. The seized weapons had been sold in the previous year as acoustic expansion 
weapons in Slovakia, converted back to live-firing firearms, and transported overland 
from Eastern Europe to Boulogne-sur-Mer, France, where they were then transported 
by ship to the UK (for more details, see section 2.3.4 of the chapter on the UK).219 
In addition, the gendarmerie highlighted the smuggling since 2012 of sub-machine 
guns from Croatia to the UK, transiting through Slovenia, Austria, Germany, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and France. Marked with the name of a seemingly ficti-
tious company, ‘R9-ARMS CORP USA’, it appears that the weapons were produced 
illicitly in Croatia. In early 2015 Croatian authorities arrested two truck drivers who 
worked for a Croatian transport company in the possession of bags containing 14 of 
these 9 x 19 mm pistols; they were scheduled to drive a refrigerated truck to deliver 
cosmetics in the UK. In France, these weapons were seized in the context of two 
judicial cases in 2015.220
3. Access by terrorists to firearms on the illegal 
market in France
Under the French Penal Code, acts of terrorism refer to cases of breaches of the law 
– including killings, kidnappings, hijackings, providing support to combat groups, 
weapons-related offences and money laundering – that are undertaken with the 
purpose of disrupting public order through intimidation or terror.221 Within this 
broad definition, terrorism has taken a number of different forms and inflicted a 
heavy toll in France in the last 25 years. Not all terror events in France have involved 
the use of firearms,I yet firearms have nevertheless been a recurring tool used by a 
variety of perpetrators of acts that aimed at causing maximal civilian casualties or 
disrupting symbols of the French state. Some were claimed by foreign jihadi armed 
groups, or linked to Corsican nationalist or Basque separatist organisations. Others 
were perpetrated by social outcasts, some of whom adhered to left-wing ideologies. 
A non-exhaustive list of terrorist attacks with firearms since the 1990s can be found 
in Box 2. 
I The terrorist incidents that did not involve firearms were not necessarily less deadly. In 1995 a 
wave of bombings was attributed to the Groupe Islamiste Armé in retaliation for French support 
of the Algerian government. The 25 July 1995 attack involved the detonation of a makeshift bomb 
that killed eight people and injured 117 at the Saint Michel RER train station in Paris. See, for 
example, ‘Retour sur 35 ans d’attentats en France’, Libération, 15 July 2016 and ‘Charlie, Bataclan, 
Nice … et maintenant une église: le (très) lourd bilan du terrorisme en France’, Capital, 15 July 2016.
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Box 2: High-profile terrorist attacks with firearms in France in the past 
25 years
In Paris on 4 October 1994 two anarchist activists, Florence Rey and Audry 
Maupin, killed three police officers and a taxi driver using pump-action shot-
guns, one of which they bought in a department store. The attackers initially 
targeted the armed guards of a car pound in order to steal their revolvers, 
which they intended to use to carry out bank robberies to fund their activi-
ties. In the car chase that followed they killed the driver of the taxi they had 
car-jacked and three police officers.222
In Ajaccio on 4 February 1998 Yvan Colonna, a member of the Front de 
Libération Nationale Corse (FLNC), killed the local préfet, Claude Erignac, 
using an MAS G1 pistol that had been previously stolen during an attack on a 
gendarmerie station. The victim was shot in the back at close range.223
In Nanterre on 26 March 2002 Richard Durn, a 33-year-old who lived off 
social benefits at his mother’s house, opened fire during a city council 
meeting, killing eight and injuring 19 councillors. He used a Glock pistol and 
a Smith & Wesson revolver that he had bought legally, but for which the 
licences had expired.224
In Cap-Breton on 1 December 2007 Mikel Carrera Sarobe, a member of the 
Basque separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), killed two undercover 
Spanish Guardia Civil officers in their car after encountering them ‘by 
chance’ in a restaurant. He used a Smith & Wesson MP9 pistol that had been 
reported stolen from a firearms import company together with some 400 
other handguns.225
In a series of shootings that took place in the period 11-19 March 2012 Mohamed 
Merah killed three French soldiers in Toulouse and Montauban, as well as 
three students and a teacher at a Jewish school in Toulouse.226 Among the 
firearms used by the shooter was a Colt .45 pistol that had been reported 
stolen the previous year from a professional sports shooter’s home.227
On 15 November 2013 a man armed with a shotgun entered the hall of news 
channel BFM-TV and threatened its staff. Three days later the same individ-
ual burst into the office of the Libération newspaper and shot and injured an 
assistant photographer, before firing random shots in the La Défense district 








recordings of the incident show a pump-action shotgun, with the buttstock 
either sawn off or replaced by a pistol grip. Two spent 12-gauge ammunition 
cases were retrieved by the police, with ballistics marks matching those of 
a Winchester Defender shotgun.229 The shooter, born in 1965, had previously 
been involved in the 1994 Rey and Maupin case (see above), helping the per-
petrators to acquire one of their shotguns.230 
Between 7 and 9 January 2015 several connected terrorist shooting incidents 
took place in and around Paris, resulting in 17 deaths. The brothers Saïd and 
Chérif Kouachi, armed with East European automatic rifles, killed 11 people 
at the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo editorial office, as well as a 
police officer. During the search for the Kouachi brothers, Ahmédy Coulibaly, 
armed with vz.58 automatic rifles and Tokarev 33TT pistols, entered a Jewish 
Hypercacher supermarket at the Porte de Vincennes, shot four people dead 
and held hostage more than 20 people for several hours. Coulibaly had pre-
viously shot a young female police officer dead and wounded another person 
in the street in Montrouge.231 
On 13 November 2015 terrorist attacks resulted in 130 people being killed and 
more than 400 wounded in Paris. Ten perpetrators divided into three teams 
coordinated attacks targeting the Stade de France, busy restaurant terraces 
in the 10th and 11th arrondissements, and the Bataclan theatre. While the 
suicide bombings at the Stade de France were largely unsuccessful, the two 
other teams used automatic rifles and claimed all but one victim. Several of 
the perpetrators had fought in Syria and/or Iraq; they were also later found 
to have ties with the perpetrators of the March 2016 attacks on Brussels 
Airport and metro in Belgium, which resulted in 32 deaths (see the chapter 
on Belgium).232 
Since 2015, and the deadly assaults carried out in that year under the banner of 
radical Islam, terrorism has taken on a new dimension in France and become pri-
marily associated with religiously motivated mass killings. France is by far the 
Western European country most affected by the recent wave of jihadi terrorism: 
from 2013 to 2016 it was the target of ten such terrorist attacks (out of 24 for all of 
Western Europe), four failed attacks (out of six), and 28 plots (out of 64).233 A total of 
147 people were killed and hundreds injured in the context of the 7-9 January and 13 
November 2015 Paris incidents,234 which were claimed by foreign terrorist groups 
al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State. Firearms – primarily automatic AK-pattern 
assault rifles and handguns acquired from intra-European criminal sources 
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– caused the vast majority of these casualties.235 In the aftermath of these attacks 
acts of right-wing terrorism targeting Muslim targets increased, including some 
involving the use of firearms. Although no fatalities were recorded, shots were fired 
at six mosques in various French localities following the January 2015 attacks, for 
instance.236
Recent events have underscored the devastating effects of terrorist attackers wield-
ing fully automatic AK-pattern rifles in crowded venues. Yet as the listed events in 
Box 2 illustrate, attackers have also relied on handguns and shotguns in a number 
of high-profile incidents, suggesting access to a more diverse arsenal than typically 
portrayed. 
Ballistics data from the national FNIB database contain information on the calibre 
of firearms and ammunition observed by French forensic laboratories in the context 
of terrorism-related cases. These may be firearms or ammunition used in actual 
attacks, or seized from the caches of armed organisations and during arrests of 
their members. As such, the data are potentially illustrative of the wider range of 
firearms used in terrorist activities and are not limited to high-profile events. While 
most recent terrorism-related ballistics evidence collected nationally is entered 
into the FNIB, it currently remains in its infancy and its scope is so far mainly limited 
to cases that occurred in 2015 and 2016.237
These caveats in mind, 2016 FNIB data provide a diverse picture of the main calibres 
linked with terrorism (538 database entries in total). Particularly striking is the fact 
that 9 x 19 mm and especially 7.62 x 51 mm ammunition comprise the highest pro-
portion of entries (Figure 6). According to officials, this is explained by the seizure 
of a large ETA arms cache containing 7.62 x 51 mm CETME assault rifles, 9 x 19 mm 
MAT 49 and Sten sub-machine guns, and GP35 pistols.238 Other prominent calibres 
for terrorism-related entries include .357 Magnum, 12 gauge and 9 mm Makarov. 
Interestingly, 7.62 x 39 mm ammunition – for AK-pattern rifles – is only the seventh 
most prominent calibre among the 2016 terrorism-related entries. Also of note are 
the significantly smaller proportions occupied by 12 gauge and .22LR in the terror-








Figure 6: The ten calibres most commonly observed by French ballistics 
laboratories in 2016, in percentages for all entries and terrorism-
related entries (retrieved firearms only)
Source: INPS239
Although the FNIB dataset remains in its infancy, it illustrates the wide-ranging 
diversity of calibres linked to terrorist activity as it is defined in France. Furthermore, 
terrorism-related calibres differ only partially from those used in other crimes and 
offences, suggesting that at least in some cases terrorist actors rely on firearms and 
ammunition that are locally available. Unfortunately, it was not possible for this 
study to disaggregate the FNIB data by type of terrorist actor, a task that would 
further illuminate these findings, but it would require time, resources and official 
clearance to retrieve this information from the associated judicial files. 
Because investigations into most of the recent jihadi terrorism cases are still 
ongoing, interviewed French officials were not able to provide detailed information 
on the proximate sources of firearms used to arm these attackers.240 A number of 
pieces of the puzzle have nevertheless emerged from open-source investigative 
media reporting. Because they have been ably summarised elsewhere,241 they are 
only succinctly reviewed here. The following paragraphs use open-source informa-
tion and previously unpublished official data on the specific models of firearms 
used in a number of jihadi terrorist attacks and the status of tracing efforts, and on 
the firearms that have been seized from Basque separatist and Corsican nationalist 
networks. The final part of this section will draw some general conclusions on the 
extent of linkages between organised crime and terrorist acquisition of firearms.
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3.1 Firearms and recent jihadi terrorist attacks
Open-source information on recent terror attacks in France demonstrates links 
between jihadi terrorism and organised crime. According to media reports, 
Mohamed Merah, the perpetrator of the 2012 attacks in Toulouse and Montauban, 
was previously involved as a ‘go-fast’ driver with an organised criminal group 
smuggling cocaine between Spain and France.242 These connections likely helped 
him to acquire the .45 Colt pistol he used in the 2012 attack. This claim is supported 
by the observation that the pistol was part of two crates of arms and ammunition 
that were stolen from a professional sports shooter in 2011,243 and other weapons 
from these stolen crates were also retrieved during the arrest of other Toulouse-
based drug traffickers.244 Yet how Merah procured the other six firearms at his dis-
posal remained unknown at the time of research (see Table 6).
More recently, investigative reporting revealed that the weapons used by Ahmédy 
Coulibaly in Paris in January 2015 were reactivated firearms from Slovakia. The two 
vz.58 rifles, reportedly produced in the 1960s, and six Tokarev pistols, manufac-
tured in the 1940s and 1950s, had been modified as acoustic expansion weapons by 
Slovakian companies such as KolArms between 2013 and 2014. They were then sold 
without restrictions as blank-firing firearms in the Slovakian gun shop AFG Security 
on the simple presentation of an ID card. A Belgian national is reported to have 
bought one of the rifles subsequently used by Coulibaly, as part of 170 weapons he 
purchased from AFG Security between 2013 and 2014. Although he denied supply-
ing Coulibaly directly, in May 2014 Belgian police had found materiel in his house 
that could be used to reconvert such firearms to fire live ammunition.245 The other 
vz.58 rifle and two of the pistols were bought in 2014 by Claude Hermant, a right-
wing French national who lived in Belgium and owned a survival shop in Lille in 
northern France. He was reportedly also an informer for the gendarmerie, and 
played a role in an undercover investigation into illicit arms trafficking.246 He 
imported dozens of deactivated firearms from AFG Security before reconverting 
them into lethal-purpose weapons and reselling them to local criminal circles, 
although he denied selling the weapons directly to Coulibaly.247 Another Frenchman 
from Pas de Calais, who had previously worked for Hermant, as well as two 
Montenegrin and Serbian nationals, were arrested in April 2016 in Malaga, Spain. 
The French national was identified by Spanish police as the person responsible for 
the network that provided firearms to Coulibaly. All these suspects have denied pro-
viding weapons directly to Coulibaly, however.248 
Some information has also surfaced regarding the firearms used in the Bataclan 
attacks of November 2015. The Zastava M70 rifle was produced in Kragujevac, 








subsequently became the regular Bosnian Army. The Type 66-1 assault rifle was of 
Chinese origin, but was produced under licence in Albania and formed part of that 
country’s national stockpile. The third AK-pattern rifle was manufactured in 
Bulgaria in 1985. While little is known about when and how these rifles were smug-
gled to Western Europe, Belgian courts suspect the El Bakraoui brothers, two of the 
March 2016 suicide bombers at Brussels Airport, were involved in supplying the 
firearms to the November 2015 Paris attackers, several of whom were Belgian 
nationals or lived in Belgium (see the chapter on Belgium).249 
A more recent case highlighted the possibility of suspected terrorists using legally 
owned firearms. On 19 June 2017 Adam Lofti Djaziri attempted to attack a police 
convoy on the Champs Elysées in Paris. His car immediately burst into flames and 
he died a couple of minutes later, inflicting no victims among the police. A search 
of his car revealed the presence of a gas cylinder, 9,000 rounds of ammunition and 
a – reportedly Israeli – assault rifle.250 While searching his house, the police also 
found a Glock and a SIG Sauer pistol, a carbine, and seven Category C firearms.251 
Although Djaziri featured on France’s terrorist suspect watch list – ‘fichier S’ – he 
held the appropriate authorisation for the two Category B pistols and the shooting 
licence required for the Category C weapons. It appears that this situation was not 
due to administrative oversight; rather, Prime Minister Edouard Philippe stated 
that when Djaziri requested the renewal of his shooting licence in late 2016, the 
Direction Générale de la Sécurité Intérieure (France’s internal intelligence service) 
was informed, but opted to grant the request in order not to arouse Djaziri’s suspi-
cion that he was being monitored.252 Nevertheless, President Emmanuel Macron 
called for a thorough review of such procedures after the incident.253
For this study, French officials contributed data on the specific models of firearms 
used or seized in connection with several attacks and attempted recent attacks, pro-
viding the most comprehensive official and publicly available account to date of the 
arsenals at the disposal of jihadi terrorists in France. The data are useful for gener-
ating a typology of the weapons types and models used by jihadi terrorist groups, as 
well as for illustrating the challenges involved in tracing these firearms. Table 6 
summarises data provided by the Interior Ministry’s SCAEMS on 52 firearms 
retrieved or seized in relation to eight terrorism cases that occurred between 2012 
and 2016. Not included in Table 6 are the three AK-pattern rifles (one Chinese Type 
56-1, one Bulgarian AKKS and one Serbian M70 AB1)254 used by attackers during the 
13 November 2015 attack at the Bataclan theatre in Paris, which resulted in 89 
deaths; AK-pattern rifles were also used during the coordinated attacks on restau-
rants and terraces in Paris on the same day, but no further details were available at 
the time of research.255
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Table 6: Firearms seized in recent attacks inspired by radical Islamist 
ideologies
Make, model 






Mohamed Merah (Toulouse and Montauban attacks, 11-19 March 2012)
Franchi Spas 12 
shotgun, Italy
12 gauge B-2° Yes, unsatisfactory 
results 
ROF Sten MK II 
sub-machine gun, 
UK










.357 Magnum B-1° Yes, unsatisfactory 
results
Remington 1911 A1 
pistol, United 
States
.45 ACP B-1° Yes, unsatisfactory 
results
Remington 1911 A1 
pistol, United 
States
.45 ACP B-1° Firearm assembled 







.45 ACP B-1° Reactivated – had 




Mehdi Nemmouche (attack on Jewish Museum, Brussels, 24 May 2014; arrested in Marseille 












Saïd and Chérif Kouachi (Charlie Hebdo attack, Paris, 7-9 January 2015)
Two Zastava M70 
automatic rifle, 
Serbia 257
7.62 x 39 mm A-2-1° Yes, unsatisfactory 
results
Two Zastava M57 
pistols, Serbia
7.62 Tokarev B-1° Yes, unsatisfactory 
results




A-2-4° Yes, unsatisfactory 
results (traceable 



























Yes, sold by AFG 
Security in Slovakia
Six Tokarev TT33 
pistols, Soviet 
Union




Yes, three were 
sold by AFG 




Tula Nagant 1932 
revolver, Soviet 
Union




Sid Ahmed Ghlam (alleged 19 April 2015 murder of Aurélie Châtelain and planning of attack 
on a church in Villejuif)
Four Zastava M70 
automatic rifles, 
Serbia
7.62 x 39 mm A-2-1°
Sphinx AT 2000 
pistol, 
Switzerland
9 x 19 mm B-1° Yes, firearm 
reported stolen
SIG Pro 2022 
pistol, Germany 
9 x 19 mm B-1° Yes, firearm 
reported stolen





7.62 x 39 mm A-2-1° Firearm assembled 




Luger FEG M80 
pistol, Hungary
9 x 19 mm B-1° Erased serial 
number 259
Impossible
Four Zastava M70 
automatic rifles, 
Serbia 





Kazanlak AKS 47 
automatic rifle, 
Bulgaria
7.62 x 39 mm A-2-1° Yes, unsatisfactory 
results
Norinco Type 56-1 
automatic rifle, 
China




9 x 19 mm B-1° Altered serial 
number
Impossible
Reda Kriket (arrested on 24 March 2016 in Boulogne Billancourt for allegedly planning an 
attack during Euro 2016)
Five AK-pattern 
automatic rifles




9 x 19 mm A-2-1°
SIG Pro 2022 
pistol, Germany
9 x 19 mm B-1° Yes, reported stolen 
in Belgium
Glock 19 pistol, 
Austria












Walter P99 pistol, 
Germany
9 x 19 mm B-1°
Smith & Wesson 
Model 29 revolver, 
United States
.44 Magnum B-1°
Mohammed Laouej Bouhlel (Nice attack, 14 July 2016)
Unique pistol, 
France
7.65 Browning B-1° Yes, firearm 
reported stolen
Source: SCAEMS260
The data in Table 6 indicate that semi-automatic handguns of various calibres (legal 
Category B) represent 50% of the weapons, compared with 40% for automatic rifles 
(mainly 7.62 x 39 mm AK-pattern rifles). Sub-machine guns represent only 6% of 
the sample, with the remainder comprising a pump-action shotgun and a rocket 








dataset than fully automatic weapons is noteworthy, and somewhat contradicts 
common perceptions of terrorist arsenals being composed primarily of AK-pattern 
rifles. Semi-automatic handguns were actually used to a greater extent than fully 
automatic weapons in several of the associated attacks, including those in Toulouse, 
Montauban and Villejuif.261 Despite this observation, it is clear that fully automatic 
rifles were widely used, including in the most deadly attacks. In fact, 7.62 x 39 mm 
(the calibre for AK-pattern rifles) is the most common calibre in Table 6 (40%), fol-
lowed by 9 x 19 mm (19%), 7.62 x 25 mm Tokarev (15%) and .45 ACP (10%).
Officials stress the difficulty of tracing the firearms used in these attacks.262 As 
noted in Table 6, while tracing efforts were made in most cases, those that gener-
ated the most useful results involved pistols that were reported stolen in France 
(four cases) and Belgium (two cases), as well as the two reactivated 7.62 x 39 mm 
vz.58 rifles and six reactivated Tokarev pistols that were sold as blank-firing fire-
arms in Slovakia. In the majority of cases, however, tracing requests yielded only 
unsatisfactory results. This is true for a number of handguns and automatic rifles, 
and particularly so for older weapons produced in the Balkans before the conflicts 
of the 1990s. Producers provided information on the last known legal end user of 
the firearms, generally former armed forces of the Yugoslav Republic in the early 
1990s. In those cases, tracing was of little use in determining how and when these 
weapons ended up in France, because too many parts of a potentially long chain of 
custody are missing.263 A similar observation can be made regarding the tracing of 
the ammunition that was found. Markings on 7.62 x 39 mm cartridge cases retrieved 
at the scene of the Bataclan and Thalys attacks reveal the use of old ammunition 
manufactured before the mid-1990s primarily in East and South East European 
countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina (between 1974 and 1991), Bulgaria (in 
1967 and 1988) and Czechoslovakia (in 1991), as well as in Iran (in 1992 and 1993) and 
China (in 1963 and 1964).264 
3.2 Firearms and Basque separatism
While Basque separatist group ETA carried out most of its violent attacks in Spain,265 
the 2007 killing of two Guardia Civil officers in Cap Breton served as a reminder of 
its clandestine armed activities in France.266 The group declared the end of its armed 
struggle in 2011 and began disarming in 2016. In April 2017 it surrendered eight 
arms caches containing 3.5 tonnes of arms, ammunition and other materiel to the 
French authorities.267 Consequently, the number of investigations opened in France 
related to ETA decreased from 159 in 2007 to 26 in 2013.268 While ETA no longer 
represents a significant armed threat,269 its past arms procurement patterns are an 
interesting illustration of the ways in which a group – which featured on the EU’s 
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list of terrorist organisations until 2009 – was able to acquire and maintain an 
arsenal in south-western France. 
ETA favoured local sources of firearms supplies, and initially relied to a great extent 
on weapons it looted from the stocks of regular security forces (including Spanish 
service handguns such as the Astra pistol).270 ETA engineers also produced home-
made sub-machine guns in the 1980s and 1990s that were inspired by the Israeli 
Uzi.271 Even though these weapons were known for their high failure rate, the group 
appears to have manufactured several hundred units.272 These weapons usually had 
‘ETA’ marked on the right side of the receiver, as well as ‘RTS’ or ‘ARS’ fire selector 
markings.
Firearms held by the group in the last ten years involved mainly those stolen in 
2006 from a local firearms retailer. On 24 October 2006 an ETA commando stormed 
into the facilities of the SIDAM gun shop in Vauvert, in Gard département.273 The 
team of three seized 400 handguns – mostly in 9 x 19 mm and .357 Magnum cali-
bres, including new Smith & Wesson MP9 and CZ pistols – and 60,000 rounds of 
ammunition.274 They also took older weapons that were being repaired in the shop, 
including a Luger P08 pistol.275 Ballistics analysis of the cartridge cases left behind 
at the 2007 Cap Breton crime scene revealed the murder weapon to be a Smith & 
Wesson MP9 pistol that had been stolen from SIDAM. Firearms originating from 
this source have also been regularly seized from arrested ETA members – they were 
easily traced because the serial numbers were left intact.276
Caches that ETA recently surrendered as part of its disarmament process generally 
contained some 50 firearms each, stored in plastic containers. A cache examined at 
Louhossoa on 16 December 2016 contained a combination of Arminius revolvers, 
SIDAM-origin handguns, former Spanish Army firearms with milled serial 
numbers, SIG- and FN-manufactured firearms, and homemade ‘Uzi’ sub-machine 
guns.277 A number of Spanish-produced 7.62 x 51 mm CEMTE rifles have also been 
recovered.278 
Most of the ammunition held recently by ETA was also stolen from SIDAM. However, 
ETA also reloaded a significant proportion of its ammunition (especially in calibres 
.357, 9 x 19 mm and .45), representing about 10-15% of what has been recovered in 








3.3 Firearms and Corsican nationalism 
Since 1976, as part of its campaign for Corsican independence, the Front de 
Libération Nationale Corse (FLNC) has carried out a number of attacks on and 
bombings of symbols of the French state, both on the island and in southern 
France.280 The violent activities of Corsican nationalists have diminished in recent 
years, however: the number of investigations opened in France related to terrorism 
in Corsica decreased from 248 in 2006 to 26 in 2013,281 and in 2016 the group 
announced the end of its armed campaign.282 The situation nevertheless remains 
fragile, and organised crime contributes to the island’s high homicide rate.283 Police 
sources note that 12 gauge is currently the most predominant calibre in use in crime 
in Corsica.284 Score settling between organised crime gangs tends to involve pump-
action or hunting shotguns.285 Such groups also have access to automatic firearms, 
however. In October 2014 the 49-year-old owner of a firearms business was found 
guilty of reactivating firearms and selling them to individuals linked to Corsican 
organised crime. The weapons he supplied to them included ten AK-pattern rifles, a 
Skorpion sub-machine gun and a Walther PPK semi-automatic pistol.286 
Corsican nationalists’ holdings and procurement of firearms provide additional 
insights into how clandestine organisations acquire weapons in France. Weapons 
they displayed during their 1990s propaganda efforts suggested international 
sources of supply. In January 1996 the FLNC invited tens of journalists to a press 
conference in a forest. There, some 600 militants, dressed in black combat clothing 
and their faces covered, could be seen carrying a variety of firearms. The diverse 
weapons they displayed at this and other events typically included Uzi sub-machine 
guns, Steyr AUG and M16 rifles, rocket launchers, machine guns, and CZ 75 pis-
tols.287 Corsican nationalists have also used automatic weapons in particular to 
spray bullets at state symbols such as gendarmerie stations.288 Little information is 
available, however, on the criminal networks used to acquire these diverse firearms. 
One rare documented example involved the smuggling of Austrian police Glock 
pistols in the mid-1990s. Four Austrian police officers forged documentation to 
collect unclaimed service pistols that were reserved for retired officers who 
requested them. They then sold the firearms to local criminal networks, as well as 
about 20 units to Corsican militants they were personally acquainted with.289 
Corsican nationalists also sourced weapons locally, including through theft from 
law enforcement services. On 6 February 1998 Préfet Claude Erignac was shot first 
in the neck then twice in the head on his way to meet his wife at the theatre in 
Ajaccio. The killer left the firearm close to the scene. Tracing efforts revealed that 
the 9 x 19 mm MAS G1 pistol – a copy of the Beretta 92FS manufactured under 
licence in Saint Etienne – was one of two pistols that had been stolen during the 
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assault on a gendarmerie post in Pietrosella on 6 September 1997.290 The investiga-
tion found that Yvan Colonna, a man connected to the FLNC, was the attacker. He 
was sentenced to life in prison.291 
3.4 Links between organised crime and the acquisition of 
firearms by terrorist groups
Due to the secretive nature of ongoing investigations, interviewed officials were not 
at liberty to share information on the specific proximate criminal networks used by 
terrorist organisations to acquire firearms. Forensics specialists met for this study 
nevertheless observed that, to date, not a single firearm examined in relation to ter-
rorism has been linked through ballistics testing to other criminal cases or offenc-
es.292 While this statement should be weighed against the fact that France’s nation-
wide ballistics network remains in its infancy, the fact remains that clearly 
documenting a link between terror actors and organised criminal groups is 
challenging. 
While investigations may reveal more information as they unfold, some observers 
suggested that connections between the criminal and jihadi terrorism spheres in 
particular may be limited for a reason. Organised criminal groups would put them-
selves at greater risk of harassment by the authorities by supplying terrorists, and 
may in fact be trying to limit such ties.293 Moreover, other groups have openly 
expressed their discontent with the jihadi networks. Following the July 2016 jihadi 
attack in Nice, for instance, the FLNC publicly threatened jihadi terrorists with 
retaliation should they attempt to carry out attacks in Corsica.294 
Overall, with the exception of Mohamed Merah, most jihadi attack perpetrators 
appear to have been involved in low-level criminality rather than organised crime. 
As Europol noted, “foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and their facilitation networks are 
predominantly self-funding (for example, from their employment income, support from 
family and friends, social welfare and/or bank loans). … the perpetrators of the January 
[2015] Paris attacks were not in employment at that time; they made use of a consumer 
loan obtained with forged documents and cashed out, they had the proceeds of the sale of 
a car, and had cash linked to the sale of counterfeit goods.”295 
This suggests the discreet and small-scale involvement of jihadi terror cell members 
in low-level criminal activities with the purpose of financing their activities. 
The information reviewed in this report illustrates a wide range of and flexibility in 








was successful, information points mainly to local sources, including thefts from 
gun shops, lawful individual gun owners, and state security forces, as well as craft 
production. Little is known about the origins of the AK-pattern rifles used in the 
deadly November 2015 attacks. While some could be traced back to the Balkans in 
the early 1990s, their more proximate chains of custody are unclear. Available 
reporting suggests that the attackers’ personal networks in Belgium played a part,296 
but when and through which route these firearms were smuggled from the Balkans 
remain unclear.
4. Conclusions
France has faced several waves of terror attacks in its history, but the violence and 
human toll of those perpetrated since 2015 is unprecedented. Firearms were the 
primary weapon used in the most deadly attacks. Data on 52 firearms used or seized 
in connection with eight recent terror cases show that handguns, followed by auto-
matic rifles, have been the main types of weapons held and used by jihadi 
terrorists. 
Owing to the legacy of the Second World War, a tradition of tolerance towards 
unregistered rifles and shotguns, and more recent dynamics of cross-border traf-
ficking, France hosts a sizeable pool of illicit firearms. While difficult to quantify, 
the available estimates suggest that they may number several million, with hunting 
rifles and shotguns representing the largest share. In fact, the number of illicit guns 
circulating even appears to be growing – in 2015 firearms that were reported stolen 
outnumbered those seized by the authorities. Shotguns and handguns are the 
weapons types most frequently examined by the country’s forensics experts. While 
cases of the illicit possession or use of automatic rifles have increased slightly in 
recent years, comparatively speaking they remain much less frequent than those 
involving shotguns and handguns. When used, automatic rifles can inflict particu-
larly devastating violence, however. In the region of Marseille, for instance, homi-
cide victims are shot on average more than ten times when the weapon used is an 
AK-pattern rifle.
Illicit firearms in France originate from a variety of domestic and foreign sources. 
Domestically, they include primarily theft from private legal gun owners, gun 
shops, arms fairs and other actors. Criminal networks exploit differences and gaps 
in European countries’ national legislation and the private networking offerings of 
the internet to import categories of weapons that are prohibited or heavily restricted 
in France, including automatic rifles, sub-machine guns, handguns and their 
218
essential components. These are the most expensive types of arms on the black 
market, with prices that can reach several thousand euros. Experts and officials 
expressed concern over a growing trade in easily convertible replica firearms, as 
well as retro-convertible deactivated firearms. These weapons originate from other 
EU countries or transit through them before reaching French territory. Once con-
verted – in France or abroad – to lethal-purpose weapons, these firearms represent 
a cheap alternative to real guns and an opportunity for criminals to generate profit.
Tracing the origins of firearms used in terrorism is particularly difficult, and espe-
cially so when the weapons are ageing automatic rifles. The AK-pattern rifles used 
in recent attacks were typically produced in the Balkans in the 1980s. Apart from 
identifying their last legal owner – often South East European national armed forces 
before the conflicts of the 1990s – tracing efforts yielded unsatisfactory information 
about the weapons’ more recent chains of custody. On the other hand, the tracing of 
the reactivated vz.58 rifles helped build momentum to address the trafficking that 
had developed around easily convertible Slovakian acoustic expansion weapons. 
While most investigations into the recent attacks are still ongoing, currently avail-
able information suggests that some terrorist cells acquired illicit firearms locally 
and in neighbouring countries. This is notably the case in Belgium, from where 
several of the Paris attackers originated. Links between the November Paris attack-
ers and the March 2016 Brussels Airport suicide bombers are also strongly sus-
pected, including in terms of firearms procurement. 
As governments intensify their efforts to curtail the trafficking of weapons, organ-
ised crime groups may feel increasingly reluctant to supply terrorist groups, and 
terrorists’ use of other methods such as trucks, cars and bombs for attacks in France 
and other European countries may indicate that sources of supply are becoming 
more limited. Other organisations previously engaged in terrorist activity in France, 
such as ETA and the FLNC, have demonstrated the ability of clandestine organisa-
tions to adapt to such circumstances and identify discreet and local sources of 
weaponry, such as theft from private actors and even craft production. While 
addressing the cross-border trafficking of automatic firearms remains essential, 
efforts should also take into consideration the local sources of supply that jihadi 
and other terrorists could still seek to exploit. 
In response to the recent wave of terrorist attacks, the French government has 
endeavoured to accelerate reform of the country’s intelligence and security forces, 
and put in place plans of action and a series of associated measures to tackle illicitly 
held firearms. A key component of these efforts is the improvement of data collec-
tion and analysis methods. While the new tools put in place remain in their infancy, 








seizures and thefts and the networked FNIB ballistics system already help to provide 
important indicators of the nature and extent of illicit arms flows in the country. 
Sustaining and building on these efforts would allow for more detailed data analy-
sis of specific patterns of arms trafficking.
In parallel, efforts to reinforce the capacities of police and gendarmerie officers to 
investigate and record illicit firearms are under way. France adopted new firearms 
legislation in 2013, increased penal sanctions associated with illicit firearms pos-
session and is working to improve its registry of civilian-held weapons. Following 
the 2015 attacks, it has also pushed its European partners to accelerate the adoption 
of the new EU firearms directive and firearm deactivation regulation. Interviewed 
officials have consistently expressed concern over the slow and uneven implemen-
tation of some minimum European standards, including those related to firearms 
deactivation. Different legislation within the EU regarding the classification of 
essential parts of firearms means that these components remain easily accessible in 
a number of EU member states, and are therefore a potential source for weapons 
traffickers. Indeed, many of the efforts undertaken by France may prove futile 
unless other member states follow suit. 
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Between organised crime  
and terrorism: 
Illicit firearms actors and  
market dynamics in Italy 
Francesco Strazzari and Francesca Zampagni
The illicit trade in firearms has been a key area of international concern since the 
late 1990s,1 when large amounts of illicit firearms entered the European Union (EU) 
illicit firearms market after the end of the Cold War from stockpiles in neighbour-
ing regions, especially the states of the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, since 2001 the 
threat of jihadist terrorism has been high on the EU agenda and with it the potential 
problem of arms trafficking to supply terrorist groups based in the EU. In a November 
2012 speech Cecilia Malmström, the then-EU commissioner for home affairs, stated 
that the number of illicit firearms circulating in the EU exceeds the number of reg-
istered hunters and sports shooters, which total approximately 10 million.2 More 
recently, the flaring up of armed conflicts close to the EU’s borders, for example in 
Ukraine, the Middle East and North Africa, has raised concerns about the emer-
gence of new sources of illicit firearms to supply the European market.
Italy was chosen as the subject of an in-depth study on illicit gun markets for several 
reasons. Firstly, the country plays a prominent role in the production of firearms in 
the EU and is considered a top global exporter of small arms and light weapons. 
According to TradeMap data, the volume of Italian firearms exports is increasing, 
with a value of US$806 million in 2016.3 Secondly, Italy hosts a wide spectrum of 
organised criminal groups that have been a serious cause of concern to the authori-
ties for some time. Criminal groups are generally considered to be the main drivers 
of the illicit firearms market in Europe. This market is also closely linked to other 
criminal activities, such as the trafficking of drugs, people, etc.4 Italian mafia organ-
isations have long been considered the quintessential paradigm of organised crime: 
Europol still considers them ‘unparalleled by any other European organised crime 
group’ in terms of controlling territories and local administrations, and the 
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Calabria-based ‘Ndrangheta is currently among the richest and most powerful 
organised crime groups in the world.5 Finally, Italy’s geographical position makes it 
a strategic location for trafficking routes via the Mediterranean and the Balkans to 
continental Europe. The geographical proximity of Italy to areas of recent conflicts 
in the western Balkans has allowed Italian criminals to obtain weapons from former 
Yugoslavian states and other South-East European countries, and the country is also 
becoming an important transit route for the trafficking of illegal weapons to 
Northern Europe.6 It is important to point out that according to most estimates 
mafia-related firearms crimes have declined significantly since the 1990s, but fire-
arms are nonetheless always found when the authorities uncover mafia storage 
facilities.7
This case study follows two main lines of inquiry. The first examines the illicit 
market for firearms in Italy, including its actors and dynamics. The second explores 
potential terrorist access to firearms in Italy, and possible connections between 
organised criminal groups and terrorists. Despite this two-pronged approach, it is 
nonetheless important to note that, as of this writing, no international terrorist 
attack has taken place in Italy since 1985, with the only partial exception being an 
attempted attack by a Libyan citizen in Milan in 2009. Other attacks attributed to 
the anarcho-insurrectionist movement, which, while claiming international con-
nections, does not represent active internationally rooted groups, are mostly carried 
out with low-grade explosives and therefore do not involve firearms.
Box 1: Research design
Data were first collected through desk research covering primary sources 
and secondary literature. This early phase included the final reports of the 
European Commission-funded FIRE and EFFECT projects, as well as con-
tacts with potential interviewees. We then moved on to an analysis of rele-
vant press articles in Italian newspapers dealing with illicit firearms and 
arms seizures, mainly in the last three years (2015-2017). Based on our find-
ings, we held informal discussions and/or semi-structured interviews with 
selected government officials, experts and journalists, with a continuous 
cross-feeding from media articles that led to more interviewees, as well as 
from interviewees’ insights that led to further references to media sources. 
Finally, we attended events dealing with the topic of firearms and/or terror-
ism, such as the most important Italian firearms expo in Vicenza in February 





Between March and May 2017 a total of 15 semi-structured interviews were 
held involving three categories of actors: nine representatives of national 
authorities that deal with organised crime and illicit trafficking; five experts 
on firearms and/or terrorism (including a practitioner, an academic, a lawyer, 
a firearms lobbyist and an NGO representative)8; and a journalist who fol-
lowed media stories on firearms, organised crime and international terrorism 
in Italy. The interviews with government officials included representatives 
from relevant law enforcement agencies (e.g. national police services com-
bating firearms trafficking and terrorism) and judicial agencies (e.g. the 
National Counter-mafia and Counter-terrorism Directorate, and prosecution 
offices), which were selected according to the extent of their involvement 
either in policy formulation and/or the fight against the illicit firearms market. 
One of the main challenges faced during the interview phase was the avail-
ability of public officials and police officers. These officials required authori-
sation from their superiors to take part in interviews, and the submission of 
formal requests via public relations or press offices proved to be extremely 
time-consuming. Overall, government officials were cooperative, with the 
clear understanding that we were not attempting to collect new data or 
examine sensitive/restricted information. A few officials were reluctant to 
share information due to the perceived sensitivity of the issues. 
All the interviews were conducted in Italian, and different levels of confidenti-
ality as to the identities of the sources were agreed with each respondent, 
ranging from full details, through partial details (the institution to which he/she 
was attached), to full anonymity. Only one respondent insisted on full anonym-
ity. Table 1 lists the interviewees, together with their affiliations. To ensure their 
anonymity, the names are omitted and replaced by codes (using IT to identify 
Italy, and the number of the interview). The interviews were mostly conducted 
via phone, except with some national authorities, whose representatives were 
interviewed in their Rome headquarters. Informal conversations were also held 
with relevant respondents who were not available for an interview or who were 
asked for only a few insights in their areas of expertise.9 
Consultation of the open-source Global Terrorism Database10 provided data on 
terrorist attacks in Italy. The database covers the period 1970-2015, with data 
disaggregated by year, type of attack, weapon(s) used and perpetrator(s). In 
order to investigate the terrorism-firearms nexus, we also examined judgments 
of the Corte Penale di Cassazione (the highest court of appeal in Italy) related 
to criminal association for the purposes of international terrorism (covering five 
sentences between 2013 and 2016). None of these cases referred to firearms. 
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Table 1: List of interviewees 
Interview 
code
Interviewee Date of  
the 
interview
IT-01 Prosecutor, Procura di Catania 06/03/2017
IT-02 Associazione Nazionale Produttori di Armi e 
Munizioni 
09/03/2017
IT-03 Lawyer, Armimagazine 09/03/2017
IT-04 Researcher, University of Calabria 14/03/2017
IT-05 Professor, University of Calabria 15/03/2017
IT-06 Journalist, La Stampa 16/03/2017
IT-07 Head, Servizio Centrale Operativo, Polizia di Stato 23/03/2017
IT-08 Anonymous (government official) 23/03/2017
IT-09 Head, Arma dei Carabinieri 03/04/2017
IT-10 Rete Italiana Disarmo 04/04/2017
IT-11 Prosecutor, Direzione Nazionale Antimafia e 
Antiterrorismo
06/04/2017
IT-12 Prosecutor, Procura Nazionale Antimafia e 
Antiterrorismo
07/04/2017
IT-13 Servizio Centrale d’Investigazione sulla Criminalità 
Organizzata, Guardia di Finanza
18/05/2017
IT-14 Servizio Centrale Antiterrorismo, Dipartimento 
Centrale Polizia di Prevenzione
18/05/2017
IT-15 Prosecutor in charge of the SIDDA/SIDNA database, 






The report is divided into three main sections. Section 1 presents the Italian legisla-
tive framework dealing with firearms, law enforcement agencies dealing with illicit 
firearms and counter-terrorism, and policies to deal these phenomena. Section 
2  examines the characteristics of the Italian illicit firearms market, including its 
actors, the types and prices of firearms that were identified, and procurement 
methods. Finally, Section 3 examines the issue of terrorism, including internal ter-
rorism in Italy since the 1970s, and the connections between organised criminal 
groups and terrorists in the recent past. The section concludes by examining Islamist 
terrorism and the terrorism-illicit firearms nexus in Italy (which is largely absent).
1.  National policy to combat (terrorist access to) 
illicit firearms
1.1  Legislative context
1.1.1  Firearms-related laws
The Italian Constitution provides that the state has exclusive legislative powers in 
matters concerning state security: firearms, ammunition and explosives fall 
squarely within this category.11 Our respondents consider the Italian system of fire-
arms control to be the most stringent in Europe after that of Germany, by restricting 
the acquisition, possession and carrying of firearms through a licensing system. It 
bans fully automatic weapons and severely restricts the acquisition of other types of 
weapons. A constitutional right to bear arms is not part of the Italian legal tradi-
tion. Instead, the development of Italian gun-control law has mirrored the turbu-
lent history of the country. The current licensing system dates back to Royal Decree 
733, entitled Testo unico delle leggi di pubblica sicurezza (TULPS), of 18 June 1931 (art. 
35). This decree was issued at the time of the fascist regime’s consolidation of police 
powers, and precisely regulates state control of the activities of private individuals 
that could adversely affect public security. In the same period the Criminal Code of 
1930 regulated the illegal possession of arms (e.g. art. 697). 
The Italian legislative framework on firearms thus has deep historical roots; however, 
it is extremely fragmented due to the many amendments that have changed its 
nature. The following overview is therefore not comprehensive, but is rather meant 
to touch on key aspects. On 2 October 1967 Law 895 on the control of weapons of war 
entered into force. It was extended to common firearms by Law 497 of 14 October 
1974, due to the emergence of political terrorism on the national scene in a phase 
that – quite tellingly – would be remembered as anni di piombo (the years of lead). 
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Law 110 of 18 April 1975, with further amendments, introduced new administrative 
and criminal rules that systematised the different types of firearms and weapons-
related crimes. The TULPS and Law 110 of 1975 also regulate the weapons, ammuni-
tions and explosives of the ‘Armed Forces and the Armed Corps of the State’: simply 
put, they state that proper authorisation is required to use them. These provisions 
exempt the police from the need to obtain authorisation to use weapons, weapons 
parts, ammunition and explosives in the exercise of their duties.12
Box 2: Classification of firearms in Italy: weapons of war and common 
firearms
Law 110 of 18 April 1975 (L.110/1975) distinguishes between weapons of war 
(arma da guerra) and common firearms (arma comune da sparo) (art. 2). 
Weapons of war include weapons that are designed for use in war: bombs; 
chemical and radioactive agents; lethal combat devices of all kinds; and 
explosive shells. The same category includes firearms used in war. These are 
weapons that can be operated with the same ammunition as weapons of 
war, can be fired automatically, or have ballistic characteristics similar to 
weapons of war. In terms of firearms, their lethal potential is evaluated 
according to their degree of automation: thus, fully automatic firearms, fire-
arms that can fire in bursts and some automatic firearms are classified as 
weapons of war or war-type firearms. Private individuals are forbidden to 
access such weapons (L.110/1975, art. 10).13 A dedicated unit in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, the Unità per le Autorizzazioni dei Materiali di Armamento 
(UAMA), controls the export, import, and transit of weapons of war and 
related equipment.
Common firearms are all non-war-related firearms, and are divided into 
shooting firearms (L.85/1986, art. 2; L.110/1975, art. 10) and hunting firearms 
(L.157/1992, art. 13). Sports shooting weapons include both long and short 
firearms that because of their structural and mechanical characteristics can 
be exclusively used for sports activities.14 Common firearms used for hunting 
include shotguns with the following characteristics: 
• a smoothbore barrel, with two strokes, repeating or semi-automatic, 






• a rifled barrel, with a single-handed manual or semi-automatic action, 
of a calibre not less than 5.6 mm, with a shell of a height not lower 
than 40 mm; or
• two or three barrels combined, one or two of which are smoothbore 
barrels with a calibre not exceeding 12 gauge, or one or two rifled 
barrels with a minimum calibre of 5.6 mm.
According to L.85/1986 (art. 2), the Ministry of the Interior and the national 
Commission on Firearms had the power to decide whether a firearm quali-
fied as a common firearm, and these were listed in an annex to the National 
Catalogue of Firearms. With the abolition of the catalogue and the commis-
sion (see section 1.1.2), the common juridical opinion is that the Ministry of 
the Interior has the sole power to make such decisions.15 
As in most countries,16 Italy requires no licence or registration process to 
own and operate blank-firing firearms. Such firearms are included in the 
category of ‘tools convertible into firearms’ (previously called ‘toy weapons’, 
L.110/1975, art. 5). They are divided into those made of metal and those of 
other materials (e.g. plastic, wood, etc.). Both types must be constructed so 
that they cannot be turned into lethal weapons that can fire bullets. Only 
those made of metal must have a fully blocked barrel and must not be able 
to fire any kind of live ammunition. In addition, the barrel must be closed by 
a non-removable red cap.
Finally, Interior Ministry internal administrative notes (circolari) indicate how policy 
should be implemented.17 
Crimes related to firearms can be grouped into two categories: 
1. illicit actions as such: the embezzlement, theft and possession of firearms 
with subversive intentions; the removal of serial numbers; the manufacture 
of fake branded weapons; and the alteration/reactivation of firearms; and
2. actions considered to be illicit without proper authorisation: the manufac-
ture, import, selling, transfer, export, possession and carrying of weapons.18
In addition to the requirement to ensure the proper storage of legitimately held 
weapons (detailed specifications for weapons storage containers are provided by 
law), there is an obligation to immediately report to the competent authorities any 
theft of weapons and explosive materials, and to record all daily operations related 
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to firearms (transfer, transportation, etc.). According to the TULPS (art. 41), agents 
and officials of the Judicial Police who receive reports of the presence of illegal 
firearms, ammunition or explosive materials in any public or private venue or 
home are obliged to immediately institute a search for such materials in order to 
seize them. 
1.1.2  Firearms licences
In Italy it is illegal to carry weapons in public places, but the law provides for differ-
ent types of gun licences that are issued to applicants only after the conclusion of a 
formal, centralised procedure managed by the Ministry of the Interior. Two kinds of 
authorisation are needed to legally purchase firearms: 
1. An ‘authorisation to purchase’ (nulla osta all’acquisto e detenzione)19 allows 
the holder to purchase and own a firearm, but not to carry or use it. It is valid 
for 30 days and for only one purchase. An authorisation to purchase is also 
needed to inherit firearms from a deceased estate. 
2. A licence to carry (licenza di porto d’armi) allows more purchases until the 
expiry date. It is valid for one year (for concealed carrying) or six years (for 
sports shooting and hunting). 
The local police headquarters (questura) issue both authorisations. To obtain either 
type of licence, an applicant must be 18 or older, and provide proof of service in the 
armed forces or police, or a certificate of his/her ability to handle weapons (usually 
issued by a national sports shooting club). This documentation must not have been 
obtained more than ten years before the application is made. Finally, the applicant 
must have a clean criminal record (as verified by the police) and must not be men-
tally ill or be a known abuser of or addicted to alcohol or illegal drugs. 
There are four types of nationally valid licences to carry firearms:
1. Hunting licence. This allows the licence holder to carry hunting weapons20 
only during the hunting season and only in game reserves. When transport-
ing them outside game reserves, the weapons must be kept unloaded and 
locked in their case. 
2. Sports shooting licence. Licence holders are allowed to transport firearms 
unloaded and stored in a proper case from their home to an authorised 
shooting range or to another safe place to practise shooting. A private area 
used for this purpose must be reasonably distant from roads and inhabited 





therefore transport his/her gun anywhere through the national territory, 
although these guns can only be used in the designated places referred to 
above and must never be left unattended during transportation. Six sports 
shooting firearms can be owned, while common arms (for hunting) are 
limited to three. 
3. A licence to carry a concealed firearm (known as a licence for ‘personal 
defence’). This allows a citizen to carry a handgun for personal defence. This 
kind of licence is usually much harder to obtain than the other two firearms 
licences, it must be renewed yearly (while hunting and sports shooting 
licences are valid for six years), and the applicant has to provide a valid 
reason for carrying a concealed gun (e.g. someone who sells valuable goods 
such as jewellery). Unlike the other two licences, this one is issued by the 
prefettura (prefecture) and not questura.21 
4. A special licence to carry for private security personnel. This licence differs from 
the standard licence to carry a firearm in that it has to be renewed every two 
years and costs less to obtain. The open carrying of handguns is not explic-
itly forbidden by law, but is de facto permitted only for on-duty security per-
sonnel. Some officials such as state police, prefects, and prosecutors can buy 
and carry guns for self-defence without a licence.
The Ministry of the Interior does not publicly release official numbers of firearms 
licences, but according to a media source citing the ministry we estimated the fol-
lowing numbers (Figure 1 and Table 2). 









































Source: Corriere della Sera (2017)
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Table 2:  Security guard and personal defence licences issued  
for long-barrelled and short-barrelled firearms, 2013-2016
2013 2014 2015 2016
Security guards (short-barrelled) 56,396 53,368 44,734 46,381
Security guards (long-barrelled) 679 731 548 630
Personal defence (short-barrelled) 21,200 20,162 19,117 18,034
Personal defence (long-barrelled) 465 435 459 328
Source: Corriere della Sera (2017)
According to another media source, the numbers differ slightly. According to this 
source, in 2015 the total number of issued licences was 1,265,484, of which 774,679 
were for hunting (12.4% higher than 2014), 470,821 were for sports shooting (18.5% 
higher than 2014) and 19,984 for self-defence (4.7% lower than 2014).22 
The number of sports shooting licences has increased enormously over the last few 
years – particularly since 2015 – because it is easier and cheaper to obtain licences. 
Several media sources23 and interviewees have highlighted how, in order to circum-
vent the restrictions imposed by the concealed carrying licence, in recent years 
more and more people have taken out sports shooting and hunting licences. There 
is no effective official control of the veracity of the activities for which the applicant 
claims these licences will be used (i.e. no required number or type of sports shoot-
ing activities). 
1.1.3  Counter-terrorism laws
The control system in place in Italy aims at preventing any illicit access to firearms 
for subversive purposes; as such, it also limits terrorist access. In addition, Italian 
law has a system of provisions specifically targeting terrorism, whose roots are to be 
found in the country’s recent past. Association for the purposes of terrorism, 
including international terrorism, or for the purposes of subversion of the demo-
cratic order (associazioni con finalità di terrorismo anche internazionale o di eversione 
dell’ordine democratico) are the specific object of article 270-bis of the Italian Criminal 
Code. This article was introduced by Law 15 of 1980 to control the subversive move-
ments that attempted to undermine the democratic order of the state during the 
1970s (see section 3.1). It was amended after the terrorist attacks in the United States 
on 11 September 2001 by Law Decree 374 of 18 October 2001, ‘Urgent Measures to 





2001; this law introduced the offence of international terrorism in article 270-bis of 
the Criminal Code. 
Law 34 of 14 February 2003 ratified the UN Convention for the Suppression of 
Terrorist Attacks by the Use of Explosives through article 280-bis of the Criminal 
Code. The development of emergency legislation was subsequently accelerated 
after the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005 through Law 
Decree 155 of 27 July 2005 entitled ‘Urgent Measures for the International Combating 
of Terrorism’ (known as ‘Decreto Pisanu’, according to the then-minister of the inte-
rior), subsequently converted by Parliament into Law 155 of 31 July 2005. The provi-
sion gave new powers to the police to identify terrorists (and non-residents could be 
given a residence permit as a reward for providing useful information in terrorist 
investigations); extended the use of telephone tapping; extended the period for 
which electronic data can be stored; and extended to the armed forces the power to 
identify and detain people and means of transport on the spot. Detention in prison 
was permitted for a crime even if it was normally punishable by a ‘soft’ sanction if it 
was committed for the purposes of terrorism. The arrest of those suspected of plan-
ning acts of terrorism was also permitted. 
The most recent urgent counter-terrorism measure adopted by the government is 
Law Decree 7 of 18 February 2015 entitled ‘Urgent Measures for Countering Ter-
rorism, Including International Terrorism’, which was converted with amend ments 
to Law 43 of 17 April 2015. It introduced new measures for the expulsion of foreign-
ers in order to prevent terrorism, for interviews of detainees by directors of the 
security services for the purposes of obtaining information that could prevent ter-
rorist activities, the processing of personal data by the police, etc. With an amend-
ment to article 270 quinquies of the Criminal Code, Italian lawmakers intended to 
sanction not only the person providing training in the use of firearms for the pur-
poses of terrorism, but also the person receiving such training (carrying a sentence 
of five to ten years’ imprisonment). The same punishment is applied to someone 
self-training him-/herself to use firearms; with training courses conducted through 
IT being an aggravating factor.
In terms of international compliance, Italy has adopted EU Directive 91/477/EEC 
through the Law Decree 527/1992, which was then integrated with Law Decree 
121/2003 and further modified by Law Decree 204/2010, which adopted EU Directive 
2008/51/EC. Law Decree 204/2010 introduced the definition of a firearms broker as 
‘a person or entity, other than a dealer, whose trade or business consists wholly or in 
part of the sale, acquisition and organisation of the transfer of arms, ammunition 
and parts thereof, without having the material available’. According to an inter-
viewee, Italy’s compliance with the relevant EU directives is comprehensive and far 
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exceeds EU requirements.24 Italy has also ratified UN Protocols against Organised 
Transnational Crime (Law 146/2006) and the UN Arms Trade Treaty (2013).
1.2  National authorities 
No single Italian authority is specifically dedicated to combating the illicit firearms 
market. The illicit possession and/or use of firearms applies to each criminal sector 
(organised crime, drug trafficking, petty crime, etc.), so the various law enforce-
ment and judicial authorities active in the fight against terrorism, organised crime 
and illicit trafficking all effectively tackle the illicit circulation of firearms (see 
Figure 2). 
Due to the prominent presence of mafia groups and organised crime in Italy, at the 
judicial level the most relevant body is the National Anti-Mafia and Anti-Terrorism 
Bureau (Direzione Nazionale Antimafia e Antiterrorismo, or DNA), which is the 
coordinating judicial body enforcing anti-mafia legislation. The DNA is responsible 
to the Corte di Cassazione (the highest judicial court), which falls under the Ministry 
of Justice. District sections (DDA) are located in the 26 regional capitals where 
courts of appeal sit and are in charge of the investigation and prosecution of organ-
ised crime, mafia-type activities and terrorism. In 1991 the specialised Anti-Mafia 
Investigative Department (Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, or DIA) was set up to 
carry out preventive investigations related to organised crime.
In terms of law enforcement, the main police forces in Italy are the State Police 
(Polizia di Stato, or PS) and the Arma dei Carabinieri, both with national jurisdiction 
and respectively under the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Defence. The 
Polizia di Stato is a civilian police force, while the Carabinieri is a military force. The 
Polizia di Stato operates under the Directorate for Public Security (Dipartimento di 
Pubblica Sicurezza): it provides general police services throughout Italy, and has 
police stations (questure) in every major city and town. The Polizia di Stato’s Rome 
headquarters (the Servizio Centrale Operativo, or SCO), which falls under the 
Direzione Centrale Anticrimine (which in turn is under the Directorate for Public 
Security) coordinates questure flying squads and investigations of organised crime.
The Directorate for Public Security also includes the head office of the Polizia di 
Stato: the Central Police Directorate for Crime Prevention (Direzione Centrale della 
Polizia di Prevenzione, or DCPP). The DCPP is in charge of the prevention of and 
fight against internal and international terrorism. Among DCPP units there is the 
Anti-Terrorism Central Section (Servizio Centrale Antiterrorismo), which coordi-





(Divisione Investigazioni Generali e Operazioni Speciali, or DIGOS). The DIGOS is a 
special operational division of the Polizia di Stato that acts as its intelligence branch; 
it has an office in each provincial headquarters (questura) of the Polizia di Stato. It is 
charged with investigating sensitive cases involving terrorism, organised crime 
and serious offences, and it periodically reports to the minister of the interior and 
the chief of police. 
The Carabinieri is a military police force that historically belongs to the wider 
family of European gendarmerie, with both military responsibilities and general 
responsibility for maintaining civilian public order. The Carabinieri includes a 
special operations group called the Raggruppamento Operativo Speciale (ROS), 
which is its main investigative branch for dealing with organised crime and terror-
ism. It was created from the remains of the Special Anti-terrorism Unit, which was 
established in the 1970s mainly to combat domestic terrorism. Having defeated the 
Red Brigades in the 1980s, the Special Anti-terrorism Unit was also employed to 
investigate organised crime, especially during the phase of escalating military-style 
attacks organised by the Sicilian Cosa Nostra during the first half of the 1990s. 
Among the investigative methods used by the ROS, one of the most effective (and 
most dangerous for the agent concerned) is the undercover infiltration of gangs; 
this method is used in investigations into narcotics; kidnapping; money launder-
ing; and the smuggling of firearms, ammunition and explosives.25 The ROS has an 
internal unit for counter-terrorism that has three sub-sections: religious terrorism, 
left-wing terrorism and right-wing terrorism.26
The Guardia di Finanza (Financial Crime Police) is a militarised police force under 
the authority of the minister of economics and finance that addresses activities 
connected with financial and economic crimes (such as various financial crimes, 
organised crime, smuggling, international drug trafficking, illegal immigration, 
terrorist financing and copyright violations). Its Servizio Investigazione della 
Guardia di Finanza (SCICO) is responsible for preventing and supressing criminal 
infiltration of the Italian economic sector. 
The secret services also deal with firearms crimes, organised crime and terrorism. 
The External Information and Security Agency (Agenzia Informazioni e Sicurezza 
Esterna, or AISE) has the task of researching and processing all the information 
needed to defend the independence, integrity and security of the Republic from 
threats from abroad. The Internal Intelligence Agency (Agenzia Informazioni e 
Sicurezza Interna, or AISI) deals with any internal threat and subversive activity, 
and any form of criminal or terrorist aggression. The Department of Security 
Information (DIS), which is responsible to the prime minister, coordinates the plan-
ning of research, analysis, and operations by the AISE and AISI.27
250
The Committee for Strategic Anti-terrorism Analysis (Comitato Analisi Strategica 
Antiterrorismo, or CASA) is an inter-agency committee chaired by the chief of 
police and with members from the Polizia di Stato, Carabinieri, secret services (the 
AISE and AISI), Guardia di Finanza, and Directorate for Prisons Administration 
(Dipartimento Amministrazione Penitenziaria). The CASA deals with current 
national and international threats, but not at an investigative level. Because all the 
information it deals with is highly sensitive, we were not granted an interview.28
In terms of the ballistics and forensics sector, the Scientific Investigation Department 
of the Carabinieri (RIS) and the Italian Scientific Police (Polizia di Stato) are both 
national bodies and have the same duties of cooperating in investigations and sharing 
ballistics information via the Integrated Ballistics Identification System (IBIS).
1.3  Policy
An analysis of Italian policy to combat the illicit firearms market and terrorist 
access to firearms requires an examination of both policies to control firearms and 
policies to counter organised crime and terrorism.
1.3.1  Policies to control firearms 
Licensing requirements 
The police have adopted a policy of limiting licence renewals in order to control 
firearms. In the last few years the number of licences issued for personal defence 
has decreased, due to increased refusals by questure (Table 2). The principle of self-
defence has formed part of Italian law since 1930 under article 52 of the Criminal 
Code. In 2006 (Law 59), the definition of self-defence was widened, allowing a 
weapon to be used for self-defence in certain specific circumstances. A new reform 
further extending the circumstances in which firearms can be used for self-defence 
is under discussion at the time of writing, although it has been subjected to consid-
erable criticism.29
Moreover, Law Decree 121/2013, which has been implemented since May 2015, 
introduced the requirement of a health certificate proving an applicant’s psycho-
physical fitness for the issuance of a firearms licence. Such a certificate is issued by 
local health agencies or by military or State Police medical offices and health facili-
ties. After 2015, hundreds of firearms were handed over to the police by private indi-





Figure 2:  Structure of Italian agencies and bodies responsible  







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Italian law prescribes that any rifled firearm imported or manufactured in Italy 
after 1976 should bear a serial number assigned by a commission composed of gov-
ernment officials and representatives from the Italian arms industries. The com-
mission’s role was to decide if a rifled firearm should be classified as either a weapon 
of war or a common firearm. The National Catalogue of Firearms (Catalogo 
Nazionale delle Armi Comuni da Sparo) described the characteristics of the weapon 
(barrel and overall length, number of rounds in the magazine and other technical 
specifications); these characteristics could not legally be altered without resubmit-
ting the weapon to the commission for reclassification. In 2012 the catalogue and 
the related commission were abolished by the Economic Stability Law.31 Their place 
was taken by the Banco Nazionale di Prova (National Proof House, or BNP) in 
Gardone Val Trompia, which is institutionally the technical supervisor of the con-
formity of firearms and ammunition to technical and legal standards, and can 
therefore be considered the ‘registry office’ of all weapons produced in Italy and 
most that are imported. The BNP admits or rejects firearms pending importation 
from non-CIP32 countries, while simultaneously maintaining an electronic record 
of the characteristics (long or short firearm, European firearms category, manufac-
turer, magazine capacity, etc.) of the firearms whose sale is permitted. The number 
of tested firearms is publicly available (Table 3); however, no track is kept of where 
these arms go after proofing. 
Table 3: Firearms registered by the National Proof House, 2011-2015
Type of firearm 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Long firearms 
(hunting and sport)
381,136 406,576 500,617 439,144 N/A*
Short firearms 
(sports and common)
149,672 214,955 260,620 190,430 N/A
Replicas and muzzle- 
loading firearms**
74,597 96,441 122,692 113,674 N/A
Blank- firing firearms 127,032 92,347 113,958 95,217 N/A
Single parts 27,110 37,263 29,756 40,356 N/A
Total 759,547 847,582 1,027,643 878,821 797,037
Source: BNP
* Data not available.





The BNP does not classify arms according to their civil or military use (as the cata-
logue was meant to), with this having been clarified by Annex 1 to Directive 91/477/
EEC.33 Although Italian law requires marking only for common firearms, Italian 
firms already voluntarily mark military weapons during the manufacturing 
process. Moreover, the Ministry of Defence must test all military weapons manufac-
tured by private industry.34
Each firearm is marked with a unique serial number, the year of import, the country 
of origin and the marking of the Italian Republic (or some other marking for fire-
arms imported from a country outside the EU).35 A firearm is considered illegal if it 
does not have one of these marks (L.110/1975, art. 11). With the exception of 
Germany, the Italian BNP is very advanced and is considered one of the best among 
CIP countries.36 Due to the experiences of the 1970s – during which kidnappings, 
knee-cappings, robberies, executions and bombings were ubiquitous – Italy has 
developed an advanced legal framework for the deactivation and demilitarisation 
of firearms.37 Firearms certified by the BNP are no longer convertible. 
Record keeping 
According to interviewees, it is impossible to keep track of registered firearms in 
Italy. The BNP has a record of firearms, but does not know where they are, while the 
producer does not know what happens to its firearms after they are sold: ‘A fire-
arm’s identity card exists only for a short time after the firearm’s production, but it 
does not follow the firearm throughout its life.’38 
In terms of record keeping, Italian law requires licensed firearms dealers to verify 
the eligibility of purchasers (through licences) and maintain records of gun pur-
chases, which must be forwarded to the police on a monthly basis.39 Each gun shop 
provides data to local police headquarters, but no harmonised database of licences 
is available to gun shops.40
Italian law enforcement agencies collect data when weapons are stolen and on 
recovered firearms reported by all police forces across the national territory, and 
these data are included in the inter-forces database (Sistema d’Indagine, or SDI).41 
The SDI is run by the Criminal Police Central Directorate.42 According to the UAMA, 
Italian national databases contain all the information related to a firearm’s recorded 
movements (stolen, illegally acquired, bought or owned by private individuals, 
destroyed, seized, removed from depositories, unmarked, etc.), and records are kept 
for 50 years.43 
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Information on firearms is also stored in the IBIS database (known as the Archivio 
Ballistico Nazionale Elettronico), which is checked whenever a firearm is found,44 
but this information is not exhaustive and often it is impossible to ascertain the 
origin of the firearm.45 When firearms are seized, they are generally sent to the RIS 
(Carabinieri) to check if they have been used previously in other incidents. The 
authorities in charge check both IBIS and the Interpol Ballistic Information Network 
(IBIN). Because organised crime groups, especially mafia groups, generally use a 
weapon only once, IBIS often fails to provide a positive match. 
1.3.2  Policies to combat organised crime and terrorism
Italy is the country of origin of some of the most important organised criminal 
groups that are capable of acting on a global scale in any type of illicit trafficking 
(see section 2.2). It is worth emphasising how the territorial roots of these organisa-
tions, their ability to infiltrate legal markets, the international ramifications of their 
presence and their extraordinary capacity for social conditioning have compelled 
the Italian state to develop one of the most advanced anti-mafia laws in the world.46 
When the recent surge in international terrorism required preventive and investi-
gative structures, these were already in place in Italy as a result of the fight against 
mafia groups. Another peculiarity of the Italian context and its rich history of polit-
ico-criminal violence is that criminal organisations appear to have started using 
terror tactics as a result of their strategic interaction with repressive state action. 
During the 1970s counter-terrorism measures were part of emergency legislation, 
while during the 1980s these measures focused on the collaboration of (internal) 
terrorists with the justice system. In the 1990s Italy changed its approach to address-
ing terrorism: the new generation of counter-terrorism measures aim not only at 
repressing the phenomenon, but also preventing it.47 From the brief analysis of the 
reconstruction of the major interventions in the anti-terrorism law framework 
since 2000 (see section 1.1), one can observe how in the past 16 years the govern-
ment has adopted three law decrees (emergency laws) to tackle the threat consti-
tuted by the rise of a new form of international terrorism. One may observe that – as 
elsewhere in Europe and beyond – this process was incident-driven, or anchored in 
emotional waves among the public triggered by terrorist attacks, and there was 
therefore limited capacity to shape a harmonious and organic preventive strategy. 
In a nutshell, the legislative approach is aimed at countering terrorism with 
increased preventive measures by extending the areas/activities covered by the law, 
so as to cast a wider net and impose more severe prison sentences in the hope of 
neutralising threats and preventing attacks.48 From 2001 the focus has been on the 





assistance to associates, such as, among other things, imposing severe sentences 
for all criminal associations, including terrorist ones; the expulsion of imams49 
accused of fomenting hatred; monitoring places frequented by Islamist radicals 
and jihadist suspects; and establishing an Islamic Council (Consulta per l’Islam 
Italiano) under the Ministry of the Interior.50
More recently, the most significant step was the inclusion of anti-terrorism powers 
under the DNA since April 2015.51 To better operate in the new field of counter-ter-
rorism, DNA prosecutors are improving staff training and developing international 
cooperation with Eurojust and the judicial authorities of other countries, especially 
Balkans countries, including excellent cooperation with Albania and Serbia.52 All 
national authorities dealing with the fight against illicit firearms markets appear to 
have been involved in tackling organised crime and internal terrorism since around 
the 1990s, and have improved their skills to deal with the new challenges presented 
by international terrorism. 
The DNA and its SIDDA/SIDNA database constitute a reference and analysis centre 
for the Italian judicial information system. SIDDA/SIDNA is the Sistema Informativo 
Direzione Distrettuale Antimafia/Sistema Informativo Direzione Nazionale 
Antimafia (at the district level of DDA and the national level at the DNA). This is one 
of the most advanced databases in the world (especially among those for judicial 
use), which allows data processing related to serious crimes53 throughout the coun-
try.54 It draws on data from over 50 remote databases, including all Italian police 
and administrative databases, as well as those of phone companies. By preventing 
the fragmentation of information on terrorism-related offences, it provides timely 
support to judicial and non-judicial evaluations. Big data and modern analytical 
tools allow preventive measures to be taken based on the availability of real-time 
data.55 Furthermore, there is constant information exchanges among the prosecu-
tors in the DDA and DNA, since local DDA deal with criminal offences potentially 
related to terrorist-subversive criminality (so-called ‘flag crimes’).56 The illegal pos-
session of arms and explosives is considered a flag crime. The Italian Ministry of 
Justice has made the SIDDA/SIDNA database available to the Serbian Special 
Prosecutor’s Office fighting organised crime.57 The national anti-mafia and anti-
terrorist prosecutor stated that ‘Our aim is to export this database system to all the 
prosecutors in the Balkans region, in order to harmonise the various systems … if 
we all have the same system, it will be easier to communicate and exchange data’.58
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2.  Characteristics of the illicit firearms market  
in Italy
As with other EU countries, most weapons circulating in Italy’s black market come 
from the legal market and are diverted into illegal environments. Illicit production, 
mostly by small-scale craftsmen, represents only a small share of the market. 
2.1  Size of the illicit market
There are only a few studies of the illegal firearms market in Italy, with rough esti-
mates of its size and proceeds. Existing international estimates assess the size of the 
illegal firearms market at between 10% and 20% of the total volume of the legal 
market.59 Reliable and accurate official data on legal firearms possession in Italy is 
currently not available. Although weapons should all be reported to the authorities, 
at present there is no accurate and official available data on legally held firearms in 
the country. The last available data from the EURISPES report (2008) mentions 10 
million firearms in Italy.60 In addition, the specialised website Gunpolicy.org pro-
vides unofficial and outdated estimates of privately owned firearms in Italy (both 
licit and illicit), with a total of around 7 million firearms, as well as government 
firearms, 1,600,000 of which are owned by the military and 420,000 by law enforce-
ment agencies. The National Association of Arms and Ammunition Producers 
(Associazione Nazionale Produttori Armi e Munizioni, or ANPAM) has stated that 
the market for sporting firearms and ammunition had a total turnover of €100 
million in 2016, 50% of which was constituted by ammunition, 25% by long fire-
arms with smoothbore barrels, 12.5% by long-barrelled rifled firearms, and 12.5% 
by handguns.61 
Because reliable data and sources that could be triangulated are lacking, it is impos-
sible to accurately estimate the number of illicitly held firearms in Italy. It is cur-
rently not even possible to ascertain how many firearms are seized each year. Data 
on seizures for the period 1993-2000 are partially available from secondary sourc-
es.62 No national authority is responsible for collecting a total number, and the 
three agencies in charge of seizures (Guardia di Finanza, Polizia di Stato and 
Carabinieri) collect their own data, but these figures are not publicly available. The 
FIRE63 international research project compiled an interactive database with seizure 
cases for each country from 2010 to 2015, based on news sources. Given the reliance 
on non-comprehensive and unofficial data, most of the findings that were obtained 
are of an approximate nature. According to Transcrime’s contribution to FIRE, Italy 
holds an important position in Europe for the number of firearms seizures in the 





cases).64 In terms of numbers of incidents involving illicit firearms, Italy ranks first, 
with 1,589 incidents, representing over one-third of the EU total.
In addition, the data on lost or stolen firearms and data on destroyed firearms are 
stored in the police SDI database, but are not publicly available. UN sources allow 
one to retrieve partial data on the destruction of firearms in Italy for the period 
2005-2009. In 2009 the Italian Army destroyed 15,027 surplus firearms, which is a 
much lower number than in previous years (169,925 in 2007; 140,088 in 2006; 
37,371 in 2005).65 66 
Another way of identifying the size of the illicit firearms market is by examining 
the revenue of mafia groups, but here data also appear to be deficient and out dated.67 
By drawing on official reports and news sources, one can infer that organised crimi-
nal groups own large numbers of weapons, but detailed information is highly frag-
mented and unsystematic: most of the details come to light as a result of law 
enforcement seizures.
2.2  Actors on the illicit gun market
The main protagonists in the illicit supply of firearms in Italy are organised crimi-
nal groups. They usually engage in arms trafficking in addition to other illicit activ-
ities, using their expertise in illicit trafficking, and relying on well-established 
routes and contacts. Paoli states that ‘Italy’s most important criminal coalitions are 
increasingly succeeding in penetrating the “wholesale” sector of international arms 
trafficking, participating in sizable and highly profitable transactions’.68 
The main mafia groups in Italy are the Cosa Nostra, ‘Ndrangheta, Camorra and 
Sacra Corona Unita. These groups are respectively based in the southern regions of 
Sicily, Calabria, Campania and Apulia, but have branches spread throughout Italy 
and abroad.69 In periods of mafia wars, in particular in Sicily and Calabria, mafiosi 
were among the most important customers of international arms markets. Once 
they gained control over the supply sources, they became sellers of firearms.70 Mafia 
groups purchase firearms both to commit crimes (homicides, intimidation and 
extortion) and to sell on to others. They trade arms with other criminal groups, 
mainly in exchange for illicit goods like drugs. Among the organised criminal 
groups based in Italy, Europol finds that the ‘Ndrangheta and Albanian criminal 
groups are most involved in the illegal firearms trade.71 The most recent reports by 
Italian law enforcement agencies emphasise the involvement of both Italian mafia 
groups and foreign criminal organisations (Bulgarian, Albanian, Russian and 
African) in the trafficking of illegal firearms, even though no specific details are 
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made available.72 According to our interviewees, there are strong contacts with 
organised criminal groups from Albania, which seems to be the only foreign crimi-
nal groups acting as firearms suppliers in Italy.73 As one interviewee puts it, ‘You 
have to negotiate with Albanians who are in Italy. You don’t go to Albania yourself, 
but you ask them. Those who need serious firearms look for an Albanian intermedi-
ary. They send him to acquire a sample of the firearm to avoid a dud, test the firearm 
and finalise the purchase.’74
Besides Italian and foreign organised criminal groups, a number of other actors are 
also linked to the illicit gun market in Italy. Another group of actors in the Italian 
illegal firearms market is made up of illegal gun owners who are not directly linked to 
criminal or terrorist groups, but who possess firearms without having the necessary 
permits. This relatively amorphous category includes both individuals acting negli-
gently and those with criminal intent (e.g. theft, poaching). The former are less of a 
security concern: they merely possess firearms without having the necessary permits. 
Of more concern are illegal gun owners with criminal connections. Ineligible buyers, 
such as members of criminal groups, tend to obtain guns from the legitimate market 
through ‘straw purchasers’ – relatives, friends or ordinary citizens with a gun licence 
who buy firearms on their behalf and then usually report them stolen. The serial 
numbers on these firearms are usually removed. Because a straw purchaser is not 
likely to be able to acquire more than one gun in this way, the mafiosi seem to rely on 
more structured sources of supply to maintain their stocks of weapons.75 Corrupt offi-
cials and professionals also play a role in the illicit circulation of firearms,76 with 
public officials stealing firearms from official stocks and selling them on the black 
market. Finally, hobbyists and amateurs alter and reactivate firearms.
2.3  Availability and prices of firearms 
Given the clandestine nature of the illicit firearms trade, only limited information 
is available on the types, quantities and value of the illicit firearms in circulation. 
Only seizure information disaggregated by weapon type, model, and the circum-
stances of the seizure can help to determine whether unusual or new types of equip-
ment enter illicit markets, identify the transfer routes of specific models, and 
potentially reveal new flows.77 Below we discuss recent literature on Italian organ-
ised criminal groups, seizure information from news sources, and interviewees’ 
views in order to sketch a likely scenario.
Most Italian organised criminal groups possess their own supplies of firearms, 
which are usually old and varied, including guns, revolvers, AK-47-pattern assault 





World War-era firearms or modified toy guns. Some organised criminal groups 
have access to large stockpiles of sophisticated weaponry, including military fire-
arms and even bazookas. 
According to Massari, “they generally prefer to use 7.65 mm machine guns and revolv-
ers, as well as 9 x 21 mm pistols – the model used by Italian police. AK-pattern assault 
rifles are also widely used, since they seldom misfire, cost less than their market equiva-
lent (M16), and are best known by members.”78 
AK-47 assault rifles still work even if they have been buried for years,79 and they are 
often found in seizures of weapons stocks, together with hunting rifles, old car-
bines, firearms from the Second World War, firearms stolen from security guards, 
machine guns, Uzis, Kalashnikovs, and semi-automatic handguns.80 According to 
the police, Kalashnikov replicas manufactured in Chinese circulate in the Italian 
illicit market, after having been legally purchased in Balkan countries and then 
trafficked to Italy.81
Information on the firearms discovered during recent large-scale seizures confirms 
this picture of varied weapons holdings. During Operation Lethal Arm in June 2015, 
for example, over 200 firearms were seized in the area around Milan and Brescia, 
including six machine guns (Browning, MG, M60, Breda, Sokolov), 24 automatic 
firearms (Uzi, Beretta M12, H&K MP5, Steyr, Sten),74 semi-automatic and automatic 
rifles (Kalashnikov AK-47, Colt M16, FAL, Thompson), and 76 handguns (Beretta, 
Colt, S&W, Tokarev).82 In March 2017 the Italian police raided the ‘headquarters’ of 
a gang that hijacked security vans (portavalori) in Milan and recovered Kalashnikovs, 
a shotgun and handguns.83 In addition, news sources84 reported the seizure of 
13 shotguns, eight handguns and 1,200 pieces of ammunition during a seizure in 
Crotone (Calabria) in April 2017 (see Box 3). The majority of the firearms seized in 
Crotone are produced in Italy, but none has a serial number, so the authorities could 
not immediately trace their origin. More likely these are old firearms resulting from 
thefts from private homes or gun shops.
With regard to prices, in 2012 Federica Angeli85 conducted an in-depth investigation of 
firearms black market dynamics in Rome. The retail prices of firearms that were pub-
lished as a result of this study (Table 3) were confirmed by our interviewees. Prices 
differ according to whether the firearm is new or second-hand. According to the 
Italian police ‘there are real price lists for firearms, ranging from €500 to €3,000, 
based on the “neatness” [pulizia] – meaning previous criminal uses – of the firearm 
and its efficiency’.86 According to another and more recent media source investigating 
the illicit firearms market in Rome, prices can go even lower: €250 for a semi-auto-
matic gun, €2,000 for a Kalashnikov and €1,000 for an Uzi sub-machine gun.87
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Box 3: Firearms seized in Crotone in April 2017
• One Beretta A304 Silver Lark shotgun, 12 gauge, with erased serial number
• One Franchi 520 shotgun, 12 gauge, with erased serial number
• Two Benelli Monte Feltro Super 90 shotguns, 12 gauge, with erased serial 
numbers
• One Benelli M2 shotgun, 12 gauge, with erased serial number
• One Benelli Argo rifle, 30-60 calibre
• One Franchi 500 shotgun, 12 gauge
• One rifle tipo88 Doppietta Acier Cockeryll, 12 gauge, without a serial number
• One Beretta A301 shotgun, 12 gauge, with erased serial number
• One Benelli 121 shotgun, 12 gauge, with erased serial number 
• One Benelli shotgun, 12 gauge, with erased serial number and model
• One tipo double-barrelled P. Lorenzotti shotgun, double trigger, 12 gauge, 
without serial number
• One Acier Cockeryll double-barrelled shotgun, without serial number
• One CZ 99 handgun, 9 mm calibre, with erased serial number
• Two Beretta 70 handguns, 7.65 mm calibre, with erased serial numbers
• One P38 handgun, 9 mm calibre, with erased serial number
• One P38 handgun, 9 mm calibre
• One Smith & Wesson .44 Magnum calibre handgun, with erased serial 
number
• One SFRJ handgun, 7.53 mm Mauser calibre, with erased serial number 
• One Marca Star 30P handgun, 9 mm calibre
Table 4:  Retail prices of some firearms circulating on the black market  
in Rome (in euros)
Model New Second-hand
9 x 21 mm semi-automatic handgun 1,700 700
38 mm handgun (special and revolver) 1,400 700
Assault rifle 2,000 –






2.4  Supply chains for the illicit firearms market
The illegal production of firearms is generally not considered to be one of the most 
important sources of firearms for the illegal gun market in both Europe in general 
and Italy in particular. The overwhelming majority of illicit firearms were legally 
produced, but at some point have leaked into the illegal market.89 Licit firearms can 
be diverted during transportation, by leakage from factories or surplus stocks, and 
by theft from stockpiles or individual owners. They can also be trafficked from 
abroad or converted through reactivation, modification or conversion. Diversion 
during transportation is not easy in the framework of the strict Italian legislative 
framework governing the movement of firearms, but it is still possible that a com-
pletely licit transaction on paper does not happen in reality, and weapons disappear 
to unknown destinations thanks to fake end-user certificates that are often obtained 
through bribery. According to police sources, the 3D printing of firearms in Italy is 
not an issue, and from the monitoring of the dark web it appears that most of the 
sales advertised there are in fact frauds.90 Therefore, in terms of firearms procure-
ment, three main patterns can be identified that are relevant to Italy: (1) smuggling; 
(2) reactivation or alteration;91 and (3) theft.
2.4.1  Smuggling
The Balkans region has been a major source of firearms since the end of the Cold 
War due to the presence of many stockpiles in the region that experienced major 
leaks or were looted. The internal demand for firearms in the Balkans has decreased, 
and so has arms trafficking, because there are currently no active conflicts in the 
region. During the mid-1990s the easy availability of huge amounts of cheap 
weapons from the Balkans – AK-47 assault rifles were sold for US$300 dollars or less 
– permitted a substantial increase in the size of the Italian mafia’s weapons hold-
ings.92 Drawing on seizure data in the 1990s, police officials confirm that most of 
the illegal weapons in circulation among organised criminal groups in Italy were of 
foreign origin, primarily Yugoslav, Albanian or East European.93 The availability of 
cheap, powerful weapons created a demand among Italian organised criminal 
groups for this new kind of equipment. 
According to some interviewees and news sources, in 1994 a large cargo ship from 
Ukraine was seized and found to contain two thousand tons of arms (including 
shotguns and rockets) destined for conflict areas in the former Yugoslavia, in viola-
tion of the UN embargo.94 The seized arms were taken to Italy to be destroyed, but 
after being stored at various sites,95 they were not destroyed and are still extant, 
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having been either sent by the government to the Iraqi Kurds in 201496 or falling 
into the hands of organised criminal groups.97
In 1996 the police discovered large numbers of weapons in San Giuseppe Jato, Sicily, 
a village 40 km from Palermo. At that time this was the largest arsenal that law 
enforcement agencies had ever discovered Italy. Police seized two underground 
bunkers that contained, among other weapons, ten missiles, ten bazookas, 50 
AK-pattern assault rifles, 35 pistols, seven sub-machine guns, ten anti-tank bombs, 
400 kg of explosives, and some bulletproof vests. Most of these weapons originated 
in Eastern Europe, the former Yugoslavia, Iran and Afghanistan.98 
According to experts on mafia groups, ‘Ndrangheta families started to live in 
Balkans countries during the conflicts there in the 1990s, when the international 
trade in firearms was fed by suppliers from the former Soviet bloc. They became 
brokers, buying and selling arms, and becoming central to the firearms market. 
These weapons from the former Soviet Union still supply the market today, which is 
demonstrated by the fact that there are very well-established ‘Ndrangheta networks 
in the Balkans area, especially in Bosnia.99
In 2012 Angeli reported that 90% of illegal firearms in Rome originated from the 
Balkans, especially Croatia.100 All our interviewees agreed that Balkans countries 
are the major sources of illicit arms in Italy, specifically Albania, Bosnia, Croatia and 
Slovenia. In addition to the huge availability of arms and the much cheaper costs 
compared to Italian weapons, it is also worth stressing the use of well-consolidated 
routes and criminal networks for multiple trafficking activities. 
More recently, in 2015 in the northern city of Udine, the ROS of the Carabinieri 
reported a case of arms trafficking from the Balkans. The investigation documented 
how the supply chain originated in Croatia, where weapons were easily obtained 
from a military depot with a falsified firearms control system. Firearms were then 
sent to and sold in Slovenia at the Militaria arms fair – a collectors’ event that takes 
place every six months in Sempeter pri Gorici (close to Nova Gorica).101 In Italy it is 
forbidden to sell firearms at arms fairs, unlike at the bourse aux armes in Switzerland, 
where firearms auctions are allowed. On Italian soil only arms expos are allowed, 
but no sale are permitted on site.102 
According to police sources, transport overland seems to be the preferred way of 
smuggling firearms, with weapons carried in hidden compartments in cars, vans 
and trucks. Transportation overland from northern Italy in double-bottomed trucks 
has been the easiest method used for the last 20 years.103 Thus, northern Italy (e.g. 





especially in regions close to third countries with stockpiles; in close proximity to 
large ports; and in regions with a strong presence of organised criminal groups. 
According to investigative authorities, Gioia Tauro has given way to Rotterdam as 
the port of preference for firearms smugglers, because when seizures exceed 20% 
of smuggled goods, the mafiosi prefer to change port: ‘Mafiosi can always change 
ports; this is the strength of the ‘Ndrangheta.’104 Large cargo ships have been 
replaced by small speedboats, due to the tightening of controls in ports. On the 
Apulian coast, for example, the Guardia di Finanza is specifically equipped to detect 
illicit goods smuggled in this way.105 
According to the police, a new strategy involves sealed ‘torpedoes’ (sealed contain-
ers) towed by speedboats, which are unhooked near the coast and later retrieved by 
the intended recipient with very little risk.106 Both media sources and the DIA have 
also mentioned ultralight aircraft as a way of transporting drugs.107 All the inter-
viewees agreed that firearms are not arriving with migrants by boat (as was happen-
ing in the 1990s from Albania) via the route that is currently known as the central 
Mediterranean route from North Africa, because migrant boats are intercepted by 
coastguards and migrants are rescued by law enforcement agencies, which would 
mean that arms smuggled in the same boats as migrants would be seized.108 
A recent media enquiry unveiled a possible nexus between illicit firearms traffick-
ing and art trafficking, but this is the only source of the reported link.109 A La Stampa 
journalist pretended to be an art collector and uncovered illicit art-for-weapons 
trade in southern Italy among the ‘Ndrangheta and the so-called Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS). According to him, Italian crime gangs reportedly sold weapons 
to ISIS in Libya in exchange for looted antiquities. According to the report, various 
organised criminal groups are involved in this ring: the Russian mafia provides fire-
arms from Moldova and Ukraine; the Italian mafias (especially the Camorra and 
‘Ndrangheta) arrange for the exchange; and the Chinese mafia is in charge of ship-
ments. Chinese-flagged cargo ships usually transit from Sirte to the Calabria port of 
Gioia Tauro. Antiquities are then sold on to collectors in Russia, China, Japan and 
the Gulf states.110 However, we have no official information on this trade. Our 
respondents were not prepared to confirm speculations about logistical links 
between mafia groups and terrorists in Italy.
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2.4.2  Reactivation
According to interviewees, Italy is a good place for reactivation due to its extensive 
firearms production facilities and the related local expertise. Until the 1980s the 
‘Ndrangheta and other mafia groups reactivated firearms left by US soldiers at the 
end of the Second World War.111 Yet the reactivation of firearms currently seems to 
be minimal, and not significant in terms of numbers.112 
Box 4: Trafficking from Slovakia and reactivation in Sicily
In 2015 there was a case of the illicit trafficking of 151 reactivated firearms 
(86 sub-machine guns, 45 rifles, 17 pistols and three revolvers) and several 
kinds of ammunition in Catania (Sicily) that involved two members of the 
Cosa Nostra (from the Ceusi clan). The two individuals bought the weapons 
from an online shop in Slovakia (AFG Security) for approximately €46,300 
and imported them into Italy without a licence.113 The deactivated firearms 
transited overland from Slovakia to Austria, where they were delivered to a 
courier used by the Slovak online shop to send firearms to Western Europe. 
From Austria, the firearms reached Catania, where they were reactivated. A 
lever had been inserted in the barrel to deactivate the weapons, and this 
could easily be removed.
Ballistics analysis revealed that the firearms had been deactivated using a 
procedure that was not compliant with Italian legislation. This deactivation 
procedure, known as the ‘movie prop’ method, was permitted in Slovakia 
and could be easily circumvented to reactivate firearms. Once reactivated, 
the firearms were supposed to be sent to Malta, but when they were detected 
by X-ray in Catania they were seized by the Italian authorities. The authori-
ties only found ten to 15 firearms.114 According to the prosecutor in charge, 
Malta could not have been the final destination since there is no war there, 
there are strict gun controls on the island, and there is no firearms trade 
there for the kind of weapons that were found. The firearms were presum-
ably intended for criminals in Egypt and the surrounding areas who were 
involved in illicit trafficking in people and drugs.115 
 
According to EFFECT researchers, modifications of arms do happen, but ‘not always 
and not only conducted by organised criminal groups’.116 Firstly, amateur gunsmiths 





usually do not know the firearms’ end use and are not necessarily linked with 
organised criminal groups, but are what could be called micro-criminals. In most 
documented cases handguns and double-barrelled shotguns were reactivated to 
make them capable of firing live ammunition. There were also cases of disguised 
firearms, such as guns built into pens.117 Secondly, collectors can play a dual role, 
and while posing as collectors they are actually brokers who buy deactivated 
weapons and then reactivate them. Their role as collectors allows them to gain 
access to decommissioned weapons.118
According to a DNA prosecutor, several craft workshops are able to convert toy guns 
into lethal weapons, and are mainly located in the Neapolitan, Palermitan and 
Catanese areas: ‘Small craftsmen are quite inexpensive; they are outsiders of organ-
ised crime, but they are trustworthy people while contacts [i.e. artisans] in the 
Balkans are totally unreliable, and are often used only once.’119 According to other 
interviewees, Calabria and Sicilia are the main centres for the reactivation of fire-
arms. In Calabria, the port of Gioia Tauro hosts the clandestine modification of fire-
arms in containers.120 During the mafia wars fought at the end of the 1980s, murders 
were frequently committed using sawn-off shotguns.121
The source countries of reactivated firearms are often other EU countries (see Box 4).
2.4.3  Thefts and leakages
Thefts from gun shops were one of the most popular terrorist and mafia procure-
ment methods in the 1970s. An interviewee from the DNA remarked that until the 
1990s there had always been ‘Cosa Nostra gun shops’ in Sicily. These were the Cosa 
Nostra’s own gun shops, run by its frontmen, where a theft could be simulated, 
allowing the group to take the firearms it wanted. However, nowadays this is no 
longer possible, because controls have been tightened and applications to open gun 
shops are more rigorously screened by the administrative and judicial authorities. 
Gun shops of any significance no longer exist, but there are trustworthy artisans 
who can reactivate or convert firearms (see above).122
According to Massari, “almost 70% of the thefts of legally owned civilian-held firearms 
in Campania had been faked; the guns were not stolen but voluntarily given to mafiosi. 
This type of procurement represents an important channel used by organized crime to 
secure ‘clean’ weapons for homicides and other crimes”.123
Sometimes mafia weapons holdings include firearms stolen from private homes or 
security guards: for mafia groups, stealing a security guard’s gun is a way of testing 
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the courage of new members.124 According to an interviewee from the arms lobby, 
the storage of firearms is a major problem for legal owners, due to the increase in 
thefts of handguns.125 The EFFECT report highlights how the number of stolen fire-
arms has increased with the increased numbers of thefts from apartments.126
According to the DNA, leakages from factories no longer occur: this was a major 
source of firearms for internal terrorist groups in the 1970s.127 Government stock-
piles are still at risk of being targeted, however. Corrupt members of the security 
forces may allow firearms to be diverted by sabotaging control systems, or state offi-
cials can themselves be stealing weapons.128
Huge numbers of firearms are stored at destruction sites. The destruction of fire-
arms in Italy is carried out by the Direzioni di Artiglieria under the army logistics 
command in the Ministry of Defence. Specific sections deal with firearms destruc-
tion: the Centro Rifornimenti e Mantenimento (CeRiMant), located in Naples, 
Padova, Rome and Milan; and the Sezione Rifornimenti e Mantenimento (SeRiMant), 
with units in Cagliari, Palermo and Treviso.129 In April 2017 the Ministry of the 
Interior reported ‘congestion in the armoury that is creating significant technical-
logistical problems, and it is critical, in terms of security, to keep the weapons under 
custody’.130 An interviewee stated that there is a waiting list for firearms to be 
destroyed, since not only seized firearms have to be destroyed, but also firearms 
with manufacturing defects and firearms handed over to the questure by private 
individuals who do not or cannot comply with licensing requirements.131 132 A sig-
nificant case of arms leakage was recently discovered at CeRiMant in Padova (2017). 
A ballistics expert working as a fireman and his son smuggled entire weapons or 
their parts from the army section at Padova, assisted by a lieutenant and an employee 
working for CeRiMant. The serial numbers were then removed or parts were assem-
bled into new weapons and subsequently sold on the Sardinian and Calabrian 
markets. The weapons were also used as payment for drugs sold by the ‘Ndrangheta 
and then sent to Sardinia.133 These firearms included semi-automatic guns of 
various sizes and brands; assault rifles, including several AK-47; Beretta 7.62 calibre 
FAL assault rifles; and Israeli-made Galil rifles.134
2.5  Dynamics of the illicit firearms market
The Balkans region appears to be the main origin of firearms on the current Italian 
illicit market. Our interviewees agreed that the market was very fragmented, 
lacking any single means of control or any convergence, although the ‘Ndrangheta 
plays a significant role in the market that sells to organised criminal groups, with 





have access to large supplies of weapons, and play a crucial role in the distribution 
of firearms in these circles. Seizures often take place based on information provided 
by mafia turncoats. Indeed, police tend to test the reliability of pentiti (turncoat 
informants) by asking them to locate hidden firearms stores.136 Given the territorial 
organisation of mafia groups, each one usually has its own supplies of firearms.137 
‘In the case of both the Camorra and the ’Ndrangheta, the areas where these crimi-
nal organisations traditionally operate – Campania and Calabria – are “flooded” 
with large numbers of weapons.’138 In both Sicily and Calabria most arms caches are 
discovered in rural areas, close to old houses, inside farm stalls, behind double 
walls, in bunkers, or in underground caches or wooden boxes, as was the case in the 
most recent major seizure (see Box 3).139
The illicit firearms market in Italy is not huge, since it does not aim to produce 
profits, serving more as an organisational method for structuring and strengthen-
ing organised criminal groups. In the past, for example, firearms exchanges 
occurred between organisations (e.g. Camorra and Cosa Nostra), while nowadays 
organised criminal groups access their own weapons, in particular from their con-
tacts outside Italy.140 According to both police and judicial sources, the illicit fire-
arms market in Italy supports other criminal markets.141 In terms of their financial 
value per weight of the weapons that are smuggled, firearms are definitely a much 
less profitable cargo. Smuggled Kalashnikovs would be much heavier and take up 
far more space than a shipment of cocaine or heroin worth an equivalent value, and 
the smuggled firearms would be far more difficult to conceal from law enforcement 
agencies. With the exception of mafia weapons stocks in hidden locations, both 
firearms and drugs are regularly seized. Firearms are often paid for with drugs, 
whose wholesale distribution in Europe is largely controlled by the ‘Ndrangheta (or 
with cash, given the enormous profits provided by drug trafficking).142 
According to a prosecutor, Albanian organised criminal groups carry weapons to 
protect the drugs while they are being trafficked, and then leave these firearms as a 
gift to their counterparts in Italy.143 There is a long history of criminal links between 
Italian and Albanian organised criminal groups. During the 1990s smuggling 
routes that had traditionally been used for cigarettes and drugs were converted to 
accommodate the growing flow of migrants from Albania. In a report released in 
2003, the Anti-mafia Parliamentary Committee stressed that during the 1990s fire-
arms and ammunition travelled with migrants in small, fast boats along the same 
routes. According to police sources, by the end of the 1990s, with the Albanian 
arrivals, weapons were widely available, and ‘quantities of weapons and drugs were 
exchanged’.144 The strong partnerships established between mafia groups and 
foreign organised criminal groups facilitated a specific type of exchange of services: 
Italian organisations needed drugs and firearms in order to allow Balkans 
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organised criminal groups to manage the business of illegal immigration by sea 
along the Italian coast.145 
In Italy, each organised criminal group manages the circulation of firearms in the 
area it controls, thus access to the market depends on the group’s grip on its terri-
tory. According to an expert on the ‘Ndrangheta, in Calabria it is difficult for other 
groups to enter the illicit market, while in other areas other organised criminal 
groups could become brokers, since the ‘Ndrangheta deals mainly with large-scale 
trafficking of various kinds.146 The purchase of firearms occurs among trusted con-
tacts in the criminal network or customers whom intermediaries can vouch for.147 
According to media reports148 that have been confirmed by the Italian police,149 in 
Rome firearms are stocked in certain neighbourhoods, where buyers can choose the 
firearm they want or even rent one for a specific job.
3.  Terrorist access to firearms in the illicit 
market in Italy
3.1  A history of domestic terrorism
The first bomb to disrupt Italian society and lead the way for Italian domestic terror-
ism was set off by a neo-fascist group in a bank, the Banca Nazionale dell’Agricoltura, 
in Piazza Fontana in Milan on 12 December 1969. Since then, many different forms 
of terrorism have troubled Italy over the past five decades. Grievances against the 
Italian government in the post-war period generated political violence ranging 
from nationalist-separatist terrorism in the South Tyrol region near the Austrian 
border150 to right-wing neo-fascist terrorism, left-wing Marxist and anarchist armed 
wings, Sardinian autonomy movements, and mafia groups.151
The terrorism that affected Italy was very fractured, with five key players: commu-
nists – mainly the Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades); the extreme right – fascists, with 
links to rogue segments of the secret services; anarchists; organized crime – mafia 
groups; and power-mongers – politicians and wealthy industrialists. Right-wing 
terrorists were responsible for the highest death toll of all terror attacks during the 
‘anni di piombo’, although in most instances these acts cannot yet be attributed to 
one specific organisation.152 While left-wing organisations always claimed respon-
sibility for attacks, the right-wing strategy was to cause massive insecurity through 
indiscriminate attacks on the population at large. Neo-fascists involved in major 





trials of members of the militant Right began to shed some light on many terror 
incidents.153 The twinned menace of terrorism and the so-called ‘strategy of ten-
sion’154 gradually declined in the 1980s, with the cycle of right-wing terrorism cul-
minating in the bomb at the Bologna station on 2 August 1980, which killed 85 
people. A year later a masonic lodge known as P2 was discovered to have subversive 
political aims; its members included prominent figures in the armed forces, busi-
ness and politics.155
The Global Terrorism Database records 1,545 terrorist attacks in Italy in the period 
1970-2015, peaking at the end of the 1970s. While most attacks were carried out 
with explosives (685) or incendiary devices (458), 348 involved firearms. 




































Source: Global Terrorism Database (2015)
Of the 348 attacks involving firearms, 135 were committed by the Red Brigades, 48 
by Prima Linea (an Italian Marxist-Leninist group), over 40 by other communist 
groups, and over 20 by extreme-right and neo-fascist movements (i.e. Armed 
Revolutionary Nuclei and the Italian Social Movement). The majority of attacks 
were armed assaults and the rest were attempted assassinations without any fatali-
ties, while a few cases resulted in one or two deaths. As in Europe, in Italy the most 
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active groups – except attacks that were not claimed by any group or carried out by 
unknown perpetrators, representing 48% of the total – were mainly national 
groups: the Informal Anarchist Federation, the Red Brigades and neo-Nazi groups.156 
Besides internal terrorism, there were, among others, attacks by the Armenian 
Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (25 attacks between 1979 and 1981 using 
explosives and firearms), Palestinian attacks, and attacks by Euskadi Ta Askatasuna 
(ETA) Basque separatists at the beginning of the 1990s involving the planting of 
explosives at airports, tourist sites or businesses.157
It is believed that in the 1970s terrorists in Italy were able to access firearms via 
leakages from factories, thefts from gun shops and connections with mafia 
groups.158 However, the authorities never managed to seize any Red Brigades 
weapons, so the source of their firearms could not be ascertained.159 The most 
recent and relevant seizure of firearms from internal terrorists took place in 
February 2007. In Operation Tramonto the police seized three weapons of war160 
and four common firearms161 from the Political-Military Communist Party (which 
had links to the Red Brigades).162
As some interviewees pointed out, firearms seized from suspected terrorist who 
were detained in high-security prisons in Calabria, in particular in the areas of 
Conigliano and Rossano, were identified as having been used in mafia-conducted 
assassinations. It seems that these guns originated from firearms leaked to mafia 
groups from seizures by the Italian authorities in the Balkans in 1991-1994 (see 
section 2.4). Mafia families needed money at the time and firearms were sold to 
obtain cash; however, since it was risky to sell them on the international market, 
they were sold to small gangs, small ethnically based criminal groups and terror-
ists.163 164 The mafia’s connections with Italian terrorism have facilitated relations 
with foreign terrorism. In fact, the ‘Ndrangheta also played a relevant role in pro-
viding firearms to other terrorist groups at the European level, such as the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) and the Basque terrorist group ETA.165 In 2012 Operation 
Metropolis revealed that a senior IRA member, Henry James Fitzsimons, started to 
act as an intermediary for the ‘Ndrangheta after the IRA abandoned its armed strug-
gle.166 Some media sources highlighted an alleged arms-for-drugs exchange 
between the Camorra and ETA in the 2000s, with ETA supplying drugs obtained 
from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (the main Colombian insurgent 
group) in exchange for the Camorra supplying weapons from Eastern Europe, but 





3.2  Islamist terrorism 
No firearms-related terrorist attacks by international terrorist groups have occurred in 
Italy in recent years. The last such attack, in which semi-automatic weapons were 
used, was carried out at Fiumicino Airport in 1985 by Palestinians from the Abu Nidal 
group. More recently, in 2009 a Libyan man planted explosives in front of a barracks in 
Milan, but the bomb only partially exploded and he injured only himself. According to 
news sources, he was protesting against the presence of Italian troops in Afghanistan.168
In Italy no judicial proceedings have occurred involving the use of firearms by Islamist 
terrorists, nor even cases of foreign fighters or radicalisation where firearms are in 
some way involved. Some prosecutors highlight the first and only case of an investi-
gation of Islamist terrorism involving firearms.169 In Turin in 1998 an Egyptian citizen 
(Misbah Ali Hassanay Azab) with a false Yemeni passport was arrested with two other 
Egyptians (with regular documents) who were hosting him. The three were all sus-
pected of being part of the group known as Egyptian Islamic Jihad.170 A large number 
of firearms manufactured abroad were found in the garage of the house of one of the 
two Egyptians with regular documents. These firearms included SIG Sauer pistols 
and Uzi sub-machine guns.171 A cooperative informant involved in investigations of 
the ‘Ndrangheta who was an important arms trafficker in the 1980s172 saw the seized 
firearms on TV news and recognised a firearm he had sold to the Pavignaniti 
‘Ndrangheta clan.173 The trafficker stamped the serial number on firearms in a very 
specific way, thus it was not difficult for him to recognise ‘his’ firearms. However, as 
the prosecutor stated after the case had been concluded, ‘how the arms got from the 
‘Ndranghetisti in Milan to Islamists in Turin we never managed to discover’.174
More recently, Anis Amri, the perpetrator of the terrorist attack in Berlin on 19 
December 2016 (which involved his shooting a truck driver and driving the truck 
into a Christmas market, killing 12 people) used a handgun against the Italian police 
in Milan during a random document check. The Italian police confirmed that the 
gun used in the Berlin attack, an Erma pistol, matched the one found on Amri.175 
News sources reported that Amri might have acquired the gun in Switzerland.176 
Investigators stated that the gun was legally imported into Switzerland in the 1990s, 
but it remained unclear what happened to it afterwards, because it did not appear in 
the weapons registers of any Swiss cantons and there was no national weapons reg-
ister in Switzerland at the time.177
The government officials who were interviewed agreed on how difficult it was for ter-
rorist groups to access firearms in Italy nowadays. Firstly, they emphasised the 
absence of any active terrorist networks in Italy, which means that no group is looking 
for sources of supply. Investigations of potential terrorists are ongoing in Italy, but no 
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findings have emerged from these investigations regarding the actual availability of 
firearms to members of international terrorist organisations.178 Secondly, supply 
channels are tightly controlled by Italian organised criminal groups, even though the 
market is fragmented. As has already been stressed, mafia groups still exercise strong 
control over ‘territories’ and illicit trafficking, and there are no independent ethnic 
criminal environments, except for the emerging Albanian organised criminal groups. 
On the one hand, illicit firearms are fairly easily accessible to private individuals with 
underworld connections, but, on the other hand, it is hard for groups who are not 
part of Italian organised criminal groups or have no contacts with such groups to 
access the illicit firearms market. Selling to outsiders means that information could 
become available to the police through their informants.179 
Terrorist networks’ inability to access the illicit firearms market does not mean that 
individuals cannot obtain a gun.180 However, unknown buyers like Islamist lone-wolf 
terrorists would have no access to the illicit market. As a prosecutor stated with 
regard to terrorists’ access to firearms in Italy: ‘At this time, if there is evidence of a 
terrorist destination, I do not see that firearms could be easily acquired. But if you do 
not have a beard you can get a gun without much difficulty.’181 According to the 
authorities there are currently no concerns about terrorist access to firearms in Italy, 
since no terrorist network is active in the country and weapons are only sold to known 
buyers. Terrorists looking for firearms need to go directly to source countries.182
The difficulties Islamist terrorists face when attempting to access the illicit gun 
market in Italy are well illustrated in the ‘Briki Lassaad + 1’ case in 2016.183 A Tunisian 
and a Pakistani were under investigation for terrorism and radicalisation, and in a 
wiretapped conversation they mentioned the possibility of buying a toy gun for 
target practice (as suggested by the self-training guide they were using entitled How 
to Survive the West: A Mujahidin Guide). However, one said to the other, ‘we cannot 
do it with your name, since as soon as they see a Muslim name they activate the 
filter and say “let’s see what he’s doing”’.184 According to the prosecutor responsible 
for the case, the two accused had no connections that would allow them to buy fire-
arms in Italy.185 The inability to find firearms has represented the major – if not the 
only – obstacle to the implementation of terrorist attacks.
No evidence is currently available of direct links between Italian organised crime 
and terrorism. Investigations into this issue are under way, but they are confiden-
tial.186 According to the last DIA report, there are no connections between Cosa 
Nostra and international terrorism.187 In the words of a prosecutor: ‘to investigate 
the access to firearms by terrorist groups in Italy, the [basic] premise is missing: the 
presence of terrorist groups and the need to find arms in Italy.’ He added that mafia 





security, even in prisons, which poses problems to them.188 However, an expert 
interviewee, when questioned about the ‘Ndrangheta and Italian organised crimi-
nal groups, did not rule out possible collaboration in the future: “mafias are rational 
entities in the short and medium-term, but they are capable of self-injury, in the sense 
that if it becomes convenient, they buy or sell from and to ISIS, as is already the case with 
narcotics. Thus [a future connection between the mafia and Islamist terrorism] cannot 
be ruled out …. The mafiosi do not do politics, but they do business, and they do business 
with everyone.”189 
4.  Conclusions
The findings presented in this chapter combine available data in the literature and 
official reports with interviewees’ observations on the illicit firearms market in 
Italy, its actors and dynamics. These findings reveal the possibility of future terror-
ist access to firearms, as well as links between organised criminal groups and 
terrorists.
In terms of firearms control, strict Italian legislation is backed up by advanced 
investigation techniques, and the investigative apparatus put in place to fight mafia 
groups and internal terrorism in the 1970s has widened to include the fight against 
international Islamist terrorism. However, no systematic attention is paid to the 
phenomenon of illicit firearms as such, and the law enforcement system focuses on 
the perpetration of crimes in general. The diversion of licit Italian-made firearms to 
the illicit market is quite difficult, except in case of thefts or leakages from govern-
ment stockpiles. The illicit market has mainly been supplied with firearms from the 
western Balkans since the 1990s. Mafia groups tend to purchase their weapons 
through their connections in source countries. The illicit firearms market appears 
to be used to support other illicit markets such as drug-trafficking and counterfeit-
ing. Mafia groups control their territories and illicit trafficking, with Albanian 
organised criminal groups as the only relevant foreign actor emerging in the illicit 
firearms market. However, other foreign criminal groups could appear in Italy in 
the future to fill any spaces left by mafia and Albanian groups.
Interviewees agreed that terrorist access to firearms in Italy continues to be difficult 
for several reasons. Firstly, because there is no active terrorist network in Italy, no 
terrorist is trying to find firearms in the country. Secondly, even if there were terror-
ists who needed firearms in Italy, there is no independent ethnic criminal milieu, as 
in France and Belgium, that is able to provide procurement channels. Gatekeepers 
are needed to access the Italian illicit firearms market, which is managed by Italian 
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organised criminal groups, with the ‘Ndrangheta being the most relevant player. 
According to government officials who were interviewed, at this stage terrorist 
groups have no connections with the organised criminal groups managing the cir-
culation of illicit firearms in Italy. Mafia groups seem to feel that it is best not to be 
involved in high-profile deals with terrorists, in order to pursue their interests in 
business and the infiltration of politics without drawing unnecessary attention to 
their activities. Nevertheless, if they see benefits to themselves in dealing with ter-
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Monique Bruinsma and Toine Spapens
In recent years both criminals and members of terrorist networks have demon-
strated their ability to acquire weaponsI on the Dutch illicit firearms market. These 
two types of firearms users are closely linked: firearms have usually ended up in 
terrorist hands through the criminal underworld, and many jihadists seem to have 
used their (former) criminal contacts to obtain weapons. Little academic or policy-
oriented research is available on how these specific groupings interact in the 
Netherlands. There is, however, an interesting body of knowledge on the general 
availability of illegal firearms in the country: since 2002 several studies have been 
published on illicit firearms possession, use and trafficking in the Netherlands.1 
These studies were often the result of fruitful collaboration among the Dutch police, 
the Ministry of Safety and Justice, and external researchers. 
This report addresses the main characteristics and dynamics of the illicit gun 
market and describes the (challenges facing the) regulatory and policy framework 
in the Netherlands aimed at combating the illicit gun market in general, and terror-
ists’ access to this market in particular. 
In the first section we describe Dutch national policy to combat the illicit firearms 
market, section 2 discusses the characteristics of the illegal firearms market in the 
Netherlands, section 3 specifically deals with terrorists’ access to firearms on the 
illegal market in the country and section 4 summarises the most important 
conclusions. 
I Within the context of conventional arms, our analysis focuses on lethal firearms. In our study we 
refer to them simply as ‘firearms’. When reference is made to imitation weapons or non-lethal 
firearms, this is always explicitly stated. 
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Box 1: Research design
As has already been indicated, a number of relevant studies have been 
undertaken in the past years.2 They are based on empirical data up to and 
including 2011. For more recent data we obtained permission from the Dutch 
police to study and include the results of the most recent national analysis 
of the illegal trade in firearms.3 In addition, five key actors from the Dutch 
police and the National Public Prosecutor’s Office were consulted to assess 
and update the information we had obtained; these are listed in Table 1. 
Table 1: Experts consulted
Position
Date and method of 
response
Chief researcher responsible for analysing the illicit 
trade in firearms for the police’s National Threat 
Assessment 2017 on Organised Crime
23/05/2017, email
Police director of the National Programme for Counter-
terrorism, Extremism and Radicalisation
30/05/2017, email
Police Firearms Portfolio holder 14/04/2017, interview
01/06/2017, email
Police project leader for combating illegal firearms 01/06/2017, email




Our analysis of the current regulatory and policy framework was mainly 
based on open-source research reports, internal policy documents made 
available for this study, and a face-to-face interview with the police Firearms 
Portfolio holder. For the third part of this research (section 3) we drew up a 
summary of 25 years of terrorist activities in the Netherlands based on an 
analysis of media information and court rulings published on the website 
rechtspraak.nl.4 A search using the terms ‘firearm(s)’ and ‘terrorism’ resulted 













1.  Regulatory framework and policy 
Even by European Union (EU) standards, Dutch firearms legislation is very strict. 
Civilian possession of firearms is forbidden, unless an appropriate licence is 
obtained. And weapons may only be transferred to others if an exemption is granted 
to both the supplier and recipient.5 In this first section we will give an overview of 
the regulatory framework and the policy for combating the illegal firearms trade in 
the Netherlands. 
1.1  Firearms legislation 
National legislation governing the trade in, possession and use of firearms and 
ammunition in the Netherlands is laid down in two core documents: the Weapons 
and Ammunition Act (WWM)6 and the Weapons and Ammunition Regulations 
(RWM).7 In addition to the formal framework, the ‘Circular on Weapons and 
Ammunition’ is important for the implementation of weapons-related legislation: 
it provides general information about the implementation of the WWM and RWM 
in its Part A;8 and contains instructions from the minister of security and justice to 
the chief of police and the Central Department for Import and Export about the 
policy to be followed in the implementation of the WWM and RWM in its Part B.9
In the Netherlands, the possession of a firearm is not a right, but a privilege. 
Hunting, membership of a sports shooting association or the need for firearms to 
perform police/armed services duties are the only legitimate reasons for the pos-
session of a firearm. Firearms licences are issued under strict conditions that, 
among other things, include the characteristics of the person (criminal record; 
mental health) and the safe storage and transportation of firearms. Also, the pos-
session of firearms that look like something other than a firearm (so-called dis-
guised firearms) is prohibited, as well as of imitation weapons, to the extent that 
they do not fall under the European toy directive. The possession of an airgun can 
also be an offence, if the conditions for use are not met or if it looks like a real 
firearm in terms of its shape and dimensions. 
While the country’s firearms legislation is considered to be restrictive, some in the 
Netherlands consider sentences for the illegal possession and trade of firearms as 
relatively lenient when compared to other EU member states.10 However, this must 
be qualified by the fact that it is difficult to compare prison sentences because 
regimes for early release may differ substantially. In the Netherlands, convicts are 
obliged to serve at least two-thirds of their sentence. The maximum sentence for 
participation in the illegal trade in firearms, without any aggravating circumstances, 
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is a maximum prison sentence of eight years or a fifth-category fine 11 (which was 
fixed in 2017 at a maximum of €82,000).12 The maximum sentence for the illegal 
possession of a firearm without proof of legal trade is four years or a maximum fine 
of €82,000.13 According to the national consultations of the chairmen of the 
Criminal Law Sectors of the Courts of Appeal and District Courts (LOVS), the 
maximum sentence for ‘simple’ firearms possession is almost never imposed in 
practice. On average, the LOVS observes that judges impose sentences of nine 
months’ unconditional imprisonment for the possession of an automatic firearm, 
six months for a riot gun and three months for a lethal pistol, revolver or rifle.I On 
average, a sentence of four months unconditional imprisonment is given for the 
concealed carrying of a firearm, while the illegal possession of gas, alarm, air or 
imitation guns generally results in fines of between €170 and €550.14 The LOVS lists 
the following aggravating and/or mitigating factors: whether the firearm is loaded, 
is fitted with a silencer, is stored within reach in a vehicle, is carried in public, is 
carried (or transferred) at an airport or on board an aircraft, whether there is live 
ammunition that has been converted so as to cause even more serious injury than 
ordinary ammunition, or whether or not the firearm could be easily reactivated.15 
1.2  National policy and law enforcement agency 
cooperation to combat the illegal firearms market  
and terrorists’ access to this market 
In the Netherlands, various agencies are involved in tackling the illegal possession 
of and trade in firearms: the police, the Royal Netherlands Military Constabulary 
(KMar), Customs, the Public Prosecution Service (OM), the Dutch Forensics Institute 
(NFI), the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV) and the 
Ministry of Security and Justice. These agencies work together in the national 
network for controlling illegal firearms.16 
The OM leads investigations into the illegal firearms trade and, if necessary, col-
laboration is sought with judicial agencies abroad. Each regional police unit has 
weapons and ammunition specialists attached to its forensic investigations team. 
Because the Dutch police have relatively few (full-time) detectives, the OM has con-
stantly to decide how to deploy investigative capacities. General investigative pri-
orities are set every four years in a security agenda that is based on the National 
I It should be noted that at the time of writing the data referred to on the subject of the WWM was 
last updated in March 2012. Furthermore, in many cases firearms are detected in the context of 
investigations of other types of crime, such as drug trafficking, and in these cases it is impossible 














Threat Assessment.17 The allocation of detectives to investigate specific cases then 
takes place in local steering teams that include OM and police representatives.18 The 
KMar19 regularly carries out mobile control operations on the Dutch border, some-
times jointly with Belgium and Germany. 
The General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) has the task of identifying 
threats to national security,20 including the mapping of firearms-related threats 
linked to both crime and terrorism, but focusing on preventing situations where 
the possession and use of firearms become a danger to national security. If the AIVD 
uncovers a possible threat, other interested parties (e.g. the police and the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office) are informed in an official report so that they are able to take 
appropriate action.
Because of the threat and (potential) impact of possible terrorist attacks using fire-
arms, in 2014 the national coordinator for counterterrorism and security (NCTV) 
singled out the reduction of the availability of firearms to terrorists as one of the 
priorities in the current action programme entitled Integrated Approach to 
Jihadism.21 In general, the NCTV wants to reduce the general availability of (illegal) 
firearms. More specifically, the aforementioned programme states that the inten-
tion is ‘[to make] it more difficult for the malevolent to acquire attack resources’ by, 
among other things, ‘signalling possible preparation activities [more] promptly’.22 
For this purpose, ‘the information sharing, investigation and gaining of intelligence 
concerning the [attempted] acquisition of attack resources [shall be] intensified, 
particularly concerning the availability of firearms in criminal circles and the inter-
mingling of these circles with jihadist networks’.23 As part of this prioritisation, the 
NCTV, in his role of instigator, facilitator and coordinator, has increased the focus 
on preventing firearms acquisition.24 The NCTV maintains close contacts with the 
Firearms Portfolio holder to discuss developments in the approach and supports 
the accumulation of knowledge, information, personnel and resources so as to be 
able to achieve the prescribed objectives. Such collaboration between the police 
and NCTV also occurred earlier in the area of chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear defence, but is still relatively new in terms of firearms.25 The Dutch police 
have welcomed the NCTV’s targeting of firearms. Dealing with the issue of acquir-
ing automatic firearms from the perspective of potential terrorist use is seen as 
essential for a successful approach to the illegal trade in automatic firearms. It gives 
extra urgency to the problem, which could allow the issue of the illegal trade in 
firearms to be freed from the changing national priorities of the Ministry of Safety 
and Justice dealing with organised crime.26
Linked to the above, but also based on concern about criminals’ increasing use of 
automatic firearms in the Netherlands, according to a statement by the minister of 
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security and justice in March 2017, the national approach to illegal firearms has ‘in 
the past two years been considerably intensified at the policy and operational lev-
els’.27 Law enforcement agencies now pay more attention to the trade in and posses-
sion of illegal firearms and have improved their information-collecting abilities. In 
addition, the police have appointed a national portfolio holder for illegal firearms, 
the OM has designated a national public prosecutor to deal with the issue, and a 
national network for combating illegal firearms possession has been set up. These 
measures have led to an increasing number of criminal investigations and seizures 
of caches of firearms and explosives. In short, the approach to illegal firearms has 
been improved and in the future will continue to be a priority of the police and the 
Ministry of Safety and Justice.28 
Within this context, the police particularly focus on: (1) reducing the number of 
assault rifles that circulate in criminal circles; (2) curbing the flow of illegal firearms 
that come to the Netherlands from the Balkans; (3) tackling the influx of firearms or 
firearms parts ordered on the internet and coming to the Netherlands by post; and 
(4) improving the monitoring of the access to firearms of radicalising/radicalised 
people with a criminal profile or who are members of a criminal network.29
Finally, national prevention policy was intensified in 2005 to discourage the acquisi-
tion of illegal firearms or trading in firearms. An example is national campaigns 
drawing attention to the prohibition of imitation weapons. Additional initiatives are 
local by nature, such as information projects about firearms possession, preventive 
firearms controls at schools30 and preventive body searches in areas where there is a 
high risk of firearms-related incidents.31 An important supporting document for 
these initiatives is the Action Plan of 2005 for combating illegal firearms.32
1.3  International cooperation
Dutch law enforcement agencies cooperate with law enforcement services in EU 
member states in cases of international firearms trafficking. This includes collec-
tive investigations (as part of joint investigation teams, or JITs) and cooperation 
based on mutual legal assistance facilitated by Dutch police liaison officers sta-
tioned abroad. On several occasions information from other countries has led to 
major investigations of illegal firearms dealers in the Netherlands. 
At the beginning of 2017 around 50 Dutch investigations were ongoing and many 
required cross-border cooperation.33 However, in February 2017 two articles appeared 
in the Dutch newspaper De Telegraaf with the suggestive headlines ‘Dutch firearms 













sources claiming to be employees of the National Crime Agency. The matter is 
extremely sensitive. According to these articles, in 2016 the Dutch Ministry of 
Security and Justice was asked on four occasions to tighten firearms policy. The 
United Kingdom (UK) is apparently frustrated by the low priority given to dealing 
with the issue of illegal firearms in the Netherlands, because it is confronted with 
firearms that are trafficked from the Netherlands to the UK. Given that major crime 
groups from the Netherlands and the UK closely collaborate (see below), law enforce-
ment collaboration between the two countries is essential to obtain evidence and 
tackle these groups. The UK source, however, stated that ‘If a firearm is seized in the 
Netherlands, that’s often the end of the matter. Our and your police services work 
together very well, but we notice, according to our contacts, that your police would 
like to do more.’ He further stated that in the Netherlands the seizure of a firearm is 
all that happens: ‘We trace back the trail and regularly encounter more criminals. If 
our services request further information about a firearm, the Dutch police often 
cannot tell us anything.’ According to this criticism, prioritisation, resources and 
authority are lacking in the Netherlands. In response to these articles, the minister 
of security and justice denied these accusations in the Dutch Parliament and stated 
that the tackling of illegal firearms has been improved since 2015 and that ‘whether 
and how the approach can be improved is being constantly assessed’. He further 
stated that whether more investigative capacity can be freed up would be decided 
later in 2017 based on the outcomes of the National Threat Assessment and subse-
quently the Security Agenda.36 The Dutch police stated that consultations with the 
UK on the matter were as constructive as ever.37 The criticism expressed anony-
mously in the media was neither repeated nor supported by British officials.38
The Slovakian police and Europol expressed similar criticism of the contribution of 
the Netherlands to identifying arms dealers in 2015, in response to arrests made for 
arms trafficking from Slovakia. At that time, Europol also had uncovered indica-
tions of regular (‘once or twice a month’) courier shipments of firearms from 
Slovakia to the Netherlands. While the Slovakians wanted to identify all the 
members of the smuggling operation, the Dutch authorities apparently chose to 
immediately arrest three low-level individuals (so-called ‘errand boys’) who were 
smuggling a package with components for 35 CZ sub-machine guns.39 The case was 
concluded within a year by the judge: the main suspect (a Polish citizen) was sen-
tenced to three years’ imprisonment, while his Dutch fellow-suspects were acquit-
ted. Yet at the time of their arrest the three were supposed to deliver the firearms to 
a man who would be waiting in a black BMW at a parking lot in Nistelrode. The 
police were unable to establish the identity of the man and the destination of the 
firearms. A Dutch newspaper reported in the spring of 2015 that this caused annoy-
ance at Europol and among the Slovakian police. ‘It is typical of the way in which 
the arms trade is handled in the Netherlands and arises from a consciously 
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implemented policy’, concluded a journalist in an editorial.40 To improve interna-
tional collaboration the Netherlands shortly thereafter started participating in a JIT 
with Slovakia, Poland, Germany and the UK.41 This team achieved good exchanges 
of operational information and successful interventions, and is still active.42
Another method to improve bilateral collaboration is the strategic positioning of 
police liaison officers abroad. Optimising this network has been given top priority.43 
The Dutch police particularly underline the importance of its liaison officers sta-
tioned in Belgrade and Bucharest.44 Based on the Benelux Implementation Agreement 
for Liaison Officers, a Belgian liaison officer is also stationed in Albania who works 
for both the Belgian and Dutch police (and the KMar). The western Balkans countries 
are generally considered to be important source countries for the trafficking of 
assault rifles to the Netherlands. According to a police interviewee, ‘Having police 
liaison officers stationed there is extremely important for us, because in these coun-
tries personal connections [characterised by] trust and confidence are essential.’45 
Collaboration with international actors such as Europol, Interpol and Eurojust is 
subsequently shaped mainly by the participation of firearms experts in relevant 
international networks. A ‘firearms info unit’ is positioned as the national focal 
point for firearms for the Dutch National Police and also provides information to 
the Europol focal point. Furthermore, the Netherlands is one of the co-drivers of the 
priority issue of illegal firearms within EMPACT, together with the UK, France and 
Belgium (co-drivers) and Spain (driver). The Dutch police appointed one national 
firearms expert to monitor relevant developments affecting the Netherlands stem-
ming from EMPACT, the European Firearms Experts Network and the Europol 
Firearms Focal Point.46 These various international positions are filled by a total of 
four officials, each with many years of experience of the Dutch approach to fire-
arms-related crime. They can all deputise for one another and if necessary can 
attend meetings together as joint representatives.
1.4  Main challenges facing national policy to combat  
the illicit firearms market in the Netherlands
As explained previously, the Netherlands has extremely strict firearms legislation, 
and a licence for a lethal firearm is only issued under strict conditions (solely for 
sports shooting and hunting) and after screening the applicant’s criminal record 
and mental health status. Because of these restrictions, criminals rely on firearms 
that are smuggled into the Netherlands or have been stolen from either licensed 
firearms dealers or people who are permitted to own a firearm. The investigative 













Intelligence is followed up as quickly as possible and searches are conducted to find 
and seize the firearms. However, keeping a record of this process, and further inves-
tigation into the origins of seized firearms and the criminal groups possibly involved 
in their trafficking, is far less systematic. A primary cause of this is that specialisa-
tions such as firearms expertise have been increasingly abolished since 1993.
Police firearms specialists now primarily have a technical function. They have been 
attached to forensics teams and focus primarily on examining confiscated firearms 
and properly describing them. Most of these specialists have little or no access to 
relevant investigation information and have excessive workloads that involve cor-
recting reports drawn up by police officers who seized firearms but lack specialised 
knowledge. They also become bogged down in record-keeping systems that do not 
support them sufficiently in their work. It will therefore not come as a surprise that 
figures about seized firearms are currently incomplete and unreliable.
Despite political statements, investigating the firearms trade and trafficking is not 
given the highest priority in the Netherlands. This can be largely explained by two 
factors. Firstly, the arms trade in the country is a relatively small criminal market 
compared, for example, with the production and export of drugs and the import 
and transit of cocaine. Secondly, as a consequence of the relatively small scale, the 
arms trade is often a sideline for criminal groups that primarily focus on other illicit 
markets. Therefore, policy-makers have assumed that the trade in and trafficking of 
illegal firearms are automatically dealt with when other crimes are investigated. 
The level of priority that the Dutch police give to firearms trafficking and trade is 
mainly determined by external pressure and not by the fact that firearms are neces-
sary tools for members of the criminal underworld. This is reflected in policy priori-
ties. At the start of 2000, firearms were included on the list of investigative priori-
ties, which was confirmed in 2004 based on the outcomes of the National Organised 
Crime Threat Assessment. In 2008, however, a new threat analysis did not reveal 
major changes in the crime situation, but it was decided that firearms were not a 
threat, primarily because trafficking and trade took place on a small scale. In 2012, 
based on the latest threat analysis, the minister of security and justice concluded 
that illicit firearms were a threat, but for reasons not explicitly stated, decided that 
a separate investigative priority dealing with firearms was not necessary. In 
response to a number of murders in Amsterdam in which Kalashnikovs were used, 
including in a shooting near a primary school, firearms once again became a prior-
ity at the end of 2015. Whether this will remain the case is unclear, particularly 
because the most recent figures show that the number of firearms seizures is declin-
ing. On the one hand, however, this may be explained by inaccurate records of fire-
arms seizures; on the other hand, one can question whether such figures should be 
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the prime criterion for prioritising criminal activities. For example, the number of 
firearms says little about possible impact: in the hands of a terrorist even a single 
firearm can inflict major harm. 
2.  The illicit gun market in the Netherlands
2.1  Estimated size of the illicit gun market 
It is impossible to estimate the exact number of illegal firearms in a country. Any 
estimate requires assumptions that may be challenged, and wide margins of error 
are possible. One assumption (which is used by the Dutch police and in other 
Western European countries47) is that law enforcement agencies annually seize 
around 10% of the total number of firearms available in the criminal underworld.48 
Based on this assumption and detailed data of seizures by the Dutch police in the 
period 1998-2000, an estimate was made in 2002 that 10,000-15,000 firearms were 
introduced into the Dutch market annually by smuggling and that in total there 
were between 85,000 and 125,000 illegal firearms in the Netherlands.49 In the same 
period the police confiscated 7,170 firearms, of which around 1,200 were surren-
dered voluntarily. However, there are various problems with this estimate. Firstly, it 
is unclear whether the ‘10% rule’ actually applies to the Netherlands. Secondly, the 
information about the number of confiscated firearms was still incomplete. Thirdly, 
the estimate would mean that the cache of illegal firearms is constantly growing at 
a high rate, although it is impossible to demonstrate that demand has increased at 
the same rate. Fourthly, the number of weapons is not equal to the number of 
owners, because key members of organised criminal groups generally own several 
(types of) firearms. These and other considerations mean that the number of illegal 
firearms could be either higher or lower than the estimates.
In 2005, to supplement the 2002 estimate, a population-specific estimate was made 
of the number of illegal firearms owners in the Netherlands.50 This was done using 
the capture-recapture method – a statistical method that (with good source data 
about the number of seized firearms) can give a reasonable estimate of the scale of 
the number of illegal firearms in a particular country. The 2005 capture-recapture 
estimate included people who were apprehended at least once in the period 2001-
2003 for the illegal possession of firearms, and who belonged to one or more specific 
categories of criminal groups (those who are connected to the illegal drug-traffick-
ing world, who were suspected of carrying out armed robberies and who were born 
in the Dutch Antilles). Taken together, the groups selected were involved in around 













were 2,093 relevant suspects between 2001 and 2003; of these, 1,977 were appre-
hended once for a weapons-related offence, 105 were apprehended twice, eight three 
times, two suspects were apprehended four times and one suspect five times. Based 
on the analysis, it was estimated that these three groups together total at least 40,533 
people who possess firearms, including both those who had been apprehended and 
an estimated figure for those who had not been apprehended.51 This supports the 
perception, which had also been raised by the previous study, that there are tens of 
thousands of Dutch citizens linked to crime who want to arm themselves. The cap-
ture-recapture method such as the one developed in 2005 could not map the degree 
to which there was a preference for owning lethal, non-lethal or imitation weapons. 
It could not be completely excluded that some suspects used an imitation weapon or 
a gas or alarm pistol, for example when a firearm was used as a threat and was sub-
sequently not found; as a result, no technical details on it were available. 
Because of the deterioration of the record-keeping system for firearms seized in later 
years and the decline in the information available on illegal traders (see below), no 
comparable approximation was subsequently made.52 A useful aid for estimating the 
scale of the illicit firearms market in more recent years could be provided by the 
number of confiscated firearms that are destroyed annually by the Logistics and 
Distribution Unit (ULD) of the Dutch police. An application for destruction is linked to 
a criminal case for about 2,000 firearms each year (see Table 2). This validates the 
assumption that these are firearms that have circulated in criminal circles and have 
been confiscated. If we assume that the seized firearms must be replaced, these figures 
are the absolute lower limit of demand in the market. In addition, some of the firearms 
with a case number may have had a criminal owner – the average citizen does not just 
lose a firearm. Furthermore, not every firearm that must be replaced ends up in the 
hands of the ULD, for example, criminals who get rid of a firearm after using it.53 
Table 2:  Number of destroyed lethal firearms linked to criminal cases,  
2006-2011
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Handguns (pistols and 
revolvers)
1,999 2,047 1,374 790 1,143 1,655
Rifles, assault rifles and 
sub-machine guns 
108 173 126 309 150 436
Shotguns and hunting rifles 36 34 40 47 60 166
Total 2,143 2,254 1,540 1,146 1,353 2,257
Source: Boerman and Bruinsma (2012, p. 47)
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2.2  Availability and prices of different types of firearms 
2.2.1  Availability 
The illegal possession and trade of firearms in the Netherlands mainly involves 
pistols. At least half of all lethal firearms seized in the country are of this type (i.e. 
between 700 and 1,100 annually). Revolvers are less commonly seized than pistols 
(around a quarter of the handguns seized). These data come from the national phe-
nomenon studies up to 2012,54 but a similar pattern can also be noted in the more 
recent data that four police units collected for the National Threat Analysis 2017.55 
Automatic assault rifles seem to have become more readily available in recent years 
and/or have a wider range of customers. After 2012 the number of incidents involv-
ing heavy automatic weapons such as Kalashnikovs increased significantly. Before 
that date such incidents were highly exceptional and generally linked to interna-
tionally linked criminal networks. At the end of 2012 this state of affairs had 
changed due to a series of murders with automatic weapons mainly related to con-
flicts between cocaine wholesalers.56 In addition, perpetrators increasingly started 
to use assault rifles instead of handguns (pistols and revolvers) to commit crimes 
such as robberies. For instance, assault rifles were used to keep residents at a dis-
tance during an ATM attack using explosives in Amsterdam.57 The developments 
resulted in an increase in the number of murder investigations (first mainly in 
Amsterdam, but later also elsewhere) and an increase in the number of search war-
rants related to the possession of automatic firearms. Consequently, since 2014 
more assault weapons have been seized. The number of automatic firearms seized 
in the large cities of Amsterdam and Rotterdam rose from 10-20 per year in 2012 
and 2013 to 30-40 per year in 2014 and 2015.58 From 2001 to 2010 the share of auto-
matic firearms seized annually in the whole of the Netherlands was on average 4% 
of all seized lethal firearms (around 50 per year).59 More recent data are unavailable, 
but in October 2015 Chief Commissioner Hans Vissers of the Zeeland-West Brabant 
Police Unit stated in his role as spokesperson on firearms that ‘an increase can be 
observed in the number of heavy weapons, such as sub-machine guns …. In 2013 we 
confiscated around 170, in 2014 just over 200, and if the increase continues at the 
same tempo, we will perhaps reach 250 this year.’60 
A third observation is that converted gas and alarm pistols remain widely available. 
Since the end of the 1990s the trade in such pistols has attracted attention in both 
the Netherlands and abroad.61 These are firearms that originally were unable to fire 
live bullets, but were illegally converted to make this possible. Converted firearms 
are technically less reliable than firearms originally designed to be lethal, but for 













conversions were considered a special subject of interest and this resulted in several 
targeted investigations. Data until 2012 indicate that between 100 and 275 con-
verted firearms were seized each year.62 Constructing reliable estimates subsequent 
to that year is not possible, but police experts believe it is a stable market. 
Fourthly, 3D-printed firearms have not been seized in the Netherlands. In recent 
years articles appeared in the media about manufacturing firearms with 3D print-
ers, and the phenomenon was presented as a potential new risk.63 However, up to 
mid-2017 3D-printed firearms have never been found in Dutch criminal circles and 
the NFI has not received any such firearms.64 
With regard to the countries that produced the seized firearms in the period 2001-
2010, a fairly constant pattern could be observed in 2012: seized pistols mainly origi-
nated from legal factories in Italy, Germany and Belgium; revolvers were mainly pro-
duced in the United States and Germany; the gas and alarm weapons that were later 
converted generally came from factories in Italy, Germany and Turkey; and up to 2010 
automatic firearms came mainly from the UK, what was then Serbia and Montenegro, 
and Russia.65 Overall, the conclusion was that this is an EU problem: 75% of the illegal 
firearms seized in the Netherlands were produced in EU member states.66 According 
to experts, it can be assumed that this picture has not changed considerably in recent 
years.67 However, investigations have identified an occasional new type of firearm 
linked to European countries of origin that were previously less prevalent: the Czech-
manufactured CZ vz.58. This could be connected to the increased trafficking of deac-
tivated or reactivated firearms from Slovakia (see section 2.3.3).
2.2.2  Prices
The Dutch police have gathered a large amount of information for the period 2002-
2017 on the prices of firearms in the criminal underworld, mainly from investiga-
tion reports and information collected from informers. 
In the Netherlands, pistols cost on average €1,000-2,000, while AK-47s are sold for 
€1,500-4,500 (including 100 rounds of ammunition). Recycled, slightly damaged 
firearms or fake brands are the cheapest.68 In 2008 it was established that converted 
gas and alarm pistols had been on sale for at least ten years for €300-500.69 More 
recent police data and interviews with detainees confirmed these prices.70 For spe-
cific Glock pistols the price can go up to €3,000. This observation is supported by 
the discovery of a comprehensive price list that circulated in the Dutch underworld 
in 2008 and listed virtually all the types of firearms on offer. On this list, an AK-47 
was listed at €1,600, which is lower than for some pistols.
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The available data show that prices have remained quite stable over the years. This 
same price list was seized during searches over a period of several years in various 
criminal investigations.71 The picture has not changed since 2012, which indicates 
no scarcity of lethal firearms. This observation, in combination with the observa-
tion that more automatic firearms are used and found in criminal circles (see 
section 2.2.1), suggests that the market for automatic firearms in the Netherlands 
has grown in scale since 2012. In a recent case there even seems to be the suggestion 
of a temporary over-supply in the market: Skorpion vz.61 machine pistols were 
being offered in sets of ten and for a lower price than previously seen in other cases. 
Apparently, this was due to a (temporarily) large stockpile or a new supplier. 
Large price differences can be observed across European countries, which makes 
the Netherlands an interesting destination and transit country for trafficked fire-
arms. Although the identified prices on the illegal market vary, according to the 
Dutch police there are strong indications for classifying the Netherlands (1) as an 
outlet for firearms particularly from Serbia (and also from Slovakia); and (2) as a 
transit country for firearms destined for the UK. In Serbia, for example, AK-47 
assault rifles can be acquired for €300-350, while in Slovakia they go for €500. The 
Netherlands is therefore an interesting market because the same weapon costs 
around €500-1,000 more than it would in Belgium. Transit to the UK is even more 
interesting. According to the Dutch police, AK-47 assault rifles would cost €3,000-
11,000. These prices were identified in various investigations in the period 2012-
2016, which revealed that weapons were purchased in the UK from the Netherlands 
or (telephone) contacts were made between UK arms dealers and individuals in the 
Netherlands.72 In addition, bartering firearms for drugs can be very lucrative, 
because good-quality drugs can be bought cheaply in the Netherlands and sold in 
countries where guns are cheap and drugs expensive. Thus, the importance of the 
Netherlands as a drug market cannot be separated from its attractiveness as an 
intermediate destination for illicit firearms. For Dutch criminals, firearms consti-
tute a valuable asset that can be exported to other countries, but also sold in the 
Netherlands, although the latter takes longer because the market is relatively small. 
Whatever the case, firearms are durable goods and for this reason are a good long-
term investment. For example, there are rumours that at least one Dutch criminal 
bought an entire container of firearms from Belgian firearms dealers who wanted 
to get rid of them after Belgian firearms legislation was tightened in the early 1990s. 
The police assume that the buyer was able to draw an income from this hidden stock 













2.3  Sources of weapons on the illicit market 
The Netherlands does not manufacture firearms. Consequently, illicit firearms 
must either be smuggled across the Dutch border, stolen from legal owners or ille-
gally manufactured in the country itself. In practice, the majority are manufactured 
legally in other countries and diverted to the illegal sphere at some point.73 
2.3.1  Illegal production
Around 5% of the illegal firearms encountered in the Netherlands have never been 
legal, and have thus been illegally manufactured at some stage.74 Among these 
weapons a distinction can be made between (1) self-produced firearms (often hidden 
or disguised firearms such as pens with guns built into in them); (2) brand replicas; 
and (3) weapons made up of individually acquired firearms parts. 
Little is known about the origins of self-made firearms. They seem to be largely the 
result of ‘cottage industries’ abroad, sometimes with indications of somewhat more 
professionally based illegal workshops. Annually, several dozens of these firearms 
are encountered in the Netherlands, mainly during searches and linked to other 
firearms finds.75 
In recent years Dutch police have also discovered so-called ‘brand replicas’. During 
the war in the Balkans the 1990s Croatian manufacturers produced several brands 
that imitated real ones (e.g. Uzi, Smith & Wesson); these were also encountered in 
the Dutch criminal underworld.76 Croatia has a long tradition of brand counterfeit-
ing.77 A new trend originating from Croatia are fake ‘R9 Arms’ sub-machine guns. 
This type of firearm was seized in the Netherlands for the first time in 2012.78 The 
full name of the legal weapon is ‘R9 Arms Corp. U.S.A.’79 Possibly this fake branding 
is intended to make the gun more attractive to buyers. Most probably they were 
built in a small, illegal factory or workshop in Croatia. Until the start of 2014 fake R9 
Arms sub-machine guns were only encountered in the Netherlands; since then 
there have also been seizures in Germany, Belgium, the UK and France.80
The phenomenon of firearms built up from individual parts has not been observed 
in the Netherlands until fairly recently. In recent years in particular, built-up Glock 
pistols have been found. In 2014 one such Glock pistol was seized, while in the first 
half of 2015 an additional 30 built-up Glock pistols were seized. In these cases, 
casings for Glocks have been purchased in Austria via the internet (no permit/
licence is required), while additional components were legally acquired in the 
United States. These components were then assembled into a firearm. It is currently 
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unknown where and by whom these firearms were assembled. Doing so does not 
require much expertise and acquiring the parts is relatively cheap. The casings of 
the most popular models (Glock 17 and 19) only cost around €140 in Austria. The 
remaining parts cost a few hundred dollars at most in the United States. This means 
that a lethal Glock can be put together for a price lower than that of a regular Glock 
pistol in the criminal underworld. Although US firearms dealers can no longer send 
firearms components to international addresses, it has been observed that people 
have all sorts of creative solutions for this, such as shipping under a different name, 
sending them via friends in the United States or making use of courier services. The 
Europol Firearms Focal Point is investigating this phenomenon.81
2.3.2  Conversion of gas and alarm weapons into lethal firearms 
Gas and alarm pistols that can be converted are acquired in countries where they 
can be bought without a licence. These firearms are then illegally converted to fire 
live ammunition. Converted Italian-, German- and Turkish-made firearms are 
encountered in the Netherlands. The first converted firearm to attract attention in 
the Netherlands was the Tanfoglio GT28, which was produced in Italy and converted 
in the border area of Spain and Portugal, but these conversions slowly disappeared 
from the market due to effective enforcement. Since 2007 converted pistols of the 
Turkish brand Ekol Tuna and associated types appeared more frequently, as well as 
converted German Walther P22 and P99 gas pistols.82 In addition, converted Turkish 
Zoraki alarm pistols have been encountered in the Netherlands in recent years. A 
significant recent development seems that conversion not only takes place abroad, 
but also in the Netherlands itself, although the scale remains unclear.83
2.3.3  Recycling of rejected, malfunctioning, decommissioned or 
depreciated firearms 
For several years the illicit trade in recycled firearms has been characterised 
throughout the EU as a constantly growing market.84 In this context the term ‘recy-
cled’ means that rejected, decommissioned or malfunctioning firearms are made 
useable. Often these are discarded police or army weapons, for example, the fire-
arms arsenals of these services had been modernised, after which the old weapons 
were sold legally as decommissioned ‘decorative firearms’ or converted into alarm 
weapons. In the Netherlands old pistols from the Danish, Swedish, and East German 
police, and previously decommissioned Russian, Hungarian and Finnish pistols 
have been seized.85 The core of the problem is the differences in legislation and reg-













of firearms, on the one hand, and the sale of firearms components and ammuni-
tion, on the other. This allows arms dealers to acquire decommissioned firearms 
and firearms components in various EU countries without restrictions. In the past, 
large numbers of recommissioned FN, Walther (PP and PPK models), Makarov, FEG 
and Tokarev pistols in particular have been seized.86 From 2010 Nagant revolvers, 
which appeared to be reactivated in the Netherlands, also drew the attention of the 
Dutch police.87 
In recent years, however, the main concern was the illegal flow to the Netherlands 
of Slovakian reactivated (largely automatic) firearms, especially CZ vz.58 assault 
rifles, which first appeared in 2013. In the first half of 2016 the Dutch police seized 
such weapons almost every week. Based on sales data in Slovakia and the illicit 
business activities of identified Dutch traffickers, the Dutch police assumed that 
criminals had smuggled hundreds and perhaps even more than a thousand reacti-
vated firearms from Slovakia to the Netherlands. Some of these guns have been 
used to commit murders in the Netherlands.
Slovakian firearms stores seem now to be concentrating on the sale of so-called 
Flobert firearms instead of acoustic firearms, and they seem with this to open up a 
new market that gives some legal room for manoeuvre, but equally quickly leads to 
illicit trade. Flobert firearms are firearms with a limited fire power (up to 7.5 Joule) 
and a small calibre (generally 6 millimetre or 4 millimetre M20) and are freely 
obtainable in Slovakia (but also, for example, in Germany). The first Flobert fire-
arms from Slovakia – pistols of the brand/model Walther P99 – were encountered in 
the Netherlands in the first months of 2016. It transpired that the firearms did not 
comply with the current specifications of a Flobert firearm and were simply original 
sharp-shooting firearms. This is again a good example of a part of a law being tight-
ened in one EU country, after which traders simply find another loophole in the law. 
If countries are not obliged to adopt equivalent legislation and regulations which 
apply throughout the EU, these problems will, it is expected, continue.88 
2.3.4  Embezzlement
There are very few up-to-date data on embezzlement as a method of leaking legally 
owned firearms into the illicit gun market in the Netherlands through corrupt legal 
arms dealers or gun owners. The most recent example dated from 2010 and involved 
a corrupt Dutch legal arms dealer and a single firearm.89 
Other known cases involved foreign firearms dealers who illegally sold large quan-
tities of firearms to the Dutch criminal underworld. In various investigations in the 
302
period 2003-2008 the Dutch police encountered a total of 203 Glock pistols with 
erased serial numbers that originated from a licensed German firearms dealer who 
embezzled more than 4,500 firearms (including Glock and Beretta pistols, and 
Ruger revolvers) between 2001 and 2006. This dealer made it appear that he had 
himself converted the Glocks from lethal 9 mm calibre pistols to 3 mm M20 pistols, 
that is, luft energie patrone (LEP, or air pressure cartridge) firearms that can be legally 
sold in Germany. In his arms register the firearms were deregistered with the 
remark: ‘converted to LEP firearm’; in practice, the weapons disappeared into the 
criminal underworld in their original form. The German authorities have since 
shut down the company.90 
Another licensed German firearms dealer was caught in 2008 selling weapons to 
Dutch nationals who did not have a permit. After an extensive investigation a deliv-
ery was monitored and 15 Glock pistols were confiscated. The police were unable to 
establish how many illegal firearms had been traded to the Netherlands via this 
route. There were, however, rumours that the Dutch suspects had been in the arms 
trade for many years. 
A third example concerns a corrupt Belgian arms dealer from Beveren who filed off 
the serial numbers of firearms and sold them to customers without a permit. The 
dealer was convicted in 2008, but between 2004 and 2006 he sold 779 firearms in 
this way, including automatic weapons and riot guns. More than half of these fire-
arms were sold to ‘a Dutchman’ and in the following years the police seized several 
of these weapons from Dutch criminals.91 
A final example again concerns a legal German firearms dealer operating a shop 
close to the Dutch border who ‘sold’ 128 firearms to several non-existent Dutch cus-
tomers. Some of these firearms were later seized from criminals who were involved 
in illegal cannabis production in the Netherlands.92
2.3.5  Theft
Firearms are also acquired through theft from government stockpiles, private indi-
viduals, licensed firearms dealers and shooting clubs. In 2012 nearly 400,000 fire-
arms were registered as missing in the Schengen countries, around 1,600 of which 
were in the Netherlands.93 Particularly relevant for the Netherlands is the large 
number of weapons disappearances in neighbouring countries (in 2012, 31,000 
firearms disappeared in Belgium and 143,000 in Germany), since these firearms 













In the Netherlands, around 300-400 firearms are stolen each year.94 Most of these 
thefts involve firearms stolen from individual permit holders.95 In recent years 
some large-scale firearms thefts also took place from legal arms dealers and shoot-
ing clubs in the Netherlands: in the 2012-2015 period there were four instances of 
this involving around 20-30 stolen firearms per case.96 After a remarkable case 
involving a large number of air force pistols in 2005,97 no major thefts have taken 
place from government stockpiles.98 
2.3.6  Smuggling
The smuggling of firearms to the Netherlands traditionally takes place by road with 
cars, vans and trucks from or via the neighbouring countries of Belgium and 
Germany. Individual shipments of illicit firearms are usually small (less than ten at 
a time).99 Large-scale container trafficking has not been detected since 2004. The 
Dutch police believe that a few people in the Netherlands import firearms on a large 
scale.100 The few cases that have been discovered each year indicate that these 
people have often built up a large and varied firearms arsenal, with handguns, 
semi-automatic and automatic firearms, anti-tank weapons, and hand grenades. 
Networks of family members or communities abroad play a large role in this kind of 
smuggling. The National Threat Assessment 2012 refers to illegal importers with 
Turkish and Portuguese connections. The most recent National Threat Assessment 
2017 mentions mainly importers with connections with countries such as Poland, 
Croatia, Slovakia and (to a lesser extent) the Antilles. 101
The police have observed that Dutch criminals have recently been experimenting 
with new trafficking methods. It was observed that firearms components were 
hidden in large postal parcels sent to various parties in the Netherlands.102 The 
police observe that the practice of ordering firearms via the internet and having 
them delivered by postal and courier services has increased considerably since 
2012. Both major and petty criminals use this method, according to the National 
Threat Assessment 2017. However, there is also considerable uncertainty about the 
exact scale: ‘It is unknown how the trade via the internet relates in scale to the 
normal face-to-face trade.’103 
With the growth of firearms sales via the internet several perfectly innocent facili-
tating actors have become more important for the illicit firearms market in the 
Netherlands, for example, courier companies. Illegal firearms dealers use these 
companies to send packages of firearms anonymously from, for example, the 
United States to the final recipient in the Netherlands. The use of courier compa-
nies makes it more difficult for law enforcement agencies to detect these types of 
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firearms shipments. A new feature is also the use of so-called straw purchasers in 
the United States; that is, US citizens who can legally buy firearms in the United 
States, and do so on behalf of criminal firearms dealers in the Netherlands. They 
then send the firearms to the Netherlands via courier companies. 
2.4  Actors in the illicit gun market 
In many ways the market for illegal firearms is a closed one comprising importers, 
buyers and sellers who have often known each other for years.104 This situation has 
recently become less absolute through the emergence of the dark web, where sup-
pliers and buyers who do not know each other can be brought into contact. 
In the Netherlands, illegal firearms are mostly sold to criminals. The customers 
identified by the police tend to have criminal records involving financial and violent 
crimes and are mainly ethnic Dutchmen, followed by people of Moroccan or Turkish 
origin.105 The people involved in the illegal sale of firearms in the Netherlands are 
virtually always men; the majority were born in the Netherlands and have Dutch 
nationality.106 These men tend to have criminal records, with a relatively large 
number of WWM offences. Many criminal groups that trade firearms are also active 
in other forms of crime, such as drug trafficking or contract killing in the criminal 
underworld.107 
Those involved in the larger cases of illegal sale of firearms are often criminal 
members of the commercial traveller community or members of outlawed motor-
cycle gangs. Since 2012 two cases have involved the conviction of motorcycle gang 
members for illegal trade in firearms. The first case involved an investigation into 
the president of the Satudarah gang in the city of Tilburg. He was convicted of sup-
plying automatic firearms to a new chapter of the gang in the German city of 
Duisburg (the weapons were possibly intended for a conflict with a rival gang). The 
second case involved the sentencing of the president of the Hells Angels in the 
Dutch city of Haarlem to two-and-a-half years in prison in connection with, among 
other things, an arsenal of firearms that had been uncovered. In recent years various 
criminal members of the commercial traveller community have been under serious 
investigation for possible links to two large arms dealers and a sizeable arsenal of 
firearms that was discovered in 2015 in a garage lock-up in Limburg.108 Finally, the 
National Threat Assessment 2017 links ‘criminal groups of Dutch-Antillean or 














It seems that buyers of firearms use several supply lines. Within the larger network 
of Dutch-Antillean criminal groups, requests for firearms are circulated via mobile 
phone messaging. This can also be observed among youths who trade in illegal fire-
arms. WhatsApp and other easy-to-use message systems form a flexible middle 
layer of firearms brokers. According to the National Threat Assessment 2017, 
there are also groups involved in brokering; the members of these groups 
belong to a broader network and form ad hoc coalitions. After importa-
tion, they take care of the further sales of the firearms in the Netherlands. 
The group members are able to contact each other easily.110
The National Threat Assessment 2017 also states that ‘firearms are more frequently 
leased, particularly by street gangs’.111 In addition, firearms arsenals have been 
uncovered that seem to have come from different supply routes.112 An example of 
this is a major discovery of firearms in Nieuwegein. In this case the police and the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office found an unprecedented number of weapons and related 
materiel in a warehouse: 60 pistols and revolvers, nine hand grenades, 36 auto-
matic weapons and large amounts of ammunition. A dozen bulletproof vests were 
also seized.113 
2.5  The Netherlands as a transit country for illicit firearms 
trafficking
While most of the firearms trafficked to the Netherlands are sold domestically, 
some are exported to lucrative markets in other countries, especially the UK and 
Ireland. Several examples illustrate this. In 2008 the Amsterdam police discovered 
a large stash of firearms primarily originating from the United States and Germany 
that were intended for export to Ireland and the UK by an Irish criminal group that 
was suspected of smuggling weapons, drug and cigarettes.114 In 2011 the military 
police discovered more than a hundred semi-automatic firearms during a roadside 
search of a van. The Hungarian driver claimed he was on his way to deliver firearms 
to collectors in the UK. He did not possess the papers necessary for transit and the 
firearms had not been decommissioned.115 An interesting related case is that of a US 
citizen in 2007 who had to ‘babysit’ a large quantity of firearms stored in a house in 
Amsterdam. He was part of a British criminal group that smuggled cocaine from 
Jamaica to the UK and that had been linked to several murders in the latter coun-
try.116 It is currently not clear whether the firearms were on route to a more lucrative 
market abroad or were to be stored in the Netherlands until they were needed in the 
UK. The findings of earlier studies suggest that British criminals have settled in the 
Netherlands, partly because the Netherlands acts as a transit and distribution 
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country for heroin and because of the UK’s strict enforcement and investigation 
policy.117 These criminal links may also play a role in the trafficking of illegal fire-
arms. Recently, a police investigation of supply lines of reactivated firearms from 
Slovakia has also revealed connections between Dutch firearms dealers and British 
customers.118 There are also reports of a Dutch-based criminal group that makes use 
of low-flying light aircraft to ship drugs and firearms to the UK.119 
Occasionally there are indications of transit to destinations other than the British 
Isles. A Europol investigation, for example, revealed a distribution route for fire-
arms from Kosovo via the Netherlands and Denmark to Sweden involving a Dutch 
motorcycle gang.120 Sometimes the smuggled firearms are also destined for 
Southern Europe, for example, to Italy, smuggled by a drug-trafficking group.121 In 
2007 the National Crime Squad received information about firearms being possibly 
trafficked from a military base in Estonia via the harbour of Rotterdam and with the 
involvement of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (the main Colombian 
insurgency group). It involved 25,000 AK-47s and HK-G4-type assault rifles. To 
finance the transport of these firearms, batches of cocaine were delivered to the 
United States and the Netherlands. Firearms to the value of US$50 million were 
apparently exchanged for the cocaine.122 
3.  Terrorist access to the illicit gun market  
in the Netherlands 
Information on the ways in which terrorists in the Netherlands have acquired fire-
arms is scant and fragmented, mainly because only two terrorist attacks have been 
committed with firearms in recent decades. The first was on filmmaker, columnist 
and director Theo van Gogh on 2 November 2004 by the Muslim extremist 
Mohammed Bouyeri. The second was the murder of politician Pim Fortuyn by the 
radical left environmental activist Volkert van der Graaf. In addition, in recent years 
at least 15 people in the Netherlands have been suspected of planning terrorist 
attacks with firearms. In this section we describe these cases based on public court 
records supplemented by media reporting of the cases. The court records also 
contain information about firearms possession in the Netherlands or about fire-
arms acquisition in or trade to the Netherlands.123 Our analysis of how the terrorists 













3.1  Overview of firearms-related terrorist activities  
in the Netherlands
3.1.1 Political murders
As stated above, two successful politically motivated murders of high-profile targets 
have been carried out in the Netherlands since 2000. On 6 May 2002 the environ-
mental activist Volkert van der Graaf (whom we will call suspect A) shot Pim Fortuyn 
dead nine days before the parliamentary elections in which Fortuyn’s party (Lijst 
Pim Fortuyn) was predicted to achieve a major victory. Van der Graaf saw Pim 
Fortuyn ‘as a danger to society’, particularly to ‘vulnerable groups such as Muslims 
and people on disability benefits’.124 He fired five rounds at close range and hit 
Fortuyn in his chest, neck and head. The perpetrator had no criminal record and 
used a Star Firestar M-43 semi-automatic 9 mm single-action pistol. He carried the 
firearm loaded with seven bullets around with him and had previously kept it 
hidden in a case in his attic. This case was later found and contained two boxes of 
ammunition (25 rounds of S&B, 18 MRP rounds and three other rounds).125 Van der 
Graaf stated that he had purchased the firearm in 1997 or 1998 in a bar in Ede to 
‘protect himself against farmers who threatened him because of the legal proceed-
ings he was taking against them’.126 Van der Graaf supposedly purchased the ammu-
nition in The Hague and the firearm had traces of DNA on it that could link it to a 
robbery committed earlier.127 
The second high-profile case was the murder of film-maker, columnist and director 
Theo van Gogh. On 2 November 2004 Muslim extremist Mohammed Bouyeri 
(suspect B) killed him with seven bullets fired from an HS 2000 pistol. He then cut 
Van Gogh’s throat with a large machete. Two passers-by were shot at and in an 
exchange of fire with the police he shot at eight police officers and threatened three 
others by pointing the pistol at them. He then reloaded his pistol with 15 more 
rounds.128 After the murder, a great deal of information was revealed about the 
many contacts Bouyeri had with members of the so-called Hofstad network, which 
had been under AIVD surveillance since 2002 for the possible planning of terrorist 
activities (see more about this network below). For example, members of the 
Hofstad network had visited him at his home.129
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3.1.2  Other terrorist activities
Suspects in the so-called Hofstad case.130 In the middle of 2002 a group of Muslim 
youths in The Hague attracted the attention of the AIVD because their behaviour 
was becoming increasingly more radical. An investigation was started into the 
group and from the middle of 2003 the AIVD identified more and more indications 
that an attack was imminent. In October 2003 the public prosecutor issued arrest 
warrants for five members of the group, which from then on was known as the 
Hofstad network. Because of lack of solid evidence, four people were released 
within two weeks, while the fifth was deported from the Netherlands.131 On 7 June 
2004 the AIVD then observed one of the main suspects, Samir Azzouz (suspect C), 
scouting the surroundings of the AIVD building. At the end of the month he was 
again arrested, this time for possible involvement in an armed robbery – which 
could, however, not be proved.132 The police did search his house and found items 
possibly related to terrorism plans: maps, photos, and drawings of objects, notes 
about security-related matters, explosives, two magazines and a silencer for an 
automatic firearm, an imitation weapon, soldered electrical circuits, a bullet-proof 
vest, a set of night-vision goggles, ammonia, and hydrochloric acid.133 The investi-
gation of Samir Azzouz led to Operation Piranha, which is discussed below.I A 
second firearm that was discovered and linked to this group was an imitation 
weapon that was found in a house raided by the police on 10 November. The casing 
of this firearm had on it the mixed DNA profile of three people: the two suspects 
who were present in the house and who had been the targets of the raid – Jason 
Walters (suspect D) and Ismail Akhnikh (suspect E) – and another person whose 
identity we were unable to discover in open sources (suspect F). More important for 
the arresting team was the fact that suspects D and E were then in possession of four 
hand grenades from the former Yugoslavia, one of which was thrown at members of 
the arresting team during the raid.134 Finally, it has become known that a loaded 
Agram 2000 machine pistol was found on the back seat of the car belonging to the 
Hofstad suspects Nouriddin El Fathni (suspect G) and his wife, Soumaya Sahla 
(suspect H), when they were stopped on 22 June 2005 at the Lelylaan station in 
Amsterdam. This incident was considered by the judge in the case to be ‘separate 
from the Hofstad network’, because when this arrest was made the other Hofstad 
suspects had already been in custody for several months.135 Both suspects G and H 
were sentenced by the court on 10 March 2006 and 18 October 2005, respectively, 
for complicity in the possession of the Agram 2000.
I Another reason is that in 2003 the AIVD had intercepted a telephone call between suspect Samir 
Azzouz and the Moroccan-Spanish terrorism suspect Abdeladim Akoudad, who was suspected of 
involvement in the attacks in Casablanca on 16 May 2003. He too was detained in January 2003 













Suspects in the Piranha case.136 This case was a follow-up of the Hofstad investigation 
and partly concerned the same suspects (suspects C, G and H, together with four 
other suspects). Four new suspects make an appearance: Mohammed Chentouf 
(suspect I), Mohammed Hamdi (suspect J) and the married couple Lahbib B. (suspect 
K) and Hanan S. (suspect L). According to the public prosecutor, all seven suspects 
were ‘on one or more occasions in possession of firearms’, including assault rifles.137 
Five of them were also suspected of transporting firearms by car to Belgium and The 
Hague (suspects G, H, I, K and L) and four of the five (all except suspect I) had prac-
tised their shooting skills ‘near a wood in Amsterdam’ using the AGRAM 2000 with 
which suspects G and H had previously been apprehended.138 The Piranha investiga-
tion started in early October 2005 with an official notice from the AIVD. The seven 
were suspected of having firm plans for attacks, including attacks on politicians and 
the AIVD building in Leidschendam ‘for the hearing of the appeal of Azzouz on 31 
October 2005’. The AIVD was subsequently able to observe suspect C trying to order 
firearms: ten Kalashnikovs, two pistols with silencers and ten belts with five kilo-
grams of explosives that worked on batteries. He was supposed to be phoned by a 
supplier in Belgium on 10 October 2005. However, the firearms dealer proved to be 
an undercover member of the AIVD: suspect C and the six co-suspects were detained 
on 14 October 2005 in The Hague, Almere, Amsterdam and Leiden.139 Two weeks 
after that arrest, the National Crime Squad searched their rented house in 
Schaarbeek (Brussels). No further firearms were found, but later the police found 
firearms and ammunition in the cellar of a block of flats in The Hague with a shared 
entrance way where suspect H, the wife of suspect G, lived.140 They were discovered 
by chance after torrential rain had flooded the cellar in early September 2006. When 
the fire brigade pumped the water out of the cellar they found two plastic bags con-
taining two magazines, 300 bullets, a Smith & Wesson revolver and a Skorpion 
vz.61 machine pistol. The Skorpion vz.61 showed ‘a very great similarity’ to a sub-
machine gun that could be seen in the background of a video made by suspect C.141 
A Dutch suspect in the Sharia4Belgium case. This suspect was Redouan Akdim 
(suspect M), one of three Dutch nationals142 who were extradited by the Netherlands 
to Belgium in the context of the major Sharia4Belgium trial in Belgium.143 Together 
with other suspects from Belgium, suspect M was thought to have obtained money 
and recruited fighters for jihad in Chechnya. The Dutch court that heard the extra-
dition case stated that in Belgium suspect M had been sentenced to eight years 
imprisonment and a fine of €11,000 for being one of the leaders of a terrorist group 
between 13 January 2010 and 24 November 2010 and for possessing, transporting 
and passing on/selling a firearm without a permit.144 The report of the ruling con-
tained several further details about the case. It was stated that suspect M was sus-
pected of trading illegal firearms in Antwerp and elsewhere in Belgium between 1 
March and 31 March 2010: ‘The illegal arms trade involved at least one firearm and 
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was committed together with [name 1], who is also suspected of involvement with a 
terrorist organisation.’ In a letter from the Belgian authorities dated 11 January 
2011, the following was also stated: “On 6 March 2010, the person claimed was detained 
on Dutch territory in a car, in which he was driving with two others. A Ruger firearm, type SP 
101, calibre .357 MAGNUM and the associated ammunition was found, which he had 
received before this in Belgium from [name 1]. A box of bullets with the label Fiocchi 9 Luger 
Palla Blindata Full Metal Jacket was also found in the car.”145 
The Winzip case. This case concerns Mohamed Abdiuwahab A. (suspect N), a Dutch 
national of Somali origin who returned to the Netherlands in the summer of 2013 
after spending six months in Syria.146 After his return, the police arrested him in 
2014 for a minor offence and placed him in a cell with an undercover officer (whom 
we shall call A). He told A about a robbery he wanted to commit. A offered to help 
him. Suspect N was then apprehended in May 2015 with three firearms in his posses-
sion: a Pachmayr riot gun with serial number JB70040, a .357 Magnum calibre 
revolver and a gas pistol converted to 6.35 mm calibre. He was also illegally in pos-
session of category III ammunition: six .38 Special calibre bullets, nine other rounds 
of ammunition, one .357 Magnum cartridge, a box with 25 rounds of 6.35 mm bullets 
and 30 shotgun cartridges. According to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, he intended 
to use the booty from the robbery to finance his terrorist activities. The element that 
makes the report of this ruling significant is that it contains several reports of inter-
cepted conversations in which the suspect arranged the purchase of firearms.
A Dutch suspect who was apprehended with a friend in Germany, probably en route to 
Syria.147 Mohamed el Atrach (suspect O) caught the attention of the Dutch police 
and Security Services because of his brother Abdelkarim el Atrach, who joined the 
terrorist movement Jahbat al-Nusra in Aleppo, and because of his connections with 
several members of a jihadist network in the Dutch city Arnhem. Suspect O was 
apprehended with survival clothing in the summer of 2013 in a car and was sus-
pected of wanting to take this clothing to his and his friends’ brothers in Syria who 
were fighting for Jabhat al-Nusra. The suspect apparently wanted to join the group 
and was convicted of ‘preparing to participate in an organisation that has the inten-
tion of committing terrorist crimes’. In the report on the ruling it was stated that 
several imitation weapon were seized from the suspect: a black pellet gun and cor-
responding pellets, a black plastic pistol and another black ‘imitation weapon’. A 
fourth imitation weapon was also seized, but the possession of this weapon was not 
prohibited and the judge ruled that it had to be returned to him.
A suspect preparing to go to Syria to participate in jihad.148 Pictures of a man with an 
AK-47 in his hands were also discovered on this potential fighter in the Syrian civil 













court records about its acquisition or who owned it. However, it was stated that 
the man had sent many text messages via services such as www.paltalk.com, 
www.militaria4you.com and www.dumpshop.online.nl. The man was declared not 
criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder: ‘The suspect was encouraged 
by hallucinations to undertake the terrorist preparatory activities for which he is 
charged.’
A suspect who was dubbed a ‘recidivist jihadist’ by the Public Prosecution Service and 
was detained on 9 October 2015 together with two other Dutch citizens149 at the border 
between Bulgaria and Turkey, en route to Syria.150 Younes A. (suspect Q) an 18-year-old 
man from Almere, was suspected of participating in a criminal organisation with 
terrorist intent: he wanted to join ISIS and, among other things, had inflammatory 
text messages on devices he owned. He was sentenced to one year in prison, eight 
months of which were suspended. The record of the ruling states that various inves-
tigations were started into this suspect in response to official AIVD reports dated 
26-10-2012, 25-03-2015 and 30-07-2015, all dealing with his intention to travel to 
Syria and participate in jihad. The last-mentioned official report also states that the 
suspect had found an arms dealer and that, if his imminent attempt to leave the 
country failed, he wanted to ‘do something’ in the Netherlands. This led to a thor-
ough investigation using far-ranging investigative measures, resulting in a new 
official report by the AIVD on 17 August 2015 specifically dealing with the firearms 
trade. The report states: “In the framework of its legal duties, the AIVD has at its dis-
posal, in addition to the official report issued on 30 July 2015, the following reliable infor-
mation: [suspect] (born on [date of birth] in [place of birth], Iraq) may, via [relevant party] 
(born on [date of birth] in [place of birth]), possess or come into possession of the [tele-
phone] number of a person who could help him acquire automatic firearms. The relevant 
party apparently spoke to [the relevant party] about this. [The] relevant party considers 
such a firearm suitable for executing a ‘lone wolf ’ action, by himself and/or with others.” 
After receipt of this notification extensive investigative resources were deployed. A 
police investigator was placed in the immediate vicinity of the suspect and he was 
eventually led to a house that was fitted with bugging equipment. The suspect was 
finally detained on 9 October 2015, because he was possibly (once again) planning 
to leave for Syria or Iraq using a forged passport. The suspect was considered ‘to a 
lesser degree criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder’, because he 
‘functioned intellectually on the border of developmental disability’.151
Also relevant is the apprehension in 2016 of the French Syrian Anis B., whom the 
French public prosecutor suspected of involvement in preparing terrorist attacks.152 
When he was apprehended, 45 kilograms of ammunition were found in his apart-
ment in Rotterdam, some for assault rifles. The public prosecutor claimed that the 
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man had bought this ammunition from Antillean criminals. NCTV Dick Schoof 
stated in a Dutch newspaper, ‘I cannot remember such a large arms find connected 
to terror ever being made before. A disturbing development.’153 
3.2  Firearms acquisition by terrorists 
Based on the previous section, we can draw up the following summary of illegal 
firearms that were linked to suspects who were convicted in the past 25 years of 
(planning) terrorist activities in the Netherlands (see Table 3). Another two suspects 
were making enquiries about purchasing firearms: the AIVD discovered that 
suspect C tried to order ten Kalashnikov-type assault rifles and two pistols with 
silencers (in addition to explosives) and that suspect P made enquiries about the 
purchase of an ‘automatic firearm’. 
Table 3: Overview of terrorist-related firearms in the Netherlands





Number of suspects who had 
access to these firearms, 
according to court records
Submachine guns
Skorpion vz.61 1 7 
Agram 2000 1 7 
Pistols
Star Firestar M-43 9 mm single-action 
semi-automatic 
1 1 
HS 2000 semi-automatic 1 1 
Gas pistol converted to 6.35 mm calibre 1 1 
Revolvers
Smith & Wesson 1 7 
Ruger SP 101 .357 Magnum 1 1 
.357 Magnum 1 1 
Others
Pachmayr riot gun with serial number 
JB70040
1 1 
Imitation weapon/pellet gun 5 5 
Total number of firearms and separate 
suspects 14 15* 













Although further details about the technical characteristics, physical condition or 
origins of these firearms are not available, we can conclude that this is a broad range 
of firearms – from automatic firearms to an imitation weapon – including sub-
machine guns, revolvers, pistols and a converted gas pistol. What further attracts 
attention is that both automatic firearms that were encountered were manufac-
tured in Central and South-Eastern Europe: in the Czech Republic (the Skorpion 
vz.61) and Croatia (the Agram 2000).
Dutch law enforcement agencies believe that terrorists in the Netherlands acquire 
their firearms through contacts in the criminal underworld. In January 2017 the 
NCTV stated that ‘Criminals and terrorists are increasingly working together. This 
means jihadists can acquire firearms more quickly.’ According to him, this inter-
connectivity between the underworld and jihadism is a recent phenomenon: ‘We 
saw this much less a few years ago. When Syrian fighters return, they know where 
they can acquire items and services.’ This could be firearms and explosives, but 
also, for example, help with entering or leaving the country unobserved. He 
explained the growing collaboration stemming from the criminal pasts of those 
involved. Their old relationships remain intact: ‘Trade is trade for criminals. They 
don’t ask questions.’154 It also emerges from research that many of the male jihad 
suspects have criminal records155 and that they sometimes use their time in prison 
to contact criminals as possible future suppliers of firearms and explosives.156 
Furthermore, witnesses and exhibits suggest that jihadists actively and – occasion-
ally – openly enquire about firearms and explosives. They then let the intended sup-
pliers know that they have connections who could supply them with the finances 
needed to purchase firearms.157 Illegal firearms dealers who focus exclusively on 
supplying firearms to jihadists in the Netherlands have not been identified.158 
Based on court records, little can be said about the specific way in which the sus-
pects described above acquired their firearms. Information on this may also be 
lacking because investigators focus primarily on the terrorist crimes themselves 
and not on the firearm. But several interesting observations arise indirectly, both in 
the two murder cases, and also in several cases where the suspects were under AIVD 
observation for a longer time, sometimes with the help of informers and under-
cover officers. Firstly, in the Piranha case it appears that the suspects who were 
living in Amsterdam also bought their firearms there.159 Secondly, also in this case, 
it is clear that the firearms circulated around the entire group of seven people and 
were also regularly moved from place to place. All the individuals in this closely 
knit network could quickly gain access to firearms. These firearms were simply 
transported in the boot of a car and not much effort was made to conceal them. 
Thirdly, particularly the Winzip case, which involved a Dutch citizen from Delft of 
Somali origin who went to Syria (suspect N), demonstrates how easily this man 
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moved in both criminal and jihadist circles. It is possible that he sold illegal fire-
arms to both fellow criminals and fellow jihadists. In the transcribed wiretapping 
reports he emerges as being able to supply all types of firearms very quickly because 
of his existing contacts in criminal circles. In 2014, for example, he said to an 
informer: “that he had once with a boy collected several firearms in Utrecht Parkwijk 
with a bag of bullets. That there was also a shotgun. That the firearms were not new but 
for his own use but that he could sell them to [undercover agent] A-2154 if he had money 
with him. Then he [the suspect] said that he could arrange two new Glocks with a lot of 
bullets for 3,000 euros each. Later [the suspect] said that if they were not new he could 
arrange something for 2,200 euros each. [The suspect] said that he could in any case give 
A-2154 a Ladykiller 6.5 so that he had something and that he could arrange more.”160 
And he said (also in 2014) to two undercover officers who had said that they needed 
firearms: “’if you need me I can help you’ or words to a similar effect. We asked him what 
do you mean by helping. To this we heard him say that he could help us with two new 
Berettas. We then asked him when he could deliver them to us. He said, in two or three 
days … We asked him whether he could deliver sooner. He then replied that he could 
supply a shotgun in three hours. … We asked him all sorts of questions about how quickly 
he could deliver and the size of the firearm. We saw that he indicated with his hands a 
size of around 60 centimetres. He said that he had something else, namely a 6 mm 
firearm, a Ladykiller. l [undercover agent A-2158] asked whether the firearm had been 
used. He answered that this was a very new one. You could easily kill somebody with it. 
He also said that he had an imitation weapon that looked like a real firearm. … We then 
asked him when he could deliver the firearms to us, he answered that he could deliver 
tomorrow around 12.00 noon or 1.00 p.m., together with a whole lot of bullets. … He told 
us that that would cost 500 to 600 euros. We asked him whether he could deliver this 
evening. He answered that it was dangerous to drive around with those things in the car 
in the evening. Then he said it could be delivered tomorrow around 12.00 noon to 1.00 
p.m. … ‘For the Berettas I have to speak to someone, perhaps it will take 1 day before I 
have them. And you must phone me tomorrow at 10.00 a.m. about the Ladykiller and the 
shotgun. We can then perhaps meet up between 12 and 1.’”
The suspect and the two undercover agents subsequently met each other again in 
2015:
During the drive, I [undercover agent A-2158] asked how much experience 
[the suspect] had with firearms. [The suspect] said that he had a lot of 
experience with Kalashnikovs. … I [A-2154] asked him whether he wanted 
to go along this evening, because this was, after all, a robbery. [The suspect] 
said to us, ‘yes, I know what we’re doing, brother’ … I [A-2158] asked [the 













and possibly using them. To this [the suspect] said ‘no, of course not. I can 
arrange and organise a lot for you’.161 
Additionally, there is unconfirmed information in one case that criminal suppliers 
who were involved in trading drugs wanted to expand their activities by selling fire-
arms to terrorists. This refers to a criminal group of Dutch nationals and Yugo-
slavians.162 The core actors were Yugoslavian brothers who had emigrated from 
Albania and the former Yugoslavia to the Netherlands. They worked as doormen, 
started cannabis plantations and later also became active in the trade in cocaine, 
ecstasy and firearms. A car tyre centre was used for money laundering, as a meeting 
place and to conceal cocaine in tyres. Firearms were also stored and traded.163 The 
available information does not reveal for which terrorists the firearms were 
intended (in the Netherlands or abroad, jihadists or others), but the criminals con-
cerned explicitly mentioned terrorists as potential buyers of their weapons.
Supplementary to this, it has become known that the firearm used by suspect B to 
murder Theo van Gogh originated from a large batch of firearms that were stolen in 
Zagreb, Croatia, in 2000.164 Most of these firearms ended up in the hands of crimi-
nals across Europe and suspect B probably also acquired his firearm from an illegal 
arms dealer in the criminal underworld.165 
Finally, in the Pim Fortuyn murder case, the suspect (suspect A) stated that he had 
bought the firearm illegally in a café in Ede, a municipality in the Netherlands with 
around 110,000 inhabitants. He probably felt reasonably at home there, since he 
had worked in the vicinity (in Wageningen). The firearm was in the lower regions in 
terms of both price and quality. It was categorised as the ‘Lada’I among firearms in 
the documentary A Democracy in Shock.166 The suspect probably paid around €150 
for it, claimed an firearms dealer who appeared as an expert witness in high-profile 
court cases.167 The scenario seems conceivable that the customer did not want to 
pay a lot of money for it: it was not a top-quality firearm and was tainted, since it 
had been used previously in a robbery and could be traced. According to the fire-
arms dealer, the suspect could have probably acquired the firearm through his own 
activist contacts. The expert indicated that in illegal circles ‘they are very reluctant 
to supply a firearm to somebody outside those circles’. The expert thought it more 
likely to have come ‘from the circles around the Basque terrorist movement ETA 
[Euskadi Ta Askatasuna]. After all, the Firestar is the service pistol of the Guardia 
Civil, the Spanish state police.’168 The Spanish company Star Bonifacio Echeverria 
SA produced these firearms until 1994. The company went bankrupt, after which 
large numbers of Spanish police officers started to sell their own firearms to legal 
I The Lada was a Russian-made car with a very poor reputation in terms of its quality and reliability.
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arms traders.169 The precise nature of the link between legal dealers and the illegal 
market in the Netherlands is not clear. On July 2002, however, a Dutch newspaper 
stated that “the firearm used to murder Fortuyn probably originated from a shipment 
that was smuggled from Spain to Belgium, and intended for the illegal market. In col-
laboration with other information and security services, including those of Spain and 
Belgium, it is being investigated whether the ‘Star Firestar’ had possibly been used previ-
ously in one of those two countries.”170 
Despite a possible connection between ETA and the environmental activist who 
killed Fortuyn, there is no evidence that terrorists with differing ideologies transfer 
firearms to one another. 
4.  Conclusions
The firearms available on the Dutch illegal market seem to be mainly supplied to 
criminals in the Netherlands itself. The availability of assault rifles has increased in 
recent years, although it remains to be seen whether this is a temporary phenome-
non because of the ‘Slovakian route’, which has now been closed, or the result of 
increased demand in the criminal underworld. The market for the main types of 
firearms used by criminals – pistols and revolvers – seems to be stable, because no 
price fluctuations have occurred. 
Apart from being sold on the Dutch market, illicit firearms are almost certainly also 
routed to other countries via the Netherlands, particularly to Ireland and the UK. 
The Netherlands does not manufacture firearms and illegal arms dealers must 
therefore smuggle the weapons into the country, steal them from licensed owners 
or buy them from other illicit dealers. Firearms originating from illegal domestic 
production are seldom encountered. 
In recent years, five important observations can be made with regard to the sources 
of the weapons on the Dutch Illicit firearms market. Firstly, like many other EU 
member states, the Netherlands has experienced increasing problems with fire-
arms that have been introduced into the illegal market through the process of recy-
cling – especially reactivated firearms coming from Slovakia. Secondly, the market 
for converted gas and alarm pistols remains substantial, and particularly converted 
alarm pistols of Turkish manufacture have recently turned up in relatively large 
numbers. A new development is the emergence of Dutch ‘converters’, while previ-
ously almost all converted pistols were brought in from abroad. Thirdly, the rela-













online shops or on the ‘dark web’ and then assembling them into complete fire-
arms. Because of differences in legal requirements among the various EU member 
states (but also between EU member states and the United States), a single part can 
usually be bought without a permit in at least one country and then be sent to the 
end user by post. For the time being, mainly firearms enthusiasts living in various 
countries who have extensive knowledge of national differences in legislation, who 
know each other from weapons fairs, and who stay in contact via closed online cha-
trooms seem to be involved in ordering and exchanging firearms parts. Fourthly, 
since 2012 a new self-built firearm has been encountered in the Netherlands: the 
‘R9 Arms’ sub-machine gun, which is probably of Croatian manufacture. Fifthly, 
thefts from licensed owners, firearms dealers and military stockpiles have been 
consistent sources of supplies for the illegal firearms market: in 2012 around 1,600 
firearms were registered in the Netherlands as missing and annually around 
300-400 new firearms thefts are reported. 
Illegal firearms seized in the Netherlands mainly originate from Germany and 
Belgium, as well as from the western Balkans. A relatively small group of firearms 
dealers import various types of firearms into the Netherlands, many of whom have 
been active for years and know each other directly or indirectly. Those who import 
firearms from countries such as Poland, Croatia and Slovakia have usually migrated to 
the Netherlands and use family members and friends who still live in their countries 
of origin to acquire firearms. It often remains unclear how a firearm is eventually sold 
to an end user. In investigations, people living in trailer parks, members of outlawed 
motorcycle gangs, criminal groups of Antillean or former-Yugoslavian origins, and 
criminal youth groups have been linked to the domestic illegal sale of firearms. Some 
youth gangs trade converted gas and alarm pistols and carry out contract killings. 
Two terrorist attacks in the Netherlands in the past 25 years (1991-2017) were com-
mitted with firearms (the politically motivated murders of Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and 
of Theo van Gogh in 2004). In addition, Dutch law enforcement agencies have 
arrested (and often jailed) at least 15 other terror suspects who possessed illegal fire-
arms or came close to acquiring them. The suspects possessed a broad range of 
illegal firearms – from automatic firearms to imitation weapons – including not 
only sub-machine guns, but also revolvers and pistols, and a converted gas pistol. 
Terrorists in the Netherlands are believed to acquire their firearms through their 
own (often previous) criminal connections. Illegal firearms dealers who focus 
exclusively on supplying firearms to jihadists in the Netherlands have not been 
observed. The police suspect that interconnectivity and collaboration between 
criminals and jihadists have increased in recent years, which means that the acqui-
sition of firearms has become simpler and thus also quicker for terrorists. Based on 
particular cases, observations about the acquisition of firearms are as follows: that 
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firearms are acquired close to the place where the suspects live or in a social envi-
ronment that they know; that firearms circulate within groups of like-minded indi-
viduals and are then regularly moved from place to place; that firearms are trans-
ported in the boot of a car or in a van and not much effort is made to conceal them; 
and that there are people who deal in firearms and move equally easily in criminal 
and jihadist circles.
Because of the threat and (potential) impact of possible terrorist attacks with fire-
arms, but also based on concerns about the increasing use of automatic firearms by 
criminals in the Netherlands, national policy to tackle illegal firearms has been 
upgraded since 2015. In the past two years the number of criminal investigations 
and seizures of caches of firearms have increased. In the future the police intend to 
focus their efforts on four fronts in order to reduce the number of assault rifles avail-
able in the criminal underworld; reduce the flow of illegal firearms that come to the 
Netherlands from the western Balkans; combat the online acquisition of firearms 
and firearms components (and their dispatch via the postal service); and improve 
monitoring of the access to firearms of people with a criminal profile or who form 
part of a criminal network, focusing on radicalised people or those in the process of 
being radicalised. The national prevention policy to limit the acquisition of illegal 
firearms or the trade in firearms for terrorist purposes has intensified since 2005. 
The Dutch police have increasingly participated in international investigations (e.g. 
in a JIT) and focused on increasing their cooperation with other countries’ law 
enforcement agencies. Of crucial importance is the strengthening of the network 
of police liaison officers stationed in or near the western Balkans countries 
(Albania, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia). Collabora-
tion with international actors such as Europol, Interpol and Eurojust is mainly 
characterised by the participation of Dutch firearms experts in relevant interna-
tional con sul tations. 
Recently the Dutch minister of safety and justice made combating the trafficking of 
and trade in illegal firearms a priority of the country’s law enforcement agencies. 
The authorities struggle with the fact that in the Netherlands illegal firearms con-
stitute a relatively small criminal market (when compared to drugs, for instance) 
and suppliers are often mainly involved in other types of crimes. Threat assess-
ments should, however, emphasise the impact of the damage that a criminal or ter-
rorist can potentially inflict with even a single automatic rifle, instead of focusing 
on numbers only. Every firearm in the hands of a determined perpetrator of vio-
lence constitutes a national threat and this alone should suffice to guarantee that 
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firearms and security at the EU 
eastern border
Roxana Albisteanu, Alexandru Dena  
and Matthew Lewis
From a security perspective Romania is in a challenging geographical position and 
has to secure over 2,000 km of the external borders of the European Union (EU). 
Nonetheless, through strong cooperation with EU institutions, strong regulations 
on firearms and effective preventive measures against terrorist risks it has managed 
to become one of the safest countries in the EU, with fewer than ten gun-related 
homicides per year and no terrorist attacks in more than 20 years. While a series of 
complex factors contribute to this picture and other related factors are unknown 
due to the lack of publicly available data, it is interesting to analyse what has worked 
so far in terms of policies and regulations, and the main risks that Romania faces 
presently and will face in the future from the perspective of its illicit firearms 
market and terrorist access to it.
Our analysis is based on quantitative and qualitative methods and consists mainly 
of desk-based research and interviews (see Box 1). However, several major chal-
lenges significantly hinder a comprehensive analysis of these issues in Romania. 
The episodic nature of transactions on the illicit firearms market1 and the low 
overall capacity of the Romanian public administration (including law enforce-
ment institutions) to systematically collect data and use them to support evidence-
based policy-making2 (as indicated in the European Commission’s 2016 Romania 
Country Report) poses a series of challenges in the process of systematically collect 
and analyse aggregated data based on information from various law enforcement 
or judicial authorities at the national level on firearms trafficking, gun-related vio-
lence, the potential relationship of gun traffickers to terrorist organisations, and 
the links among all these indicators. For research purposes, access to relevant 
aggregated data is difficult, particularly in terms of assessing if there is a connec-
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tion between terrorist activities and the illicit firearms market. The main institu-
tion charged with counter-terrorism in Romania is the Romanian Intelligence 
Service (SRI), which is the Coordinator of the National System for Preventing and 
Countering Terrorism. This makes field research in the area very difficult, since 
interviewing experts working on counter-terrorism, most of whom work for the 
SRI, is very difficult, and information on counter-terrorism is mostly classified. 
There is also a significant lack of publicly available data in this area. 
 
In the first section we discuss existing legislation dealing with the illegal posses-
sion, use and trafficking of firearms, national policy on the illicit firearms market in 
general and terrorist access to that market in particular. We focus on the key policy 
instruments, the main national players in the fight against the illicit firearms 
market and cooperation between the relevant national services and similar national 
law enforcement agencies in Europe, as well as international players (such as 
Europol). We end this section by identifying the main challenges facing national 
policy on the illicit firearms market in general and terrorist access to that market in 
particular.
Based on the available sources of information, the second section provides an anal-
ysis of the characteristics of the illicit firearms market, including potential diver-
sion from the legal market, existing military stockpiles, and other factors such as 
convertibility and reactivation. The section also discusses the illicit firearms market 
in terms of the firearms that are available, their geographical origin, their prices, 
how they ended up on this market, the characteristics and dynamics of supply 
chains, and the profile of the players involved in this market based on an analysis of 
case studies, official reports, jurisprudence, and media articles for the period 
2010-2016. 
The third section provides a short description of terrorist activities in Romania in 
the past 25 years and discusses whether the country’s illicit firearms market is 
connected to terrorism. The number of case studies dealing with this issue is 









Box 1: Research design
The desk-based research for the first chapter consisted of a review of exist-
ing literature on the characteristics of the illicit firearms market and terrorist 
activities in Romania; the publicly available statistical data on the size, 
nature and supply chains of the illicit firearms market in the country; and the 
annual reports of the General Inspectorate of the Romanian Police (IGPR), 
the General Inspectorate of the National Border Police (IGPF), the Directorate 
for Investigating Organised Crime and Terrorism (DIICOT) – General 
Prosecutor’s Office, and the SRI. We also reviewed open-source information 
on the illicit firearms market in Romania between 2010 and 2016 (over 400 
unique cases were identified from national and local media reports, while 
several hundred media articles were consulted). 
Furthermore, as part of the field research, discussions with some of the main 
institutional actors in this area were held during an expert round-table dis-
cussion (held under Chatham House rules) organised at the headquarters of 
the European Commission’s Representation in Romania on 26 April 2017. The 
round-table discussion addressed the research questions of the SAFTE project 
one by one and facilitated an exchange of information among all the institu-
tions involved. The participants were specialists from the Criminal Investigation 
Directorate, Intelligence Analysis Unit and Terrorism Department of the 
National Police; the National Authority for the Control of Exports (ANCEX, 
which is part of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs); the Military Technical 
Academy; and the Southeast European Law Enforcement Centre (SELEC). A 
separate discussion with the Weapons, Explosives and Hazardous Substances 
Directorate of the National Police was held in the following month.
In addition, we consulted court records of illicit firearms cases for the period 
2010-2016 to obtain information on how various types of firearms have 
ended up on the illegal market, the characteristics and dynamics of the 
related supply chains, the geographical origin of various types of firearms, 
and the profile of players involved in the market. This information was 
obtained through the online jurisprudence database of the Superior Council 
of Magistracy (http://www.rolii.ro). Available court records related to possible 
cases of the acquisition or attempted acquisition by terrorists of illicit fire-
arms were searched, but no cases were found. As the report shows, Romanian 
legislation does not allow that public court records for cases of terrorism-
related activities provide any information on these cases.
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1.  Romanian laws and national policy  
to fight the illicit firearms market and 
terrorist access to it
As we illustrate in the following sections, firearms trafficking and gun-related 
crime in Romania are believed to be significantly lower than in other EU countries. 
Even though it is difficult to determine the size of the country’s illicit firearms 
market, it is estimated to be quite small. This is due partly to strict regulations on 
gun possession, to a weak gun ownership culture and to the fact that organised 
crime groups (usually the main actors involved in firearms trafficking) have a dif-
ferent focus in their criminal activities on Romanian territory. 
1.1 Legal framework of the arms and ammunition regime
The regime to control arms and ammunition is regulated by Law 295/2004 and the 
secondary legislation derived from it: Government Decision 130/2005 on the 
Metho dological Norms for the Application of Law 95/2004, and Government 
Decision 1914/2006 on the Methodological Norms for the Application of the 
Provisions of Chapter VI of Law 295/2004. 
According to Article 2.2 of Law 295/2004, a firearm is any portable gun with a barrel 
that can expell, is designed to expell, or can be transformed to expell a pellet, bullet 
or projectile by the action of a propellant fuel. It is considered that an object can be 
transformed for this purpose if it has the appearance of a firearm and, as a result of 
its construction or the material from which it is made, can be transformed for this 
purpose. According to the Criminal Code (2014), the breache of the arms and ammu-
nition regime consists of failure to comply with the arms and ammunition regime, 
the illegal use of firearms, and the forgery and modification of firearms (as well as 
erasing markings on firearms). The Customs Code defines firearms smuggling as 
‘introducing into the country or taking outside of the country firearms, ammuni-
tion … without authorisation’, which is punishable with imprisonment for between 
three and 12 years. 
In recent years Law 295/2004 has been amended several times and made more 
restrictive (see Box 2). According to the information presented on the website of the 
National Police, the regulatory changes to the arms and ammunition regime were 
adopted in the context of harmonising the country’s national legislative framework 
with European regulations covering this area (Directive 477/1991/CEE of the Council 
of the EU on controlling the acquisition and possession of weapons, as amended and 








future to conform with the proposed new EU Directive on firearms,3 although for the 
most part Romanian legislation is stricter than the new provisions of this Directive. 
An example is that firearms and weapons subject to declaration in Category C of the 
Directive are governed by tighter regulations in Romanian law, since they are 
included in Category B: Firearms subject to authorisation. Some other provisions 
recently added to the new EU Directive – such as the requirements for psychological 
and medical examinations – were already in place in the Romanian law.
Box 2: Recent amendments to Law 295/2004
2008: Emergency Ordinance 26/2008 amended Law 295/2004 by providing a 
tightening of the conditions for purchasing and owning weapons that use 
compressed air expansion as a propellant. Previously, airguns could be 
bought and owned without restriction, even though they could fire metal 
projectiles.
2011: Law 117/2011 amended Law 295/2004 by introducing the obligation to 
obtain a holder’s licence for non-lethal weapons similar to the one required 
for lethal weapons, and requiring stricter storage conditions for non-lethal 
weapons, which are now the same as for lethal weapons. 
2014: After the entry into force of the new Criminal Code in 2014, Law 
295/2004 was republished because the chapter on gun-related crimes was 
now covered in the Criminal Code. 
Before the adoption of the new Criminal Code, illicit trafficking in firearms 
was regulated by Law 295/2004 and was punishable by imprisonment of 
between three and eight years. With the adoption of the new Criminal Code 
(2014), the article that defined illegal trafficking in Law 295/2004 was 
repealed.4 The offence is now defined by the Criminal Code as ‘any other 
operation regarding the movement of firearms without right’, as well as by 
the Customs Code (see above). 
The offences related to the arms and ammunition regime dealt with in the 
Criminal Code are: 
• failure to comply with the arms and ammunition regime (art. 342). The 
theft of firearms and ammunition was introduced as a distinct provision, 
while other provisions under this article include: owning/carrying/manu-
facturing or any other operation regarding the movement of firearms 
without authorisation and the operation of illegal repair shops, which is 
punishable by one to five years of imprisonment;
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• the illegal use of firearms: there is a differentiation between the illegal 
use of lethal and non-lethal firearms; the penalties are one to three years 
of imprisonment for lethal firearms and six months to two years for non-
lethal firearms; and
• the forgery and modification of firearms, as well as erasing markings on 
firearms (with penalties of between one and three years).
2015: Law 319/2015 to amend Law 295/2004 introduces tighter rules for 
holders of lethal and non-lethal weapons, making them subject to authori-
sation dependent on psychological and medical examinations. Specifically, 
holders are obliged to be subjected to such examinations at the express 
request of the competent police structures or at the express recommenda-
tion of the doctor and/or psychologist of the competent authority if there 
are behavioural indications that such examinations are needed.
2017: Law 22/2017 introduced minor changes to Law 295/2014 prohibiting 
the testing and evaluation by natural or legal persons of weapons systems 
and devices.
1.1.1  Main elements of the Romanian legislative framework on 
civilian firearms possession
Gun control in Romania can be categorised as restrictive: lethal handguns can only 
be acquired by police officers, members of the military, magistrates, diplomats and 
members of Parliament for the purposes of self-defence and protection. Military 
weapons may be owned and used only by specialised structures within the defence, 
public order and national security services. Besides these categories, civilians can 
also own rifles and smooth bore shotguns if they are registered hunters, but only in 
terms of the conditions laid down by the law, while sports shooting weapons can be 
purchased by athletes and coaches, as well as by hunters. Lethal collectible 
weapons can only be purchased by weapons collectors. Non-lethal weapons can be 
acquired and owned for self-defence purposes according to the conditions laid 
down by the law. 
A permit must be obtained to own all categories of lethal and non-lethal weapons, 
which requires prior notification of the police, medical and psychological tests, a 
clean criminal record and the installation of proper safekeeping facilities at home. 
A gun licence is valid for five years from the date of issue or from the date of the last 
extension. In order to extend the validity of the weapons permit, the holder is 








within whose territorial jurisdiction he/she is domiciled or residing and to present 
the weapons covered by the permit and the required documents. The validity of the 
licence can be extended by the competent authority for a period of five years if the 
holder meets the conditions stipulated by law and the weapons in question have 
been submitted to periodical technical inspections.
The legal requirements governing gun sales, transfers, storage, marking and tracing 
in Romania5 are the same for lethal and non-lethal weapons:
• The private sale and transfer of firearms are prohibited unless carried out by 
licenced entities and registered with the police. Dealing in firearms without 
a valid gun dealer’s licence is unlawful. The owner of a gun shop is required 
to report a lost or stolen weapon to the police within 24 hours. 
• Firearm regulations include written specifications for the lawful safe storage 
of private firearms and ammunition by licensed gun owners, the lawful safe 
storage of firearms and ammunition by state entities, and the lawful safe 
storage of firearms and ammunition while in transit.
• A unique identifying mark on each firearm is required by law. State authori-
ties carry out recognised arms-tracing and -tracking procedures.
• Gun owners have the right to carry firearms in public places under certain 
conditions:
 – Lethal handguns should not be loaded and should be kept in a holster at 
all times, hidden from sight. The law exempts authorised individuals 
from this requirement. Other restrictions refer to handing over the 
weapon for safekeeping when entering a public institution and not being 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
 – Legal owners are allowed to carry only one non-lethal handgun, but not 
in crowded places such as stadiums, concert halls and public gatherings. 
The same rules covering alcohol and drugs also apply to the carrying of 
non-lethal handguns.
Owning lethal weapons
According to Law 295/2004, weapons for self-defence and personal security can 
only be purchased by the following categories of persons:
• dignitaries, magistrates, diplomats, military personnel and police officers, 
who may carry such weapons during working hours and after work, includ-
ing if they have retired, unless they no longer qualify to own such weapons;
• persons who carry out a function involving the exercise of public authority 
during the period of their mandate; and
• persons in witness protection programmes.
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Hunting weapons can be purchased by hunters and can only be long-range weapons. 
Legally owned weapons may only be sold through gunsmiths or brokers authorised 
to sell such weapons. Authorisation for the procurement of lethal weapons is 
limited by a number of conditions aimed at limiting the misuse of these weapons 
(see Box 3).
Box 3: Basic conditions for possessing firearms in Romania 
People can own firearms in Romania if they fulfil the following require ments:
A. They have reached the age of 18.
B.  They are part of one of the categories allowed by law to posess firearms 
and have made the relevant applications for official authorisation.
C.  They have not been convicted by a court and sentenced to life imprison-
ment or imprisonment for more than one year for intentional offences or 
for offences provided by the law.
D.  They are currently not currently under indictment in criminal cases for 
intentional acts.
E.  They are psychologically and physically fit to possess and use weapons 
and ammunition.
F.  They do not pose a threat to public order, national security, and the lives 
and physical safety of other people, according to the information available 
to the licensing bodies.
G.  They have completed a theoretical and practical training course, pre-
sented by a person legally authorised to provide such training, under the 
conditions laid down in the relevant law.
H.  Their right to purchase, hold or use lethal or non-lethal weapons subject 
to authorisation has not been cancelled in the previous two years, except 
in cases where the cancellation was ordered according to the provisions 
of Law 295/2004.
I.  No lethal weapons or non-lethal weapons subject to authorisation have 
been lost by or stolen from them in the last five years for reasons of neg-









The amendments to Law 295/20046 tried to tackle the issue of blank-firing pistols (as 
part of the non-lethal category of weapons) and the possible threat posed by unre-
stricted access to such guns by imposing stricter regulation of their ownership (the 
requirement of undergoing a medical and psychological test and the need to have a 
clean criminal record to obtain a permit to own them, as well as other conditions). 
Romanian citizens and residents of EU Member States residing in Romania, as well 
as non-EU foreigners legally resident in Romania who are 18 years old, may acquire 
non-lethal weapons in categories C and D (see Box 4), as well as related ammunition 
from any dealer and, where applicable, an intermediary who sells such weapons 
under the terms of the authorisation (Category C) or prior notification (Category D). 
Box 4: Classification of non-lethal firearms7
Category C: Arms subject to authorisation:
1.  short arms (pistols or revolvers) designed to expel rubber projectiles, and 
the corresponding ammunition;
2.  short or long weapons that use the expansion force of compressed air or 
pressurised gases in a container to expel a projectile at a speed of more 
than 220 m/s;
3.  short or long weapons that use the expansion force of compressed air or 
pressurised gases in a container to expel a metal projectile that does not 
develop a velocity of more than 220 m/s; and
4.  short arms (pistols or revolvers) designed to produce noise or to disperse 
noxious, irritating or neutralising gases, as well as appropriate ammunition.
Category D: Arms subject to notification:
1.  tranquilising guns;
2.  signalling guns and appropriate ammunition;
3.  starting guns used in sports competitions and appropriate ammunition;
4.  deactivated weapons and appropriate ammunition;
5.  theatre props and appropriate ammunition;
6.  crossbows and the appropriate projectiles; and
7.  antique weapons and appropriate ammunition. 
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Non-lethal weapons cannot be sold or lent by their owners, unless this is notified to 
the competent police body. Non-lethal weapons are subjected to restrictions regard-
ing entry into public institutions and shipping or air transport.
Notification of the procurement of non-lethal Category D weapons shall be made in 
writing and shall be accompanied by an identity document (the original or a copy) cer-
tifying the applicant’s age and, where appropriate, legal residence in Romania. After 
procuring any of the non-lethal weapons listed in Category D, the applicant is obliged to 
submit within five days to the competent body that issued the proof of notification an 
application for the issuance of a holder’s certificate (Annex 15 of Government Directive 
130/24.02.2005) and the non-lethal weapon registration in this document. 
1.2  Romanian national policy to address the illicit firearms 
market and terrorist access to it
No publicly available strategy or other type of policy documentI deals with the illicit 
firearms market and terrorist access to it in Romania. These issues are, however, 
addressed separately in wider strategies, such as the National Strategy for Public 
Order and Safety and the National Defence Strategy 2015-2019. 
The National Strategy for Public Order and Safety8 describes the smuggling of 
goods across national borders as one of the main threats to public safety and there-
fore defines control actions particularly at ports infrastructure and land border-
crossing points. Although there is no specific focus in this policy document on fire-
arms trafficking or its potential links to terrorist activities, the main risks and 
vulnerabilities identified in the strategy – drug trafficking, human trafficking, 
illegal migration and the smuggling of goods across the border – are all activities 
associated with the use of firearms for protection purposes, as identified in the 
media analysis conducted for this study.
Among the objectives of this strategy, the general aim of preventing and combating 
organised crime, cross-border crime, and terrorism includes as one of its specific 
objectives the improvement of operational capacity to prevent, anticipate, and 
combat organised crime and terrorism, through:
I According to Government Decision 870/2006, in Romania three types of policy documents are 








• the identification and destruction of criminal networks specialising in drug 
trafficking as well as terrorist activities;
• ensuring the security, efficient functioning and availability of the informa-
tion systems of national structures dealing with these issues;
• extending the Europol Secure Information Exchange Network (SIENA) to all 
relevant national structures involved in the fight against organised crime;
• improving structured data/information collection tools and analysis 
instruments;
• improving the efficiency of crime prevention systems and early warning 
mechanisms for the purposes of anticipating threats, and preventing, detect-
ing and prosecuting serious offences;
• reducing drug demand and supply, and strengthening research, evaluation 
and information; and
• expanding cooperation and other actions to prevent and combat the various 
forms of serious crime and terrorism.
 
The National Defence Strategy 2015-2019 is based on an extended approach to secu-
rity, covering not only the military dimension of national security, but economic, 
social, political, technological and environmental aspects as well. Terrorism is 
acknowledged as a persistent threat, including from the perspective of identifying 
and dismantling recruitment and financing flows related to terrorism. Radicalis-
ation, cross-border crime (including drug trafficking; trafficking in people, firearms 
and goods; and illegal migration) and the illegal trafficking of conventional 
weapons that may derive from the intentions of state and non-state actors to carry 
out operations targeting conflict areas/potential conflict areas are recognised as 
risks to national security.9
Data linking the illicit arms market and terrorist activities are very difficult to find. 
There is no publicly available document that links the policy priorities for combat-
ing these two issues. This is largely because the main counter-terrorism actor is the 
SRI, which means that most data in this field are classified. In Romania, Law 
535/2004 classifies terrorism as a national security issue. As such, even though 
there is a national Strategy to Combat Terrorism, this document is not publicly 
available. 
The lack of reliable statistical data from these documents as well as the lack of an 
evidence-based approach and of specific, measurable and achievable objectives 
with a set of indicators to measure impact significantly reduce the relevance and 
effectiveness of any discussion of the policy framework in this area. 
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1.3  Actors and cooperation in the fight against the illicit 
firearms market
Law 295/2004 designates the General Inspectorate of the Romanian Police as the 
competent authority exercising control over the possession, carrying, and use of 
weapons and ammunition, as well as on operations with arms and ammunition. 
The National Border Police can also be considered to be one of the main actors in 
the fight against the illicit firearms market. The Romanian Intelligence Service is 
the national authority that deals with the prevention and combating of terrorism.
1.3.1  Inter-agency cooperation on firearms and terrorism in 
Romania
Data on firearms ownership are centralised in a national record of firearms owners 
and the firearms owned by such owners, to which multiple agencies have access (see 
Box 5). All legal owners of firearms are required to register in the National Firearms 
Registry, which is held by the IGPR’s Weapons Explosives and Hazardous Substances 
Directorate, which administers the records of the legal owners of arms and ammuni-
tion, whether Romanian or foreign, natural or legal persons, on the territory of 
Romania. The centralised nature of the record-keeping system provides reliable 
data on firearms owners, and the lethal and non-lethal weapons owned in Romania. 
To combat organised crime and firearms trafficking, Law 39/2003 established a 
central analysis and coordination group for the prevention of criminality. This 
group takes the necessary measures to draw up and update the National Action 
Plan for Preventing and Combating Organised Crime.
The National Strategy to Prevent and Counter Terrorism establishes the basis for 
the creation of the National System for Preventing and Countering Terrorism, 
which consists of a mechanism for cross-sectoral inter-institutional cooperation 
that includes all the authorities and public institutions with responsibilities in this 
field, namely the:
• Supreme Defence Council, which is responsible for strategic coordination; 
• SRI, which is responsible for technical coordination;
• government ministries dealing with foreign affairs, defence, internal affairs, 
finance, justice, transport, health, agriculture, labour, the economy, the envi-
ronment, European funds, youth, culture and regional development; and 
• other national authorities: the External Intelligence Service, Security and 








Romania, General Prosecutor’s Office, National Office for Preventing and 
Countering Money Laundering, National Commission for the Control of 
Nuclear Activities, National Agency for Exports Control, and National Agency 
for the Control of Strategic Exports and Prohibiting Chemical Weapons. 
Box 5: Access to the National Firearms Registry10
Records kept
Access (internally 
– IGPR) Access (externally)
• Lethal weapons
• Non-lethal weapons
• Legal owners of weapons and 
ammunition, and data on 
authorisation, possession, 
use and transfer documents
• Existing gun shops and 
armouries on the Romanian 
territory and data on the 
documents for authorisation, 
possession, use and transfer
• Shooting ranges
• Lost and found weapons and 
ammunition
• Weapons and ammunition 
generally pursued on 
Romanian territory and 
internationally









• Directorate of 
Operative









• The structure that manages 
the National Firearms 
Registry connects through 
the National Component of 
the Schengen Information 
System and through the 
SIRENE Bureau with similar 
structures in EU Member 
States for the mutual 
exchange of data and 
information on the 
circulation of arms and 
ammunition from Romania 
to the EU and vice versa.
• Access of similar structures 
in EU Member States to the 
National Firearms Registry 
occurs through the above-
mentioned cooperation 
structures, according to the 
access and security levels 
established by law.
 
A 2004 decision of the Supreme Defence Council established the National System 
of Terrorist Alert to support the planning process for counter-terrorism activities 
at the national level and to inform citizens on the level of terrorist threat in the 
country.
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1.3.2  European and international cooperation
Romania cooperates with all European and international partners according to 
national and international regulations. Romania is connected to the various 
European networks and databases (SIS, Prum, etc.), and also to the Interpol 
network.
In matters of fighting criminality, the International Police Cooperation Centre 
(CCPI), which forms part of the Romanian Police, is the only central structure spe-
cialising in the exchange of international data and information on combating 
cross-border crime. The CCPI controls four cooperation channels: the National 
Focal Point, Europol National Unit, Interpol National Office and SIRENE system. 
Through these channels the CCPI aids the international exchange of information of 
several national institutions – the Ministry of Internal Affairs, SRI, Public Ministry 
(General Prosecutor’s Office), National Customs Authority, National Office for 
Preventing and Fighting Money Laundering – with international partners such as 
Europol, Interpol, SELEC and foreign liaison officers.
The legal framework for this cooperation consists of:
• Emergency Ordinance 103 of 13 December 2006, which defines measures to 
facilitate international police cooperation;




• the SECI agreement (SELEC); and
• Interior Ministry Order 200/2004 on the exchange of information through 
the National Focal Point.
 
Cases of cooperation in large-scale operations against drugs, human trafficking and 
cybercrime are numerous. They involve many EU Member States and non-EU coun-
tries (the United States, Brazil, etc.) and can be found in the annual reports of the 
relevant agencies. 
In terms of cooperation on firearms, Romania has in recent years received tracing 
requests from Brazil, Colombia, France, Hungary, the Russian Federation, Serbia 
and the United States, and has sent tracing requests to France, Germany and Italy.11 
There is only one publicly known case of successful cooperation in a large-scale 
firearms-related operation: in 2017 Europol announced the results of Operation 








countries and with the full operational and analytical support of Europol. The oper-
ation seized 556 firearms, 131 of which had been converted. It was the first European 
operation that tried to deal with the issue of blank-firing pistols and the threat 
posed by differences in national legislation on owning such pistols (for additional 
information, see section 2.2). As an observation, the effect of this type of operations 
is limited in terms of countering this phenomenon, since the differences in legisla-
tion between participating states do not allow prosecutions to take place in all 
cases, e.g. differences in procedures for conducting operations and differences in 
definitions of the relevant offences.
In terms of cooperation on terrorism, from the publicly available information we 
have been able to identify one case of cooperation that has occurred: the 2011 
annual report of the DIICOT refers to the indictment of an Iraqi citizen, Al Dulaimi 
Ali Asae Mohamad, in terms of Article 33 of Law 535/2004, which deals with pre-
venting and countering terrorism. The defendant had established four commercial 
entities for the purpose of aiding entry to and exit from the country and prolonging 
the right to stay in Romania of five Iraqi citizens (Omar Farid Ahmed, Falah M. 
Salem, Aqeel Mohammed Dhuyab, Omar Assey and Muntasier Aassi) while 
knowing that they had aided or committed terrorist attacks on behalf of Al-Qaeda 
in Iraq. DIICOT prosecutors cooperated with authorities from Iraq, Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Sweden in this case.
However, there are challenges to cooperation both on the national and interna-
tional levels and measures that can be taken to improve it. One of these challenges 
is related to data collection and analysis and the absence of a centralised focal point 
through which to collect and exchange information.
As the DIICOT 2015 annual report stated,12 there is a need for an integrated approach 
to preventing and combating organised crime in Romania that should have three 
pillars:
1. A mechanism should be established to carry out a national risk and threat 
analysis of organised crime. This could include analysis of the potential rela-
tions between organised crime and terrorism, including the access of terror-
ists to firearms and other types of weapons. This analysis would feed on 
information received from various departments and agencies (DIICOT, IGPR, 
IGPF, SRI, etc.)., which means that a unified system for data collection and 
reporting should be established and a legal framework to support this should 
be created. The priorities and resources of the competent authorities in this 
field should be allocated based on this analysis.
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2. A national strategy should be drafted to combat organised crime based on 
the risks and threats identified by the above-mentioned analysis.
3. A multi-annual and inter-institutional action plan should be drafted and 
implemented.
2.  Characteristics of Romania’s illicit firearms 
market 
This section provides an analysis of the main characteristics of the supply and 
demand affecting the illicit firearms market in Romania. The analysis is mainly 
based on data and case studies collected from three types of sources: annual activ-
ity reports of relevant key institutions for the period 2010-2016, online media arti-
cles on gun-enabled crime (2010-2016) and reports of international organisations 
(such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Europol, etc.). 
Unfortunately, publicly available data do not allow a precise determination of 
these characteristics and a comprehensive picture of this phenomenon. Annual 
activity reports and reports of international organisations sometimes contain 
slightly different data, while media reports obviously cannot provide a compre-
hensive picture, because they are focused on firearms seizures and/or shootings; 
do not cover all the existing cases; and do not always include all the relevant 
details (e.g. if the firearms used in shootings were illegally held or not). The analy-
sis of court files also offers an incomplete picture, because only cases that have 
gone to court are covered. 
2.1  Estimating the size of Romania’s illicit firearms  
market
All legal owners of firearms (lethal or non-lethal) are required to register with the 
National Firearms Registry, which is held by IGPR’s Department for Firearms 
Explosives and Dangerous Substances. The centralised nature of the Romanian 
record-keeping system provides reliable data on firearms owners and the lethal and 
non-lethal weapons that they own. Although these records are secret (in accord-
ance with the provisions of Law 295/2004), general statistical data are publicly 
available in annual police activity reports (see Table 1). Unfortunately, these data are 
only available for 2010, 2011 and 2013, and are not included in the reports for 2012, 
2014, 2015 and 2016, which indicates inconsistencies in the way in which data are 


























































Despite the lack of data for recent years, we can conclude that the number of legal 
owners of both lethal and non-lethal firearms in Romania is quite low relative to the 
size of the population (approximately 20 million) and compared to other EU 
member states. According to data from international reports, such as the UNODC 
Study on Firearms 2015, Romania has an average of 0.4 annual rate of firearms seized 
in Romania by the police per 100,000 residents.These low figures are due mainly to 
strict gun ownership laws and a weak gun-ownership culture. Consequently, the 
legal market for lethal handgun imports is rather small. Only certain categories of 
citizens are allowed to apply for permits to carry guns for self-defence and personal 
security purposes (members of the judiciary, police, Parliament and the military).
Generally, estimating the size of the illicit gun market is generally a more difficult 
endeavour than estimating figures for legal gun ownership due to the hidden charac-
ter of the phenomenon, but also because of the lack of reliable and detailed quantita-
tive data for this phenomenon. This is also the case in Romania. The analysis of 
reports that provide data on illegal firearms available at the national level and discus-
sions with law enforcement experts in Romania indicate that there could be an 
important hidden variable in the structure of indicators that reflect the illegal market. 
Firstly, these data only refer to operations conducted by the relevant authorities 
and, as such, to firearms that have been seized. There is no publicly available record 
or estimate of inferred firearms . Secondly, the data on seized firearms also include 
legally owned firearms that have been seized for various reasons, including, for 
I No available data in the annual report for the year in question.
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example, non-compliant storage.I Therefore the data on seized firearms do not 
reflect only illicitly held firearms. In addition, when analysing the data from the 
annual activity reports of the IGPR, the IGPF and airport units of the SRI on firearms 
seizures, shootings, and the illegal use or possesion of firearms, there appears to be 
no accepted inter-agency method of collecting, categorising and analysing data. 
This is not only the case among the various institutions, but also within the same 
institution from one yearly activity report to the next. It is also not clear if the data 
included in the SRI annual reports also include cases of illegal firearms possession 
at airports as recorded in the official IGPF reports. Furthermore, there are differ-
ences between the data on seized firearms in the national reports and data included 
in the reports of international organisations such as UNODC, the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, or Europol).
Notwithstanding these problems, we will give a brief overview of these figures to 
give at least a partial picture of the problem and its size. Table 2 includes the avail-
able figures on gun crime, the illegal use of firearms, and seized firearms as recorded 
by the IGPR between 2010 and 2016. These figures indicate that gun homicides and 
armed robberies in which a firearm was used are limited in Romania. The figures 
also show significant differences in the number of firearms seized in the country. It 
is currently unclear if the higher number of firearms seized in 2013, 2014 and 2016 
represent a trend of increasing illegal firearms possession, or reflect an increased 
awareness of the problem and related heightened police attention, or are merely a 
coincidence. Interestingly, where data are available (2011 and 2013), these figures 
suggest that a significant share of seized firearms are of the non-lethal kind. 
For firearms seizures given in Table 2, it is not always stated how many of them were 
illegally owned firearms or legally owned firearms that were illegally used/stored 
and consequently seized (in 2011 only 343 seized firearms were illegally owned out 
of a total of 2,569). This also adds to the observation that data are not consistently 
reported, as Table 2 shows. 









Table 2:  Firearms-related crimes and seized firearms according  


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Some figures on illicit firearms trafficking are also available. The IGPF annually 
records tens of cases of illicit firearms trafficking (see Table 3). Again, however, 
these figures vary considerably from year to year. In 2015, for example, 45 firearms 
and 2,899 cartridges were seized at the border, compared to 268 (mostly non-lethal) 
firearms and 111,483 cartridges in 2013. 
In its annual reports, the SRI, which is responsible for security at airports, reported 
the following figures for firearms and cartridges seized in airport control operations:I 
• 2011: 127 firearms and 1,670 cartridges; 
• 2012: 17 firearms and 2,532 cartridges; and 
• 2013: four firearms and 60 cartridges.
Table 3:  Firearms-trafficking cases and seized firearms and ammunition  
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62 firearms (15 
hunting rifles, 
15 gas pistols, 2 
CO2 pistols, 2 
military pistols 
and 28 other 
firearms)
45 firearms  
(5 hunting rifles, 
1 sporting rifle, 
7 gas pistols, 
8 CO2 pistols 






89,507 111,483 174,401 2,899
Given the lack of reliability and comparability of the official data on seized firearms 
and related crimes, we developed our own database of seized (lethal and non-lethal) 
firearms and incidents involving the illegal use of firearms based on an analysis of 
online media reports.II These figures confirm the significant share of seized 
I Even though we did not manage to find out if these numbers are included in IGPF reports (the 
IGPF is supposed to receive the firearms that the SRI seizes at airports), the numbers for 2011, for 
example, seem to suggest that this is not happening (127 seized firearms reported by the SRI and 
only 109 by the IGPF).








non-lethal firearms (blank-firing pistols or air rifles) in the country (see Table 4).I 
This media-based analysis further suggests that the majority of seized firearms 
were registered in the capital (Bucharest). 
Table 4:  Seized lethal and non-lethal firearms, and cases of illegal use  




lethal firearms Illegal use
2010 76 91 27
2011 139 111 23
2012 139 2,572 27
2013 58 293 6
2014 45 74 14
2015 49 68 7
2016 58 114 12
Figure 1:  Geographical distribution of seizures at county level,  






















































































I In 2012 the number of seized non-lethal firearms was exceptionally high due to a large seizure of 
compressed air rifles by the IGPF at the border with Republic of Moldova). 
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Despite the differences, the available data indicate a rather low number of seizures 
and gun-related crimes. This suggests that illegal firearms possession and gun 
crimes are not significant security issues in Romania. The experts we interviewed 
for this study also made the same observation. These issues are therefore not 
treated as a priority by the Romanian authorities.
2.2  Types of available firearms and prices
It is difficult to identify the availability of the various types of firearms (and their 
prices) on the illicit gun market in Romania, since there are no public records of 
centralised data on such firearms, while this information is not mentioned in 
annual police reports and only seldom referred to in media reports. Our interviews 
with experts from the IGPR indicate that, because gun-related crime is generally 
low in Romania, the illicit gun market and gun crime are not considered to be a 
significant security risk and therefore little attention is given to the systematic col-
lection of data to support risk analysis. 
Despite these limitations, the available official quantitative data (see above) and the 
analysed cases reported in the media suggest that the most frequent type of fire-
arms found in searches and seized are easily convertible, non-lethal blank-firing 
firearms. Especially blank-firing guns manufactured in Turkey are being trafficked 
into Romania from Bulgaria. These non-lethal firearms can easily be modified for 
enabling them to expel projectiles, for example by removing the barrel obturator.15 
The prices in Romania of blank-firing pistols manufactured in Turkey vary from 
€200 (new) to €50-70 (used). These firearms are bought legally in Bulgaria, where 
they are significantly cheaper than on the Romanian market: such a firearm can be 
bought for approximately 136 leva (equivalent to €70) for a new one .16 The acquisi-
tion of these firearms is relatively easy in Bulgaria mainly due to the legislation in 
the country, which allows the buying of non-lethal firearms directly from a shop 
without any obligation other than registering the personal data of the buyer in the 
shop’s register and submitting the request for a permit to the Bulgarian authorities 
and declaring the firearms to the Bulgarian police within seven days from the date 
of acquisition. The other brands of blank-firing pistols of German, Austrian or 
Italian manufacture that are found in shops have higher prices (approximately 
€400).
In 2016, with operational and analytical support from Europol, a series of internati-
onal police actions known as Operation Bosphorus were undertaken in ten EU 








the EMPACT Firearms Operational Action Plan 2015 targeting gas and alarm pistols 
of Turkish manufacture that were being trafficked into the EU via Bulgaria. It led to 
the arrest across the EU of 245 persons and the seizure of 556 gas and alarm pistols 
(of which 131 were converted), 108 other firearms, 33,748 rounds of ammunition 
and numerous tools for the conversion of blank-firing to lethal-purpose firearms.17 
This operation clearly illustrated that the non-lethal firearms available on the illicit 
gun market in Romania mainly come from Turkey through Bulgaria. 
Blank-firing pistols became attractive for criminals in Romania because of their 
capacity to be easily converted (and also converted back to blank firers if needed), 
because they are cheap and have an intimidating effect – they look like real lethal 
handguns (in some cases resembling famous models such as Beretta or Colt).18 
Because of the restrictive law regarding lethal handguns and also high penalties in 
Romania, Turkish blank-firing pistols that imitate lethal handguns came to be a 
very good option for organised crime groups (OCGs) in Romania.
These guns are mainly used by criminals to threaten victims or rival gang mem-
bers.19 Shooting incidents with converted firearms suggest that these weapons can 
be found in various criminal contexts such as the illicit drug trade, extortion or 
gangs. In 2013, for example, the DIICOT indicted 54 members of two rival OCGs 
(Sportivii and Camatarii) after street fights between them involving the use of con-
verted handguns, which severely injured one gang member.20 Besides using them 
for protection purposes within Romania, OCGs involved in the trafficking of all 
kind of illicit goods are using firearms to protect their shipments, as shown by the 
case studies identified in media articles, as well as in IGPF and DIICOT annual 
reports. According to the Romanian authorities, there are no documented cases of 
groups committing crimes only involving firearms. Instead, firearms illegally pos-
sessed through trafficking were mainly used in spontaneous incidents of violence 
or in connection with other crimes.21
The estimation of prices is very relative. The rule is that illegal firearms are more 
expensive than legally acquired ones. In OCG transactions firearms can be exchan-
ged for other, more expensive goods (drugs, grenade launchers, etc). The examples 
in Box 6 suggest that prices can vary not only by type of weapon (non-lethal or 
lethal), but also according to the region where the sale takes place or even the rela-
tionship between buyer and seller. 
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Box 6: Case studies on prices of illegally sold firearms
1.  On 20 November 2015 the police caught someone selling an illegal 
revolver with 50 cartridges for €3,500.22
2.  In case 88/D/P/2009 a criminal group was indicted for firearms smuggling 
across the border with Serbia. The group delivered firearms from Serbia 
to several Romanian clients at prices of around €250 for a .22 LR rimfire 
rifle, €200 for a 9 mm or 7.65 mm pistol, and €350 for a 7.62 mm cara-
bine, all of them made by Zastava in Serbia. A suspect from the same 
group went to Austria in 2008 to buy a 9 mm PA calibre blank-firing Reck 
pistol.23
3.  In the Ciorogarla case (see section 2.3.3) the price for one AK-type auto-
matic rifle sold by the OCG involved was reportedly €2,500.
 
Buyers of firearms (mainly blank-firing pistols) are usually members of OCGs going 
for the easiest way to acquire a gun that looks like a real one and that can be made 
lethal after conversion. As indicated in other reports, OCGs can be both Romanian 
and foreign.24 OCGs usually use firearms for various purposes:
 1. Firearms used to protect drug or cigarette shipments. These are usually the fire-
arms seized when a shipment is intercepted. 
2. Firearms trafficked for money. This is a rare occurrence in Romania, since 
prices are low for blank-firing pistols and there is no real and sustained 
demand for lethal firearms. 
3. Firearms used in heists (e.g. the “Criminal Academy”, an organized criminal 
group, who used guns to threaten victims during heists) or in attacks (e.g. the 
Vitalie Proca case in November 2012, or the Piatra Neamt case of 14 November 
2010, when two gang members were shot in a coffee shop with a .45 calibre 
handgun; the gun was brought into the country from Turin, Italy in 2007).
As we identified in the case studies from the media analysis and court cases, 
non-OCG buyers can be ordinary people (i.e. not criminals) who just want to pay 
less than the prices found in Romania, or individuals who, without being aware of 
the law, buy a pistol from a trafficker and then subsequently realise that they have 
committed a crime.
No reported cases were found of terrorists acquiring firearms in Romania. Most of 
the cases related to terrorist activities found in SRI reports and in the database of 








expelled from the country and declared inadmissible for up to 15 years for reasons 
of national security – no other details regarding these cases are made public.
2.3  Sources and supply mechanisms of the illicit gun 
market in Romania
In Romania, firearms end up on the illicit gun market through three mechanisms: 
(1) illicit production; (2) illicit trafficking; and (3) diversion from the legal domestic 
market. In this section we will give an overview of the most important aspects of 
these mechanisms. Relevant and reliable academic or policy-oriented literature on 
this topic is, however, quite limited, which is why most of the analysis is based on 
data provided by public reports of relevant institutions, data presented in interna-
tional reports, study cases reported in the media, and court decisions.
2.3.1  Illicit production of firearms
The illicit production of firearms and ammunitionI is rather rare and connected to 
artisanal production whereby individuals set up private workshops that produce 
weapons for profit. Within the researched time period – 2010-2016 – two cases of 
handmade production in private workshops were recorded (see Box 7). 
Another risk that we identified from discussions with experts is that of the illegal 
production of 3D-printed firearms. Although some reports have downplayed the 
risks posed by 3D printing,25 particularly due to the low strength of materials that 3D 
printers are able to generate (e.g. plastic barrels) and there have been no registered 
cases so far in Romania, we believe that the 3D printing of firearms will pose a high 
risk in the future. Especially for terrorists, these weapons can be very attractive, 
since they are usually needed only for the attack itself and not to be sold and/or 
used in the longer term. Existing 3D-printed firearms have proved to be able to fire 
up to 14 cartridges, which is enough for an attacker wishing to commit a terrorist 
attack.26 These guns are difficult to control and almost impossible to trace or detect, 
because the only component made from metal is the firing pin.  
I Law 295/2004 defines illicit manufacturing as the production or assembly of firearms, parts or 
ammunition:
 (A) by using any essential components obtained from illicit trafficking;
 (B) without an authorisation issued by a competent authority of the member state in which 
manufacture or assembly takes place;
 (C) without marking the firearms assembled at the date of their production, in accordance with 
the provisions of the present law, which carries the penalty of imprisonment for two to eight years.
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Box 7: Case studies on illegal workshops 
During a police search in the western part of Romania, near Lugoj (Tipari, 
Timis county), 12 hunting rifles were found. The suspects made and sold 
handmade guns at prices of €100-150. These were used mainly for poaching. 
There is no information on how many firearms had previously been sold.27
On 2 December 2016 a 28-year old man became involved in a fight with some 
neighbours in the village of his fiancé’s grandmother. He used handmade 
guns to kill two people and injure another two, after which he committed 
suicide with one of the guns. A police search revealed a workshop in the 
basement of the man’s house in Palilula (Dolj county). In total, 15 firearms 
and over 1,000 cartridges were found, many of them converted or handmade. 
He did not have a criminal record.28
2.3.2 Illicit firearms trafficking 
Given Romania’s geographical position, firearms trafficking from neighbouring 
countries to the South and East represents a risk. In Romania, the main source of 
illicit trafficking in firearms is Bulgaria. As mentioned in the previous section, 
Turkish-manufactured blank-firing guns that are legally bought in Bulgaria and 
then imported into Romania are the most readily available weapons on the 
Romanian illicit gun market. The main documented trafficking routes from 
Bulgaria pass through several different border crossings (Varna-Vama Veche, Ruse-
Giurgiu, Silistra, Calafat, and Corabia).29
Based on our analysis of Romanian court decisions, we can conclude that in some 
cases the smugglers on trial were committing their first offence. These smugglers 
usually stated that they did not know that Romanian law obliged them to notify the 
police before purchasing a firearm of any kind nor that they had to declare a blank-
firing pistol that had been legally bought in Bulgaria at the border. In cases of repeat 
offences, blank-firing pistols were brought into Romania for other people for the 
purpose of making a profit and the consignee did not know that the pistol had been 
brought across the border illegally. In these cases the guns were not always smug-
gled for a criminal customer, while in other cases OCGs were involved. In 2011, for 
example, the DIICOT dismantled an OCG from Craiova (a city in south-central 
Romania) whose main criminal activities involved the defrauding of electronic 








traffick lethal firearms and ammunition from Bulgaria. The trafficked firearms 
were sold to other OCG members from Craiova and later used in fights between 
gangs.30 But in general, OCGs are not that interested in firearms trafficking into or 
from Romania because of the low price of blank-firing pistols or lethal firearms and 
thus the limited profit that can be generated from such trafficking. 
Firearms are mainly smuggled into Romania in buses and private vehicles.31 The 
study of media articles and Operation Bosphorus showed that in Romania the traf-
ficking of firearms from Bulgaria mostly involves individual weapons. Many cases 
showed that individuals cross the border into Bulgaria, buy a blank-firing pistol 
legally and then hide the gun in their car when they cross the border. The number 
of firearms that are transported is always very small and criminals prefer to make 
frequent crossings of the border, because the probability of being caught with a gun 
or two is much lower than with a large shipment. Seizures of large quantities of 
firearms are rare. 
As shown, sellers can be either individuals who think they can earn quick money by 
transferring cheaper pistols from other countries (Bulgaria), members of OCGs 
selling to other members, or even amateurs with technical skills who are involved 
in illicit production (private workshops) and conversion for profit.
Firearms trafficking to Romania also occurs from Western and Southern European 
countries such as France, Germany, Italy and Spain. The modus operandi for smug-
gling is the same as for weapons coming from Bulgaria, but the border crossings 
used are different (Bors, Nadlag and Cenad). The interviewed experts confirmed 
that the route from Bulgaria is mainly used for trafficking blank-firing firearms, 
while the routes from France, Germany, Italy and Spain are used for the trafficking 
of long-barrelled rifles.32
From the analysis of the serious cases presented in DIICOT annual reports,33 most 
dismantled OCGs were involved in human trafficking, cybercrime or drug traffick-
ing (mainly cocaine and heroin via the Iran-Turkey-Bulgaria route). On some of the 
trafficking routes used, for example, for cigarette smuggling along the northern 
Moldova-Romania or Ukraine-Romania routes, firearms are being seized, but this is 
rather rare.
The data reported by Romania to UNODC for 2010-2013 indicate that the majority of 
firearms (over 80%) that enter the country illegally are destined for the local 
market.34 It should be mentioned that there are other easier routes than from 
Bulgaria via Romania for the illegal trafficking of guns to Western European coun-
tries. Operation Bosporus, for example, showed that a large number of the 
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blank-firing guns found during the operation had been trafficked from Bulgaria to 
Western Europe along a variety of routes.
Several of Romania’s neighbouring countries (such as Moldova, Ukraine and Serbia) 
have experienced frozen or armed conflicts that left them with large stockpiles of 
firearms, many of which are lost due to thefts, neglect or corruption and then enter 
the illicit market. Transnistria, for example, has large Russian Army stockpiles that 
have represented a source of illegal firearms since the end of the war in the early 
1990s. In May 2014 an investigation by the Organised Crime and Corruption 
Reporting Project conducted in the Republic of Moldova demonstrated how easily a 
leading member of a transnational OCG involved in criminal activities in Moldova, 
Romania and Italy could provide 30 AK-type automatic rifles and five grenade 
launchers in one week at a location near Odessa for €29,000. The price for other 
handguns like the Baikal TT was about €800 per piece, while a grenade launcher 
was on sale for €1,000.35 Currently, however, the smuggling of firearms from coun-
tries such as Moldova, Ukraine or Serbia to Romania is quite exceptional. 
Our analysis has not found an actual case of firearms being smuggled from Ukraine, 
where an active war is in progress, in the period 2010-2016. Besides OCGs’ need for 
a limited number of firearms, Romania does not represent a real market for mili-
tary-grade firearms, which makes it more likely for firearms coming from Ukraine, 
for example, to be trafficked to Western European countries instead of Romania. 
Given the extensive smuggling of cigarettes from Ukraine or Moldova to Romania, 
the trafficking of firearms or components from these countries can be considered a 
potential future risk, since weapons could be smuggled along the same routes.
2.3.3  Diversion of firearms from the legal market
Romania has a significant arms industry. In 2014 various types of Romanian-
produced military equipment worth more than $160 million were sold to 53 coun-
tries worldwide.36 The main producer of weapons is Romarm, a state-owned 
company under the Ministry of the Economy, with 15 factories and production facil-
ities specialising in the production of ammunition, weapons and other military 
equipment. The main factory that produces firearms and ammunition is the Cugir 
Firearms Factory. Approximately 95% of Cugir’s production is exported to NATO 
countries and countries outside NATO that use Soviet-type ammunition.37
There are several ways for legally owned firearms to be diverted to the illicit market 
in Romania. The first is through theft from legal firearms producers and holders. 








station of the disappearance, loss or theft of such weapons, or no longer than 24 
hours later.
Theft from military stockpiles
After the 1989 Revolution the modernisation of the Romanian Army led to a reduc-
tion of the armed forces from 180,000 in the mid-1990s to 71,745 active forces in 
2011, which generated large surpluses of stockpiled weapons and ammunition.38 
Diversion to unauthorised end users was considered as one of the main risks that 
such stockpiles pose, yet only one case of stockpile theft is known (the ‘Ciorogarla 
case’). In January 2009 six members of an OCG stole 62 firearms, including mili-
tary-grade assault rifles,I from a military unit’s stockpile. These stolen firearms 
were then distributed among the members of the gang for use in drug trafficking. 
The gang tried to make the weapons untraceable by removing their serial numbers. 
One of the suspects was caught trying to sell 27 of these firearms (pistols and auto-
matic rifles) to a police informant. During subsequent investigations 35 firearms 
were found in December 2009 and another 15 in January 2011.39 
Conversion and reactivation 
In recent years conversion has become an increasingly frequent way of diverting 
legal firearms into the illicit market in Romania. This applies both to firearms 
already in Romania and those brought to Romania from other countries (see above). 
Legal loopholes and differences between legal frameworks in various countries that 
can be exploited by criminals are particularly relevant in this case, both among EU 
Member States and between EU Member States and third countries (particularly 
Turkey, Moldova and Ukraine). 
Before the promulgation of EU Regulation 2015/2403 of 15 December 2015 estab-
lishing common guidelines on deactivation standards and techniques for ensuring 
that deactivated firearms are rendered irreversibly inoperable, there were no 
common deactivation standards for firearms in EU Member States, and the differ-
ences in national legislation allowed firearms to be rather easily reactivated and 
sold in a different country. The case of the deactivated firearms bought in Slovakia 
and then smuggled into other EU countries with stricter deactivation standards to 
be reactivated is well known. Europol has indicated that some of the firearms ship-
ments from Slovakia were destined for Romania.40 Based on publicly available data, 
however, we have not identified cases of reactivated firearms in Romania. Also, our 
I These 62 firearms were one machine gun, 20 AK-type 7.62 calibre automatic rifles, 32 1933 TT 7.62 
calibre pistols, five 7.65 mm pistols, three CUGIR 9 mm pistols and one 26 mm flare pistol.
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interviews with Romanian key actors suggest that there is no major concern over 
the reactivation of deactivated firearms in the country. There are also no known 
reported cases of the modification of semi-automatic firearms to automatic ones. 
The conversion of blank-firing guns, on the other hand, is a frequently encountered 
problem in Romania. While the possession of lethal handguns is restricted, 
Romanian law allows civilians to buy blank-firing pistols without the need to notify 
the police prior to purchase or to comply with the regulations that require a medical 
certificate, a psychological test, a clean criminal record and proper storage facili-
ties. This resulted in the number of legal owners of non-lethal firearms being almost 
identical to the number of owners of hunting rifles and lethal handguns.
In many EU Member States the conversion of blank-firing guns has become the 
major mechanism through which firearms have become available on the illicit gun 
market. This is the result of the ease with which one can acquire these licence-free 
weapons and with which some of these firearms can be converted to shoot live 
ammunition.41 The conversion methods identified in Romania are the same as 
those found in other parts of Europe. The design of some models of blank-firing 
pistols makes conversion very easy, allowing them to fire pellets42 or even live 
ammunition. The most frequently found firearms are the Turkish-made Ekol 
Voltran and Atak Zoraki, which are the most prone to conversion. Some conver-
sions can also be reversed very easily,43 making it very difficult to prove earlier 
conversion. 
Cases of blank-firing converted pistols being used in crimes have been encountered 
in Romania since 201044 and have resulted in several casualties in different parts of 
the country and different criminal contexts. In 2010, for example, the wife and 
daughter of a businessman from the northern region of Romania were killed with a 
converted blank-firing pistol. The perpetrator, a Ukrainian citizen, entered the 
country with the gun specifically for this purpose.45 In December 2012 in the western 
region of Romania a converted blank-firing pistol was found abandoned in a car 
that had two bullet holes in the driver’s door. Further investigations showed that 
the incident was linked to an OCG’s attempt to extort €142,000 from a local busi-
nessman.46 Also in 2012, converted blank-firing pistols were used in a fight between 









Illegal sale of legally owned firearms
The illegal sale of legally owned firearms can be considered as unlikely in Romania. 
These types of cases were not found during our study. This is largely the result of 
the restrictive legal framework for firearms possession in Romania. 
Romania has a very restrictive law on the legal ownership of handguns, and very 
few people are allowed to legally own handguns for the purposes of personal secu-
rity and self-defence (see above). This is also the reason for the small number of 
legally owned handguns ending up on the illicit market due to theft or from being 
sold illegally. 
The majority of the approximately 90,000 legal owners of lethal firearms in 
Romania are owners of hunting rifles. The legal possession of long hunting rifles is 
regulated similarly to in other European countries, i.e. civilians who are members 
of a hunting association can apply for permit to own rifled-barrel or smoothbore 
firearms, with the requirements of a prior medical examination, a psychological 
test, a clean criminal record and proper storage facilities. This is partly the reason 
why there are no known cases where legally owned long firearms were used in 
shootings or ended up on the illicit market. 
In contrast to some other EU member states (including the neighbouring Bulgaria), 
legal owners of blank-firing pistol need to go through a complex legal procedure to 
own such a pistol in Romania (see above). The same restrictive rules apply to the 
ownership of air rifles that fire metal projectiles (4.5 mm, 6.35 mm, etc.) and CO2 
pistols. These regulations make Romanian firearms law one of the most restrictive 
in Europe.
Even though the dark web is an increasingly important new market for firearms, 
public reports of proactive investigations by the police conducted on this market 
were not found during research for this study. The National Police’s capacity to 
conduct this type of investigation and analysis is very limited, both technically and 
because of lack of personnel, mainly due to the trans-territorial nature of this 
market. 
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3.  Terrorist access to Romania’s illicit firearms 
market
3.1  Terrorist activities in Romania
Article 1 of Law 535/2004, which deals with the prevention and combating of ter-
rorism, defines terrorism as a set of actions and/or threats that pose a public danger 
and affect national security. These actions can have the following characteristics:
(a)  They are committed intentionally by terrorist entities, motivated by extremist 
views and attitudes, and hostile to other entities against whom they act using 
violent and/or destructive means.
(b)  They are carried out with the aim of achieving specific political objectives.
(c)  They target people and/or infrastructure within public authorities and institu-
tions, the civilian population or any other parts of a country’s population.
(d)  They have a strong psychological effect on the population at large aimed at 
drawing attention to the aims being pursued.
The Global Terrorism Index 2016 of the Institute for Economics and Peace places 
Romania in 130th place (the last position in its system of ranking countries) in 
terms the number of terrorist attacks it has experienced.48 The country has not 
experienced a terror attack in more than three decades, but in recent years several 
potential terror attacks have been foiled in Romania. Interestingly, these incidents 
involved terrorist networks of very different ideologies and with very different 
goals (see Box 8). 
In addition, in recent years Romania has also been explicitly named as a potential 
terrorist target by prominent extremist Islamist leaders. In 2012 and in the after-
math of the Burgas bus bombingI in Bulgaria, Sheikh Omar Bakri, a Syrian extrem-
ist Islamist leader in Lebanon,II stated in an interview that Romania, like Bulgaria, is 
a target for terrorists. He explained that Islamist extremists consider both coun-
tries as Islamic realms and condemned them because of their military presence in 
Iraq or Afghanistan and because of their cooperation with Israel.
I The 2012 Burgas bus bombing was a terrorist attack carried out by a suicide bomber on a bus 
carrying a group of Israeli tourists at Burgas Airport. 
II Bakri played a key role in the Hizb ut-Tahrir movement, a Sunni pan-Islamist organisation that 
advocates for the re-establishment of the caliphate. He also led the al-Muhajirun movement 








Box 8: Foiled terrorist attacks in Romania49
After Romania’s accession to NATO in 2004 the first case of Islamist radicali-
sation appeared in the country. Florian LeschI decided to plan an attack 
because of Romania’s pro-Western political orientation. The suspect came 
to the attention of the intelligence services after sending threatening mes-
sages in the name of the Islamist cause to several television stations in both 
Romania and abroad. On 27 June 2006 Lesch was arrested on a secondary 
road travelling towards Timisoara (a city in western Romania). In his car an 
improvised explosive device (IED) designed to be triggered remotely was 
found. This IED could have destroyed an entire building and could have 
caused numerous casualties. He was sentenced to 12 years in prison. 
In 2012 the SRI arrested two Pakistani terrorists who belonged to the Sikh 
International Federation of Youth and Students and were part of the Khalistan 
Liberation Front. They were planning to organise terrorist attacks with home-
made bombs across the country.
In December 2012 Khzr Karim Friad intentionally missed a flight out of 
Romania and, motivated by hatred of the UK’s involvement in Iraq, planned 
to kill a UK embassy official in Bucharest with a 12-cm-long knife. In 2013 he 
was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment.
In April 2013 a network of members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) 
who had been active in Romania for a long period of time was dismantled 
through Operation Blue Wolf, which involved the Romanian, Hungarian and 
Austrian authorities.
In 2013 the DIICOT indicted four citizens for crimes related to terrorism and 
breaking the law on explosive materials. The defendants made explosive 
devices and set them off near Ghioroc, Timis county, and in December made 
two similar devices, which they sold to an undercover agent.
In 2015 ethnic Hungarian who were members of the separatist right-wing 
extremist group HVIMII were arrested for an attempted attack with an IED. 
The bomb was supposed to go off in a city square during National Day cel-
ebrations. They were sentenced to several months in prison.
I After he converted to Islam he chose the alias of Aynan Hassan Abger (a former soldier in the 
Seventh Brigade of the Bosnian Islamic Army).
II The Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement (a far-right movement in Hungary).
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SRI annual reports give the numbers of individuals who were identified as being 
involved in terrorist activities in the reporting year, arrested (Romanian citizens), or 
expelled and denied subsequent re-entry (foreign citizens), as well as individuals 
suspected of having ties with terrorist groups.I In May 2013, for example, an Iraqi 
and a Lebanese citizen were denied entry to the country due to their involvement in 
terrorism-linked illegal migration activities aimed at facilitating their fellow 
nationals’ entry into Romania and Europe, as well as being involved in drugs and 
arms trafficking in support of the Syrian insurgency.50
Individuals who have engaged in terrorist activities in Romania most often belong to 
extremist Islamist networks, but people involved in ethno-nationalist or separatist ter-
rorism are also active in the country (see Table 5). Europol Terrorism Situation and 
Trend Reports (TE-SATs) for 2010, 2011 and 2016, for example, indicate that a number of 
people were arrestedII for membership of the PKK or actively supporting the organisa-
tion. In 2014 four Hungarian citizens were denied entry to Romania, one of whom was 
a leader of the extreme right-wing group New Hungarian Guard – Seckler Battalion.51
















2010 14 2 - - - - 16
2011 2 2 - - - - 4
2012 15 1 - - - - 16
2013 7 1 - - - - 8
2014 - - - - - - -
2015 11 - - - - - 11
2016 1 - - - - - 1
Source: Europol TE-SAT reports, 2010-2017
I According to Article 86(5) of Emergency Ordinance 194/2002 governing the management of 
foreigners in Romania, when a foreign citizen is denied entry to the country for national security 
reasons, the court decision does not provide any information on its motivation.
II Actually, these are not all arrests, but can refer to court procedures to deny a foreign citizen re-
entry into the country and expelling him/her for a number of years, for national security reasons.








Even though no case of terrorism financing has gone to court, SRI reports indicate 
that there might be a connection between the illicit activities of foreign citizens and 
activities that support terrorism, such as financing, logistical aid, and facilitating 
the entry of individuals affiliated with terrorist organisations who use Romania for 
transit to other parts of Europe. As Europol’s 2010 TE-SAT report states, even though 
“[EU] Member States on the Eastern borders of the EU have, so far, been less of a target for 
Islamist terrorists, a number of arrests in Romania indicate that some EU Member States 
may be used as transit countries to other parts of Europe. Also, the possibility cannot be 
ruled out that those countries serve as operational rear bases from which terrorist groups 
can develop their logistical and financial capabilities”.52 
In the same vein, the 2015 TE-SAT report indicates that Romanian territory is one of 
the transit land routes for illegal travellers to and from Syria and Iraq, via Turkey, as 
are its neighbours – Hungary, Serbia and Bulgaria. The 2016 TE-SAT report reiter-
ates this point, showing that, even though Romania reported low terrorist threat 
levels, the issue of foreign terrorist fighters transiting its territory remained a 
concern.
3.2  Acquisition of firearms by terrorists 
No data are available on the contemporary access to firearms of terrorists active in 
Romania, which is probably due to the lack of cases and to the classified nature of 
the information. 
In recent years some media report have suggested that Romania has been the source 
country of firearms used by terrorist networks in other parts of Europe. After the 
Paris attacks in 2015 some Western newspapers cited an expert from South Eastern 
Europe who stated that the firearms used came from Romania. It was later demon-
strated that there was no connection to Romania: the Czech-made guns were actu-
ally deactivated automatic rifles sold legally in Slovakia as accoustic weapons and 
later reactivated to fire live ammunition (see the chapters on Belgium and France).53 
Another false media report about a Romanian connection in recent arms traffick-
ing was broadcast by SkyNews showing an on-site transaction in Romania to illus-
trate how easily military-grade guns sourced from Ukraine can end up in the hands 
of terrorists. After investigations by the Romanian authorities it was revealed that 
British journalists paid local hunters to act as firearms traffickers using their own 
hunting and collectors rifles. The Romanian hunters and the British journalists 
were investigated for spreading false information that affected national security.
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Despite these false allegations, firearms from Romania have reached the hands of 
terrorists in other parts of the world. There were a number of historical cases of 
diversion prior to the 1989 Revolution. In that period Romania was the world’s fifth-
largest exporter of military products, with annual exports worth over one billion 
dollars. The main clients were Arab states and totalitarian regimes in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America. The delivery of Romanian weapons in that period fueled inter-
nal conflicts in countries such as Angola, Mozambique or other African states, and 
some of the weapons produced in Romania ended up in the hands of terrorist 
groups,54 where they appear to remain. 
Also, in more recent years, firearms manufactured and/or exported from Romania 
have ended up in the hands of criminals, insurgency groups and terrorists world-
wide. After 1989, arms produced by the Cugir Firearms Factory (see section 2.3.3) 
have mainly been sold on the US civilian market. An adaptation of the AK type 
resulted in the creation of the WASR 10 semi-automatic model, which was sold 
solely to Century International Arms, the largest North American firearms dealer, 
which sells it on the civilian market in the United States at $400 per weapon. Some 
of these weapons are modified and then resold in Mexico, where a WASR 10 rifle is 
worth $2,000-3,000, due to import restrictions. According to a report by the US 
Public Integrity Center, the WASR 10 has become one of the favourite weapons of 
Mexican drug traffickers.55
According to investigators from the  Balkan Investigative Reporting Network and 
the  Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project,56 in recent years AK-47s, 
mortar shells, rocket launchers, anti-tank weapons and heavy machine guns have 
been exported from Romania and a number of other Central and South Eastern 
European countriesI and have ended up in Syria and Yemen after being initially 
exported to Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey. These 
weapons are now being used in Syria by Western-backed Free Syrian Army units, 
but are also in the hands of fighters from Islamist groups such as Ansar al-Sham, 
the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra, the so-called Islamic State, factions fighting 
for the Syrian government, and Sunni forces in Yemen. Given the durability of fire-
arms and the risk of diversion, there is a high risk that the weapons sold today to a 
legitimate government in a conflict area might end up on the EU illegal market in 
the future and eventually fall into the hands of criminals and terrorists.
The 2014 IGPR annual report refers to Operation Flanko, a joint investigation involv-
ing Romanian police officers, DIICOT prosecutors and US authorities, with the 









support of the SRI, that dismantled an organised group that was active in many 
European countries. The members of the group were suspected of supporting ter-
rorist activities by supplying firearms and anti-aircraft weapons to the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (Colombia’s main insurgent group). Two Romanian citi-
zens and one Italian were detained in a third country. There are no further public 
records on the provenance of the weapons involved, even though it seems that they 
might have been obtained from a weapons supplier in Russia.57 
4. Conclusions 
In Romania, tight gun regulations have managed to ensure a safer climate in terms 
of gun-related crime and violence (one of the lowest rates in Europe). Both the 
number of legally owned firearms and the number of illicit firearms seized in law 
enforcement operations are significantly lower than in other EU member states. 
However, the growing phenomenon of blank-firing pistols at the European level 
has been an issue for many years and also has significant consequences for the 
illicit firearms market in Romania. The Europol 2017 Serious and Organised Crime 
Threat Assessment (SOCTA) states clearly that ‘Firearms traffickers are highly adept 
at exploiting legal loopholes and differences in regulatory regimes between 
Member States to divert firearms from legal suppliers’. These loopholes in legisla-
tion create demand, and demand creates the basis for trafficking. The countries 
that do not regulate blank-firing pistols facilitate demand. As shown in the SOCTA 
report and proved by Operation Bosphorus, Romania has been affected by these dif-
ferences in EU countries’ national legislation dealing with the ownership of blank-
firing pistols. 
Unfortunately, the security issue of easily convertible blank firers has not received 
enough attention in past EU directives on firearms, partially because European 
countries do not have the same approach to assessing the threat of blank-firing 
pistols and the danger of conversion. The new EU directive effectively tackles the 
issue of acoustic guns (automatic or semi-automatic lethal guns legally converted 
to fire blank cartridges), stating that a firearm that has been converted to fire blanks 
must remain licensed under the same rules as its original lethal-purpose version.58 
Romania, as one the countries for which the main issue regarding the illicit fire-
arms market is blank-firing handguns, already has strict regulations on blank-fir-
ing handgun ownership. An effective measure at the EU level that the Romanian 
authorities should support could prohibit the selling of blank-firing pistols by 
natural persons, shops or factories from a country with a free-access regime to a 
natural person from another country that has more restrictive laws. The success of 
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Operation Bosphorus, which dealt directly with the issue of blank-firing pistols, 
resulted from the willingness of the countries involved to cooperate and correctly 
assess the Europe-wide threat caused by these easily convertible pistols.
The EU Commission has stated that there is a need to improve existing statistical 
and analytical tools at the EU and national levels, including through setting up 
interconnected national focal points on firearms, developing expertise, and improv-
ing the analysis of and strategic reporting on illicit trafficking in firearms, notably 
through the combined use of both ballistic and criminal intelligence. To this end, 
information could be reported in standardised templates, and an analysis and fore-
casting unit could be established to provide early warning of specific threats. 
Recommendations have already been made at the EU level to all European coun-
tries to create national focal points on firearms. The EU Commission has also 
stressed the need for developing internationally harmonised data collection, and to 
regularly map out global firearms trafficking routes to the EU and make the infor-
mation available to all member states’ law enforcement authorities. For this to be 
put to good use, however, national units are needed that are able to supply reliable 
data and have the analytical capacity to integrate and use the information received. 
As has been shown throughout the present report, data collection and standardisa-
tion by the various Romanian authorities with competencies in this area can be 
improved. This is one of the main impediments to correctly assessing the size of the 
illicit firearms market in Romania and the risks emerging from it. The need for a 
fully operational Romanian focal point on firearms issues that collects data from 
the institutions and agencies involved emerged from both the research and the 
expert interviews.
To gain a clearer (and comparative) picture of the illicit firearms markets in EU 
member states that supports the development of evidence-based policies, it might 
be useful to develop a common methodology for data collection and centralisation, 
with a set of clear indicators related to these markets for use by law enforcement 
agencies from all member states. The methodology should include aspects such as 
steps in data collection, the nature of the institutional framework (which institu-
tions should send data, how and of what type) and templates for data collection. 
This could also support the operational and statistical data sent to the Europol Focal 
Point or Interpol and could build the ‘better intelligence picture’59 referred to in the 
2015 EU Action Plan against Illicit Firearms Trafficking.
Furthermore, even though the Romanian authorities do not regard firearms traf-
ficking and gun-related crime in general as a serious threat, firearms should become 
an issue in the risk analysis made by each European country, no matter the number 








in the present report, other issues affect Romania from the perspective of the illicit 
firearms market and terrorists’ access to it, even though they are not frequent 
occurrences. Besides cases in which Romanians are involved in international fire-
arms trafficking, OCGs’ main activities on Romanian territory include human traf-
ficking, modern slavery and drug trafficking, and they often use violent methods in 
these activities, for which they procure firearms – either for the purposes of threats 
or actual use. There are only rare cases of OCGs being involved in firearms traffick-
ing, since this is not a very profitable business for them and the risks are quite high. 
As such, law enforcement agencies in Romania should pay more attention to the 
connections between OCGs and criminals involved in other types of activities, par-
ticularly in border areas and on smuggling routes. 
As regards Romania’s relations with non-EU neighbouring countries, both from a 
bilateral perspective and from the perspective of the EU’s relations with its neigh-
bours, we believe that the issue of the very low production standards of easily con-
vertible firearms should be addressed in bilateral relation with countries that 
produce such weapons, but also in EU policy on the access of these types of easily 
convertible weapons, particularly blank-firing pistols, to the European market. 
Moreover, strong firearms regulation and effective stockpile management should 
be prioritised in relations with Eastern Partnership and pre-accession countries, 




1 Final Report of Project FIRE – Fighting Illicit firearms trafficking Routes and actors at 
European level (HOME/2013/ISEC/FP/C1/4000005009)
2 The structural causes underlying the weak capacity of the Romanian public administra-
tion, available at http://gov.ro/fisiere/stiri_fisiere/Analiza_cauzelor_structurale_care_
stau_la_baza_slabei_capacitati_a_administratiei_publice_din_Romania.pdf
3 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-4465_en.htm.
4 Udroiu, Constatinescu, “The new criminal code. The previous criminal code”, Hamangiu 
2014, p.442
5 Law 295/2004 and Gunpolicy.org, last accessed 10.05.2017
6 Law 295/2004 (republished in 2014 and last amended in 2017) on the regime of firearms 
and ammunition
7 Public information that can be found on the website of the Romanian Police – https://
www.politiaromana.ro/files/pages_files/clasificare_arme_site.pdf 
8 http://lege5.ro/Gratuit/haydeojtha/hotararea-nr-779-2015-pentru-aprobarea-strate-
giei-nationale-de-ordine-si-siguranta-publica-2015-2020/2, last accessed 09.05.2017
9 http://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Strategia_Nationala_de_Aparare_a_Tarii_1.





12 2015 annual report of the Directorate for Investigating Organized Crime and Terrorism, 
pg.61
13 https://www.politiaromana.ro/ro/utile/statistici-evaluari/evaluari, last accessed 14.06.2017
14 https://www.politiaromana.ro/ro/utile/statistici-evaluari/evaluari, last accessed 14.06.2017
15 https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-protocol/Country_Factsheet_WEB.pdf 
pg.80, last accessed 14.06.2017
16 www.arms.bg, last accessed 14.06.2017 
17 https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/operation-bosphorus-against-fire-
arms-trafficking-results-in-nearly-250-arrests-in-2016, last accessed 12.06.2017.
18 h t t p s ://w w w. e u ro p o l . e u ro p a . e u /n ew s ro o m /n ew s /o p e ra t i o n - b o s p h o r u s - 
against-firearms-trafficking-results-in-nearly-250-arrests-in-2016















23 http://www.rolii.ro/hotarari/5894d413e49009cc05001b19, last accessed 10.07.2017
24 Final Report of Project FIRE – Fighting Illicit firearms trafficking Routes and actors at 
European level (HOME/2013/ISEC/FP/C1/4000005009)
25 Final Report of Project FIRE – Fighting Illicit firearms trafficking Routes and actors at 
European level (HOME/2013/ISEC/FP/C1/4000005009)
26 http://news.softpedia.com/news/3D-Printed-Rifle-Can-Shoot-Repeatedly-Without-






pg.80, last accessed 14.06.2017
30 http://www.opiniatimisoarei.ro/politistii-si-jandarmii-pe-urmele-lui-zeus-chuck-nor-
ris-si-levier/07/04/2011, last accessed 10.05.2017
31 https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-protocol/Country_Factsheet_WEB.pdf 
pg.80, last accessed 14.06.2017
32 https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-protocol/Country_Factsheet_WEB.pdf 
pg.80, last accessed 14.06.2017







armele-romanesti-si-unde-sunt-vandute-448665, last accessed 10.05.2017
37 http://www.digi24.ro/special/reportaje/reportaj/reportaj-digi24-cum-sunt-facute-armele- 
romanesti-si-unde-sunt-vandute-448665








39 http://rolii.ro/hotarari/5897e28ee49009ac2e0010c1, last accessed 08.05.2017; http://
www.diicot.ro/images/documents/rapoarte_activitate/raport2010.pdf 
40 Europol (2016), Role of EUROPOL in combating firearms trafficking, European Parliament, 


















html, last accessed 7/5/2017
50 Europols’ TE-SAT 2014 report, p.13
51 https://www.riseproject.ro/articol/expulzarea-unui-indezirabil/, last accessed 10.06.2017































From the IRA to ISIS: 
Exploring terrorist access  
to the UK’s illicit firearms market
Paul Holtom, Paul James and Connor Patmore 
In this chapter we focus on the illicit firearms market in the United Kingdom (UK) 
and the ways in which terrorists can access this market. Researchers have noted 
that a number of sources provide information on illegal firearms use in the UK (e.g. 
crime data and crime reduction evaluations, police reports, media reports), but 
limited research has been undertaken to understand the dynamics and key players 
in the UK illegal firearms market.1 The research undertaken on terrorist acquisition 
of firearms in the UK has focused primarily on the methods used by the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) and other terrorist organisations involved in the conflict in 
Northern Ireland, with a strong emphasis on the international dimension of such 
acquisitions.2 Academic and policy-oriented research therefore lags behind policy 
interest in terms of terrorist access to the UK illicit firearms market. We address this 
lacuna in our knowledge of the issue by using a mixture of quantitative and qualita-
tive investigative methods (see Box 1). 
Box 1: Research design
The difficulties of estimating the scale and characteristics of the illegal fire-
arms in a country are well documented. We conducted a comprehensive 
review of UK government sources, media reports, and academic research, 
and interviewed ten key informant interviewees (KIIs) to determine the ‘char-
acteristics of the illegal firearms market in the UK’, in line with recommended 
practice for estimating illicit firearms markets and trafficking in Europe.3 
Firstly, the research team gathered official UK Home Office statistical data on 
the legal firearms market in the UK, which are disaggregated by region and 
370
police force area. Secondly, the team collected and analysed UK statistical 
data on firearms offences, paying particular attention to regional disparities. 
The Office for National Statistics provides these data annually, using police-
recorded crime data.4 KIIs recommended the use of data on firearms dis-
charges in a particular area as an indicator for illegal firearms availability. This 
information is not provided in official statistical datasets, but is occasionally 
provided to the public for areas that are affected by high levels of firearms 
usage (e.g. Birmingham, Greater Manchester, Liverpool and London). Thirdly, 
although the UK government does not routinely make official annual statistical 
data on firearms seizures publicly available, this information has been pro-
vided to the UK Parliament; however, it is not disaggregated by type of firearm 
or where weapons were seized. Fourthly, we also drew on the annual strategic 
assessment of the National Crime Agency (NCA), publicly available reports 
from the National Ballistics Intelligence Service (NABIS), materials made avail-
able by police forces and information contained in media reports. Fifthly, a 
dataset of cases of illegal firearms possession; the illegal production, conver-
sion and reactivation of firearms; diversion; and illegal smuggling was con-
structed by collecting information on firearms offences using the law pages.
com, and the websites of the NCA and NABIS.I Additional information on these 
cases was gathered from reports in national and local media and from KIIs.
Our research relied heavily on information gathered from interviews con-
ducted with nine current and former high-ranking UK police officers with 
experience of investigating the country’s illegal firearms market from an 
organised crime group (OCG) and urban street gang (USG) perspective and/
or a counter-terrorism perspective. In addition, we also conducted an inter-
view with a journalist with extensive experience of covering crime and secu-
rity issues in the UK, in particular the issue of terrorist access to illegal 
firearms (see Table 1). KIIs provided a good understanding of developments 
in the UK illegal firearms market during the past decade and terrorist access 
to this market. Several KIIs generously gave their time to provide detailed 
accounts of operations and cases of illegal firearms acquisition, transfer and 
smuggling, which included information on available firearms, prices, sources 
of supply and the main players in the UK illicit firearms market. 
I The dataset focused on cases in which an individual or group was convicted of the following 
offences: the possession of, or conspiracy to possess, prohibited firearms or ammunition with 
intent to endanger life or to enable another person to endanger life; possessing a prohibited 
firearm or imitation firearm with intent to commit an indictable offence, or resist arrest; illegally 
importing firearms and conspiracy to illegally import firearms or ammunition; the possession, 
purchase, acquisition, manufacture, selling or distribution/transfer of a ‘prohibited’ firearm; the 
conversion of or conspiracy to convert imitation firearms; the possession of firearms or ammuni-













MTable 1:  UK key informant interviewees, March-May 2017
Key informant 
interviewee (KII) Position Date
KII 1 Former high-ranking police officer, Greater 
Manchester Police
23/03/2017
KII 2 High-ranking police officer, Merseyside Police 24/03/2017
KII 3 Former high-ranking police officer, Avon and 
Somerset Police; former NABIS employee 
28/03/2017
KII 4 Former high-ranking intelligence officer, West 
Midlands Police; former NABIS employee 
28/03/2017
KII 5 Former NCA head 28/03/2017
KII 6 High-ranking police officer, North East 
Counter Terrorism Unit, West Yorkshire Police
24/04/2017
KII 7 Crime correspondent for national newspaper 02/05/2017
KII 8 High-ranking police officer, West Midlands 
Police
04/05/2017
KII 9 High-ranking police officer, Police Service of 
Northern Ireland
05/05/2017
KII 10 High-ranking police officer, head of UK 
Counter Terrorist Command, London 
Metropolitan Police Service
12/05/2017
In addition to open-source information and interviews with KIIs, the research 
team submitted targeted Freedom of Information (FOI) requests for informa-
tion on firearms seizures, discharges, and lost or stolen registered firearms 
to 15 police forces in England and Scotland.I Four police forces provided all 
the requested information and three forces provided some of it (citing lack 
of information or high costs of retrieval as grounds for refusal for some infor-
mation). In addition, FOI requests were submitted to the Home Office, the 
Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the NCA. The NCA refused to supply the 
requested information on firearms seizures and the Home Office indicated 
that it does not hold such data. However, the Home Office provided informa-
tion on recorded lost or stolen registered firearms for England and Wales 
and the MoD provided information on armed forces losses in the UK. 
I More specifically, the police forces with the highest levels of registered firearms and shotguns, 
and also those with the most recorded firearms offences for the years 2011-2016. FOI requests 
were sent to the following police forces: Avon and Somerset, Devon and Cornwall, Essex, Greater 
Manchester, Kent, Merseyside, Metropolitan, Norfolk, North Yorkshire, Scotland, Sussex, Thames 
Valley, West Mercia, West Midlands, and West Yorkshire.
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There fore, although these data did not give the research team the confi-
dence to determine an estimate for the size of the UK illicit firearm market 
in terms of numbers of firearms or financial value, when complemented with 
information provided by KIIs and media reports they gave the team the con-
fidence to reach tentative conclusions about the availability of various types 
of firearms in the country’s illicit firearms market.
1.  UK national policy to fight the illicit firearms 
market and terrorist access to it
1.1  UK legislation dealing with the illegal possession, use 
and trafficking of firearms
UK legislation is regarded as being particularly restrictive in terms of the legal pos-
session of most types of firearms and gives a strong message that the illegal posses-
sion, use and trafficking of firearms are regarded as serious criminal offences.I 
According to a 2010 parliamentary report, 34 pieces of UK legislation dealt with fire-
arms control.5 The Firearms Act (1968) is the main piece of primary legislation con-
cerned with the possession and use of illegal firearms, and the Customs and Excise 
Management Act (1979) is of most relevance for firearms trafficking. The relevant 
provisions related to the possession, use and trafficking of illegal firearms in both 
Acts have been amended numerous times, with recent relevant amendments follow-
ing the adoption of the: 
• Criminal Justice Act (2003); 
• Violent Crime Reduction Act (2006); and 
• Anti-Social Behaviour Crime and Policing Act (2014).
In addition, the Terrorism Act (2000; 2006) includes the offence of possessing a 
firearm ‘in circumstances which give rise to reasonable suspicion that … possession 
is for a purpose connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an 
act of terrorism’, with the 2006 Terrorism Act increasing the maximum prison sen-
tence for such an offence from ten to 15 years.6 The Terrorism Act (2000) also made 
it an offence for an individual to provide, receive, or invite another to receive 
I Northern Ireland’s Firearms Act is largely comparable to that of the rest of the UK, with the 
exception of permitting serving and former police or prison officers to legally possess firearms if 













instruction or training in the use of firearms, with a maximum prison sentence of 
ten years.I
Box 2: UK legal definitions of firearms and terrorism 
Firearms
Section 57 of the Firearms Act (1968) provides the definition of firearms used 
in this case study: 
A firearm is a lethal barrelled weapon of any description from which any 
shot, bullet or other missile can be discharged. It includes: 
• any lethal or prohibited weapon as defined by Section 5 of the Firearms 
Act (1968);
• any component part of such a lethal or prohibited weapon; and 
• any accessory to any such weapon designed or adapted to diminish the 
noise or flash caused by firing the weapon.7 
Terrorism
Section 1 of the Terrorism Act (2000) provides the definition of terrorism 
used in this case study: 
Section 1(1) … the use or threat of action where –
(a) The action falls within subsection (2), 
(b)  The use or threat is designed to influence the government or an interna-
tional government organisation to intimidate the public or a section of 
the public, and
(c)  The use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, reli-
gious, racial, or ideological cause. 
I Terrorism Act (2000, sec. 54). The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (2015) introduced a 
‘weapons and explosives measure’ in terms of which the secretary of state can prohibit an indi-
vidual from making an application for a firearm or shotgun certificate and possessing offensive 
weapons, imitation firearms or explosives if the individual is suspected of involvement in terro-
rism-related activity, as defined by the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 
(2011). See Counter-Terrorism and Security Act (2015, sec. 18). Sections 2-4 of the Terrorism Pre-
vention and Investigation Measures Act (2011) define ‘involvement in terrorism related activity’ as: 
‘commission, preparation or instigation of terrorist acts; conduct which facilitates the commis-
sion, preparation or instigation of terrorist acts; conduct which gives encouragement to the com-
mission, preparation or instigation of terrorist acts; and conduct which gives support to individu-
als who are known or believed by the individual concerned to be involved in the above conduct.’
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Section 1(2) Action falls within this subsection if it –
(a) Involves serious violence against a person, 
(b) involves serious damage to property, 
(c)  endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the 
action, 
(a)  creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of 
the public, or 
(b)  is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an 
electronic system.
Section 1(3) The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which 
involves the use of firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not sub-
section (1)(b) is satisfied.8
 
Three key dimensions of UK legislation seek to address the illegal possession, use 
and trafficking of firearms: 
1. the prohibition of the possession and importation of prohibited firearms, 
unless given an exemption by the home secretary; 
2. the regulation of the possession and importation of permitted firearms and 
shotguns; and
3. deterrence by tough prison sentences. 
Most legal commentaries note the complexity of UK legislation in terms of the defi-
nitions of firearms that are prohibited versus those subject to regulation.9 Particular 
problems have been highlighted regarding the definitions for and determining the 
regulation of ‘imitation firearms’, ‘realistic imitation firearms’, ‘readily convertible 
imitation firearms’, ‘deactivated firearms’ and ‘antique firearms’.10 The Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) Guidance notes that while case law exists to help with 
interpretations, challenges remain.11 The 2010 UK House of Commons Home Affairs 
Committee report on firearms controls stated that: “An onerous burden is placed on 
the police and on the public because of the difficulty of understanding and applying the 
34 relevant laws which govern the control of firearms. It is unreasonable to expect 
members of the public to know their responsibilities when the law is so complex and con-
fused. It is also unreasonable to expect the police to apply the law accurately in all cases 
when it is so complex. … We recommend that, rather than adding new rules and greater 
confusion, the Government provides proposals for early consultation on how to codify 













give careful consideration to how it will publicise the legislation in order to give greater 
clarity to the lay person”.12
Criminals have thus been able to exploit some of the ‘grey areas’ in the Firearms Act 
with regard to the acquisition and use of converted blank-firing and reactivated 
firearms. 
Box 3: Responding to the threat posed by the conversion of Olympic 
.380 BBM blank-firing pistols
I
 
In early 2009 the London Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) noted the use 
and recovery of an increasing number of Olympic .380 BBM blank-firing 
pistolsII that had been illegally converted to fire live ammunition – 148 such 
pistols were recovered in London during 2007-2010. Such converted pistols 
were reportedly being sold for between £450 and £750. An MPS armourer 
determined that the pistol could be converted using equipment that could 
be purchased from a do-it-yourself shop. The MPS consulted with the 
German manufacturer of the pistol and the director of the UK Gun Trade 
Association regarding their concerns over the ease of converting the pistol, 
and conveyed its concerns to NABIS, the NCA’s predecessor (the Serious 
Organised Crime Agency, or SOCA), Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs 
Service, the Forensic Science Service (FSS) and ACPO Criminal Use of 
Firearms (CUF) for assistance to address the problem. Following tests, the 
FSS concluded that the Olympic .380 BBM blank-firing pistol is ‘readily con-
vertible’ and should be classified as a ‘prohibited firearm’ and, in accordance 
with the Firearms Act (1968), subject to licensing. 
 
Yet one of the reasons for the variety of the pieces of legislation that deal with fire-
arms control in the UK is that changes in legislation and policy are made in response 
to the collection and presentation by police forces of clear evidence of new develop-
ments, and trends in the illegal possession, use and trafficking of firearms, such as 
the criminal acquisition and use of converted, reactivated and antique firearms or 
I This case study draws on the following materials: KII 3, 28 March 2017; KII 4, 28 March 2017; and 
NABIS (n.d.), Operational Debrief: Olympic .380 BBM Programme of Activity.
II The Bruni Olympic .380 BBM blank-firing pistol was reportedly a popular choice for use in dog 
training, signalling the start of races at youth athletics meetings, and theatrical and other drama 
productions. A licence was not required to purchase the pistol, which retailed for around £80-90. 
As a result, retailers were not required to keep records of imports or sales of the pistols, as would 
have been the case for a firearm subject to regulations.
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the role of intermediaries in the supply of illegal firearms. For example, the case of 
Grant Wilkinson, discussed in section 2.3.1, influenced the NABIS and Association 
of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) proposals to create the offence of ‘possession of a 
firearm with intent to supply’. Box 3 presents a case study of the way in which evi-
dence was gathered of the threat posed by the conversion of an Olympic .380 BBM 
blank-firing pistol, evidence for understanding how to determine ‘readily convert-
ible firearm’ in accordance with the Firearms Act (1968), and a response proposed to 
mitigate the risk, which included changes to legislation, cooperation with firearms 
dealers, and an amnesty. Therefore, while the UK’s Firearms Act approaches its 50th 
anniversary, the country’s legislation, regulations, and policy have been adapted to 
address the challenges posed in the 21st century by illicit firearms availability and 
use in the UK.
To address the problem posed by the fact that an estimated 1,500 pistols were 
already in circulation in the UK, a ‘multi-agency Joint Management Group’ worked 
with registered gun dealers, as well as trade and gun enthusiast associations, to stop 
further imports; withdraw the pistol from the market via a recall; and implement a 
targeted amnesty, which recovered 700 pistols. Overall, 1,322 pistols were removed 
from circulation using these methods.
Despite repeated recommendations for the codification of UK legislation on fire-
arms controls into a single new law,13 the UK government has continued to amend 
the Firearms Act (1968) through other legislation covering criminal offences. For 
example, during the 2010 parliamentary committee hearings on firearms controls, 
NABIS and ACPO recommended the creation of two new offences, which were 
introduced by the Anti-Social Behaviour Crime and Policing Act (2014) as amend-
ments to the Firearms Act (1968): the possession of a firearm with intent to supply; 
and the importation of, or conspiracy to import, firearms without a licence. 
However, the government did follow the committee’s recommendation to provide 
guidance on UK firearms controls, publishing the Guide on Firearms Licensing Law in 
April 2016.14
The third key dimension of UK legislation to address the illegal possession, use and 
trafficking of firearms is the use of tough prison sentences as a deterrent (see Box 4 
for the maximum sentences for firearms-related offences). UK guidance on sen-
tencing for firearms offences refers to the judgment of Lord Bingham in R v Avis 
(1998), in which he stressed that the unlawful possession and use of real and imita-













used to discourage such possession and use.I Since Bingham’s judgment, the 
maximum sentences for several firearms offences have been increased, new 
offences have been added to the Firearms Act (1968), and mandatory minimum 
five-year prison sentences are to be imposed for offences relating to the possession, 
purchase, acquisition, manufacture, sale or distribution/transfer of ‘prohibited 
firearms’, as well as cases where someone uses another person to ‘look after, hide of 
transport’ prohibited firearms or arranges for the firearms to be available.II 
The sentencing of those convicted of such offences has been robust, including in 
cases where the Trident anti-gun crime unit in London raided properties where the 
offender was suspected of being a custodian for prohibited firearms. For example, 
Katrina Jordan was sentenced to six years and eight months in prison for the illegal 
possession of a firearm after police executed a search warrant on her flat and found 
a Kalashnikov assault rifle and ammunition in January 2015, while Lynn Tetteh was 
sentenced to five years in prison for possession of a Kalashnikov assault rifle and 
ammunition in April 2016.15 It is also notable that the solicitor general, Robert 
Buckland, has referred several cases relating to firearms possession, acquisition, 
distribution, sale or transfer to the Court of Appeal for custodial sentences to be 
increased. For example, in December 2016 Tawana Blake was sentenced to six-and-
a-half years in prison for being paid by a gang to store two illegal firearms and 
ammunition. Buckland referred her case to the Court of Appeal and in February 
2017 her sentence was increased to eight-and-a-half years, with Lord Justice Simon 
stating that ‘a deterrent sentence is required where assistance to criminals is 
significant’.16 The highest-profile instance of such a referral relates to Buckland’s 
call in 2016 for the sentences for 16 members of Birmingham’s Burger Boys gang to 
be increased for the sale and transfer of at least eight firearms and ammunition, 
initially sourced from Paul Edmunds. Box 5 summarises the original and new 
prison sentences in this case.
I Lord Bingham posed four questions that should be considered in sentencing for cases of the 
unlawful possession and use of real and imitation firearms, which are included in guidance for 
UK judges on sentencing: 1. ‘What sort of weapon was involved? Genuine weapons are more dan-
gerous than imitations, loaded firearms than unloaded, unloaded for which ammunition is avai-
lable than those for which none is available. Possession of a firearm which has no lawful use, 
such as a sawn-off shotgun, is more serious than possessing a firearm capable of lawful use; 2. 
What use, if any, was made of the firearm? The more prolonged, premeditated and violent the 
use, the more serious the offence is likely to be; 3. With what intention, if any, did the defendant 
possess the firearm? The more prolonged, premeditated and violent the use, the more serious 
the offence is likely to be; and 4. What is the defendant’s record? The seriousness of any firearms 
offence is increased if there is an established record of committing such offences or crimes of 
violence’ (CPS (n.d.), Legal Guidance: Firearms, http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/d_to_g/firearms/).
II The changes were introduced by the Criminal Justice Act (2003), Violent Crime Reduction Act 
(2006) and Anti-Social Behaviour Crime and Policing Act (2014).
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Box 4: Maximum sentences for offences relating to the production, 
possession, distribution and importation of illegal firearms
Firearms offence Maximum 
prison sentence
Legislation
Possession of/conspiracy to possess 
prohibited firearms or ammunition with 
intent to endanger life or to enable 





Possession of a prohibited firearm or 
imitation firearm with intent to commit 





Importing firearms and conspiracy to 







Possession, purchase, acquisition, 
manufacture, selling or distribution/
transfer of a ‘prohibited’ firearm
10 years Section 5, Firearms 
Act (1968) 
Possession of a firearm or imitation 
firearm with intent to cause fear of 
unlawful violence
10 years Section 16A, 
Firearms Act (1968)
Conversion of/conspiracy to convert 
imitation firearms
7 years Section 4, Firearms 
Act (1968)
Carrying a firearm, air weapon or 
imitation firearm in a public place
7 years Section 19, 
Firearms Act (1968)
Possession of firearms or ammunition 
without a firearm certificate
5 years Sections 1 and 2, 
Firearms Act (1968)
Conspiracy to possess, acquire, 
distribute, sell or transfer firearms and/
or ammunition
5 years Section 3, Firearms 
Act (1968)
Unregistered selling, manufacture, 
transfer or repair of firearms
5 years Section 3, Firearms 
Act (1968)














Box 5: Increased prison sentences for the sale and distribution of 
illegal firearms: Birmingham’s Burger Boys
  
Offender, age Original sentence  Sentence after appeal
Nosakhere Stephenson, 41 16 years and 6 months 22 years
Sundish Nazran, 32 13 years 17 years and 3 months
Louis McDermott, 36 9 years and 4 months 12 years and 8 months
Theodore Wiggan, 28 10 years 13 years and 4 months
Rowan Gul, 33 12 years and 3 months 16 years and 9 months
Fitzroy Ducram, 50 7 years and 4 months 10 years and 8 months
Mohammed Miah, 24 13 years 17 years and 5 months
Amar Ghalib, 32 4 years and 11 months 7 years and 2 months
Joynal Abdin, 26 7 years and 3 months 12 years
Ifran Hussain, 25 10 years and 10 months 13 years and 10 months
Usman Hussain, 31 5 years 8 years
Mohammed Fedar, 27 4 years and 4 months 6 years and 8 months
Janed Mohammed, 21 4 years and 6 months 5 years and 5 months
Clinton Officer, 32 11 years 14 years
Jamal Smith, 24 6 years and 6 months 8 years
Darren Mentore, 35 12 years 14 years
Source: BBC (2016)17
1.2  UK national policy and key instruments to address the 
illicit firearms market and terrorist access to that market 
UK national policy to address the illicit firearms market has been characterised as 
‘event-driven’, with increased attention in Parliament and changes to legislation 
following marauding firearms attacks, high-profile shooting incidents and worry-
ing trends in illegal firearms crime. UK policy would benefit from ‘a continued 
focus by politicians and police’ to maintain low levels of illegal firearms acquisition, 
possession and use.18 No single national policy strategy document deals with the 
illegal firearms market, but the issue is addressed in the context of OCG and USG 
activities. The NCA is tasked with national coordination, information collection 
and analysis regarding illegal firearms possession, use and trafficking, providing 
analysis in the National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime. KIIs 
recognised the importance of police forces’ providing the NCA and NABIS with 
information on illegal firearms to enable the creation of a national picture and good 
intelligence. The NCA National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised 
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Crime 2016 concluded that firearms are among the top five threats to the UK for 
2016-2017.19
The UK government’s counter-terrorism strategy – known as CONTEST – was launched 
in 2003 and first published in 2006.20 It consists of four ‘work streams’: 
• Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks; 
• Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism;
• Protect: to strengthen protection against a terrorist attack; and
• Prepare: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack. 
Overall, the strategy has been regarded as providing ‘a holistic framework for the 
UK’s response to terrorism’.21 As we will demonstrate in the following sections of this 
chapter, terrorist-related concerns about the illegal firearms market relate primarily 
to the threat of a marauding terrorist firearm attack (MTFA) with semi-automatic or 
automatic firearms. Lord Harris’s report showed that attention and activities have 
been directed towards the ‘prepare’ dimension of the strategy regarding the risk of 
an MTFA in London.22 This study focuses on the ‘pursue’ dimension, in terms of pre-
venting terrorist access to illegal firearms. KIIs emphasised the importance of UK 
counter-terrorism experience and surveillance resources for ‘intelligence, enforce-
ment and prevention’, arguing that the following elements have been important for 
preventing terrorist access to illegal firearms and MTFAs in the UK: 
• the limited availability of semi-automatic and fully automatic firearms 
because of the enforcement of UK firearms legislation;
• the fact that OCGs with access to semi-automatic and fully automatic fire-
arms are unwilling to supply terrorists, perhaps due to their ‘honour code’ or 
the risk of detection and subsequent negative impact on their other business 
interests; and
• the UK’s significant intelligence, monitoring and surveillance capabilities 
that enable early detection of potential risks and thus prevent MTFAs.23
Research for this chapter focused on the supply side of the illegal firearms market 
and terrorist access to that market. However, a key aspect of UK policy on illegal 
firearms possession, use, and trafficking in OCG and USG contexts is the need to 
adopt a comprehensive approach that addresses demand and related serious and 
organised criminal activities, in particular illegal drug market activity.24 One KII 
with extensive experience of successful investigations into cases of illegal firearms 
possession, use and trafficking in an area with high rates of gun crime stressed that 
‘we can’t break all of the supply routes, therefore we need to change [OCGs’ and 













one has to be cognisant of the broader socio-economic context in which illegal fire-
arms are used, and that it is not enough to just focus on trying to cut off supply.26 
Several KIIs emphasised the importance of looking at young people as an at-risk 
group for gun crime, which is particularly reflected in the UK’s Ending Gang and 
Youth Violence Programme.27 
While there is a national framework for tackling OCG and USG gun crime, police 
forces have relative autonomy to determine how best to address the illegal firearms 
market in their areas, and which measures to take and cooperative arrangements to 
make. Therefore, there is a force-by-force approach for dealing with the local illegal 
firearms market, driven by local market dynamics and key individual decision-
makers in regional police forces. Most notable in this regard are the three police 
forces that established specialist units to tackle firearms-related crimes in three of 
the four police forces areas with the highest levels of firearms offences:
• Trident (London Metropolitan Police Service): established in 2000 in response 
to high-profile shooting incidents and murders, but now responsible for 
tackling gang crime more broadly;
• Xcalibre (Greater Manchester Police): formed in 2001 as part of a multi-
agency response to tackle gun- and gang-related criminality in Moss Side 
and South Manchester; and 
• Matrix (Merseyside Police): created in 2005 and dedicated to tackling gun 
crime at all levels, from education and community involvement to investiga-
tion and armed response where required. It ceased to exist in 2014 due to 
budget cuts. 28
The importance of utilising street-level intelligence gathered by covert operatives 
in conjunction with the surveillance and monitoring of computers, phones, credit 
cards and banking helps to identify the ‘Mr Big’ figures involved in the illegal fire-
arms market and not just the lower-level figures. While KIIs acknowledged that 
Matrix was disbanded during a period of declining gun violence in the Merseyside 
area, the subsequent increase in firearms offences in this area corresponds with the 
period since the disbanding of the specialised unit. It was therefore felt that if ‘we 
take our eye off the issue, the problem returns … we need to keep up the pressure 
and constantly disrupt the supply of firearms’.29 
Due to the circulation of illegal firearms within the UK, this has involved mapping 
OCG and USG linkages in order to understand potential firearms flows and distribu-
tion. KIIs explained that intelligence on who procures from and supplies the UK 
illicit firearms market comes primarily from covert operations and surveillance.30 
According to KIIs, an area where more work is needed is that of understanding the 
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nature of the demand for firearms.31 A variety of methods have been used to learn 
about supply and circulation, such as the use of undercover operatives (to access 
the illicit firearms market, gather information on the types of firearms that are 
available, prices, etc., and identify key players and potential sources of supply) and 
the use of controlled deliveries of firearms parts in postage/courier parcels from the 
United States (to apprehend the key players involved in the illegal firearms market 
and not just the custodians and initial recipients).32 Golding and McClory empha-
sised the importance of long-term covert operations to disrupt illegal arms supplies 
and circulation in the UK, as well as noting that such operations require considera-
ble resources and therefore compete with other priorities, such as terrorism. They 
stressed that the West Midlands Police had insufficient surveillance capacity to deal 
with illegal firearms supply and the Greater Manchester Police could not put phone 
taps in place quickly enough.33
1.3  Forms of cooperation in the fight against the illicit 
firearms market
Several agencies are involved in the fight against the illicit possession, use and traf-
ficking of firearms in the UK:
•  National Crime Agency 
 – Strategic Governance Group and Threat Group on Firearms
 – Border Policing Command
• National Ballistics Intelligence Service 
• UK police forces (police force areas in England and Wales, Police Scotland, 
Police Service of Northern Ireland)
 – National Police Chiefs Council/Association of Chief Police Officers 
Criminal Use of Firearms 
 – Five regional counter-terrorism units 
 – Anti-gun crime specialist units
• UK Border Force
• Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs Service 
• National Police Chiefs Council – Counter Terrorism Coordination Committee
• National Counter Terrorism Policing Network
• Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism Command (known as SO15) 
• Home Office, Office for Security and Counter Terrorism 
• Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, MI5
• Crown Prosecution Service
• Judiciary













This section provides an overview of cooperation among these agencies and the 
ways in which they cooperate internationally. In addition to cooperation with other 
national law enforcement agencies and Europol, UK police forces and NABIS have 
also sought to cooperate with European firearms producers. As noted above, the 
London Metropolitan Police Service consulted with Bruni as part of its efforts to 
address the threat posed by converted Olympic .380 BBM pistols. In 2012 NABIS 
visited the Glock factory in Austria to deepen cooperation that began because of 
tracing requests sent to the factory in relation to the circulation of Glock pistols in 
the UK illegal firearms market.34 
1.3.1  Inter-agency cooperation in the UK
KIIs stressed the importance of good inter-agency cooperation in the UK to address 
the illegal firearms market and terrorist access to it. The experience of dedicated 
‘gang and gun crime’ units in Greater Manchester, London, and Merseyside, com-
bined with the national capabilities and intelligence provided by NABIS, enabled 
police to ‘investigate the gun’ and, in the process, both address street-level gun vio-
lence and apprehend the key players – ‘Mr Big’ figures – in OCGs, USGs and illegal 
firearms supply. The recovery of ballistics material used in crimes and other dis-
charges, and its processing and analysis by NABIS helped police to create an 
‘inferred firearm’ and better understand the dynamics of the firearms market in 
each police force area, as well as national networks. 35 The ‘investigate the gun 
approach’ made possible by such cooperation was regarded by KIIs as a novel 21st-
century response to gun crime in the UK, revealing useful information to address 
the illegal firearms market in the UK.36 The creation of NABIS (see Box 6) and NCA 
support are regarded as critical in this regard. 
When an illegal firearm is seized at a UK port of entry, it is reported by the NCA 
International Crime Team (ICT).37 When a firearm is seized in someone’s possession 
in such circumstances, the appropriate NCA border investigation team conducts 
the investigation. In cases where the firearm is found in a parcel, the NCA ICT 
assesses the circumstances and decides on the appropriate unit to investigate a par-
ticular case, perhaps referring it to the regional intelligence unit that covers the 
intended recipient’s address. The regional organised crime unit or police force 
area’s intelligence bureau takes further action. Irrespective of the option chosen, 
the NCA ICT and NABIS are required to be informed of progress and the outcome of 
any investigation. In order to ensure that a pre-existing investigation into an illegal 
smuggling operation is not disrupted by the UK Border Force, senior investigating 
officers ‘should give serious consideration to notifying the UK Border Agency’ to 
prevent disruption. Similarly, a senior investigating officer is required to check with 
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the UK Border Force to ensure that action to stop criminals bringing firearms into 
the country does not interfere with an operation by another UK law enforcement or 
security agency, including counter-terrorism operations. 
Box 6: National Ballistics Intelligence Service 
NABIS was launched in March 2008 as a ‘new weapon in the fight against gun 
crime’. It is funded on a subscription basis by UK police forces, with forensic 
laboratories in Birmingham and Manchester and links to the laboratories of 
the Metropolitan Police, Police Scotland, and the Police Service of Northern 
Ireland. NABIS provides law enforcement agencies in the UK with forensic, 
tactical, and strategic intelligence, based on the analysis of ballistic recoveries 
from crime scenes and other firearms-related incidents that are processed 
and analysed using the Integrated Ballistics Identification System (IBIS). This 
includes statistical data on firearms availability, recovery and use. 
NABIS has expanded on the FSS forensic database of firearms and ballistic 
material recovered from crime scenes, which it inherited, and the current 
database contains information on firearms types, producers, serial numbers, 
and other markings. NABIS reportedly traced 1,417 recovered firearms that 
had serial numbers between 2013 and May 2016,38 helping to identify the 
source and point of diversion for each weapon and also contributing towards 
the construction of an overall national picture on sources of supply and risks 
of diversion.39 It is necessary for police forces to submit recovered ballistic 
material as quickly as possible for NABIS analysis, to help support investiga-
tions into the firearm in question and possible links with other recorded 
firearms crimes in the area or in other parts of the UK. 
The West Midlands Police, which hosts the NABIS team and database, con-
siders NABIS to be ‘the most advanced ballistic tracking and intelligence 
service in the world’.40
 
 
Operation Dragonroot (see Box 7), and the agenda for the ACPO CUF, indicate that 
counter-terrorism considerations are currently a significant factor in UK police 
operations to address illegal firearms possession, supply, and distribution.41 KIIs 
highlighted the positive benefits of collaboration between units that focus on OCGs 
and USGs and those with a terrorist focus, because the former deal with the illegal 













tested daily, while the latter have better strategic-level intelligence, as well as more 
sophisticated monitoring and surveillance capabilities. 
Box 7: Operation Dragonroot, October 2016
Operation Dragonroot was a joint operation that took place in the UK during 
October 2016 involving police forces around the country, organised jointly by 
the NCA and the National Counter Terrorism Policing Network (NCTPN). It 
was intended to give a clear public signal of bringing organised crime and 
counter-terrorism resources together to address illegal firearms in the UK. 
The operation was intended to disrupt the ‘criminal supply of illegal firearms’ 
and identify the ‘potential for their supply to terrorists’.42 Media attention 
focused on the 833 firearms seized during the operation, which included the 
confiscation of firearms from firearms dealers who had their licences 
revoked and 93 firearms surrendered to Essex police. The recovered or 
seized firearms included 200 handguns (including CZ-75, Makarov, Tanfoglio 
GT32, and Zoraki pistols), 153 shotguns, 99 rifles, 11 assault rifles (including 
one AK-74), two machine guns and one Skorpion sub-machine gun. 43
However, the testing of ‘a new approach to intelligence collection and 
sharing, which the NCA and NCTP will now continue via a central coordina-
tion hub’ was considered more important than the quantity and quality of 
firearms collected.44 KIIs indicated that the results in terms of intelligence on 
criminal-terrorist links with regard to illegal firearms varied significantly 
among police force areas.45 The operation ran in parallel to a public aware-
ness campaign #GunsOffOurStreets, which ‘invited the public to report what 
they know’.46
 
KIIs warned that care needs to be taken to prevent the merging of capabilities for 
addressing the illegal firearms market.47 One KII noted that while counter-terror-
ism units can provide more resources for monitoring and surveillance to address 
illegal firearms supply and circulation, the KII questioned the willingness of these 
units to share potentially useful information with those involved in addressing 
illegal firearms in the hands of criminals. This KII therefore cautioned that too 
much stress on counter-terrorism could have a negative impact on the ability of 
police forces to address the daily negative impacts on the public caused by illegal 
firearms supply and circulation.48 He therefore stressed the importance of getting 
the balance right between the various proactive and reactive approaches.49
386
1.3.2  Cooperation with law enforcement agencies in Europe and 
European agencies
KIIs explicitly mentioned only Ireland, Lithuania, and the Netherlands as EU 
member states with which UK law enforcement agencies have undertaken signifi-
cant cooperation to address the illegal firearms market in the UK. UK law enforce-
ment agencies cooperated with Lithuania in efforts to address the illegal supply of 
converted Baikal pistols during 2006-2011 (see also section 2.3.4).50 Cooperation 
between the UK and the Netherlands to address the smuggling of drugs and small 
numbers of firearms led to the creation of a joint investigative Dutch police-Mersey-
side Police ‘team’.51 In October 2013 the NCA concluded an investigation in coopera-
tion with the Netherlands and Germany into a UK OCG that was importing drugs 
and weapons from the Netherlands.52 
The head of NABIS intelligence, Ian Head, has served as the chair of the European 
Firearms Experts (EFE) group, which forms part of the Law Enforcement Working 
Party, during 2013-2017. Because the EFE group is responsible for producing the EU 
Firearms Threat Assessment and facilitating the sharing of expertise, good practice 
and information on illicit firearms manufacturing and trafficking in Europe, the 
fact that a NABIS representative chairs the group would indicate that there is good 
potential for UK cooperation with partners in another EU member state. For example, 
NABIS was asked to produce the 2011 European Firearms Threat Assessment.53 The 
decision to appoint Ian Head was reportedly taken in ‘recognition for the work that 
NABIS and the UK has done to support the group over the past five years [and] 
NABIS is helping to shape the international engagement of law enforcement and 
influence how Europe tackles gun crime’.54 The NCA has also noted that the UK ‘has 
influenced EU-level activity including efforts to standardise and tighten firearms 
legislation’.55 
One KII discussed cooperation with Europol, focusing in particular on the embed-
ding of two police officers from Merseyside and the West Midlands Police, both 
with extensive experience of investigating illegal firearms-related crimes in the UK 
liaison bureau at Europol during 2014-2015.56 The secondments were a pilot pro-
gramme ‘to facilitate the exchange of information from UK Law Enforcement relat-
ing to firearms, the wider threat of Serious and Organised Crime and the EMPACT 
(European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats) threat priority 
areas’.57 According to the ACPO CUF lead, Deputy Chief Constable David Thompson, 
‘The project has a two-fold purpose; to increase joint investigations with EU Member 
States and ACPO forces, and gain increased support from Europol for UK investiga-
tions’.58 The results of the project were regarded positively by one KII, because the 













questions regarding the implications of Britain’s pending withdrawal from the 
European Union (EU).59 The UK also reportedly shares the quarterly results and 
analysis of its firearms tracing with the firearms focal point at Europol.60 However, 
the KII noted that while the UK is providing information on illegal firearms, only 
limited information is being returned. Part of the problem could be related to the 
currently limited use of IBIN. In conclusion, the KII stated, ‘I’m not sure we get what 
we want from European cooperation [on the issue of illegal firearms trafficking] at 
the moment’.61 
1.3.3  Cooperation with the United States
Several KIIs mentioned good cooperation with the United States in the investiga-
tion of imports into the UK resulting from online sales, including on the dark web, 
and courier or postal deliveries of blank-firing and Glock pistols.62 
One of the best publicly known cases of multi-level cooperation to address the 
illegal importation of firearms into the UK, and their subsequent distribution to 
criminals in the country, is known as Operation Lapworth I and II (see Box 8). The 
operation focused on the attempt by criminals based in West Yorkshire in England 
to illegally import 12 Glock pistols from the United States in the period between 
April 2010 and April 2011. The operation involved cooperation in the UK between 
the West Yorkshire Police, SOCA (the NCA’s predecessor), NABIS, the UK Border 
Agency and the CPS, and consultations with SO15. It also relied on good coopera-
tion with the US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). The 
case revealed important information on the methods used to smuggle firearms into 
the UK, but also demonstrated the benefits of national and international coopera-
tion to gather intelligence, test new surveillance tools and tactics, and test the 
responsiveness of mechanisms for bilateral cooperation to trace illegal firearms 
and manage a transatlantic investigation into a smuggling operation. Operation 
Lapworth I and II is one of the best examples of strong inter-agency cooperation in 
the UK, and noteworthy cooperation with the ATF in the United States.
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Box 8: Operation Lapworth I and II, 2010-201163
Operation Lapworth began following the discovery by the UK Border Agency at 
East Midlands Airport of parts and components for two Glock 26 pistols that 
had been shipped from the United States to addresses in Bradford in packages 
that stated that the contents were electronic items. Altogether, 13 firearms 
were shipped by Scottdale Liburd of Texas in the United States to addresses in 
West Yorkshire in 27 parcels, all of which stated that the contents were elec-
tronic items. The shipments were arranged by Asian males involved in criminal 
activities, with the initial contact made with Liburd via iOffer.com. Payments for 
the weapons were made via PayPal and indicated that credit card fraud was 
used to pay for some of the items. The parcels were delivered to recipients that 
were not directly involved in criminal activities, with subsequent delivery or 
pick-up by the criminals. Even after the arrest of Atique Arif, Adnan Izbal, 
Mudassar Izbal, Mohammed Tariq, and Damian Waite in July 2010 for their role 
in the illegal importation of the seized Glock pistol components, communica-
tion continued with Liburd to continue the delivery of Glock pistols. At the same 
time, a tracing request facilitated between NABIS and the ATF had identified the 
so-called ‘straw purchaser’I for the Glock pistols in the United States as Yvette 
Trevino. The ATF arrested Trevino and relayed information to its UK counterparts 
in early August 2010 that Trevino’s former boyfriend, Scottdale Liburd, organised 
the purchases and shipments from the United States. 
In December 2010 Liburd informed the ATF that renewed requests had been 
made for the shipment of Glock pistols to West Yorkshire. All parties agreed to 
utilise this information to arrange for a controlled delivery of deactivated fire-
arms parts from the United States to West Yorkshire, with the aim of identifying 
the actual end user of the firearms and locating the firearms that had been 
delivered before July 2010, some of which had been used in Manchester in the 
autumn of 2010. The controlled delivery therefore not only required cooperation 
between law enforcement and border agencies, but also cooperation with the 
airline involved in the transportation of the items and the use of surveillance 
technologies that could be housed in the smuggled parts and components 
without discovery until the end user could be identified. The controlled deliver-
ies took place in February 2011 and led to a snooker club in Bradford run by 
Sakawat Shah, who, along with Moshin Hussain, was suspected of dealing in the 
illegally imported firearms after they arrived in the UK. In October 2011 Shah and 
Hussain were sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment, while Arif and Tairq were 
given 24-year prison sentences and Iqbal was sentenced to 12 years in prison. 
I ‘Straw purchaser’ is the term used to describe an individual that purchases a firearm, but con-













2.  Characteristics of the UK illicit firearms 
market 
The UK illicit firearms market is fragmented. There are strong regional variations relat-
ing to supply, but also distribution networks that operate between regions.64 This 
section provides an overview of the availability of illegal firearms in the UK, drawing on 
a mixture of quantitative and qualitative data. KIIs and media sources provide informa-
tion on the price of different types of firearms in the UK, as well as the main character-
istics and supply mechanics of and actors involved in the illegal firearms market. In 
addition, the study sought to investigate whether the UK illicit firearms market can be 
most accurately described in terms of ‘the existence of local markets in illegal firearms 
with questions of supply and demand largely manifested at a local level’.65
2.1  Estimating the size of the UK illicit firearms market
It is very difficult to reliably quantify the size of a national illicit firearms market, 
since it involves assessing an illegal activity that is not captured by official statis-
tics.66 It has been estimated that following the Dunblane massacre of March 1996, 
there were between 500,000 and 4 million firearms on the UK illicit firearms 
market.67 This is such a broad range that it is not regarded as a useful point of depar-
ture for a study of this market. One common assumption expressed by KIIs and 
desk-research corresponds with the NCA claim that: ‘The overall availability of fire-
arms in the UK remains lower than in other western European countries.’68 For 
example, according to official UK national data, as of the end of March 2016 a total 
of 720,419 firearms and shotgun certificates were valid related to 539,194 registered 
firearms (mainly rifles) and 1,331,563 shotguns.69 Therefore, in 2016 around only 1% 
of the population of England and Wales were legally permitted to possess a firearm 
or shotgun.I Previous studies have demonstrated that England and Wales have rela-
tively low firearms possession rates compared to other European countries. While 
the EU has an estimated 15.7 firearms per 100 persons, for example, the estimate for 
England and Wales is only 6.2 firearms per 100 persons.70 
We examined several proxy indicators for estimating the size of the UK illicit fire-
arms market.71 Firstly, we analysed the regional breakdown of official data for 
England and Wales on registered firearms and official data on police-recorded fire-
arms offences. Despite the limitations of using this government data for estimating 
I The UK Office of National Statistics (ONS) recorded the population of England and Wales in 2016 




the size of the UK illicit firearms market, we found that the police force areas with 
the highest number of registered firearms do not provide a useful indicator for the 
availability of illegal firearms, because the highest number of firearms offences 
occur in urban areas with comparatively lower overall numbers of firearms and reg-
istered firearms holders. It has been noted that there: “is a lack of data in the public 
domain showing the extent to which legally-owned firearms are used in gun crime, partly 
because it is difficult to collect accurate data (because in many incidents the gun is not 
fired or recovered and therefore difficult to identify), and partly because the Home Office 
does not routinely publish the data that it does collect”.72 
Importantly, the Home Office, the ACPO Firearms and Explosives Licensing Group, 
and NABIS informed a parliamentary enquiry on firearms control that the ‘“the vast 
majority” of firearms-enabled offences are committed with illegally-held fire-
arms’.73 The relatively low level of firearms loss and theft also indicates that in 
recent years the legal firearms market has not represented a significant source for 
the UK illicit firearms market (see section 2.3.5). 
Secondly, we tried to collect data from open sources and FOI requests on firearms 
discharges for regions with high levels of firearms offences. Thirdly, we examined 
information on firearms seizures. All of these official data sources were interro-
gated using information provided by KIIs and other qualitative data sources. These 
various data sources do not directly provide an indication of the size of the illicit 
firearms market in the UK, but can help to understand the level of availability of 
illegal firearms in the country. 
2.1.1 Firearms offences 
Criminal offences involving firearms accounted for 0.2% of police-recorded crimes 
during the period 2012/13-2015/16.I Table 2 indicates that the number of police-
recorded firearms offences was in decline in England and Wales between 2008 and 
2014 and in Scotland between 2007 and 2013, but has increased again in recent 
years. The most significant factor behind the worsening situation is a 15% increase 
in offences involving handguns, which have occurred mainly in urban areas (from 
2,162 in 2013/14 to 2,497 in 2015/16). Offences involving shotguns and imitation 
weapons, including converted weapons, have also increased in recent years. Despite 
the overall 5% increase in firearms offences committed during 2015/16 compared 
I The types of crime involving a firearm that are considered in this section are: homicide; attemp-
ted murder; threats to kill; assault with injury and assault with intent to cause serious harm; 
robbery; rape; and sexual assault (ONS (2017), Focus on Violent Crime and Sexual Offences, Eng-













to 2013/14, the data for police-recorded crimes involving firearms in England and 
Wales in 2015/16 are still at 47% of the firearms-crime level for 2005/06. 
Table 2:  Trends in police-recorded crime in England, Scotland and Wales 
involving the use of firearms,I 2002/03-2015/16II
Year 
(April-March)
Firearms offences in 
England and Wales 
Firearms offences in 
Scotland 
Firearms offences in 
England, Scotland 
and Wales 
2002/03 10,248 - -
2003/04 10,338 - -
2004/05 11,069 - -
2005/06 11,088 1,068 12,156
2006/07 9,645 1,260 10,905
2007/08 9,865 1,143 11,008
2008/09 8,199 970 9,169
2009/10 8,082 841 8,923
2010/11 7,040 647 7,687
2011/12 6,022 535 6,557
2012/13 5,158 365 5,523
2013/14 4,856 374 5,230
2014/15 4,912 - -
2015/16 5,182 - -
Source: ONS (2017);74 Allen and Dempsey (2016)75
For at least the past decade the Greater Manchester, London, Merseyside, and West 
Midlands police force areas consistently recorded the highest levels of firearm 
crime per head of population in England and Wales (see Table 3). Data for 2015/16 
indicated that London Metropolitan (30%), West Midlands (10%) and Greater 
Manchester (9%) police force areas accounted for around half of firearms offences 
in England and Wales, while they account for about a quarter of the population.76 
National data for 2016/17 were not published when this study was prepared, but 
London Metropolitan firearms offences data for 2016/17 were released in April 2017 
and indicated a 42% increase from 1,793 firearms offences in 2015/16 compared to 
2,544 during 2016/17.77 
I Firearms include: shotguns; handguns; rifles; imitation weapons such as BB guns or soft air 
weapons; other weapons such as CS gas or pepper spray; stun guns; and unidentified weapons. 
They exclude conventional air weapons, such as air rifles.
II Police-recorded crime data are not designated as national statistics.
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West Midlands 974 985 903 912 648 499 540 562 20
Metropolitan Police 3,396 3,087 3,524 2,747 2,479 1,959 1,594 1,652 19
Greater Manchester 1,160 827 709 504 365 387 397 437 16
Bedfordshire 83 64 96 105 64 49 77 86 13
South Yorkshire 202 144 121 134 84 163 164 161 12
Merseyside 398 352 258 226 248 211 212 162 12
Essex 260 176 154 135 137 131 154 176 10
West Yorkshire 332 287 267 218 257 253 224 221 10
Suffolk 38 25 16 26 20 22 16 59 8
Lancashire 349 207 215 179 126 100 116 116 8
Source: ONS (2016);78 Allen and Dempsey (2016)79
2.1.2  Firearms discharges
KIIs from police force areas with high levels of firearms crime informed the research 
team that ‘firearms discharges by the public’ are better indicators for illegal fire-
arms availability than ‘gun crime’.80 A report from the West Midlands Police chief 
constable to the Strategic Police and Crime Board explained that: “Firearms dis-
charges are regarded as a strong indication of the actual prevalence of lethal purpose 
weapons amongst criminals. This is one of the critical areas monitored by the UK threat 
group and NABIS. Discharges provide an insight into the nature and type of weapons 
used and the circumstances”.81
Yet the report noted that there are differences between police forces’ recording of 
firearms discharges. For example, the Greater Manchester Police only record ‘gang-
related firearms discharges’, while other forces record all reported public firearms 
discharges. The NCA noted that firearms discharges more often relate to USGs than 
OCGs, due to the fact that OCG use is more limited and is largely involved with pro-
tection, robbery, intimidation and status.82 NABIS analysis has indicated that: “once 













This disposability may be aided by the relatively low cost of antique, converted or reacti-
vated weapons. … Conversely, so called ‘status weapons’, such as sub-machine guns, are 
re-used disproportionately more often and are subject of greater movement, showing 
them to be a far less disposable commodity”.83 
This should be borne in mind when examining the data given below as an indicator 
for firearms availability. 
The Greater Manchester Police and Merseyside Police provided information on 
recorded firearms discharges for recent years. While the data for Merseyside indi-
cate a decline in firearms discharges during the period 2012-2015 (see Table 4), KIIs 
reported that there were 87 firearms discharges in 2016.84 Furthermore, new types 
of firearms were discharged, because only 29 of the 87 recorded discharges were 
shotguns, and less than half a dozen of the remaining 58 discharges could be linked. 
A similar trend was recorded in Greater Manchester Police data, with a notable 
increase in firearms discharges during 2015/16 compared to previous years – from 
34 discharges in 2012/13 to 21 in 2013/14, and then on an upward trajectory to 33 in 
2014/15 and 55 in 2015/16.85 The data were interpreted by KIIs as indicating the 
greater availability of new types of firearms during 2015-2016 in comparison with 
previous years.
Table 4:  Information on firearms seizures and discharges in the Merseyside 
Police area, 2012-2016I






Source: Merseyside Police (2017)86
I Data on firearms discharges were ‘obtained by use of ”keyword” searching and then a review of 
the descriptive information held. The data is based on physical evidence or from credible indivi-
duals that there has been a discharge of a firearm which includes air weapons’. 
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2.1.3  Firearms seizures
The UK Border Force provides data annually on seizures of drugs, cigarettes, alcohol, 
ivory and coral, but not firearms, explosives and ammunition.87 Therefore, the data 
on seizures at borders and ports presented in Table 5 have been constructed using 
information made publicly available during questions and debates in the UK 
Parliament. This dataset reveals that the UK Border Force seized the highest number 
of ‘real’ firearms during 2012/13, with the second highest level in 2015/16. The 
broad range of items covered by ‘imitation’ and ‘other’ does not enable informed 
analysis for the availability of illegal firearms. For example, the ‘imitation’ category 
‘other’ category mixes ‘parts of guns’ with stun weapons, mace and pepper sprays, 
airguns, and silencers. Therefore, only limited analysis of this data is possible to 
inform an estimate of the size of the UK illicit firearms market. 
NABIS has provided some information in press releases on the number of firearms 
seized or recovered in recent years.88 For example, NABIS analysed 859 ‘recovered’ 
firearms, most of which were classified as ‘illegal’, during 2015/16 and found that 55 
of these firearms had ballistic links to criminal discharges.89 
Table 5:  Firearms seizures by the UK Border Force, 2010/11-2015/16I 
Type of 
firearm 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Real 94 197 463 283 126 445
ImitationII 776 3,888 1,255 399 419 321
OtherIII 1,150 176 1,403 3,017 2,301 1,533
Sources: UK Parliament (2016); They Work for You (2016)90 
2.2  Types and prices of available firearms 
Problems with the categorisation of firearms used in firearms offences, in particu-
lar unidentified firearms, mean that it is difficult to use these data to determine the 
types of firearms that are available on the illicit firearms market. UK police-recorded 
I The figures quoted are management information, which is subject to internal quality checks and 
may be subject to change. These figures are not already in the public domain.
II Imitation includes: readily convertible firearms and realistic imitation firearms.














data show that handguns continue to be the criminal ‘firearm of choice’, a prefer-
ence that reportedly began in the 1980s.91 Since 2003/04, handguns have been used 
in 40% of police-recorded firearms offences (see Table 6).92 










2006/07 612 4,173 2,516 69 1,276 1,068
2007/08IV 602 4,172 2,561 71 1,325 1,205
2008/09 618 4,273 1,507 89 953 848
2009/10 581 3,757 1,526 67 1,368 850
2010/11 611 3,107 1,618 74 958 746
2011/12 494 2,655 1,387 56 834 652
2012/13 453 2,256 1,226 43 724 499
2013/14 387 2,134 1,142 55 698 495
2014/15 431 2,062 1,123 52 (55)V 833 463
2015/16 411 2,157 1,431 (43) 666 517
Source: ONS (2017);93 Allen and Dempsey (2016)94 
It has been estimated that 750 USGs or OCGs in the UK are ‘involved with guns’.95 
Hales, Lewis and Silverstone emphasised that ‘supply is patchy’ and criminals are 
‘forced to buy whatever is on offer’.96 One KII indicated that ‘firearms are transported 
around the country’ for use by different OCGs and USGs, which further emphasises 
the limited supply of firearms.97 This was based on the assumption that the profile 
for the availability of firearms for use in criminal offences in Manchester provided a 
‘typical’ profile for OCGs and USGs in England and Wales. For example, firearms 
used by gangs in Manchester were transferred to ‘co-ethnic’ gangs and affiliates in 
Birmingham and Leeds too – but these firearms were not transferred to OCGs and 
USGs in Liverpool. The impression was given of circulation among small USGs.98 
I Police-recorded crime data are not designated as national statistics.
II Imitation firearms include weapons such as BB guns and soft air weapons, which can fire small 
plastic pellets at low velocity.
III Rifles and other firearms include starting guns, prohibited firearms (including CS gas) and other 
firearms.
IV The Violent Crime Reduction Act introduced in October 2007 made it illegal to import or sell imita-
tion firearms and tightened the rules for the manufacture and sale of certain types of air weapons.
V The use of (…) refers to rifles data for calendar year 2014 for 2014/15 and 2015 for 2015/16, taken 
from Allen and Dempsey, (2016 p. 9).
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NABIS data provide the UK with an excellent opportunity to understand the types 
of firearms that are available in the country, changes in demand and supply over 
time, and prices. NABIS research and analysis published in 2015 indicated seven 
types of illegal firearms in the UK:
• ‘original lethal purpose’ firearms; 
• converted blank-firing firearms; 
• reactivated firearms; 
• lawfully owned firearms and shotguns that have been diverted into the illicit 
market; 
• homemade firearms; 
• antique weapons; and 
• 3D-printed guns.99 
The analysis did not reveal which type of firearms are most in demand or readily 
available based on submissions to NABIS, but noted that ‘a third of guns examined 
by police were blank-firing, modified or reactivated weapons that had been 
converted’.100 It is important to bear in mind that access to certain types of firearms 
differs according to position in the criminal hierarchy: while semi-automatic or 
reactivated ex-military firearms are restricted to older and more senior members of 
an OCG (for intimidation purposes or for an assassination), cheaper firearms, such 
as converted pistols and antique handguns, are usually available to young gang 
members and USGs.101
2.2.1  Prices
Research conducted by Hales, Lewis and Silverstone that was published in 2006 
remains the most comprehensive survey of illegal firearms procurement and prices 
for illegal firearms in the UK (see Table 7). Their research indicated that the price for 
illegal firearms in the UK was influenced by the following factors: 
• Firearm type and availability;
• Leakage from legal sources;
• Regional levels of supply and demand; 
• Purpose built lethal firearms are typically more expensive than converted or 
illegally manufactured firearms; 
• If the firearm has been used in a previous crime, it will be cheaper than a 
‘clean’ firearm; 
• Better criminal contacts typically mean wider choice and lower price; 













• Prices are generally lower if the seller is a dependent drug user; and 
• Ammunition availability.102
KIIs highlighted that most of these factors continue to influence illegal firearms 
prices.103 
Table 7:  Price estimates for different types of firearms, 2006
Type of firearm Low end High end
Shotgun £50-200 £700-800
Handguns £150-200 £1,000-1,400
Converted imitation firearm  
(e.g. 8 mm blank firer)
£200
Automatic weapons (e.g. MAC-10  
sub-machine gun/machine pistol)
£800 £4,000
Source: Hales, Lewis and Silverstone (2006, pp. 49-56)
Ammunition availability is also considered an important factor for understanding 
the dynamics of the UK illicit firearms market. Therefore, UK police forces monitor 
the price of ammunition as a key indicator for the availability of ammunition and 
types of firearms in their areas.104
2.2.2  Changes in availability
In 2010 a UK parliamentary committee reported that ‘replica, converted and deacti-
vated firearms have emerged as a major source of illegal guns, perhaps owing to the 
difficulties that criminals now experience in acquiring genuine lethal firearms’.105 
NABIS analysis in 2010, for example, indicated that some pre-1995 standard deacti-
vated firearms had been reactivated and used in criminal offences, and in January 
2012 NABIS produced a profile on the ‘Scale and Use of Deactivated and Reactivated 
Firearms Across the UK’, which indicated that although there have been a compara-
tively low number of reactivated firearms discharges, such firearms are used for 
murder and intimidation.106 Therefore, the issue of conversion is not new and avail-
able data indicate that converted handguns are among the most readily available 
types of firearms for OCGs and USGs in the UK.I 
I Reactivated MAC-10s were reportedly selling for up to £2,000 in 2008, while a reactivated Uzi 
sub-machine gun was sold to an undercover officer in Merseyside for £5,000 in 2010.
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KIIs explained the cyclical nature of supply and demand in the UK illegal firearms 
market. They noted that when a particular type of firearm is targeted for an inter-
vention in order to restrict supply, its price increases and demand switches to 
another type of firearm that has become more readily available.107 During the past 
decade it appears that this process has manifested itself in the following way.108 
During 2005-2009, a significant quantity of converted Baikal pistols were supplied 
from Lithuania. The blank-firing pistol was believed to cost around £10 and exam-
ples were sold to Lithuanian gangs for £300 after conversion and fitting with silenc-
ers.109 It was reported that a converted Baikal pistol could cost about £1,500 in the 
UK at the time. Targeted interventions by police forces in London and Greater 
Manchester, and cooperation with Lithuanian authorities by the nascent NABIS 
arrested the supply during 2009-2011.110 During 2009-2011 Glock pistols were 
imported into the UK from the United States in significant quantities before supply 
was arrested. The Glock pistols were reportedly purchased for around £300 in the 
United States and resold in the UK for up to £4,000.111
Box 9: Illegal firearms in Merseyside112
Merseyside has a high level of firearms crime, and like other such areas in 
the UK, demand for firearms largely originates from OCGs and USGs involved 
in the illegal drugs trade. Also in comparison with other areas with high 
levels of firearms crime, Merseyside recorded a significant decline in fire-
arms offences during 2007-2014 (see Table 3). However, several KIIs indicated 
that Merseyside has traditionally constituted a distinct firearms market in 
the UK, with a specific profile for types of firearms and sources of supply 
that differs from other regions of England and Wales.113
Firstly, firearms circulate among criminals in Merseyside, and there is limited 
evidence of transfers to other parts of the UK for use in criminal activities.I 
Inferred firearms analysis for Merseyside during 2012-2015 indicated that 
firearms used in homicides had been discharged multiple times, which is 
regarded as an indicator of limited supply, and correlated with a compara-
tively low level of firearms discharges for Merseyside (see Table 3). Most of 
the discharges were reportedly from shotguns. The Merseyside Police seized 
the following firearms during 2014-2015: 22 revolvers, 16 rifles or muzzle-
loading weapons, 43 handguns and 22 pistols.114
I A notable exception was a case where criminals from the West Midlands and Merseyside met in 













Secondly, the main source of firearms used in armed violence in Merseyside 
has traditionally been lawfully held firearms that have been stolen from 
other regions of the UK. The Merseyside Police area has had – and continues 
to have – one of the lowest overall levels of registered firearms and shot-
guns in England and Wales. Merseyside Police data also record only ten reg-
istered firearms reported stolen during the period 2012-2016.I  115 Criminals 
from Merseyside steal firearms, mainly shotguns, from large houses in nearby 
rural police force areas. It is suspected that criminals have recently targeted 
premises belonging to registered firearms holders. For example, a registered 
7.62 mm sniper rifle, .50 calibre rifles, and 1,000 rounds of ammunition were 
stolen from a property in North Wales and made their way to Merseyside. The 
sniper rifle was discharged in Merseyside and a .50 calibre rifle was recov-
ered from a field in Merseyside, where it had been abandoned, with the butt 
and barrel sawn off. 
The picture reportedly changed quite dramatically in 2016. There was an 
increase in firearms discharges and ‘new’ types of firearms being used.116 For 
example, only 29 of the 87 recorded discharges were shotguns, and less than 
half a dozen of the remaining 58 discharges could be linked. The ‘new’ types 
of firearms being used include:
• converted Glock 9 mm pistols that are misfiring, which were legally 
imported as deactivated firearms from Slovakia, and then converted in 
the UK and sold for around £3,000 each; 
• antique St Etienne and Bulldog revolvers that were purchased online 
from a retired British couple living in France. Each antique revolver and 
ammunition production kit is sold for €400 and then resold in Merseyside 
for around £1,000. The Merseyside Police have recovered 36 such antique 
firearms to date. The firearms were delivered to one person’s home and 
the ammunition to another; and 
• converted Baikal pistols, but it is unclear if this represents a new source 
of supply or the recirculation of Baikal pistols that arrived in the UK 
during the period 2006-2009.117 
I The data relate to the theft of firearms recorded as either burglary and theft or theft (Merseyside 
Police (2017), ‘Firearms in Merseyside’, FOI request DJ 2017-429, 9 June, https://www.whatdo-
theyknow.com/request/firearms_in_merseyside_2#comment-78416).
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Since 2013 KIIs have noted the supply of two different types of firearms on the UK 
illicit market as of particular concern: antique firearms since 2013; and reactivated 
firearms from Germany and Slovakia since 2015.118 Regarding the apparent increase 
in firearms availability and use in the UK since 2015, the West Midlands Police chief 
constable, Dave Thompson, stated in January 2016: “These guns are not the machine 
guns or the automatic weapons that we saw in the dark days. They are handguns and a 
lot of them are antiques and the ammunition is poor quality, but nonetheless there seems 
to be more of them than we have seen in a while. We need to look carefully at where they 
are coming from and we need to try to seize more of them …. We know, via the ballistic 
tracking, that new weapons have emerged that we have not seen before. … I think we do 
have a strong sense that there is a little more availability”.119
Since 2013 ‘antique’ firearms, such as the late-19th-century French-made Saint-
Etienne army revolver, have become increasingly popular among low-end USGs 
and represent an increased share of firearms discharges in urban areas.120 Although 
the ammunition for antique firearms is considered obsolete, and therefore these 
weapons are not subject to the same controls and restrictions as other types of 
handguns (i.e. not subject to the need for a firearms certificate), they can be adapted 
to fire modern ammunition.121 Several cases of transfer and use, including for ter-
rorist acts, are discussed below. In Birmingham, antique firearms were sold in 2014 
for £3,000 each.122
NABIS analysis from 2015 highlighted criminal interest, including by USGs in 
south-east England, in reactivated Czech-produced Skorpion vz.61 sub-machine 
guns sourced from Germany and Slovakia.123 Skorpion sub-machine guns were 
used in two attacks in London in 2014, including the shooting of a police commu-
nity support officer, and in two murders in London between September 2015 and 
April 2016.124 Detective Superintendent Damian Allain of the Metropolitan Police’s 
Trident anti-gang unit said: ‘We are seizing more automatic weapons and we recog-
nise there are potentially more Skorpion weapons in circulation but we are target-
ing the suppliers to get them off the streets.’125 Police seized 18 sub-machine guns in 
2015, compared to 13 in 2014.126 Open-source information on the price for Skorpion 
vz.61 sub-machine guns in the UK is unclear. One case records the online dark web 
purchase price for Skorpion sub-machine guns of around £3,000, with the poten-
tial for a sale in the UK up to £15,000.127 In another case it was reported that Skorpion 
vz.61 sub-machine guns and Vz.58 assault rifles could be purchased for around 













2.3  Supply mechanisms for the illicit firearms market
The five main supply mechanisms for the illicit gun market in the UK are: 
1. illegal production, conversion, and reactivation;
2. legal imports diverted to the illicit market;
3. legal purchase in another country and illegal importation into the UK;
4. the smuggling of illegal firearms; and
5. theft or loss from legitimate owners and diversion into the illicit market.
Below we will give an overview of the dynamics and actors involved in these supply 
mechanisms. It is important to keep in mind that the players involved in the supply 
of firearms to the illegal firearms market can use a variety of methods to source and 
distribute firearms (including multiple methods in one case). 
2.3.1  Illegal production, conversion and reactivation
The illegal production of ammunition and the conversion and reactivation of fire-
arms are regarded as important sources of supply for the UK illicit firearms market. 
Hale, Lewis and Silverstone provided the following profile for those involved in 
these activities: ‘Individuals with basic engineering skills have been able to circum-
vent firearms legislation by converting legally-obtained air weapons and blank-fir-
ing imitation firearms and reactivating deactivated firearms, so that they fire live 
ammunition, which in some cases is home-made.’129 These individuals can produce 
ammunition, convert a blank firer, reactivate a deactivated firearm, and/or produce 
a firearm from parts. The profile is middle-aged or elderly white males with an 
interest in firearms.130 Some consider them to be ‘gun enthusiasts’ who will not nec-
essarily have direct connections to criminal networks, but are known by a ‘distribu-
tor’ who has criminal links.131 The following cases provide information on the key 
actors involved and illustrate the dynamics of the reactivation and conversion of 
firearms in the UK. 
During 2005-2007 the Metropolitan Police investigated a series of firearms dis-
charges and murders involving reactivated MAC-10 machine pistols. Their inves-
tigations led them to Grant Wilkinson. The Thames Valley Police found Wilkinson’s 
illegal firearms factory in the outbuilding of a farmhouse near Reading and a 
store at a property in High Wycombe, which contained two converted MAC-10 
machine pistols; nine deactivated MAC-10s; ten replica handguns; parts and com-
ponents for firearms; material for the production of ammunition; and machinery, 
tools and documentation for conversion. It transpired that Wilkinson purchased 
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90 blank-firing MAC-10s from Guy Savage’s Sabre Defence Industries in London ‘on 
the pretence that they were to be used in the James Bond movie Casino Royale’.132 He 
used a false name to purchase the firearms, paying £55,000 in cash in several trans-
actions. He expected a 500% return on this investment.I 133 
In 2009 undercover officers from the Merseyside Police’s Matrix unit involved in 
the investigation of illegal firearms supply in Merseyside uncovered an illegal fire-
arms factory at an industrial unit in Liverpool, where James Dunne and Neil 
Hidderley reactivated at least 45 firearms.134 The undercover officers were led to the 
factory as a result of purchasing an Uzi sub-machine gun and Sten gun from two 
‘couriers’, Lee Malone and Joseph ‘Jo Jo’ O’Rourke. The firearms indicated the exist-
ence of reactivated weapons, because the rifling on both weapons was the opposite 
way from what it should have been.135 The Merseyside Police found the industrial 
unit that was being used for the reactivation of firearms and production of ammu-
nition. The arrest of Malone and O’Rourke also led the Merseyside Police to an 
international arms-trafficking operation (see section 2.3.3).
In January 2016 former Polish soldier Bart Pawlowski was found guilty of reactivat-
ing more than 40 firearms, including Kalashnikov assault rifles, and producing 
ammunition at a workshop in London.136 Ishmael Brown and Ehsen Abdul-Razak 
used mobile phones from their prison cell to source and sell the firearms. The deac-
tivated firearms were collected by Brown’s girlfriend, Caitlin Adams, and Aaron 
Shane Murray. The pair delivered the firearms to Pawlowski’s workshop during 
January-June 2015. The operation was uncovered when Murray and Uzair Patel were 
found in possession of a 9 mm self-loading pistol. By January 2016 only eight of the 
40 reactivated firearms had been recovered.
2.3.2  Legal imports diverted to the illegal market
NABIS research identified the way in which ‘corrupt registered firearms dealers’ in 
Australia and the United States use their extensive knowledge of firearms and fire-
arms legislation to exploit loopholes in legislation to import firearms that are sub-
sequently diverted to the illegal firearms market.137 Several KIIs intimated that more 
could – and should – also be done in the UK in this regard. 
I As a result of the investigation, proposals were put forward for significant changes to UK firearms legisla-
tion. The case also demonstrated what can be achieved when UK law enforcement agencies collaborate to 
address the illicit firearms market. Guy Savage cooperated with the police and gave evidence at Grant Wil-














A number of cases of corrupt registered firearms dealers exist in the UK. In January 
2017, for example, police in Birmingham stopped and searched the vehicle of 
67-year-old John Spencer Booth, a registered firearms dealer, and found ten sawn-
off shotguns and over 200 rounds of ammunition.138 A particularly worrying case 
came to light in April 2014, when police discovered 463 firearms (including an anti-
tank weapon) while investigating an alleged assault case involving 49-year-old 
James Arnold.139 The investigation of Arnold’s property led to Anthony Buckland, a 
firearms dealer in Norfolk, who had illegally sold at least 26 firearms to Arnold. 
Buckland was found guilty of selling prohibited weapons and fraud.
The most significant recent investigation into a registered firearms dealer diverting 
legally imported firearms into the illegal firearms market had not concluded at the 
time of writing.140 Paul Edmunds, a 65-year-old registered firearms dealer, is accused 
of playing an important role in the diversion of legally imported antique firearms 
into the illegal firearms market in the West Midlands during 2009-2015.141 It has 
been estimated that he imported hundreds of firearms from the United States, 
which were supplied via an intermediary to the Birmingham-based Burger Boys 
gang. Police found three armouries at his home in Gloucestershire in July 2015, in 
which he reportedly made tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition that were 
supplied with the antique firearms to the Burger Boys. NABIS experts linked ammu-
nition recovered from at least 90 crime scenes to the ammunition found at 
Edmunds’ house. His identification and arrest followed the capture in 2014 of the 
Burger Boys gang members involved in antique firearms dealing (see box 5).142 The 
firearms and ammunition were transferred to the Burger Boys gang via a mutual 
acquaintance, Dr Mohinder Surdhar, who was a firearms certificate holder. Surdhar 
has pleaded guilty to the transfer of firearms, but Edmunds has denied his part in 
the conspiracy.143 This case indicates the potential for legally imported firearms to 
be diverted to the illegal market, as well as the illegal production of ammunition in 
line with the first category referred to above. It also shows the importance of inter-
mediaries to the process of facilitating a transfer between legal firearms dealers and 
the illicit firearms market. As noted in section 1.1, above, antique firearms repre-
sent a loophole in the Firearms Act regulatory regime, because dealers do not have 
to record details of the sale, and purchasers do not require a firearms certificate. 
2.3.3 Legal purchase in another country and illegal importation 
into the UK
The United States is the source for over half of all firearms seized at UK border entry 
points.144 Many of these firearms can be traced back to so-called ‘straw purchases’ or 
online purchases (see also section 2.3.4). One of the most notorious cases of legal 
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purchase in the United States and illegal importation into the UK relates to the 
activities of Stephen Greenoe. Open-source reports do not reveal another case on 
the same scale during the period under study. 
During February-June 2010, US national Steven Greenoe travelled from the UK to 
Raleigh in North Carolina (United States) eight times to purchase firearms at several 
different gun stores, illegally export them from the United States, and illegally 
import them into the UK. In this way he acquired at least 79 firearms, mainly pis-
tols.I  145 Greenoe purchased most of the firearms using a North Carolina conceal-
and-carry weapons licence. The smuggling operation was first identified by covert 
police in Merseyside’s Matrix unit in February 2010, when Lee Malone and Joseph 
‘Jo Jo’ O’Rourke offered to sell undercover officers five Glock 9 mm pistols for 
£18,500 (see section 2.3.1). In the end Malone and O’Rourke only supplied three 
Glock pistols to the undercover police for £10,500. Although the serial numbers 
had been manually removed from the pistols, forensic analysis in the UK revealed 
their serial numbers. These were sent to the United States in a tracing request, 
which revealed that these three Glock pistols were purchased by Steven Greenoe on 
17 February 2010 at Carolina Shooters Supplies. Alerted to Greenoe’s activities, the 
ATF monitored his purchases during the period 20-24 July 2010 and recovered 33 
Glock pistol boxes that he had disposed of in Raleigh. These boxes matched 
Greenoe’s purchases and provided bullets that had been test fired and provided 
with the pistols. On 25 July 2010 Greenoe checked in four bags of luggage for his 
flight from Raleigh via New York to Manchester, UK. He did not declare the pistols 
in his luggage. The Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency and the ATF 
retrieved a garment bag from the luggage area, and the screening of this luggage 
revealed two hard-sided Pelican cases. Sixteen pistol slides and pistol barrels were 
found in one case, and 16 lower pistol receivers in the other. The serial numbers for 
these pistols matched those that Greenoe had purchased during his week in the 
United States. Inside one case there was a note addressed to the US Transport 
Security Administration stating that Greenoe had permission to transport the inert 
‘samples’. Another piece of luggage contained 32 magazines. Greenoe was arrested 
at the departure gate for his flight. He stated that he purchased firearms during 
February-July 2010 for his employees involved in overseas maritime protection and 
all but two of the firearms had been exported to the UK using the same method. He 
appeared to be aware that he was violating US export control laws by exporting fire-
arms without a licence. He was convicted of violating US export control laws and 
sentenced to ten years in prison.
I According to documents from the US District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina from 2010 (Case 
No. 5:10-M-1646), these firearms included 29 Ruger pistols (various models), 27 Glock pistols (various 
models), one Steyr M9 pistol, one Taurus 709 pistol, one Highpoint C9 pistol, one Smith & Wesson pistol, one 













2.3.4  Smuggling of illegal firearms
Writing just over a decade ago, Hales, Lewis and Silverstone assessed illegal fire-
arms smuggling as a ‘relatively insignificant’ source for the UK illegal firearms 
market.146 Ireland was mentioned as a source of supply, although they urged caution 
in using such information to indicate a pattern for illegal firearms smuggling into 
the UK.147 The most recent NCA National Strategic Assessment of Serious and 
Organised Crime indicates that smuggling firearms into the UK is a concern, and 
indicates two main forms of smuggling, via: 
• maritime and roll-on/roll-off traffic at UK ports; and 
• the postal service and courier companies.148 
NCA analysis indicates that handguns, Skorpion sub-machine guns and assault 
rifles are smuggled into the UK via Belgium, France, and the Netherlands from 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.149 The NCA notes that ‘routes to the UK are 
varied and dependent on the method used’.150 The assessment of KIIs in the UK 
regarding UK-based OCG involvement in firearms smuggling is in line with the 
view that firearms trafficking by OCGs in Europe is ‘almost exclusively a supple-
mentary rather than primary source of income for the small number of OCGs 
involved in this crime area’.151 As noted above, the size of the return for illegal fire-
arms smuggling is not regarded as being worth the risk for UK-based OCGs. Analysis 
of source countries and suspected routes indicates an overlap with drug-smuggling 
routes into the UK. Bulk heroin consignments are assumed to be shipped via South-
Eastern Europe to Dover. Cocaine is shipped from the Americas by container to the 
European hubs of Antwerp and Rotterdam, before transportation to UK ferry 
ports.152 The drugs-firearms link between gangs in the Netherlands and the UK, in 
particular Merseyside, is not a new phenomenon, but is a particular concern.153 
Many of the open-source cases of trafficking interceptions during the period under 
study revealed the transfer of small quantities of firearms and ammunition in drugs 
shipments. 
During the past decade one can identify two general profiles for illegal firearms 
smuggled into the UK. The first is the illegal smuggling of converted Baikal blank-
firing pistols from the Baltic states by Lithuanian crime gangs. The peak period for 
the illegal smuggling into the UK of Baikal pistols, which were converted into pistols 
capable of firing live rounds in Lithuania, was 2005-2009. UK police forces found 
evidence of their use by USGs during this period. The UK Border Force detected 
efforts to import such items in ‘private multi-occupancy passenger-vehicles or pri-
vately operated parcel post vehicles from Lithuania’.154 In one case, ten Baikal 
pistols, silencers and 300 rounds of ammunition were found hidden in the 
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dashboard of a Lithuanian-registered minibus at Dover inbound tourist controls. In 
another case, 15 converted Baikal pistols, silencers, another handgun, and several 
hundred rounds of ammunition were found in a Lithuanian-registered car-trans-
porting lorry.155 One of the sources of the conversion was uncovered in Kedainiai in 
Lithuania in August 2006, where hundreds of legally purchased Baikal low-pow-
ered gas pistols were converted to fire live ammunition.156 Publicly available infor-
mation shows that in some cases it was difficult to demonstrate criminal intent to 
distribute on the part of the drivers and passengers in the vehicles bringing the 
Baikal pistols into the UK. It was assumed that this method for smuggling converted 
Baikal pistols was successfully blocked in 2009-2010, after UK-Lithuanian coopera-
tion. However, in October 2015 five Baikal pistols and 35 rounds of ammunition 
were found in a Lithuanian ‘postal bus’, and another ten handguns, silencers, and 
100 rounds of 9 mm ammunition were seized at Dover in a UK-registered Peugeot 
208 car driven by two Lithuanian nationals.157 Therefore, it appears that in cases 
where a route and method for illegal firearms trafficking has been stopped, it can 
resurface five or six years later if demand continues and supply is restricted.
Secondly, the smuggling of deactivated and reactivated ex-military sub-machine 
guns and rifles into the UK from Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe has 
emerged as a significant concern in recent years.158 For example, the NCA issued a 
warning in 2015 concerning the smuggling of Czech-produced Skorpion sub-
machine guns into the UK.159 UK law enforcement agencies have focused particu-
larly on efforts to smuggle such automatic firearms into the country since the MTFA 
in Paris in November 2015.160 These types of firearms are thought to have been ille-
gally imported into the UK via traditional trafficking methods and by post.161 
In August 2015 the NCA and the Kent Police intercepted what is thought to be the 
‘largest seizure of automatic weapons ever made on the UK mainland’.162 Gang boss 
Harry Shilling and his ‘lieutenants’, Michael Defraine and Richard Rye, sourced 22 
Vz.58 assault rifles, nine Skorpion sub-machine guns, two silencers, 58 magazines, 
and 1,500 rounds of ammunition from FG Security in Slovakia. The automatic fire-
arms were purchased for ‘between £120 and £320 each but could have been sold for 
up to £4,000 each’.163 The gang’s intentions were brought to the attention of the 
NCA after Shilling and Defraine had travelled to Hungary, Romania and Slovakia in 
2014 to purchase firearms. Surveillance and monitoring of their phones indicated 
that the firearms would be smuggled into Cuxton in Kent from Boulogne in France 
on board a pleasure craft in August 2015. The boat left the UK on 9 August for France 
and returned with its cargo on 10 August 2015. NCA surveillance teams monitored 
the smugglers unloading bags and suitcases containing the firearms and ammuni-
tion into a van. The investigation did not reveal the gang’s plans for the firearms, 













status in the OCG and USG hierarchy. The seriousness of the offence is reflected in 
the sentences handed down to the gang in April 2016 (between 64 months and 30 
years in prison). While the source for the firearms is a well-known concern, this 
smuggling method stands out in the open-source information on large-scale fire-
arms trafficking into the UK. 
Another method for sourcing reactivated Skorpion sub-machine guns from conti-
nental Europe was uncovered in spring 2014, which exhibited elements used for 
smuggling other types of illegal firearms into the UK. While serving an eight-year 
prison sentence for robbery, Andrew Mullings used a smartphone from his cell in 
Wandsworth Prison to organise the sourcing, sale and distribution in the UK of 
eight reactivated Skorpion sub-machine guns. He purchased the weapons from a 
dark-web retailer, which delivered the firearms from Germany via Parcelforce to 
eight different addresses in London. Spencer Inglis took delivery of the firearms 
and Mullings’ girlfriend, Emily Ciantar, acted as the courier. Five Skorpion sub-
machine guns are believed to have been delivered before police obtained knowl-
edge of the delivery of the presumed sixth weapon to Inglis on 12 April 2014, with 
subsequent interceptions on 15 May 2014 and 19 June 2014. As noted in other cases, 
the use of partners and friends as couriers and custodians is a feature of the UK 
illegal firearms market.164 
The review of open-source information has revealed other cases in which criminals 
have used public websites and the dark web to order firearms and parts for delivery 
into the UK in postal and courier packages from Germany and the United States.165 
Although the UK police do not report a significant number of hits for the use of 
dark-web sources for procuring firearms for illegal import into the UK,166 the NCA 
reportedly began working in 2013 with the ATF and US Postal Inspection Service to 
investigate US-based dark-web trafficking groups that supply firearms to customers 
in the UK.167 It is suspected that this cooperation related to the case of Mark Richard, 
who used dark-web sources to order handguns and ammunition that were deliv-
ered to Aaron Bishop and Martin Beard. Open-source data indicate that handguns, 
parts, and components illegally imported from the United States and Germany – 
both lethal and blank-firing weapons – are detected being shipped by post and 
courier; in several cases these are online purchases. 
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2.3.5  Theft or loss from legitimate owners
An increase in the loss or theft of registered firearms and shotguns in the UK has 
come to be seen as an indicator of a restricted illegal firearms market.168 UK police 
report that leakage of legal firearms into the illegal market is a bigger problem now 
than in the past.169 For example, 210 rifles, 103 handguns and 282 shotguns were 
reported as ‘misappropriated’ during 2006/07, compared to 692 licensed firearms 
reported stolen or lost in 2015/16.170 The police authority areas that have high levels 
of registered gun ownership but low levels of firearms offences have been regarded 
as a source for the illegal firearms market. 
KIIs and NABIS analysis highlight that holders of licences to deal in or possess fire-
arms are acquiring illegal arms as collectors, with no intention to divert such fire-
arms to the illegal market. However, such individuals have been identified as poten-
tial risk cases because ‘these hoarders and significant firearms caches pose a risk of 
bulk theft of firearms, whether or not the owner is criminally complicit … which 
presents a risk of the collections finding their way into criminal hands’.171 
The theft or loss of firearms held by the police and the UK MoD have not been 
regarded as a significant source for the illegal firearms market in England and 
Wales.172 Between 2008 and 2016, 62 service firearmsI were stolen or lost from UK 
military bases.II Interestingly, 39 of these weapons were later recovered, which indi-
cates a relatively good recovery rate.173 However, there have been several high-pro-
file cases in recent years that have drawn attention to the potential risk of military 
personnel stealing firearms and ammunition and selling automatic weapons, 
potentially for terrorist purposes, in the UK. In England, a Royal Marines reservist 
was caught in a sting operation attempting to sell for £10,000 a C8 automatic 
assault rifle, a semi-automatic SIG Sauer P226 handgun, thousands of rounds of 
5.56 mm and 9 mm ammunition, and hand grenades that he had stolen from the 
RM Poole military base in Dorset, as well as a sawn-off shotgun.174
I These figures include the theft of 18 pistols, 14 rifles and four light machine guns; the loss of two 
pistols, ten rifles, two general-purpose machine guns and one shotgun; and the non-specified 
disappearance of two non-operational L85A2 assault rifles, one SIG Sauer pistol, seven Biathlon 
rifles and one H&K MP7 carbine.














3.  Terrorist access to the UK illicit firearms 
market
In recent years the UK has witnessed few terrorist attacks in which firearms have 
been used. In March 2017, however, the UK’s most senior counter-terrorism police 
officer, Assistant Commissioner Mark Rowley, stated that there were ‘500 live coun-
ter-terror investigations at any time … [and] 13 foiled attacks since June 2013’.175 
Earlier, in October 2016, he also stated that ‘half of the terrorist plots that have been 
disrupted in recent years have involved terrorist plotters who tried to get hold of 
guns’.176 One report quantified this as ‘five of the 10 terrorist attacks foiled by British 
security services and police during 2015-16 involved plans to buy guns’.177 
After the Mumbai attacks in 2008, UK law enforcement agencies became concerned 
about the threat of a MTFA in which a terrorist group could use the River Thames 
for an attack on key infrastructure in London.178 More recently, the call by Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi and the so-called Islamic State leadership for jihadists to kill Westerners 
in Europe using whatever weapons are at their disposal has heightened fears of an 
MTFA occurring in the UK.179 The MTFAs in Paris in November 2015 and Brussels in 
March 2016 have also influenced the focus of UK counter-terrorism agencies and 
national and local government on the need to disrupt jihadist efforts to acquire fire-
arms for use in the UK. In an independent review of London’s preparedness to 
respond to a major terrorist incident, Lord Harris noted that: 
No doubt, as a nation we have benefited from the fact that firearms are 
more difficult to acquire here than elsewhere in the world. However, 
London is not firearms-free. … Our borders are not as secure as they should 
be and much greater efforts should be made to prevent the illegal trans-
portation of weapons and people into the country. It would be naive in the 
extreme to assume that would-be terrorists will not attempt to exploit any 
such weaknesses.180 
As a result, some of the recommendations contained in the review’s report called for:
• London’s mayor to seek assurances at the national level that ‘that the routine 
screening and searching of cars and freight entering the country is being sig-
nificantly enhanced, with an uplift in land-based and sea-based border force 
coverage’; 
• the establishment of joint intelligence hubs between the NCA and Metro-
politan Police Service to ‘tackle the illegal importation of firearms with 
regular reports to Ministers and to the Mayor’s Office on the progress made’; 
and
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• changing national firearms legislation so that the ‘negligent’ loss or theft of 
a registered firearm results in the permanent removal of the holder’s fire-
arms certificate.181
While such measures could be useful for information sharing between relevant 
agencies seeking to address access to illegal firearms in the UK, several KIIs reflected 
on the broader question ‘do jihadists in the UK need firearms for a terror act?’.182 
Firstly, KIIs reflected on the various organisational structures and purposes of jihad-
ist terrorists today compared to ethno-national and separatist terrorist attacks per-
petrated by groups in Northern Ireland. Republican and Loyalist terrorist groups in 
Northern Ireland had structures and purposes that were organised in a way that 
could be infiltrated, and sources for firearms, ammunition and explosives could 
therefore be identified using human-intelligence methods.183 This is more difficult 
in the case of small cells of jihadist terrorists, but the logistical infrastructure and 
potential state sponsors and sources of supply are also not comparable. Secondly, 
KIIs considered that in seeking to acquire a firearm in the UK, especially a semi-
automatic or automatic firearm, the risk of potential detection for a would-be jihad-
ist terrorist significantly increases. The acquisition of such firearms is challenging 
for criminals, and is a ‘red’ flag’ that would invite a rapid law enforcement response 
due to the UK’s surveillance and monitoring capabilities. One KII asked if the limited 
availability of automatic firearms on the illicit market in the UK provides a very 
high ‘barrier to entry’ for perpetrators of MTFAs.184 Thirdly, it was noted that a jihad-
ist seeking to commit a spontaneous violent extremist act would use readily avail-
able tools (e.g. car, knives), because it takes time and planning to acquire a firearm 
for an MTFA.185 In the UK, automatic firearms are not considered an easily available 
option for a jihadist. 
The first part of this section provides a case study of criminal and ‘ethno-nationalist 
and separatist’ terrorist access to illegal firearms in Northern Ireland. The second 
part analyses the recent cases of firearms acquisition by jihadists planning a terror-
ist attack. The final part provides more details about the firearm used in the right-
wing terrorist murder of MP Jo Cox in 2016. 
3.1 Terrorist access to illegal firearms in Northern Ireland
There is a clear and evident crossover between organised crime and terrorism in 
terms of the supply and use of illegal firearms in Northern Ireland. It is important to 
highlight that during the period known as ‘The Troubles’ – the 1970s and 1980s – 
illegal firearms were delivered via ports in Northern Ireland and the Republic of 













Ireland – on one side terrorist groups fighting for the unification of Ireland 
(Republican) and on the other side those fighting for Northern Ireland to remain 
part of the UK (Loyalist). On the one hand, the Republican terrorist paramilitary 
organisations and in particular the IRA significantly benefitted from state sponsor-
ship from Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qaddafi and Irish expatriates in the United 
States, who provided funds and significant quantities of firearms, light weapons 
and explosives for their cause.186 It is difficult to accurately estimate the number 
and type of firearms that were smuggled into Northern Ireland during this time. 
The Loyalist forces, on the other hand, mainly used stolen weapons, and individuals 
with engineering skills produced illegal firearms from parts and reactivated fire-
arms.187 Since the signing of the Good Friday Peace Agreement in April 1998, terror-
ist paramilitary organisations have reportedly decommissioned their firearms and 
explosives, overseen by paramilitary groups and independent bodies.188 It is 
assumed that elements in the IRA and other paramilitary organisations retained 
some of their arms, with firearms known to have been used during the Troubles 
continuing to be used in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland today. 
Although armed violence has declined since the conclusion of the Good Friday 
Agreement, the terrorist-criminal nexus continues to influence the availability of 
illegal firearms in Northern Ireland.
Nowadays Northern Ireland has become relatively stable. However, official data 
show an increase in illegal firearms possession and seizures in recent years. The 
Police Recorded Security Situation Statistics show that the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland (PSNI) recovered 66 firearms in 2015/16, compared to 58 during 
2014/15.189 This increase corresponds with an increase in the number of weapons 
possession offences, which has been on the rise for the last three years for which 
data are available, reaching 923 offences in 2015/16 – the highest level recorded in 
the data series for trends in police-recorded crime in Northern Ireland.190 In addi-
tion, there were 117 firearms discharges during 2015.191 
Successor and splinter organisations to those involved in the Troubles are suspected 
of retaining firearms acquired forty or fifty years ago. Terrorist paramilitary-style 
shootings continue to be used today to maim or kill their victims. The Global 
Terrorism Database recorded 16 terrorist incidents that involved the use of a firearm 
or imitation weapons in Northern Ireland during 2015.192 PSNI data indicate that 
during 2015/16 there were 14 casualties as the result of paramilitary-style shoot-
ings, 13 of which were carried out by Republican groups and one by a Loyalist 
group.193 The vast majority of these attacks happened in Belfast, with the number of 
paramilitary-style shootings in Northern Ireland at its lowest since 2008/09. Six 
people were charged for firearms offences under Section 41 of the Terrorism Act 
(2000).194 
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Open-source data reveal a wide variety of firearms types seized by the PSNI and 
used in crimes, including Kalashnikov-type automatic rifles, Heckler and Koch 
(H&K) MP5 sub-machine guns, Glock and Makarov semi-automatic pistols, and 
shotguns. H&K MP5 sub-machine guns stolen from PSNI stocks and Glock 9 mm 
pistols appear to be used in high-profile crimes. Therefore, the illegal firearms used 
in Northern Ireland are markedly different to those in other parts of the UK, with 
access to military-grade firearms more readily available for criminal and terrorist 
use. Although some of these firearms could have entered Northern Ireland during 
the Troubles and circulated in the illegal firearms market for decades, there is evi-
dence to suggest that some of these firearms might have been smuggled into 
Northern Ireland more recently using established routes for smuggling drugs. KIIs 
suggested that firearms are included as part payment for drugs supplied to OCGs 
(see Box 10). 
Box 10: Linking drugs and guns in Northern Ireland
Jock Davison, a commander of the Provisional IRA, was shot and killed in 
South Belfast using a Makarov pistol that had not previously been used in 
Northern Ireland.195 This pistol is suspected of being smuggled into Northern 
Ireland by a Ukrainian OCG operating in Northern Ireland that was supplying 
drugs and firearms to drug dealers in Belfast. Makarov pistols are reportedly 
sold for £2,200 each, including ammunition and a silencer. 
Another case of drugs and firearms being smuggled into Northern Ireland 
was revealed by Operation Redstart, led by England’s North West Regional 
Organised Crime Unit – TITAN.196 The operation successfully disrupted the 
activities of a Liverpool-based OCG that was smuggling cocaine and canna-
bis to Northern Ireland, with the couriers protecting themselves with revolv-
ers and sub-machine guns.
A high-ranking PSNI police officer provided an overview of the five main types of 
illegal firearms available in Northern Ireland, the majority of which are suspected 
of reaching Northern Ireland via the Republic of Ireland: ‘If there is a cold in Dublin, 
there will be a sneeze in Belfast.’197 Firstly, legacy firearms from the Troubles con-
tinue to be in use today. For example, it is known that 12 Kalashnikov-type assault 
rifles recently used in firearms offences were part of the shipments that arrived 
from Libya in the 1970s. The PSNI knows of at least one firearm that has been used 













terrorist groups have limited crossover to OCGs. In contrast, there is more evidence 
of Loyalist firearms being transferred to OCGs, but such exchanges are still limited. 
Secondly, reactivated firearms are available on the illicit gun market in Northern 
Ireland. Although there is evidence of the presence of skilled and experienced gun-
smiths in both Republican and Loyalist terrorist organisations in Northern Ireland, 
Loyalist terrorist organisations are believed to have relied more heavily on reacti-
vated firearms than Republican groups. 
Thirdly, personal protection weapons (PPWs) stolen from serving and former police 
officers and other public figures, who can apply for a licence to legally possess a 
handgun under PPW provisions in Northern Ireland’s Firearms Order, represent a 
potential source of illegal firearms use. During 2016, 53 PPWs were reported stolen, 
together with considerable amounts of ammunition. Other legally held weapons 
have also been reported stolen, but exact numbers are not available. A particularly 
worrying case became known in August 2016 involving the theft by a British Royal 
Marine from a UK military base of handguns and ammunition intended for terror-
ists in Northern Ireland. 198
Fourthly, an important supply mechanism is the illegal smuggling of firearms for 
use by OCGs. Illegal firearms have been smuggled to OCGs in Northern Ireland in 
different ways, for example, by bus from Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland; by 
ferry to Dublin and then into Northern Ireland; and by ferry from Liverpool in 
England and Stranraer in Scotland. As mentioned earlier, this type of firearms 
supply is usually linked to the illegal drug trade. At the lower end of the scale, con-
verted blank-firing pistols can be purchased for around €150 and are treated as dis-
posable firearms that are used once and often left at the crime scene. There is an 
increase in the import of Glock 9 mm pistols via Amsterdam and Dublin, with the 
serial numbers removed, and up to a dozen Skorpion sub-machine guns have recently 
been seized. 
Finally, there is also evidence of attempts to procure firearms online via the dark 
web, with parts shipped separately for the recipients to reassemble. In 2016, for 
example, operations were conducted to trace shipments of Glock 9 mm pistols to 
OCGs. 
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3.2  Acquisition of firearms by jihadist terrorists in the UK
The introduction to section 3 noted the limited number of cases of jihadist plans to 
access firearms in the UK. There are only two such cases for which open-source 
information is readily available. This section presents a brief description of each 
case and reflections on the questions posed in the opening of this chapter on terror-
ist access to illegal firearms in the UK. 
One of the two successful jihadist terror attacks in the UK in recent decades fea-
tured a firearm, although it was not used. On 22 May 2013 Michael Adebolajo and 
Michael Adebowale murdered 25-year-old soldier Lee Rigby close to his Woolwich 
barracks.199 Adebolajo and Adebowale, both British Muslim converts of Nigerian 
descent, knocked Rigby over in their car before attacking him with knives. 
Adebolajo attempted to decapitate Rigby with a meat cleaver. When an armed 
police response team arrived, Adebowale brandished an unloaded 90-year-old 
Dutch-produced KNIL 9.4 mm revolver and was shot by armed police. Adebolajo 
had been arrested in Kenya in November 2010 with five Kenyan youths suspected of 
trying to enter Somalia to join al-Shabaab, and was returned to the UK. As a result of 
suspected terrorist ties, he was subject to monitoring by MI5, but was found to be 
‘spending most of his time involved in drug dealing’.200 Adebowale was also involved 
in drug dealing. Therefore, both had low-level gang links and suspected jihadist 
interests. After the attack, both were convicted of murder and illegal firearms 
possession. 
The second case relates to a foiled plot by radicalised British citizens to stage a 
drive-by shooting of police or soldiers in London in the name of ISIS. In this case, a 
would-be jihadist who did not have a criminal record was able to acquire a con-
verted Baikal pistol and ammunition from a low-level criminal source that attended 
the same Muslim Cultural Heritage Centre. The police foiled the plot in late 
September 2014 shortly after the would-be jihadists acquired a firearm.201 
The plot was as follows: 21-year-old Tarik Hassane, a medical student at the 
University of Medical Sciences and Technology in Khartoum (Sudan), and 21-year-
old Suhaib Majeed, a physics student at King’s College London, made preparations 
for an MTFA during the summer of 2014. Hassane travelled to Syria in 2013 as an 
ISIS sympathiser, although he reportedly did not seek to be a fighter. Majeed was 
tasked with procuring a firearm, ammunition and a moped that could be used in an 
attack when Hassane returned to the UK, while Hassane would be the gunman. 
Majeed sourced a converted Baikal pistol with a silencer and a magazine containing 
six rounds of ammunition from low-level street gang member Nyall Hamlett, who 













Ladbroke Grove (London), where he used to work as a cook. Hamlett, who con-
verted to Islam while in prison, acquired the items from Nathan Cuffy, who was the 
custodian of five firearms and ammunition stored at his home. In September 2014 
police raided Cuffy’s home when Majeed and Hamlett were arranging the acquisi-
tion of the Baikal pistol and ammunition. Despite this disruption to the plot, 
Hassane returned to the UK in October 2014 and was reportedly monitoring 
Shepherd’s Bush police station and/or a Territorial Army barracks in White City in 
London as potential sites for the attack. Hassane was picked up shortly after his 
return to the UK. 
Hassane and Majeed were given life sentences for conspiracy to murder and prepa-
ration for acts of terrorism, with both given a minimum sentence of 21 years before 
first consideration for release on licence. Hamlett and Cuffy were acquitted on the 
charge of knowing about the plot to commit terrorist offences, but found guilty of 
transferring a prohibited firearm and ammunition. Hamlett was sentenced on one 
count to six years and six months in prison and on another to three years and three 
months, to be served concurrently. Cuffy was sentenced to a total of 14 years in 
prison for the intent to supply and possession of four other illegal firearms. One KII 
indicated that the intention to try Cuffy and Hamlett for terrorism offences sent a 
strong signal to USGs and OCGs of the risk of supplying illegal firearms that could 
be used for MFTAs to individuals.202 
These two cases provide a very limited sample from which to draw general conclu-
sions about the ability of jihadist terrorists to acquire illegal firearms in the UK. 
Both cases relate to firearms that are more readily available to USGs – antique and 
converted handguns – and not the semi-automatic or automatic firearms used in 
the MTFAs in Paris and Brussels. In terms of the source and method of acquisition, 
even though neither Hassane nor Majeed had the low-level street crime profile of 
Adebolajo and Adebowale, a contact in their community could source a handgun 
and ammunition. Assistant Commissioner Mark Rowley has noted that terrorist 
plotters who have sought but failed to acquire firearms have tended to turn to ‘crim-
inals in the communities they hail from. It will often be people involved in low-level 
organised crime or gang activity.’203 Several KIIs noted the potential risk of low-level 
street criminals with access to antique or converted handguns being a source of 
supply for potential jihadists via a common third-party acquaintance in cities such 
as Birmingham, Bradford, Leeds or London.204 The potential risk of a gang member 
converting to Islam and planning to commit an MTFA was a risk considered by KIIs, 
but at present it was felt that there was nominal crossover of individuals between 
criminal and jihadist terrorist communities, even when they are located in the 
same geographical area. Therefore, the key to disrupting jihadist plans is thought to 
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be to identify the potential linkages, usually third parties at the edge of these 
communities.
Several KIIs stated that for a long time the UK counter-terrorism community did not 
believe that OCGs would supply firearms to jihadist terrorists.205 If it is assumed that 
there is no link, then it is unlikely that resources will be made available to disprove 
this assumption.206 It was assumed that an OCG’s ‘code of honour’ would prevent 
such interactions. However, several KIIs speculated that it was perhaps most likely 
that the supply of firearms was not a particularly lucrative aspect of an OCG’s busi-
ness, and the risk to business of knowingly supplying firearms to terrorists would 
result in too much unwanted attention and not be worth the risk. The two cases 
briefly discussed above do not necessarily disprove this assumption. Hamlett and 
Cuffy claimed that they did not know that the firearm being transferred to Hassane 
and Majeed would be used in a terrorist act. Furthermore, neither had access to 
semi-automatic or automatic firearms. Therefore, to date there is evidence of low-
level street criminals overlapping with potential jihadist terrorists, or the potential 
for firearms transactions between the two groupings. UK counter-terrorist agencies 
also have evidence of links between gangs and jihadists.207 One KII noted that 
would-be terrorists in the UK do seek to obtain firearms, but they often lack the con-
nections to suitable criminal networks.208
One KII noted that there is evidence of imprisoned top-level criminals converting to 
Islam for better food and treatment and perhaps meeting individuals that are radi-
calised and seeing business opportunities.209 Again, the case of Hamlett provides 
evidence of a criminal converting to Islam while in prison and acting as an interme-
diary between firearms custodians and jihadist terrorists, but Hamlett was not 
involved in an OCG or even in USG activity. One KII noted the concern that prison 
could be used to forge criminal associations between terrorists and potential illegal 
firearms suppliers.210 NABIS analysis has also flagged the risk that although there is 
limited evidence to date of jihadist and organised criminals in UK prisons conduct-
ing firearms deals, such a risk exists.211
Another common link between both cases is the interest by at least one plotter in 
travelling to a conflict area in which a radical Islamist group is fighting: al-Shaabab 
in Somalia for Adebolajo and ISIS-controlled parts of Syria for Hassane. In this 
regard, back in 2012 there were concerns that more of the young men that left 
Somali street gangs in London and Sheffield to fight with al-Shabaab in Somalia 
could return to the UK with experience of handling firearms and planning attacks 
that they might use in an MTFA in the UK.212 One KII contrasted this profile of 
foreign fighters with gang backgrounds with the profile for foreign fighters or sym-













his return from Syria in May 2014 could be noted here, because it was feared that he 
intended to plan an MTFA in the UK using firearms knowledge acquired fighting 
with jihadists in Syria.213 Abdullah was not arrested for the possession of illegal fire-
arms, but because of documentation that indicated that he planned to acquire a 
firearm for an MTFA and evidence that he had received training in the use of fire-
arms with designated terrorist groups in Syria. Several KIIs noted the potential risk 
of foreign fighters returning to the UK and using the skills they had acquired to 
carry out terrorist attacks.214 
3.3  Right-wing terrorist firearms attacks 
The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report notes that while most right-wing 
extremist groups across Europe appear to favour the use of knives and bladed 
weapons, firearms and explosives are also used.215 For example, during July-April 
2013 a Ukrainian national committed four right-wing terrorist attacks in the West 
Midlands, including stabbing an elderly Muslim male to death and using three 
improvised explosive devices to attack mosques.216 
The only right-wing terrorist firearms attack during the period 2011-2016 docu-
mented in this study was the assassination of Jo Cox, MP in the market town of 
Birstall in her West Yorkshire parliamentary constituency on 16 June 2016. Thomas 
Mair, a 53-year-old right-wing extremist, shot Cox twice in the head and once in the 
chest with a sawn-off Weirauch .22 hunting rifle and then stabbed her 15 times.217 
The hunting rifle had been stolen from a car in Keighly in West Yorkshire in August 
2015, although it was not thought that Mair had stolen the rifle, nor cut the stock 
and barrel to reduce the overall length of the firearm to 12 inches.218 Mair’s case was 
dealt with as a terrorist case. On 23 November 2016 he was sentenced to a whole-life 
term of imprisonment, which means he will never be eligible for parole.219
4.  Conclusions 
Our analysis of the available information indicates that once they are in the UK, 
illegal firearms circulate among OCGs and USGs, with converted blank-firing pistols 
and antique handguns representing the most readily available firearms on the illicit 
market today, with evident demand for, and possibilities for sourcing, deactivated 
and reactivated firearms from Europe and the United States. One could argue that 
the acquisition and use of converted and antique firearms reflect the limited avail-
ability of and access to automatic firearms and lethal handguns in the UK. The way 
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in which UK policy and legislation are amended in light of evidence presented by 
police forces on new threats and trends of misuse and exploitation of loopholes has 
helped to ensure that UK firearms controls remain stringent. At the same time, the 
event-driven approach and the withdrawal of resources when firearms offences 
have been in decline for several consecutive years indicate the need for law enforce-
ment agencies to remain vigilant and adequately resourced to ensure that low levels 
of illegal firearms acquisition, possession and use are maintained. The ‘comprehen-
sive’ UK policing approach, addressing supply and demand, with a particular focus 
on working with at-risk groups of young people, also yields better results than a 
focus on the supply side alone. 
To date, jihadist terrorist access to the illicit firearms market in England and Wales 
is limited. There is some evidence that there are risks of lower-level USG members 
having common acquaintances in their local communities with individuals suscep-
tible to carrying out MFTAs, but the firearms that are currently accessible are con-
verted or antique firearms. Nevertheless, there are heightened fears of the risk of an 
MFTA, and therefore resources have been assigned and mechanisms established to 
further restrict the flow of illegal arms into and within the UK due to the potential 
terrorist risk they constitute. Inter-agency cooperation mechanisms to address the 
illegal firearms market and terrorist access appear to be well placed to draw on the 
experience of dedicated ‘gang and gun crime’ units and the ‘investigate the gun’ 
approach of the NABIS network. Yet, KIIs also noted that too much stress on coun-
ter-terrorism could have a negative impact on the ability of police forces to address 
the daily negative impacts on the public caused by illegal firearms supply and circu-
lation. Getting the balance right is clearly key. 
UK sentencing for illegal firearms possession, use, transfer and distribution is 
already particularly stringent, signalling a low tolerance for such criminal activities 
in the country. The UK’s surveillance and intelligence capabilities are also regarded 
as playing a critical role at all levels in addressing the threat of terrorist access to the 
country’s illicit firearms market, and all the KIIs referred to the high level of vigi-
lance focused on the threat posed by illegal firearms in the hands of USGs, OCGs 
and terrorists. 
Based on our analysis, we can therefore conclude that the main obstacles and chal-
lenges facing UK national policy to address the illicit firearms market and terrorist 
access to it are those of: 
• maintaining constant focus on the issue of illegal firearms and recognising 














• ensuring the regulation of ‘responsible’ legal firearms possession and prevent-
ing the exploitation of loopholes and grey areas in the current legislation;
• better monitoring and understanding the potential risks of diversion from 
registered dealers and firearms holders who seek to illegally acquire, possess, 
and distribute ‘prohibited’ firearms and/or illegally produce ammunition; 
• gathering intelligence on new methods for obtaining illegal firearms – e.g. 
the dark web and 3D printing – and how best to mitigate the risk of criminals 
and/or terrorists obtaining firearms via such sources;
• ensuring the provision of sufficient personnel resources and surveillance 
capabilities to address the illegal firearms market. KIIs contrasted the avail-
ability of such resources for counter-terrorism with the challenges of acquir-
ing such resources to deal with OCG and USG possession, use and trafficking 
of illegal firearms;
• overcoming the fact that addressing illegal firearms smuggling is not the 
highest priority for agencies tasked with monitoring UK ports of entry, and 
that the relevant agencies – the UK Border Force and HRMC – are being asked 
to do more with limited resources; and
• overcoming the effect on the UK market of the fact that other countries have 
different deactivation standards, and that low-cost blank-firing and antique 
firearms are widely available in some European countries. 
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Illicit firearms circulation and  
the politics of upheaval 
in North Africa
Francesco Strazzari and Francesca Zampagni
As a broad region, the whole of North Africa can be historically characterised by its 
porous national borders. Most state borders of North African countries are literally 
lines drawn in the sand in far-flung peripheral areas where policing and patrolling 
are difficult, while the legitimacy of central authorities is often contested.1 Libya’s 
borders, for example, have always been problematic, particularly in the remotest 
southern Saharan sub-regions. The capacity of states in the Sahel region to control 
their borders is quite limited: the rarefied and hostile desert environment is tradi-
tionally a space of circulation where the few official border-crossing points are 
easily bypassed by traditional smugglers and new types of traffickers. The past 
three decades have seen the gradual rise of trade in new illicit goods, including nar-
cotics (e.g. cocaine) and counterfeit goods (e.g. medicines), compared to more tradi-
tional forms of smuggling based on tax avoidance and subsidised licit goods’ price 
differentials. In this context, small arms and light weapons have featured as both a 
smuggled commodity and a key asset for smugglers, given the increasing risks 
facing the smuggling business and the need for protection along increasingly 
unsafe routes. 
Although illicit commodities have always been a component of trans-Saharan 
informal trade,2 recent developments in the region have altered both the structure 
of that trade and the nature of its participants.3 The availability and circulation of 
weapons in the black market in North Africa was substantially changed by the 
Libyan revolution and the subsequent conflicts in that country. Weapons dynamics 
since then can be regarded as a driver of regional instability. Soon after the collapse 
of the Qaddafi regime in 2011, Libya was described as ‘the Tesco [supermarket] of 
the world’s illegal arms trade’.4 According to the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) Panel of Experts (PoE) monitoring the arms embargo on Libya, arms, 
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ammunition and explosives from Libyan depots have been scattered across as many 
as 12 countries in the Maghreb, Sahel and Levant regions, and the Horn of Africa. 
While the bulk of this weaponry has flowed towards the Sahel and Egypt, there are 
also indications of transfers to the Gaza Strip and Syria.5 During the research 
process for the SAFTE Project, several national key actors highlighted in interviews 
that some of these weapons will eventually also end up in the European Union (EU). 
In 2015 Europol publicly stated for the first time that firearms originating from the 
conflicts in Libya, Syria and Mali were available on the European black market, and 
that these countries may emerge as major sources of illegal firearms trafficked to 
the EU.6
Box 1: Research design
When dealing with data on trafficking, above all on a sensitive topic such as 
firearms, one encounters significant capacity and disclosure problems in 
terms of the systematic collection and availability of official data. The lack of 
reliable statistics is such that it is extremely difficult – if not practically 
impossible – to provide an accurate and comprehensive appraisal of the 
illicit possession of and trade in firearms in North African countries. This 
affects the quality of data not only at the national level, but also in interna-
tional databases. In this report, therefore, we attempt to make data available 
that allows ongoing dynamics and trends to be broadly identified. 
The report offers a review and analysis of secondary sources mainly based 
on research carried out in the region by the UNSC PoE monitoring the arms 
embargo on Libya, researchers, and research organisations such as the Small 
Arms Survey and Conflict Armament Research. We also draw on data from 
two databases, the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT)7 
and the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED),8 as well as 
additional news sources and articles retrieved from social media. The NISAT 
database, run by the Peace Research Institute Oslo, offers a systematic col-
lection of news articles on small arms. The database was explored using its 
geographical search function  to locate articles dealing with five states 
– Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia – and searches were further 
narrowed down to the thematic category ‘black market’ that included epi-
sodes of firearms smuggling and misuse in the period 2014-mid 2017. This 
choice was motivated by the abundant literature on Libya’s arsenals and the 












This report provides an overview of up-to-date available information and data on 
illicit arms circulation in the broad region of North Africa. Geopolitically, the UN 
definition of North Africa includes seven countries or territories: Algeria, Egypt, 
Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and Western Sahara.10 However, in line with the EU’s 
usual definition of North African countries as Europe’s southern neighbours, this 
report will not focus on Sudan. Nonetheless, since arms recirculate from and to 
neighbouring countries, the report will touch on Sahelian countries when relevant. 
1.  Dynamics of firearms trafficking and 
proliferation
All the selected countries have severe laws regulating firearms possession. 
Generally speaking, the law does not guarantee the right to private gun ownership, 
and civilian possession is regulated through licensing systems and background 
checks on applicants. In Egypt and Tunisia, the applicant should also demonstrate 
a ‘genuine reason’ to hold a firearm. Civilian use of long guns is forbidden in Egypt.11 
In Libya, civilian gun ownership was entirely prohibited under Qaddafi,12 and the 
selling or transfer of arms was prohibited. Despite gun ownership being illegal in 
Libya, in 2007 civilians owned nearly twice as many guns as the military and 
police:  civilian firearms were numbered at about 900,000, military firearms at 
535,200 and police firearms at 22,000.13 In 2010, estimated civilian gun possession 
rates in North Africa ranged from Africa’s lowest in Tunisia (0.1 firearms per 100 
people) to one of Africa’s highest in Libya (15.5). The remainder range from 3.5 per 
100 people in Egypt to 7.6 in Algeria – excluding Western Sahara, for which no 
figures are available.14 An important observation is that most of the firearms in cir-
culation originate from outside the region: Egypt is the only known manufacturer 
of small arms in the region (it was categorised as a medium-sized small arms pro-
ducer in 2001)15, while Algeria only manufactures ammunition. Libya, Morocco and 
Tunisia have no arms industries, while in Libya it is prohibited by law to produce 
arms.16
Interestingly, the proliferation and circulation patterns of weapons vary widely 
across North African countries. Each country features diverse dynamics mainly 
due to its geopolitical position and heterogeneous monopoly of force in each 
country, as well as the role of the army and government expenditure on firearms. In 
Egypt and Libya, the political and security situation remains unstable and volatile, 
with various armed groups in play and a consequent demand for weapons. The 
upswing of fighting in Libya in 2014 is still under way at the time of this writing, 
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with a multitude of armed groups active in various coalitions, an internationally 
recognised government that is unable to exert control beyond a small part of the 
capital city, and the attempt of General Khalifa Haftar’s ‘Libyan National Army’ to 
acquire larger territorial control in the south (Fezzan) and west of the country, after 
‘reconquering’ the east (Cyrenaica). In Egypt, Islamist militants and security forces 
continued to clash in the Sinai, while new armed groups appeared in 2016. In 
Tunisia, despite targeted political assassinations and armed clashes between violent 
extremists and security forces, the use of firearms has remained relatively low even 
after the revolution of 2011. Morocco and Algeria are both among the largest 
importers of arms in Africa. While Morocco does not report significant violent epi-
sodes or seizures of firearms, Algerian authorities regularly report on the numer-
ous arms seizures and counter-terrorism operations in the country, especially along 
its borders with Libya, Mali and Niger. In Western Sahara, the Polisario Front main-
tains active armed forces and has a surplus of weaponry.17 Morocco has a heavy mili-
tary presence in Western Sahara, but the area is not impervious to smuggling activi-
ties and small-arms trafficking.18
In recent years the civilian possession of firearms has increased significantly in 
some countries, mainly due to this unstable and volatile political and security situ-
ation. Determining how many weapons entered circulation after Qaddafi’s fall is a 
very difficult exercise. The UN has estimated that Qaddafi’s army was in control of 
250,000 to 700,000 weapons as of 2011, of which 70-80% were assault rifles.19 
According to British intelligence, more than one million tons of weapons were 
looted after Qaddafi fell.20 And while the international community has made efforts 
to check the proliferation of weapons from post-Qaddafi Libya, those efforts are pri-
marily focused on certain types of weapons, e.g. chemical weapons and man-porta-
ble air defence systems; less attention was (and still is) devoted to the proliferation 
of small arms. In the aftermath of 2011, Libyan authorities have implemented vol-
untary firearms surrender schemes and weapons seizure programmes in order to 
reduce the number of illicit firearms in circulation. Several small-scale civilian dis-
armament initiatives were launched in 2012, but with limited results, and the 
authorities have been slow to introduce control measures for civilian weapons 
ownership.21 Instead of a decline, there has been an alarming increase in the level of 
new weapons in the country.22
As a general trend in illicit firearms markets, some of the weapons that reach ter-
rorists and criminal organisations are produced by illegal manufacturers, but most 
firearms are diverted from legal production and at some point were leaked into the 
illegal market. Licit firearms can be diverted during transportation; by leakage 
from factories, government stockpiles or individual owners; trafficked from abroad; 












or conversion. North Africa is no exception to this rule, and the dispersal of arms 
from Libyan government stockpiles after 2011 confirms this. Furthermore, armed 
conflicts have contributed to the creation of a vast arms market across the region 
fuelled by the circulation of recycled arms used in previous conflicts in the state 
concerned or in neighbouring countries, the provision of state-sponsored supplies 
to proxies, or strategic caches of arms stored in anticipation of conflict. 
According to the 2017 UNSC PoE report, after 2011 arms were also supplied through 
the breaking of the UN arms embargo – among others, from Qatar via Tunisia, from 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and through an arms delivery from Italy ‘that had 
originated from the Balkans’.23 A 2016 fieldwork-based report by Conflict Armament 
Research finds that stockpiles in Mali and Côte d’Ivoire have also nurtured illicit 
markets: “Illicit weapon flows in the Sahel since 2011 have not stemmed exclusively, or 
even predominantly, from Libyan sources. The profile of illicit weapons in the region 
reflects the consequences of other state crises, particularly in Mali, and of weak control 
over national stockpiles in the Central African Republic and Cote d’Ivoire. The preva-
lence of Ivorian-origin small arms across the region is a particularly unexpected finding 
of this investigation. Weapons originating in Libyan stockpiles or trafficked by Libyan 
armed groups remain significant, but they are diminishing and, in some cases, being 
reversed”.24 
Notwithstanding this finding, we can still conclude that the effects of arms prolif-
eration from Libya have been the most significant in the region in the immediate 
post-2011 period. These weapons were obtained directly from Qaddafi-era stock-
piles, captured from Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) forces in Sirte, and seized 
or purchased from local ethnic militias or smugglers.25
In the following sections we will analyse the illicit firearms markets and prolifera-
tion dynamics in the various North African countries.
1.1  Libya 
Libya under Muammar Qaddafi was a centre of weapons proliferation for more 
than forty years, while amassing in its depots one of the largest and most diverse 
conventional weapons stockpiles of any African country. Before 2011 weapons own-
ership had been severely restricted, with only certain groups close to the authorities 
permitted to own weapons. Throughout this period Libya was characterised by 
highly regulated informal trade concentrated in the hands of cartels that enjoyed 
the tacit support of the regimes on both sides of the border, be they in Tunisia, Egypt 
or Libya itself.26 Under the Qaddafi regime the illicit economy was largely state 
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sponsored, and trafficking and smuggling remained largely in the hands of groups 
favoured by the regime. By selecting the participants in the arms trade, the regime 
was able to use continued participation as a guarantee of loyalty.27 The regime used 
state subsidies to keep tribes dependent and too ‘weak’ to mobilise. For example, 
around the southern city of Sabha, in the Fezzan, on the route to Niger and Chad, 
the cartels of the Awlad Suleiman, Qadhadhfa, and Warfalla dominated. In contrast 
to these tribes, those who did not enjoy favoured status with the Qaddafi regime 
were marginalised, e.g. the Zuwari and Zintan on the Tunisian border, and the Tubu 
in the Fezzan. The pre-2011 Tunisian autocracy allowed the cartels to engage in 
large-scale informal trading with Libya in return for their pledge not to smuggle 
weapons or drugs, as well as to support the Tunisian government with their net-
works of informants.28
From a virtually non-existent domestic market in Libya, the revolution and its after-
math paved the way for a large illicit trade in firearms to emerge in North Africa, 
with Libya as its epicentre. The 2014 UNSC PoE report states that a number of shops 
that openly sold small arms had been set up in several cities since the revolution. In 
the large Libyan cities, including Tripoli, a number of open-air markets are cur-
rently selling firearms. In Tripoli, for example, the Souk el Hout (fish market) on Al 
Rashid Street is well known for merchants who offer a range of firearms.29
The proliferation and availability of weapons during different phases of the revolu-
tion gradually involved new and diverse armed actors. A general three-stage trend 
across Libya through which arms availability shaped the insurgency can be 
identified: 
1. the formation of armed actors, which generally took place in the context of a 
relative weapons shortage;
2. the development of increased coordination and cohesion, as weapons 
became more available to well-connected brigade commanders; and
3. increasing fractionalisation and splintering, as weapons started to become 
available to individual insurgents in the field.30 
The significant case of Misrata shows how the fighting units began as small groups 
of uncoordinated street fighters and developed into organisations with tanks and 
heavy artillery. In 2012 the city contained nearly half the experienced fighters and 













1.1.1  Libya 2011-2013: a ‘Tesco’ for arms?
After the 2011 revolution non-state actors looted numerous military storage facili-
ties of a wide range of weapons,32 many of which found their way into the domestic 
and international black markets.33 Qaddafi’s fall directly caused the explosive 
growth of arms smuggling in recent years through a combination of the increased 
availability of large numbers of weapons from the regime’s stockpiles, the decreased 
formal and informal control of contraband flows, the emergence of (tribal) armed 
groups as dominant actors in trafficking networks, and the cross-border connec-
tions of actors fleeing post-Qaddafi Libya. The Fezzan region is probably the part of 
Libya where the most drastic changes to trafficking flows have been observed. Over 
the past few years the city of Sabha and surrounds have become an arms-trafficking 
hub, as both a point of collection and distribution. Sabha’s importance in the 
weapons trade began with the end of the initial stage of armed conflict in 2011 due 
to its proximity to large military facilities from where arms were stolen. The Tubu 
gained control of the borders and started to feed surplus weapons into contraband 
routes through Kufra (south-eastern Libya) and Dongola (Sudan) to northern Egypt, 
the Sinai Peninsula or Yemen. The old routes that followed the traditional patterns 
of Tubu tribal alliances re-emerged.34 There are also strong regional connections 
between the Tubu and Zaghawa from Chad and Darfur.35 
Arms trafficking to the south-west displays a similar dynamic. According to the 
2013 UNSC PoE report, “the western borders of Libya, from Tunisia in the north to Niger 
in the south, were the focus points for illicit trafficking from Libya quite early on in the 
uprising, with Algeria reporting its first seizure of weapons coming from Libya in April 
2011”.36 
Trafficking to Tunisia was limited, at least compared to other destinations such as 
Egypt or Mali, due to lower demand (resulting from lower levels of criminal and 
political violence) and Tunisian government attempts to prevent trafficking. More 
weapons were reported to have been seized in Algeria, since it lies on a direct route 
between Libya and Mali.37
According to the 2013 UNSC PoE report, in 2011-2012 large-scale transfers of arms 
were also sent from Libya to Syria by sea or air through Turkey. In 2015 the PoE 
reported that ‘While the Syrian Arab Republic was a significant destination for 
Libyan arms during the first two years of the conflict that trend appears to have 
faded in the past 12 to 24 months’.38 A year later the PoE stated that it had ‘found no 
information relating to recent transfers’.39 
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Until August 2014 the import of large quantities of materiel was subject to the 
notification process in the exception framework included in the embargo, includ-
ing more than 60,000 handguns, 65,000 assault rifles, 15,000 sub-machine guns 
and 4,000 machine guns of various calibres, as well as more than 60 million 
rounds of ammunition for small arms and machine guns. However, in the absence 
of any post-delivery notification system, with the procurement of materiel by 
authorities outside official military procurement channels, and the attraction of 
the Libyan market to arms brokers of dubious legality, it is difficult to assess how 
much notified materiel has actually been transferred to Libya and to which final 
user.40 The UNSC PoE has reason to believe that most transfers to Libya since the 
revolution, in particular of small arms and light weapons and related ammuni-
tion, whether notified or not, have ended up with armed groups, either through 
direct transfers or diversions. Approved materiel transferred for the EU Border 
Assistance Mission was also diverted at airports controlled by brigades.41 For 
instance, from the end of the revolution to 24 August 2014 Tripoli International 
Airport was controlled by Zintani brigades, and there were cases of deliveries 
from Belarus being diverted.42 
1.1.2  Circular trafficking, 2014-2016
Libya’s status as an important player and route for the illicit trade in small arms and 
light weapons has been recently reconsidered. While weapons continue to prolifer-
ate across North Africa, outflows from Libya have diminished since 2014. According 
to the last available UNSC PoE report (2017), “arms have continued to be illicitly trans-
ferred to and from Libya on a regular basis. While outflows have continued to be moder-
ate, consisting mainly of small arms and light weapons, materiel entering Libya has been 
of an increasingly sophisticated nature”.43 
The decrease in weapons flowing from Libya to other countries in the region is 
mainly the result of two factors. Firstly, domestic demand (and the economic means 
to pay for it) has increased as a result of the increased fighting. In 2014-2016 the 
violence was partly due to clashes between the Tuareg and Tubu for the control of 
Ubari and Ghat.44 In addition, the ACLED database indicates that important parts of 
the violent events between 2014-2016 are connected to ISIS and Ansar al-Shaaria, 
while a number of other political militias were also involved in a significant number 
of incidents.45 Another development that is worth noting is that by 2016 urban 
clashes among militias in Libya escalated to exchanges using heavy weapons.46 
Secondly, the success of a number of international initiatives to tackle arms traf-
ficking affected the flow of weapons, as well as improved interdiction efforts on tra-












borders.47 More specifically, since 2014 the French-led Operation Barkhane has been 
blocking the transfer of weapons and terrorists, coupled with G5 Sahel initiatives to 
strengthen cross-border patrolling.48 
As Shaw and Mangan note, the proliferation of illicit arms has transformed all other 
criminal markets, and weapons and protection have become a feature of the smug-
gling trade: “As violence increases, so does the criminal market for arms and for protec-
tion, perpetuating a cycle that is becoming an entrenched feature of the political debate. 
The pervasive presence of weapons has combined with the absence of state control to 
ensure the growth of the protection market for legitimate trade as well as for illicit activi-
ties. Because weapons are available to all groups, the facilitation of movement of any 
kind of goods with value requires ensuring a transaction either with those who can 
ensure safety by providing the necessary firepower or with those who control specific 
areas and can thus ensure safe passage. Providing protection has thus become key to 
regulating both the criminal market and the broader Libyan economy”.49
In its initial phases, the development of the arms trade in Libya was marked by 
violent struggles between armed groups associated with the Awlad Suleiman and 
Tubu tribes over control of informal trade routes and urban markets. The Tubu 
groups were largely successful, resuming control over the tribe’s past trafficking 
networks in the south of the country and isolating the Awlad Suleiman. They are 
involved in the profound reconfiguration of tribal trafficking networks in the 
Fezzan, which shares borders with Algeria, Niger, Chad and Sudan.50 The Zintani 
brigade controlled most of the Libya’s western border until the summer of 2014, 
while the Awled Ali tribe gained control of Libya’s eastern border with Egypt. 
According to the 2017 UNSC PoE report, the arms trade in Libya has become an 
important source of income for various armed groups, and active arms trading has 
been reported at markets in Zintan, Misrata, Ajdabiya and Waw. The materiel 
offered includes heavier and more sophisticated systems. For example, in Libya a 
functioning Milan anti-tank system, including four missiles, is available for 
US$9,000 (€7,500). In some cases fighters and arms are offered together.51 
Interestingly, a recent Small Arms Survey study has indicated that local arms 
trading is also organised through virtual, online markets, highlighting their use by 
armed groups and their members.52 In April 2016 Facebook closed six accounts that 
had been used for arms sales in Libya.53 The UNSC PoE also continues to observe 
weapons being offered for sale on Libyan Facebook sites,54 and its monitoring of 
social media indicates that “arms dealers within Libya continue to use online markets 
to sell and/or acquire material such as RPG launchers, recoilless rifles, anti-tank guided 
missile systems, heavy machine guns (12.7 mm and 14.5 mm), and man-portable 
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air-defence systems (MANPADS). Among the weapons for sale on a Libyan Facebook 
page there were also two Zastava Arms M-93 ‘Black Arrow’ anti-materiel rifles”.55 
These rifles were likely diverted from a notified Serbian shipment of imported 
wea pons.56 
There are also a few indications of arms supplies being sent from Italy to Libya in 
exchange for Libyan artefacts in 2016.57 The EUNAVFOR MED Operation Sophia, 
which has been active since 2015, has, among other things, the additional task of 
implementing the arms embargo off the coast of Libya, and it has thus placed sur-
veillance boats off the cities of Derna and Sirte. In general, weapons appear not be 
trafficked on this route, with the exception of the seizures of ‘several types of 
weapons, including Machine Guns, AK47 rifles, RPG bullets, RPG launchers, [and] 
mortar grenades’ in international waters in May 2017.58
1.2  Tunisia
Tunisia is a peripheral market for small arms and light weapons. Firearms traffick-
ing currently exists in the form of small-scale smuggling in the Tunisian-Libyan 
border region, notably the Jefara, and in particular the two official border crossings 
at Ras Jdir in the north and Dehiba to the south in the Nafusa Mountains. In 2011 
firearms also arrived in Tunisia with refugees from Libya, in particular members of 
forces loyal to Qaddafi, who sold their possessions, including Kalashnikovs, when 
they arrived in the country.59 
The end of the Libyan armed conflict had a dramatic impact on informal trade and 
trafficking in the Jefara. Demand increased on both sides of the border, especially 
for basic foodstuffs, as traders sought to maximise profit. As the 2013 UNSC PoE 
report suggests, firearms circulation in the Ben Gardane region (near the Libyan 
border) may be characterised as an ‘ant trade’: traffickers conceal single items in 
their other goods, but do not attempt to smuggle larger quantities of weapons. 
However, there have been exceptions. The discovery of an arms cache in Medenine 
in 2013, for instance, highlighted the attempts of a few violent groups and jihadists 
to smuggle firearms and explosives in modest quantities (about one pick-up load) 
through the Ben Gardane border region.60 However, most of recent reported traf-
ficking incidents at the border reflected the ant-trade dynamic, with only a few 
arms seized from individuals crossing the Tunisian border.61 
According to Kartas, ‘there is only one main route for smuggling small arms and 












namely through the oueds (dry river beds) that wind through the eastern Tunisian 
Sahara’.62 River beds offer terrain that can be crossed by vehicles and a route free of 
the checkpoints in the centre of the country. The routes are challenging and long, 
and thus there are no established ‘contraband structures’, and only well-trained 
groups with sufficient capital resources – such as khatibas (battalions) linked to al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or other violent organisations – are able to 
navigate them. It seems far more likely that weapons are transported from Libya 
directly to Algeria, where they eventually find their way into Tunisia over the smug-
gling paths in the mountains.63 In 2012-2015 there was a strong AQIM presence in 
western Tunisia in the Chaambi Mountains area on the border with Algeria, and 
many weapons were circulating, coming from both Mali (according to some, from 
the former khatiba of Abou Zeid), and from Libya.64 The insecurity and terrorist 
threats that have plagued Libya since 2013 have compelled Tunisia to tighten its 
historical ‘open door’ policy toward its neighbour.65 While Tunisia has increased 
security cooperation with Algeria, it is still difficult to identify cooperation coun-
terparts in Libya, since the security sector is weak and brigades are running most 
border control activities.
Terrorists and self-proclaimed ‘jihadi salafists’ are believed to be the groups most 
likely to seek firearms in Tunisia.66 Tunisian authorities identified two main trends 
that are not mutually exclusive: seizures from those involved in trafficking for 
profit, for which several people have been prosecuted; and those from individuals 
or groups associated with terrorism. Most of the latter are Tunisian nationals, 
although cases involving Algerians and Libyans are under investigation.67 Smugg-
ling operations have also been tied to Algeria-based violent extremist networks, 
such as AQIM, that have infiltrated the country. Among the perpetrators of violent 
attacks are Soldiers of the Caliphate, Ansar al-Shaaria, the Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade 
and allegedly ISIS affiliates.
In 2016, following a major attack on police stations and national guard outposts, as 
well as an ISIS attack on a military camp in Ben Gardane in March, the Tunisian 
security forces seized a considerable number of weapons and, as a result of the 
ensuing investigations, located over six arms caches in the wider region of Ben 
Gardane. In May 2016 the security forces found a cache of weapons and ammu nition 
in the town of Ben Gardane (20 km from the Libyan border) containing 130 machine 
guns and 29 AK-pattern assault rifles; and in November 2016 four caches were 
found in the same area containing 50 guns, including 27 Kalashnikov assault rifles 
and dozens of missiles.68 Among the arms seized in March 2016 after the attack in 
Ben Gardane and among those smuggled into the country from Libya, the 2017 
UNSC PoE report identified a series of over-under shotguns produced by Torun 
Silah Sanayi, a Turkish company.69 Following the PoE’s enquiry to Turkish 
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authorities, Torun Silah Sanayi claims to have sold the shotguns to the ‘Yassine 
Middle East Company’, a shotgun reseller in Beirut. According to the Turkish 
authorities, the customs declaration states that these shotguns were loaded onto 
the vessel Haddad I, which was intercepted by the Greek coastguard in September 
2015 and the materiel on board seized.70 However, the serial numbers documented 
by the PoE in Tunisia do not seem to match the packing lists provided by Torun Silah 
Sanayi through the Turkish authorities. The PoE concluded that it seems unlikely 
that the shotguns were transferred to Libya after they had been seized by Greece on 
board the Haddad I.71 
1.3  Algeria 
The Algerian Ministry of Defence (MoD) provides regular news updates and figures 
on arms seizures and counter-terrorist operations.72 Each month it publishes in its 
magazine El Djeich (the army) an overview of the materiel seized in the previous 
month. The total seizures in Algeria in 2016 and the first half of 2017 are shown in 
Tables 1 and 2. According to the 2017 UNSC PoE report, it is probable that a large 
share was smuggled from Libya in violation of the embargo. It is worth noting that 
the PoE reviewed Algerian reports of seizures, but could not physically inspect the 
materiel.
Our analysis of Algerian MoD official press notes73 indicated that seizures mostly 
occur in the south of the country: Tamanrasset, on the border with Niger; Bordj 
Badji Mokhtar, bordering Mali; and In Amenas, on the border with Libya. Some sei-
zures are also reported on the northern coast, i.e. at Aïn Defla, Tipaza and Bouira. 
Since the attack in In Amenas in January 2013, Algeria has greatly strengthened 
military patrols of the desert.74 Besides Libyan-sourced materiel, Algerian small 
arms ammunition – specifically, 7.62 x 39 mm and 7.62 x 54R mm cartridges pro-
duced at the Entreprise des Réalisations Industrielles de Seriana in 1999, 2007 and 













Table 1:  Seizures in Algeria, 2016
Firearms
Kalashnikov automatic rifles 668
FMPK machine guns 48
Mortars 37
Hunting rifles 82
Semi-automatic rifles with telescopic sight 35
Shotguns 26
Simonov semi-automatic rifles 64
RPG-7 rocket propelled grenade 18
RPK machine guns 16
Machine guns 12.7 mm 13
Machine guns 14.5 mm 7
Repeating rifle 36
PKT machine guns 9
PSH machine guns 2
Dictariov machine guns 5
M16 machine guns 1
MAT44 machine guns 4
3-cannons rocket launcher 1
Strela rocket launcher 1
RPG-5 rocket propelled grenade 5
RPG-2 rocket launcher 2
Anti-aircraft missile 6
Artisanal hand-crafted rifles 56
Automatic pistols of various types 35
RPD machine gun 1
MAT-49 machine gun 1
MAS-36 rifles 3
Grenades 792
Source: UNSC Panel of Experts (2017, annex 47)
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RPG-7 rocket propelled grenade 3
RPG-2 rocket propelled grenade 3
SPG-9 cannons 2
Machine guns 14.5 mm 7
Machine guns 12.7 mm 6
FMPK machine guns 12
PKT machine guns 4
Kalashnikov automatic rifles 167
RPK machine guns 5
Simonov semi-automatic rifles 26
MAT-49 machine guns 1
MAS-39 rifles 2






Artisanal hand-crafted rifles 3
Source: El Djeich  n.648, July 2017
 
According to Algerian authorities, petty criminals, terrorists and criminal networks 
carry out trafficking.76 In our analysis of news sources, the subjects involved in sei-
zures are often unidentified ‘smugglers’ or ‘terrorists’. In terms of active armed groups, 
in 2016 AQIM, Soldiers of the Caliphate (Jund al-Khilafa), and Islamist militias were 
involved in violent incidents, mostly attacks on security forces. While AQIM has been 
active in Algeria since the 1990s, with attacks peaking in 2010-2013, the Soldiers of the 
Caliphate armed group has been active more recently, since 2014. In previous years 
there were a few violent incidents involving the Mouvement pour l’unicité et le jihad 













Widespread firearm ownership and smuggling by Bedouin through Sinai to Gaza 
and Israel has been reported for many years, but it intensified and involved Libyan 
weapons after 2011. After the fall of President Mubarak, police stations were 
reported to be empty in Sinai and their weapons looted.78 Those involved in the con-
flict in Sinai could also have access to the copious arms being trafficked to Gaza via 
Rafah, the Egyptian town at the border. The smugglers avoided detection by trans-
porting weapons through unpopulated desert areas, and Egypt’s western border, 
which was already being used for drug smuggling, became a trafficking hub for 
weapons, including heavy weapons such as large-calibre anti-aircraft guns and 
rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). 
In 2011-2012 the Rafah border crossing point was crucial for the smuggling routes 
between Sinai and Gaza.79 In February 2013, and then again in 2015, Egypt flooded 
tunnels used to smuggle goods under the border to Gaza.80 The 2014 UNSC PoE 
report stated that arms transfers from Libya to Gaza occurred, but ‘the shipments 
had slowed with an increased effort by Egypt to track and seize weapons’. This is 
also due to the better border control by General Haftar’s self-established govern-
ment in eastern Libya, and the fact that Libya’s eastern border with Egypt is also 
blocked by a 380 km minefield running south from Musaid, with transfers likely 
being moved further southward through the desert into Egypt or by sea, rather than 
through the minefields. 81
Interestingly, a Small Arms Survey’s analysis of some of the weapons featured in the 
publications of the Hasm Movement in Egypt indicates that the group possibly uses 
Kalashnikov-pattern rifles that are likely of Albanian or Chinese origin. Other 
weapons used by both Hasm and Liwaa al-Thawra include standard-issue Egyptian 
rifles probably looted from government forces after successful attacks. Overall, the 
weapons used by both groups do not appear to differ much from those used by the 
group Revolutionary Punishment before them.82 
1.5  Mali and Niger
Since before Qaddafi’s fall the primary transit route of weapons and armed groups 
between Libya and northern Mali has historically run along the Algerian and 
Nigerien borders. This route then crosses western Niger, entering Mali around the 
Niger-Mali-Burkina Faso tri-border area. Tuareg fighters and civilians in particular 
have used this route to move between Ubari and Sebha in southern Libya, and to the 
Kidal region of northern Mali.83 Numerous Tuareg who had migrated to Libya before 
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2011 and fought in Libyan armed groups under Qaddafi returned to Mali at the end 
of 2011 and the beginning of 2012 with large numbers of weapons, which resulted in 
a decrease in local prices and widespread access to firearms.84
According to Conflict Armament Research interviews with Tuareg members of both 
loyalist and separatist armed groups, transit through this route has become more 
difficult due to increased surveillance and seizures by international forces. The 
2015 UNSC PoE report states that most of the arms from Libya ‘destined for terrorist 
groups in Mali [were] seized or destroyed on several occasions in 2014 in Niger by 
the French-led Opération Barkhane’.85 Similarly, the 2016 UNSC PoE report states 
that ‘transfers of arms from Libya to Mali and the Niger have decreased in intensity 
thanks in large part to Operation Barkhane though seizures continued’.86 It seems 
that the French intervention to prevent trafficking also prompted traffickers trans-
porting combatants, weapons, and other supplies to use smaller convoys that are 
harder to detect.87 However, many have kept their firearms, and caches are often 
discovered in the region.
As regards Niger, in 2011-2012 Tuareg brought weapons into the country, notably 
former rebels who had found refuge under Qaddafi since 2009. When they returned 
to Niger they were disarmed and co-opted by the regime, which made them mayors 
or presidential counsellors.
According to Pellerin, now weapons are allegedly smuggled into Niger by Tubu 
smugglers from Libya or members of Arab tribes with ties to that country. The 
smugglers are said to import the weapons as a sideline to their main smuggling 
business. For example, a Tubu smuggler whose business was second-hand vehicles 
was also said to be offering new AK-pattern rifles for sale that were sold with three 
or four ammunition clips per weapon.88 According to the UNSC PoE 2017 report, the 
Nigerien authorities reported a reduction in the scale of weapons trafficking from 
Libya in 201789 and commented that some Tubu groups are a link between ISIS and 
Boko Haram in Nigeria, and control most of the supply route from Libya to Diffa in 
south-east Niger.
In 2017 the UNSC PoE received repeated reports from within the Tuareg community 
in Mali of arms transfers from Ansar el Haqq (headed by Mohammed Ingtallah and 
based in Awbari in south-west Libya) to Ansar Dine in Mali. The deliveries allegedly 
consist of light weapons, such as Zastava M80 assault rifles, anti-tank weapons and 












1.6  Morocco and Western Sahara
According to our analysis of press articles, there are only a few cases of arms sei-
zures in Morocco/Western Sahara, and they point to ISIS affiliates. Less than 50 
violent incidents91 were reported by ACLED in the period 2010-2016, involving 
MUJAO, AQIM, al-Qaeda and the Polisario Front.
The ceasefire negotiated by the UN and accepted by Morocco and the Polisario Front 
in 1991 is still in force, despite a number of occasional minor violations on both 
sides. Due to the support of certain states, notably Algeria and Libya, the Polisario 
Front was equipped with a relatively large arsenal, and this has been expanded 
further with weapons seized from the Moroccan Army. The movement has now 
enough weapons of its own to be able to sell some and to supply the regional market. 
In the absence of a settlement of the conflict in Western Sahara, the Polisario Front 
has kept most of its weapons, and the months that followed the 1991 ceasefire saw 
hundreds of Polisario fighters cross the border to sell their excess weapons in 
Mauritania. According to an official Mauritanian source, the Polisario Front repre-
sents one of the leading suppliers of illegal weapons to Mauritania.92 In the north of 
Mauritania, cross-border trafficking of Soviet-type weapons with Western Sahara 
operates in both directions: automatic weapons (Kalashnikovs, Simonovs and G3s) 
enter Mauritania illegally from Western Sahara, while weapons such as Mausers 
and MAS-36s travel in the opposite direction.93 In 2017 the Mauritanian govern-
ment reported actions against all types of smuggling in its northern regions. 
2.  Availability and prices of firearms
Information on types of arms can be inferred by analysing recent seizures. While 
several organisations, including the 2017 UNSC PoE, have documented firearms sei-
zures in various countries in the region, the lack of access to seizure data in other 
countries makes it difficult to keep track of the origins and types of the firearms 
available in the region. In general, we can conclude that for reasons of training, 
ammunition availability and habit, Warsaw Pact weaponry continues to be pre-
ferred two decades after the end of the Cold War. Consequently, most of the assault 
rifles detected across North African countries are of the Kalashnikov variety. 
Firearms from Libya seized in Tunisia, for example, have mostly identified AK-47 
and AK 103-2 self-loading rifles from Russia (delivered to Libya in 2005 and 2008).94 
Kalashnikov-type firearms are also the most commonly seized type in Algeria 
(see Tables 2 and 3). Arms from the Balkans were also identified in Libya in late 2011 
and in 2013, i.e. AR-M9 rifles manufactured by Arsenal (a Bulgarian arms 
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manufacturer) and originally exported from Bulgaria to the UAE before ending up 
in Libya.95 Today, though, newer weapons are also of Chinese manufacture. 
In 2014 the UNSC PoE report concluded that handguns and related ammunition are 
still the weapon of choice in Libya, costing between 2,000 and 5,000 Libyan dinars. 
The PoE stated that ‘Importing such materiel is therefore a lucrative business and 
seizures bound for Libya made in 2013 clearly reflect that trend’.96 Pistols come from 
a great variety of sources, including modern commercial varieties of Taurus and 
Beretta pistols.97 Interestingly, pistols generally tend to be seized in much smaller 
batches than long arms. In addition, shotguns and hunting rifles are also in high 
demand in Libya and neighbouring countries for self-defence purposes. 
An interesting observation is the availability of Turkish-made replica handguns in 
Libya and the region at large. Since 2013 Libyan markets are replete with these 
weapons (in many cases blank-firing 6 mm to 9 mm versions), some of which are 
converted to lethal-purpose firearms.98 These weapons have become quite popular 
in Libya for self-defence purposes because they are very cheap and can be easily 
(though at some risk) modified to fire live ammunition.99 The 2014 UNSC PoE report 
attributed their popularity to their cheap prices: ‘Blank-firing pistols are also very 
popular in Libya, particularly in urban areas, where they are sold on the streets for 
150 Libyan dinars.’100 Interestingly, there does not appear to be a standard conver-
sion method for these blank-firing handguns and the conversion process is often 
carried out by individual traders seeking to maximise profits. Occasionally small 
groups are also involved in the conversion process.101
The availability of converted blank-firing guns is not limited to Libya; these guns 
are traded throughout the region. Considerable quantities of these guns have also 
been seized in Egypt. The principal entry point for these types of firearms is the port 
of Misrata, from where they are sent to the markets and warehouses of Sebha, 
where traders and armed groups sort and prepare them for further distribution. 
This form of collection and distribution has been one of the factors making Sebha a 
regional hub for small arms and light weapons.I 102 In Niger, the two most popular 
weapons are self-loading AK-pattern rifles and converted blank-firing handguns 
mostly from Turkey and known locally as ‘Turkiya’.103 
A 2016 Conflict Armament Research report indicates that, in addition to commonly 
documented legacy weapons that have been circulating for decades, new types of 
weapons were in use among Islamist armed groups in the southern Sahel:104 
I Until the summer of 2014, however, the main types of small arms and light weapons consisted of 












Iraqi-origin assault rifles and Chinese rifles. This suggests linkages between ISIS 
fighters’ sources of supply in West Africa and the Middle East, since these groups 
“used a common set of small arms unlike any previously documented in the sub-region. 
These include Iraqi-origin assault rifles and a batch of Chinese rifles manufactured in 
2011 whose serial numbers interleave with matching rifles that Syrian Kurdish People’s 
Protection Units (YPG) seized from IS[IS] fighters in Syria in 2015. These findings indi-
cate that the Islamist groups responsible for the Sahelian attacks have a common source 
of supply or constitute a single cell, and point tentatively to possible links or commonali-
ties of supply sources between Islamist fighters in West Africa and those operating in 
Iraq and Syria”.105
Little research has been done on the prices of the various types of firearms that are 
available across North Africa. The most comprehensive analysis of firearms prices 
in the region was published in 2017 and was focused on Libya. Table 3 gives an over-
view of the average asking price of small arms and light weapons. This study con-
cluded that ‘throughout all Libyan regions, pricing seemed to remain standard 
despite minor outliers (likely from package deals, items in high demand, or insin-
cere offers both high and low)’.106
3.  Conclusions
Revolution and descent into civil conflict in Libya are key drivers of weapons circu-
lation and instability in North Africa. While remaining a supermarket for arms 
along smuggling channels that have reached various groups from the western 
Sahel to the Middle East, drastically altering the supply of such weapons, Libya has 
de facto also acted as a sponge, and since 2015 has been creating new demand, 
‘reabsorbing’ weapons for its internal conflict. Since 2014, outflows from Libya have 
also diminished due to international initiatives to tackle arms trafficking in North 
Africa and the Sahel. As for illicit flows to EU countries, the EUNAVFOR MED 
Operation Sophia monitors arms flows off the coast of Libya across the Mediterranean 
Sea. Despite large numbers of people being smuggled from Libya into Europe, sig-
nificant flows of arms from Libya across the Mediterranean have not been detected. 
Weapons’ circulation patterns vary widely across countries, mainly due to the 
varied nature of the monopoly of force held by governments in the region. On the 
one hand, one finds effective government monopolies of force that are intent on 
fighting terrorist cells in urban or remote areas of the region (i.e. in Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia); while, on the other hand, one finds a situation like that in 
Libya, where force is scattered among different actors (city states, militias, tribal 
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coalitions, jihadist groups, etc.) and where legality is virtually absent and political 
legitimacy is also territorially disrupted. Finally, Egypt lies somewhere between 
these two extremes, with a military regime fighting in an actual war zone (i.e. the 
Sinai Peninsula), but also facing urban terrorist attacks.
The role of light weapons has long been underestimated; even in the Libyan case, 
external observers have been hoping that their extreme diffusion would entail a 
‘diffused deterrence effect’. This has not been the case: the pervasive presence of 
weapons has constituted the political capital of armed groups providing protection 
and extracting resources that has allowed them to play a political role in their own 
right in a complex mosaic of shifting alliances and territorial depredation. Libyan 
armed groups still engage in arms trafficking both within the country and across its 
borders, but arms trafficking is mostly embedded in regional and local networks 
and conflict economies.107 In the absence of the capacity to properly manage fire-
arms and ammunition, the risk of diversion also remains a major concern for 












Table 3:  Libaya – Dataset pricing data











LYD 1,070-1,240 LYD 1,820
(112 examples)
AK-103 rifle (No data) LYD 1,700 LYD 1,500
LYD 1,400
LYD 1,840 (30)
FAL-type rifle USD 500-800 LYD 2,050-2,130 LYD 
2,070-2,730 
LYD 3970






(No data) LYD 3,970 LYD 6,000 (17)




Škorpion sub - 
machine gun




(No data) LYD 1,020 LYD 2,000 LYD 6,500 (3)
7.62 x 54R mm LYD 0.50 (No data) (No data) LYD 2.80 (6)
7.62 x 51 mm LYD 0.50 (No data) (No data) LYD 2.70 (11)
7.62 x 39 mm LYD 0.25 (No data) LYD 1 LYD 1.80 (15)
7.62 x 45 mm LYD 8+ (No data) (No data) LYD 6.20 (4)
9 x 19 mm LYD 8 (No data) (No data) LYD 5.10 (14)
Source: Jenzen-Jones & McCollum (2017)
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Illicit firearms proliferation  
in the EU periphery: 
the case of Ukraine
Francesco Buscemi, Nils Duquet,  
Ekaterina Golovko and Eric Woods
As the second-largest country in Europe, with a history of firearms stockpiles and an 
active conflict zone, Ukraine presents one of the most complex firearms prolifera-
tion cases in Europe. The barrier for access to firearms in Ukraine is low, creating 
easy access in both the licit and illicit spheres. It is impossible to estimate the current 
number of illegally held firearms in Ukraine in a reliable and detailed way. Yet 
experts agree that this number is very high and significantly surpasses the number 
of legally held firearms in the country. The Small Arms Survey estimates that Ukraine 
is currently home to around 2 million registered and at least 2 to 3 million unregis-
tered firearms. The Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior affirmed the presence of 3-4 
million guns in the illicit sphere, while others have spoken of up to 5 million illegal 
weapons in the country.1 While difficult to quantify, the armed conflict in the 
Donbass and the persistence of hostilities have clearly exacerbated the state’s already 
tenuous control over firearms and accelerated illicit weapons flows in the country. 
Uncertainty as to the scale of illicit firearms proliferation is exacerbated by the lack 
of a comprehensive legal framework for legal firearms possession in Ukraine. Since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union there has been no primary law regulating the circu-
lation of firearms in Ukraine’s civilian sphere. This legal vacuum was filled with a 
main bylaw issued by the Ministry of the Interior and a series of other bylaws.2 
Under this kind of fragmented regulation, many grey areas remain within licit fire-
arms supply chains that not only facilitate illicit circulation, but also make for 
unclear lines around legal and illegal ownership. One of the major loopholes in 
Ukraine’s firearms control regime relates to the acquisition of firearms compo-
nents. Until recently this remained completely unregulated.3 In addition, permits 
for firearms can be easily forged, as was the case when a Chinese national in Odessa 
pretended to be a member of the Ukrainian armed forces in an attempt to access 
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firearms.4 Compounding these issues is the lack of central registries for civilian fire-
arms at both the national and regional levels.5
While much of the firearms trafficking in Ukraine currently takes place within its 
borders, fears of criminal cross-border smuggling and of terrorists accessing 
weapons from Ukraine to commit terrorist attacks in the European Union (EU) were 
fanned in 2016 when a 25-year-old French national, Grégoire Moutaux, was arrested 
for trying to bring five Kalashnikov-type assault rifles, 5,000 bullets, two anti-tank 
grenade launchers, detonators, and 125 kg of TNT across the Polish border. 
According to Ukrainian officials, Moutaux was planning to carry out 15 attacks on 
synagogues, mosques, public buildings, and key infrastructure just before and 
during the European football championship a couple of months later. 
Box 1: Research design
Data underpinning this study were gathered from open sources. Press 
releases from Ukraine’s leading law enforcement organisations, the Security 
Service of Ukraine (SBU) and State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (DPSU), 
provide the bulk of primary source data. Press releases retrieved from these 
sources were structured in a dataset that allowed for a qualitative analysis 
of trafficking sources, the number of firearms seized, the types of firearms 
seized, trafficking routes, prices and the actors involved. 
SBU press releases were published on two websites, www.sbu.gov.ua and 
www.ssu.gov.ua, the former containing data until the end of 2015, and the 
latter containing data for 2016 and 2017. The two websites were merged in 
late July 2017 and the majority of press releases appearing on the older 
website were deleted. For this reason, several links that we consulted during 
our data collection activities are no longer accessible. They are nonetheless 
cited in the text, since these data were included in the dataset.
Because arms seizures can play a political role in how institutions want to 
be perceived, we supplemented our analysis with press reports and investi-
gative pieces. Ukrainian- and Russian-language sources were prioritised 
when possible. This provides a more holistic picture of firearms trafficking in 
Ukraine rather than linking analysis to official data alone. Sources such as 
Armament Research Services, the Small Arms Survey and the Norwegian 
Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) provided some background for 
analysis. For reasons of quality and scale, we were unable to map a dataset 








This chapter analyses the main characteristics of Ukraine’s illicit firearms market 
and the dynamics shaping it. The study is based on the collection and analysis of 
publicly available seizure data and an analysis of secondary literature (see Box 1). In 
the following sections we will analyse more specifically the sources of illicit fire-
arms proliferation, the various trafficking routes and dynamics, and the various 
actors involved in these activities. We will start, however, with a concise description 
of the analysis of the available seizure data. 
1.  Seizure data 
Data on weapon seizures traditionally constitute one of the most relevant and accu-
rate indicators to measure the levels of illicit arms flows. Despite a number of sig-
nificant data limitations, we were able to identify 514 cases of seizures of small arms 
and light weapons between 2014 and the first half of 2017 on the basis of the pub-
licly available official data from the SBU and DPSU and the NISAT database (see 
Box 1). In total, 3,771 small arms and light weapons were seized in these cases (see 
Table 1). 
SBU press releases were accessible for 2014-2017. Although we need to interpret 
these data with the necessary caution, a strong increase in seized firearms can be 
observed in the first half of 2017. In this period more firearms were seized than in 
the whole of 2016. Yet it remains unclear to what extent this would suggest an 
increase in illicit flows or an increase in efforts to control arms proliferation. It is 
also important to note that one single case detected by SBU forces strongly affected 
the amount of ammunition seized in 2014. On 24 April of that year the authorities 
seized 1 million rounds of small-calibre ammunition during a search of the ware-
houses of a weapons-importing company based in Kyiv.6 The seizures reported by 
the DPSU are scarce and partial, but coincide with the information contained in the 
NISAT database, which suggests a low number of illicit cross-border flows of fire-
arms.7 Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the Ukrainian context is char-
acterised by fluidity in terms of territorial control and border porosity, especially 
those areas in the eastern parts of the country under the control of the Donetskaya 
Narodnaya Respublika (DNR) and Luganskaya Narodnaya Respublika (LNR).8 It is 
interesting to observe that our analysis based on the data collected for this chapter 
resembles the recent finding of the Small Arms Survey that between 2013 and 2016, 
770 cases of seizures were identified that included 1,600 small arms, 1.5 million 
small arms cartridges, 5,000 hand grenades, 20 man-portable air defence systems, 
and 900 rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPGs).9 In addition, on the basis of 
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official data from the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, the Small Arms 
Survey observed annual seizures of firearms ranging from 1,000 to 2,500 small 
arms and light weapons in 2014-2017.
Table 1:  Small arms, light weapons and ammunition seized,  
2014-June 2017 (514 cases)
Source/year Small arms Light weapons
Ammunition 
(rounds)
SBU 1,993 1,042 1,660,893
2014 1,229 97 1,084,668
2015 263 454 199,303
2016 221 177 161,411
First half of 2017 280 314 215,511
DPSU 56 6 1,278
2014 51 6 1,228
2015 _ _ _
2016 5 _ 50
First half of 2017 – – –
NISAT 557 117 55,610
2014 431 25 22,156
2015 65 38 21,089
2016 61 54 12,365
First half of 2017 – – –
Totals 2,606 1,165 1,717,781
 
  
Our data analysis further indicates that the predominant types of small arms that 
can be acquired on the illicit market in Ukraine are self-loading pistols, rifles and 
assault rifles. The most common types are Makarov and Tokarev pistols, AK-pattern 
assault rifles (in particular the AK-47, AKM, AKMS and AK-74U variants), and 
Dragunov sniper rifles. Older small arms such as Mauser rifles, Walther pistols, PPS 
sub-machine guns, SKS semi-automatic carbines and Mosin-Nagant rifles are also 
present. Although fewer in number, light machine guns are frequently seized by 
the authorities. Weapons in this class include the RPK, RPK-74 and PKM. They are 








When looking at the data collected, it is immediately clear that levels of illicit fire-
arms seizures (that were made public) are not uniformly spread across the country 
(see Figure 1). Differences are to be found between regions, both in terms of quan-
tity and accessibility. Significant concentrations of firearms are located in the so-
called Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) zone:10 firearms seizures were unsurprisingly 
largest in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, where fighting has been the most 
intense. The ATO zone constitutes a major source of illicit flows for the rest of the 
country. Illicit weapons are widespread along the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and regions 
adjacent to the ATO zone. Outside of the Donbass, firearms seizures were most 
common in the Dnipropetrovsk and Kyiv oblasts. While the hostilities that have 
swept the Donbass in recent years have significantly increased firearms trafficking, 
it is important to note that in western Ukraine political activism and extreme right-
wing movements historically proliferated, which corresponds to pronounced levels 
of firearms ownership, according to some observers.11
Figure 1: Concentration of firearm seizure cases by location
Source: Nations Online Project, adaptation by the authors.
466
2.  Sources of illicit firearms proliferation
In the following subsections we will give an overview of the different types of 
sources of proliferation that can be identified in Ukraine, with the exception of the 
cross-border smuggling of firearms. This last source will be included in the descrip-
tion of the various trafficking routes to and from Ukraine in the final section of this 
chapter.
2.1  Historical legacy of surplus weapons 
A significant number of the illegally held firearms that are currently in circulation 
in Ukraine can be traced back to the armed conflicts that Ukraine experienced in 
the 20th century. Between the First and Second World War the area that constitutes 
present-day Ukraine was swept by several armed conflicts. Eastern Galicia was the 
theatre of the Polish-Ukrainian war fought in 1918 and 1919 following the First 
World War. In the same years the rest of the country was experiencing a civil con-
flict that later led to the formation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) 
in 1922. Two decades later the fragmented configuration of the country re-emerged 
once again with the outbreak and unfolding of the Second World War. Many of the 
weapons used during these armed conflicts remained stored in arms stockpiles 
after the Soviet revolution and became obsolete after the introduction of the AK 
assault rifle.12 
Weapons originating from the conflicts experienced by the country in the first half 
of the 20th century have also traditionally been stored in households.13 Insurgents 
taking part in the 1917-1922 civil war and earlier revolts regularly buried their 
weapons so that they could dig them up them if the rebellion were reignited. In the 
aftermath of the 2014 Euromaidan demonstrations the process re-emerged of 
weapons being held legally or illegally by the civilian population in both pro-gov-
ernment and separatist ranks.14
Another important historical element that partially explains the high levels of 
illegal firearms in the country is the fact that the Ukrainian SSR was home to huge 
military stockpiles and troop deployments. As part of the Soviet Union, Ukraine 
was critical to the Warsaw Pact’s military-industrial complex and defence appara-
tus.15 With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited 1,810 defence 
enterprises with a total workforce of 2.7 million employees, which amounted to 
30% of the Soviet Union’s defence industry.16 In the stratified Soviet military strat-








in the event of war.17 Part of this historical tradition has remained: Ukraine is cur-
rently still home to several small arms and light weapons manufacturers.18 
2.2  State stockpile capture
Leakage and capture from state arms depots has been a recurrent problem across 
the former Soviet Union, and particularly in Ukraine. It is important to highlight 
that during the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, Soviet troops deployed in Eastern 
Europe left 2.5 million tons of conventional munitions and more than 7 million 
rifles, pistols, mortars and machine guns in Ukraine when they withdrew.19 The 
subsequent downsizing of the Ukrainian military apparatus created an even larger 
surplus of firearms. In recent decades many of these weapons have been diverted 
into the hands of various types of non-state actors as a result of criminal activities 
or the recent armed conflict in the country. The political upheaval that Ukraine has 
experienced since 2014 has clearly exacerbated these dynamics. Arms captured 
from state stockpiles during the first phases of the conflict in the so-called ATO 
zone represented a crucial source of supply for separatist formations.20
Leakages occur in a variety of ways. Small-scale thefts of firearms stored in state 
warehouses and embezzlement by state officials constitute two of these ways. In 
May 2016, for example, a small group of armed criminals were caught breaking into 
military stockpiles, where they were planning to steal weapons and explosives.21 
Much attention has been given to the significant numbers of thefts of firearms that 
belong to the armed forces. Yet leakages from army depots do not represent the 
only source of diversion from state stockpiles: leakages from SBU and Ministry of 
Internal Affairs stockpiles have also been recorded.22 For example, in February 2014 
SBU officers discovered firearms that had been stolen from an SBU office in Ivano-
Frankivsk oblast and hidden in a Kyiv park.23 Similarly, on 6 May 2014 a tramway 
driver informed the SBU of a suspicious package in a tram. Nine Makarov pistols 
and some magazines were discovered in the package; investigations revealed that 
the weapons had been stolen in February from the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the 
Lviv region.24
In other cases, separatist fighters have claimed that some of their weapons had 
been purchased from sympathetic or corrupt Ukrainian forces officials.25 A number 
of these accusations have been corroborated. In July 2016 Ukraine’s defence minis-
ter, Stepan Poltorak, was dismissed after the deputy commander of the 53rd 
Mechanised Brigade was detained after being accused of trading in ammunition.26 
The commander was subsequently prosecuted for having allegedly sold more than 
5,000 rounds of ammunition.27 The embezzlement of firearms and their 
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subsequent trafficking by members of the security services appear in the SBU data-
base, but are generally limited to members who trafficked weapons to pro-Russian 
factions, such as the May 2014 case of a former SBU officer moving 120 firearms and 
21,798 rounds of ammunition to mainland Ukraine from Crimea.28 The small-scale 
embezzlement of firearms by current or former state officials very rarely appears in 
the database. 
2.3  Political transfers to non-state actors
After the Euromaidan protests and the Crimea crisis, various militias formed across 
Ukraine as defenders of Ukraine’s revolution. Perceived corruption and misman-
agement in Ukraine’s armed forces, as well as the fear of imminent armed conflict, 
provided a fertile environment for the formation of independent armed groups. 
These groups – which often labelled themselves ‘battalions’ – emerged parallel to 
state structures, and were only subordinated to state structures after they had 
amassed considerable influence and firepower. Some militias were given the status 
of territorial self-defence units, while others were put under the command of the 
Interior Ministry or Ministry of Defence, which acknowledged the military effec-
tiveness of these groups. The various militias appeared on social media wearing 
body armour and carrying military firearms, while some militias had the backing of 
regional politicians and businessmen.29 
Despite extensive reporting on the financial and political support30 given to 
Ukraine’s various militias, open sources are generally unclear about the exact origin 
of their military firearms. Several of these pro-Kyiv militias took older model rifles 
into battle with them.31 These were often very old weapons: various videos have 
appeared from the ATO front lines showing fighters using rifles from the Second 
World War. These fighters have very happily shown off their weapons to Ukrainian 
TV.32 Whether the rifles came from civilian stockpiles or were simply found aban-
doned is currently unknown. It is important to highlight that several examples 
have been uncovered of Ukrainian units sharing weapons with right-wing militias33 
during training; the militias then post pictures online of their members holding 
military weapons. These and other items are also traded and sold among the various 
armed factions operating in Ukraine. This can occur between allied factions, or 








2.4  Craft production and firearms conversion in the 
criminal underworld 
Craft production and the conversion of replica firearms to lethal weapons can be 
considered significant sources of illicit arms, especially for criminal milieus rather 
than conflict-affected areas. This is in part due to weak regulation of civilian arms 
possession in Ukraine, as the Small Arms Survey has illustrated.34 In criminal 
milieus the craft production of weapons has represented a consistent source of 
illicit firearms.35 In the 1990s and 2000s a special role had apparently been played 
by Chechen criminals based in Ukraine who have replicated some of the craft-pro-
duced models commonly manufactured in the Chechen criminal underworld.36 In 
recent years, several workshops have also been discovered that specialise in assem-
bling firearms from parts and components. For instance, a criminal detected and 
arrested by the SBU in September 2016 manufactured pen pistols in his house. 
According to the SBU, he worked on demand and produced limited batches that he 
distributed only to a reliable clientele through a middle man,37 producing the 
weapons in the back room of his house.
Conversion activities are predominantly carried out outside the ATO zone. Yet in 
recent years some conversion workshops have also been discovered in the conflict-
affected areas. Conversion workshops in Ukraine are mainly established by single 
individuals or very small groups who primarily produce weapons for criminal net-
works or single individuals interested in carrying out criminal activities. Although 
there are not enough data on the profile of clients, given the types of weapons most 
commonly converted or manufactured in illicit workshops (mainly pistols, revolv-
ers and rifles),38 it is plausible that petty criminals are the primary pool of customers 
for converted weapons. Some of these converted firearms have also ended up in the 
ATO zone, however. An SBU press release, for example, reported the arrest of a 
42-year-old man who converted arms and sold them to various regions of Ukraine, 
including Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea.39
3.  Actors
3.1  Organised criminal groups
The leading players in Ukraine’s organised crime underworld vary by city and by 
region. The dynamics are opaque and often only become evident when a power 
vacuum arises40 or when the police raid meetings of criminal kingpins.41 Cities like 
Kyiv have a different criminal milieu42 to that of Odessa, which has a different 
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criminal milieu to those of Kharkiv or Lviv, making it almost impossible for outside 
observers to obtain a clear picture of the situation in the country as a whole. These 
crime syndicates raise revenue from a variety of sources. For example, a group that 
trafficks women to Turkey may also be involved in trafficking cigarettes, but not in 
trafficking firearms, while in turn a group elsewhere in the country may be involved 
in trafficking women and firearms, but not cigarettes. Sometimes, of course, a syn-
dicate may be involved in all three types of trafficking.43 
Understanding the role of organised crime syndicates in trafficking firearms is a 
complex process, because Ukraine has seen isolated cases of huge illicit transfers. 
In these cases a number of high-level state officials have facilitated massive arms 
flows to embargoed third parties, often states under international embargo. The 
most prominent case was that of the MV Faina, a Ukrainian cargo ship44 that was 
caught trafficking tanks, artillery and AKM assault rifles to Sudan45 after it was cap-
tured by pirates.46 The infrastructure required for operations of this scale is beyond 
the capability of most criminal gangs and organised crime groups. 
3.2  Individuals and loosely structured networks 
The proliferation of firearms in Ukraine has unsurprisingly made access to them 
easier for civilians. When confronted by the authorities, some will justify their 
illicit possession of firearms by claiming they simply found them abandoned 
somewhere,47 such as in a forest. In order to deal with this phenomenon, the SBU 
and other law enforcement agencies organise voluntary surrender periods twice a 
year. When one of these amnesty periods was held in Kyiv, 400 firearms were 
handed over to the authorities.48 Alternately, rather than voluntarily surrendering 
weapons and ammunition to the authorities, citizens may either keep them for 
themselves or attempt to sell them. Due to corruption and mismanagement 
throughout the country, firearms trafficking can serve as an attractive source of 
income for those with the opportunity to do so. 
It is usually assumed that mafia-like criminal organisations are the main perpetra-
tors of arms trafficking. However, according to the available data, most of the 
groups involved in arms trafficking are not as hierarchically structured as one 
might think. Frequently, networks are formed by several individuals working 
together, in person or remotely. These groups constitute highly flexible, loosely and 
horizontally structured networks. These connections may be established through 
personal networks, familial or other social bonds, needs, and the capacity to access 








members, criminal groups or others interested in acquiring firearms, these attempts 
at entrepreneurship will often fail.
Cases of firearms trafficking by individuals without connections to organised crime 
groups are quite numerous. Often these firearms are trafficked from the ATO zone 
to other parts of Ukraine. In April 2015, for example, the SBU seized firearms and 
explosives that had been taken from the ATO zone. In this case, locals had been 
trying to sell RPGs, light machine guns, smooth-bore rifles and hunting carbines 
that had come into their possession.49 Another example from 2015 was when a 
person living in an oblast west of Kyiv was caught planning to sell a silenced 
Kalashnikov rifle and armour-piercing rounds for $2,000. The activist had planned 
to supply the weapons through contacts in the ATO zone.50 A very similar case that 
led to the discovery of such a network occurred at the Kyiv Central Station in May 
2017, when an individual was arrested and six foreign-produced carbines and a fake 
licence to carry a firearm were seized. The individual acted alone and created his 
own network of clients by linking locations where firearms were more available (in 
particular in the ATO) and places with lower availability, but higher demand. 
3.3  Conflict actors
The above-mentioned examples demonstrate that the recent armed conflict in 
Ukraine has clearly facilitated access to firearms in the country and significantly 
increased trafficking opportunities. There are concerns that some pro-Ukraine 
militias operating in the ATO, for example, have been selling equipment. 
Unfortunately, for research purposes many of these allegations come from Russian-
based outlets and are difficult to confirm. That said, evidence in the database shows 
examples of light weapons being seized from territorial defence units, as noted 
earlier when weapons were taken from a territorial defence unit based in Kyiv.51 
Militias supporting the Kyiv government are resourceful and able to access firearms 
when they want or need to. One volunteer battalion in particular was caught by the 
Main Directorate for Fighting Organised Crime, National Police, and DPSU hoard-
ing a ‘record amount’ of stolen weapons and explosives.52 
The Russian government has also been accused of providing a wide range of arms, 
munitions and armoured vehicles to separatist fighters.53 Some of these accusa-
tions have proved to be demonstrably false, while the veracity of others remains 
uncertain.54 Yet it is important to remember that the independent researchers at 
Armament Research Services (ARES) found that existing stockpiles were the most 
important source of weapons in insurgents’ hands.55 It is difficult to confirm Russian 
support in the form of weapons supplies to parties to the conflict, given the 
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similarities between weaponry in Ukrainian stockpiles and the arsenals of former 
Soviet countries, and due to a lack of reliable information – which can often assume 
extremely different meanings depending on the source that releases it. ARES found 
that it is likely that separatist forces received some level of support from one or 
more external parties. Such weaponry would have likely included small arms and 
light weapons.
4.  Trafficking routes
In general terms, the trafficking routes of illicit firearms do not necessarily repre-
sent linear movements from point A to point B, but rather follow more complex and 
fragmented trajectories that can only be partially traced by law enforcement. Data 
reported by the SBU and other state agencies are partial, depict only a small portion 
of trafficking patterns, and frequently do not indicate the intended final destination 
of the firearms. Despite these caveats, several main trajectories can be identified. In 
this section we will distinguish among (1) intra-Ukraine trafficking, where firearms 
are trafficked between different cities and oblasts in Ukraine; (2) regional trafficking 
to and from neighbouring countries and other countries in the broader region such 
as Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Turkey and the former Yugoslavia; and (3) 
trafficking to and from EU member states. It is important to stress that our analysis has 
indicated that information on transnational movements of firearms is considerably 
less than that on intra-Ukraine trafficking. This suggests that the relative ease with 
which firearms are available in Ukraine allows entrepreneurial individuals and net-
works to traffic firearms without becoming involved in the acquisition and trans-
port of other traditionally illicit goods. 
4.1  Intra-Ukraine trafficking
Intra-Ukraine firearms trafficking often involves illicit movements to and espe-
cially from the ATO zone. Examples of firearms moving out of the ATO zone include 
the SBU’s August 2015 seizure of grenade launchers and small arms of various cali-
bres in Transcarpathia.56 An illustrative example of arms flowing into the ATO zone 
involves the seizure of a large batch of firearms, ammunition and explosives in a 
Kyiv hotel hosting volunteer battalions. The individuals occupying the hotel room 
in question explained that the seized weapons were supposed to go to the ATO 
zone.57 It is unclear at this time if firearms follow the same routes as the well-docu-








Illicit weapons movements occurring outside the ATO zone have also been docu-
mented. The cities of Odessa, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and Kyiv are important 
logistic hubs for criminal networks. Odessa in particular has been a haven for 
smugglers since the 1990s and has a vibrant market that finds itself positioned at 
the crossroads of Ukraine’s illegal gun trade. Press reports suggest that repaired 
weapons59 are accessible to the Odessa underworld. These weapons can come from 
outside the city, but are also modified by small-time gunsmiths60 in Odessa itself. 
Police have even found custom-made firearms manufactured using machine tools.61 
Parts for sniper rifles and other items are easily transported through the city’s postal 
system.62 
4.2  Regional trafficking
At the regional level, wars in Eastern Europe have been an important source of illicit 
firearms in Ukraine during the last 25 years. In particular, the civil war in the adja-
cent Transnistria, conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, and two wars in Chechnya 
contributed to the establishment of regional networks of illicit trafficking and 
influxes of firearms originating from these war-torn subregions into Ukraine.63 The 
small-scale movement of firearms in cars or on buses continues to be an issue for 
Ukraine’s border service.64 Further north, trafficking to Belarus via either Chernihiv 
oblast or Kyiv oblast remains an issue. Belarus saw a rise in firearm seizures in both 
2015 and 2016. The issue was so serious that in April 2016 Belarus announced it had 
launched a ‘special operation’ to tackle the issue of arms coming in from Ukraine, 
but it is unclear what measures were taken and what the results of this operation 
were.65 
4.3  Trafficking to and from the EU
Transnational firearms-trafficking routes into the EU are less understood than the 
transnational trafficking of drugs and people from Ukraine into the EU. Several 
hubs for the cross-border smuggling of all kinds of products to the EU, including 
firearms, can be identified. As mentioned earlier, Ukraine’s port city of Odessa is a 
key hub in the so-called ‘Black Sea Route’ for the trafficking of cocaine and heroin66 
into the EU. Elements of the city’s elite benefit financially from goods and services 
travelling through Odessa. Because of the political sensitivities around weapons 
trafficking, it is often difficult to pinpoint which elements of the city’s criminal 
milieu are involved in the process.
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The border between Ukraine and Poland remains a point of concern. The case of 
Grégoire Moutaux (see above) exemplifies how relatively easy it is to transport large 
amounts of goods across the border. In the video that the SBU released to the public, 
hidden cameras show a man purported to be Moutaux loading a van with box after 
box of weapons and explosives. When laid out for the cameras, the sheer volume of 
weapons that Moutaux was reportedly able to move in one shipment is thrown into 
stark relief.67 
Straddling Ukraine and Poland lie Volyn and Lviv oblasts, both of which are known 
for their illicit networks. Volyn is known for its notorious ‘amber mafias’, which 
control the region’s lucrative – and violent68 – amber trade. Amber is transported 
from Volyn to Poland primarily via land border crossings,69 but also sometimes by 
air. In June 2016 the SBU seized an aircraft trafficking amber, cigarettes and weapons 
into Poland.70 This confirms that some level of overlap exists between the traffick-
ing of firearms, cigarettes and amber. It would not be surprising if local officials 
were tacitly involved. In December 2017 the SBU broke up a sophisticated human-
trafficking operation in Volyn that had the backing of corrupt local officials.71
Further south lies the Ukrainian oblast of Lviv. The capital of the same name is noto-
rious as a smuggling hub. Cigarette and drug trafficking are so prevalent there are 
even Polish-language guides for how to move drugs and cigarettes across the 
border.72 The region has been documented as a smuggling and trafficking hub since 
at least the late 1990s.73 Goods include cigarettes and a variety of other products 
that can be sold at a large markup in the EU. This incentivises sectors of society who 
would otherwise not associate themselves with the trafficking of goods to become 
involved, especially in times of economic hardship. According to a Kyiv Post report, 
there are at least six main border crossings between Lviv and Poland alone.74 Press 
reports indicate that between 2013 and the 18 months following the outbreak of 
violence in Ukraine, firearm seizures at the Polish-Ukrainian border jumped from 
three to 53.75 Whether the firearms were seized on the Ukrainian or Polish side of 
the border is unclear.
Little is known about firearms trafficking from Zakarpatska oblast, sometimes 
translated as the ‘Transcarpathia region’, which borders Slovakia, Hungary and 
Romania, and lies on the southern border of Lviv oblast. Isolated incidents such as 
the July 2014 seizure of a revolver from an individual crossing the Ukrainian-
Hungarian border are recorded in the database,76 but there is no evidence of the 
existence of systematic weapons-trafficking routes. Nevertheless, press reports 
suggest that from late 2016 local customs officials had been providing ‘krisha’ or 








such as amber were still occurring.78 While indicative of the continued illicit trade, 
press reports do not indicate large numbers of weapons crossing the border.
5.  Conclusion
Ukraine’s illicit firearm’s market can be characterised as a relatively accessible envi-
ronment for individuals with the opportunity and willingness to participate in the 
market. While massive amounts of firearms are not available to every single indi-
vidual, firearms in considerable quantities and variety remain fairly accessible 
through illicit circuits. Although several historical elements have contributed to 
the proliferation of firearms in Ukraine, criminal activities and the recent outbreaks 
of armed violence in the country have significantly increased the opportunities for 
illicit firearms trafficking. Arms leakages from the ATO in eastern Ukraine to the 
rest of the country have been documented and persist today. As the conflict there 
reaches a stasis and demand for weapons subsides, the risk of more weapons prolif-
erating to central and western Ukraine increases. The presence of entrepreneurial 
networks of individuals and more structured but opaque criminal and conflict-
related networks form the basis of this threat. Their activities are facilitated by 
endemic corruption at the regional and local levels. 
The illicit proliferation of firearms observed in Ukraine also gives individuals with 
malign intentions access to these weapons and the possibility of smuggling them 
into the EU. As mentioned earlier, the number of weapons seizures on the Polish 
border jumped from three to 53 following the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine. 
Although until now relatively few cases of cross-border arms trafficking have been 
documented, a consistent threat exists of small arms and light weapons proliferat-
ing from Ukraine in the future. This perception has been explicitly stressed by law 
enforcement officials from several EU member states during the Project SAFTE 
research process (see earlier chapters of this book). In addition to firearms, the 
weapons seized by Ukrainian authorities include everything from firearms to anti-
tank weapons, heavy anti-personnel weapons and explosives. The potential availa-
bility of these weapons makes the threat of proliferation all the more conspicuous 
and relevant, especially in light of the increased terrorist threat in the EU. 
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